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shaping a new world

an orientation to latin america

edited by Edward L. Cleary

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SHAPING A NEW WORLD

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An Orientation to Latin America

Edited by Edward L. Cleary, O.P.

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PROLOGUE

The early experiences of a person coming to Latin America can cause the success or failure of that person and his work. Such has been the history of the missioners, Peace Corps volunteers, and diplomats who have lived in a new culture.

Not all who have come to another country have prospered by that contact. At worst, they have become frustrated, disillusioned, and shaken, or they have unnecessarily and uncritically implanted institutions and structures from their home country, impeding real progress in the new country. On the other hand, some few, perhaps, have prospered personally and the new country has benefited mightily by their presence. Another group of people, in the middle between these two extremes, have "bumped along," hoping that most of what they were doing was right.

Fortunately, social and behavorial scientists can offer a good deal of help to those taking up life in Latin America. The present volume attempts to utilize insights from these sciences to reveal better the outlines of a new world. This second edition of *An Orientation to Latin America* is being issued following a gratifying response by a number of readers who have found the volume helpful in their lives and in their work.

Not only newcomers but also veteran missioners and Peace Corps volunteers have felt the need of seeking insights from anthropology, sociology, and the other social disciplines. It is altogether significant that very many ex-Peace Corps volunteers and many others from underdeveloped countries are returning to universities to gain competence in these fields.

Sociology, cultural and social anthropology, economics, history, and political science thus furnish the bulk of the material for this orientation to Latin America. No claim is made that these disciplines furnish comprehensive understanding or ready solutions. However, they do provide a number of clear insights and more important,

perhaps, they do raise many questions that might not have been considered until after many years of work.

For those whose main orientation is religious, contemporary theology offers new perspectives for the work and functions of the Church. Some of the more important of these considerations are offered in the chapters concerned with pastoral orientations.

Besides utilizing various disciplines, the authors also draw upon many years of experience and systematic reflection. The team of specialists who wrote the book have lived in and studied Latin America for many years and have consulted with a number of people in various activities and countries. While the book was written, by and large, for those just breaking into a new culture, hopefully it will serve also as a stepping-stone to greater interest and perusal of the social and pastoral studies which are indicated in the bibliographies or which are appearing with increasing frequency every day. The authors sincerely hope that the volume may prove to be a considerable help to all who use it.

January 1970
La Paz, Bolivia

Edward L. Cleary
Instituto Boliviano de Estudio y Acción Social

INTRODUCTION

A World "en vias de desarrollo"

Perhaps the very first problem the new missionary has on arriving in Latin America is that of words. It is not just a matter of "learning the language" in a mechanical way; there is much more to it. It is a problem of transference. A word like "relevance" in English does not really have an equivalent in Spanish; a word like *engagement* in French does not find a true counterpart in English or Spanish; a word like *inquietud* in Spanish does not get translated easily into English.

There are basically three categories of words one must come to know well in the country where he will work. There are the sensitive words; the people can use them sometimes among themselves, but most of the time it is probably better that you avoid them. Common examples are "Indian," *mestizo*, "underdeveloped" (they are always *en vías de su desarrollo*). Charged words can cause agitation, even quite a bit of trouble, if used imprudently. Such would be: *revolución, patria, burgués, imperialismo, yanqui*. Empty words are hard to pick up because they are used so easily—*democracia, Dios*.

When one is in the early years of his work in Latin America he is supposed to suffer a tremendous *jolt*. When it comes do not worry about it; it is a necessary part of the game. The worst thing that could happen to you is not to suffer this jolt. One of the biggest problems that Italians and Spaniards have here is that they frequently do not experience this. What is important is that you do not go into *shock*, which is a bad reaction against the people. This culture shock could make you end up hating the very people you have come to help and be helped by.

You sincerely have to avoid making fun of them in your conversations with other North Americans; you have to avoid name calling, ("the gooks"), odious comparisons, constant nagging and complaining—"these people," "the trouble with these people . . . "

Rather, you have to do your best to learn their customs and, in so far as is possible, observe them. For instance, when you walk into a party, make sure you shake hands with everybody, and that means when you arrive and when you leave. They have a different concept of time, *la hora Colombiana*, a different concept of work, administration, efficiency, the importance of holidays and recreation. "Why do today what you can do tommorrow?" You have to get used to a lot of uncleanliness. You will have to get used to meeting freeloaders and leeches trying to take advantage of "the rich gringo." Your interpretation of why you are here and their interpretation of why you are here are completely different. Their idea of relationships is far more personal, even paternal, than that of most North Americans. You may think that you are Americans, but you are not (even if they refer to you as Americans); you are North Americans; they too are *en América.*

ADAPTATION

There are two extremes of shock to be avoided. One is reaction and withdrawal. Actually this is quite common. You probably know that most people who come to work here do not last. The other extreme action is "going native." This preposterous reaction is highly insulting and is a caricature of their culture. If you wear the derby of an Aymara woman, you have lost so much ground that you may never recover. They might walk around with nothing on but a couple of fig leaves and an orchid in their hair, but they do not expect you to do it. And they will not tolerate it.

What, then, is a normal adaptation to be able "to live and work" in the new culture? There are three stages of adaptation. First is to observe and accept with great empathy the culture that you find. Your goal here is *to see their way of life as they see it.* You must accept them as people. This takes a long time. Many never accomplish it. Secondly, you must understand the reality as it is. Your goal here is to grasp *why it is as it is.* This takes endless ruminating and reflection. Thirdly, you make a basic identification and adjustment. Your goal here is *to feel the way of life as they feel it.* Although I am a foreigner and will always be a foreigner, in some way this way of life is *my way of life.*

You are here to serve. You do want to change the way of life of the people, but you have to get on the inside of it in some way. This is what it means to be a "foreign missionary." You are a North

American; you will always be a North American with a fundamentally North American culture. But you are within another culture and have to be in some way part of it. And what you want to do is *help them change and better themselves*. You do not set out as an iconoclast or a great renovator until you have first adjusted to what is good in the culture of the people.

CULTURAL DOUBLE UNITY

The way of life of a people is said to have a double unity, the structural-functional unity and the psychological configuration.

When one considers the structural-functional unity of a culture that is *en vías de desarrollo*, there are three aspects of its development that are of the greatest importance: economy, health, and education. We will give heavy emphasis to economics, emphasizing the general process of moving from underdevelopment to development, differences between the rural and the industrial sectors, the common market and foreign aid and influence.

Our first and most obvious pastoral problems are that no matter what we do we will always appear rich, that we cannot just run a hand-out program, that every time we try to do something to make the economic system more just, it will be like putting a finger in a wound—the whole body will vibrate and fight against us. We dedicate one chapter to the public health sector. The point is that frequently we are dealing with an unhealthy, debilitated people. This puts great restrictions on the possibilities of pastoral work. One chapter is dedicated to the education sector. Though from a short-range point of view, the economic sector is the most urgent, from a long-run view education is the most important for development. Our pastoral problem is how to exercise a good influence from within the existing secular structures.

When one considers the psychological-configuration unity of a culture that is *en vías de desarrollo*, there are elements of the greatest importance: motivation, attitudes, and processes. The overall point to be remembered is that we are always principally talking about people. If the country you are working in is underdeveloped, for instance Guatemala, you are not just dealing with economic structures. You are dealing with an underdeveloped people.

When we say motivation, we are simply talking about that which moves them. Rather commonly, to the extent that the people are only *en vías de su desarrollo* in Latin America, security moves. It

must be attained and preserved at any cost. Prestige is another; it is a wonderful thing to have an empty title like "doctor." To the extent that the people are traditional and unurbanized, custom is a great obstacle to change—"*no es nuestra costumbre.*" Fiestas are great motivators; a man who otherwise never lifted a finger in his entire life will work like a trojan to make a fiesta a success. Quick and easy results will move; long-term projects are not very likely to succeed unless they have been preceded by many successful "quick and easy" projects that have shown visible, tangible results. Where the people are without formal education, sentimentalism permeates their thought. Ideology, particularly in politics, moves people.

By attitudes we mean the principles that guide a way of life, a mentality. People are more simple, individualistic, paternalistic, nationalistic, regionalistic than in the United States. There is a great deal of a feeling of inferiority concerning their own economic products when compared to those of Europe or North America, much more of a feeling that projects are going to fail anyway, more of a tendency to be satisfied with superficiality in analyzing profound and immensely complex problems.

Processes refer to the way in which things get done or do not get done, the configuration of the socialization and enculturation activities. Thought is very rhetorical, not dialectical or scientific. For instance, there is frequently very little real dialogue in the university; instead, much energy is spent at persuasion. Enormous effort is spent on big plans, big *organogramas*, with little attention given to practical initiative, execution, and perseverance.

Above all one must avoid a simplistic approach to culture. He must avoid clinging to one criterion, perhaps a wrong one, in interpreting whether a place is developed or underdeveloped.

THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH

The role of the Church in development is threefold: the vision of faith, the force of charity, and the objective action or work done. These three may ultimately come down to a very revolutionary stance before the more positive work of reconstruction can be done. We shall consider this threefold role in Part VI on the pastoral action of the Church in Latin America.

PART 1:

History

JORDAN BISHOP

1.

Pre-Columbian America

A standard Latin American history manual states that man came to America by a double route: via the Bering Strait from Asia, and across the Pacific Ocean from Polynesia, the latter immigrants being of a somewhat higher level of civilization than those who came from the North. Presumably either or both hypotheses may be defended, and all seem to agree on the fact that man came to America from somewhere else.

It is also evident that man in America developed a considerable diversity in the level of civilization attained, although in no case does one find a level of civilization comparable to those of the ancient Middle East, China, India, or Europe. Of the three civilizations existing in America at the time of the Spanish conquest, one, that of the Mayas, was suffering from a long series of civil wars and was apparently in serious decline; another, that of the Aztecs, suffered from internal problems; and the third, that of the Incas, had not been established long enough to achieve much more than a linguistic unity in the territory under its domination. In each case a rather complex prehistory is involved and we still have much to learn from archeological work that is still in progress.

The Mayas

The origin of the Mayas is uncertain, although their traditions indicate that they came to the Yucatán Peninsula from various directions. At the time of the death of the legendary Zamná, a sort of Mayan Moses, priest, ruler, and lawgiver, the Mayas were in secure possession of the peninsula. They seem to have been connected with the other peoples of Chiapas, Honduras, and Guatemala in language, customs, and religious institutions.

The second influx of peoples was, according to some traditions, headed by none other than Quetzalcoatl. This probably means

simply that they were followers of the Toltec religion. In any event they seem to have established themselves in a sort of peaceful coexistence about the year 1000 of our era. At the time of the Spanish conquest only one language existed in the country, apparently easily understood in spite of some dialectical variations. This continued in spite of a continuing influx of foreigners.

Toward the end of the thirteenth century a series of civil wars began that finally led to the destruction of Mayapán, the ancient capital of the kingdom, about the middle of the fifteenth century.

The Mayas were noted especially for their building, the peninsula of Yucatán being literally covered with ruins whose forms, decorations, and peculiar characteristics show that at least two races of considerably different cultures built them. Dating and correlation with dates of our own era is difficult, but the existence of a Mayan calendar has helped matters somewhat. Thus the classical period extends from shortly before the beginning of our era until the ninth or tenth century, and in spite of some speculation to the contrary, the integration of the Maya culture must almost certainly be placed sometime after 3000 B.C. The presence of men in Mesoamerica is attested some ten thousand years ago, but these are people who do not yet practice agriculture.

The conquest of the Mayas by the Spaniards took about sixteen years, finishing the destruction begun during their own civil wars. Many of them retreated to the hills and the woods, where they resisted domination by Spaniards for some three hundred years. They were reduced to a comparative quiet under the administration of Porfirio Díaz.

The Toltec and Aztec Civilizations

In time, the Toltec civilization coincides more or less with that of the Mayas. The archaic or formative period of civilization in what is now the Valley of Mexico begins some 1,500 years before Christ, with a people who already practiced some agriculture, raising beans, squash, and maize, and had developed something of an art of pottery. Shortly before the beginning of our era there were buildings of considerable size in the area, and it is at this time that the Toltec religion seems to take shape. Quetzalcoatl, the plumed serpent, god of the Toltec religion, seems to be a mythical rather than an historical personage. The religious values of this civilization are considerable, involving a consciousness of sin and the need for penitence, and some

authors have found forms of rites of baptism, penance, and communion in the Toltec religion, rites which were carried over into the Aztec period.

Much of our knowledge of the history and customs of this people we owe to the work of the sixteenth-century Franciscan, Bernardino de Sahagún, whose *Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España*[1] anticipates modern methods, and whose dates are confirmed by the findings of contemporary archeologists.[2] Sahagún arrived in Mexico in 1529 and dedicated his life to the education of the Indians and investigation of their history and customs, publishing a large dictionary of the Nahuatl language; his *Historia general* was completed in 1566. That Sahugún was somewhat ahead of his time is evidenced by the fact that this four-volume work was not published until 1829. There is a Mexican edition, published in 1946.

The Toltec Empire ended in the twelfth century as a result of civil wars, famine, plague, and foreign invasion, after some four hundred years of existence. Some remained behind and lost their identity, others migrated, as we have seen, into the Yucatán Peninsula. As often happens, the conquerors were conquered in part by the cultural heritage of this noble people, and many of the religious and cultural values were absorbed and exercised an influence in the Aztec civilization. The problem of the tensions between the traditional religion of the Toltecs and the values of the cult of Quetzalcoatl has been studied to some extent by Laurette Séjourné.[3] The Aztecs, a warrior people, were apparently responsible for the introduction of the practice of human sacrifice on an astounding scale. By the fourteenth century they were solidly established in what is now Mexico, but their crude methods of dominion did not endear them to their neighbors and subjects, and Hernán Cortéz was to gain support from other people because of this.

Cortéz was also aided in his conquest by a legend concerning the return of Quetzalcoatl, apparently confused with a Toltec king of the same name who sailed away on a raft, promising some day to return. Moctezuma II seems to have suffered some indecision in the presence of Cortéz as a result of this legend. Also, of course, he was impressed by the massacre of Cholula. As Séjourné remarks, "A man capable of cutting the throats of six thousand people in less than two hours in the patio of a temple, could hardly fail to gain the admiration of the warrior chief who was the emperor of the Aztecs."[4] A second massacre, however, turned the people not only against Cortéz, but against Moctezuma as well. The latter was stoned by a

mob of his own people, and Cortéz was forced to flee, returning later with the force necessary to complete the conquest.

QUETZALCOATL

The legend of Quetzalcoatl, the plumed serpent, can give us some notion of the religious values of the people who lived in Mexico at the time of the conquest. It is interesting to note that in our time D.H. Lawrence attempted to see the salvation of the Mexican people in a rejection of Christianity and a revival of the old cult of Quetzalcoatl. Just how faithful to the original is Lawrence's resurrection of the old god is another question, but his conclusion is not without interest:

> He had rightly or wrongly come to the conclusion that it was quite useless to preach to them the religion of Jesus, of love and compassion and so forth. After four centuries they still failed to grasp its first elements. In New Mexico, for instance, the old rites of blood-sacrifice still continued under the colour of Christianity in the self-flagellation practices of the so-called *Penitentes*. And in Old Mexico he discovered that the Virgin Goddess was believed to bring forth, not the Saviour of the world, but an awful obsidian knife such as was used to cut the heart from the living victim as an offering to the Mexican Sun-god . . . So he said to himself: "Very well, these people need religion, and the religion they need—the only religion they can understand, in fact—is the ancient religion of their forefathers, and not this alien religion which four centuries of effort have failed to impose on them."[5]

Laurette Séjourné sees in the spiritual ferment of the revival of the cult of Quetzalcoatl the source of tensions that facilitated the Spanish conquest, since the high religious values of this cult actually contradicted the bloody human sacrifices that served Aztec politics under the pretext of divine necessity.[6] The commonly accepted thesis, that in the Aztec religion man had no other end than to nourish the sun with his own blood, became the instrument of a savage totalitarian state characterized by a total contempt for the human person.[7] In this way "two currents of thought coexisted in the heart of this society: on the one hand, a mysticism degraded in order to uphold an ambitious plan of conquest; on the other, the doctrine of Quetzalcoatl as the sole moral fundament."[8]

Quetzalcoatl is an extremely human god, a king of absolute purity until the day when, influenced by evil counselors, he gets

drunk and commits a sin of the flesh. Torn by remorse, he abandons his kingdom and dies voluntarily by fire. His body burned, his heart is raised up to heaven and is transformed into the planet Venus. He is thus a god of penance and purification, of tension between the spiritual and the carnal in man. Human existence is seen as a preparation for death, and death as a rebirth and a freedom from the limited and mortal human ego. Venus disappears under the earth in order to rejoin again the sun.

The matter-spirit tension is maintained in a dynamic way, since redemption comes only through the union of spirit with matter, the discovery of the carnal and of the need for purification. The image of the plumed serpent is a symbol at once of the spiritual, the divine in man, the soaring spirit, and the carnal, tied to the dust of the earth like the body of the reptile. The moral virtues find a cosmic role in this system: the sun, which gives life to the universe, is born of the sacrifice of man, and cannot subsist without its interior force.[8]

Syncretism vs. the Tabula Rasa

The method followed by the Spanish evangelists is often described as that of the *tabula rasa*, starting from zero. There was, in fact, little attempt to assimilate the values of pre-Columbian religion in the work of evangelization in America, mainly because of a healthy fear of religious syncretism. Obviously, it is difficult to achieve the type of critical work necessary for an evangelization which can, through the conversion of persons who remain in dialogue with their own culture, reach through a gradual process the conversion, from within, of the cultural values themselves.[9]

The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the Spanish missionaries, and other missionaries as well, have already achieved a certain synthesis of the gospel and a given culture, so that it is not a question of introducing those to be evangelized to what Enrique Dussel calls the "intentional focus" of Christianity, since in practice this is almost inextricably confused with the "ethico-mythical nucleus" of one's own culture. To some extent the syncretism that the Spanish sought to avoid had already been operative in their own culture; there is no such thing as a "pure" Christianity. Hence the Spanish conquest was an expansion of a Spanish "Christendom," with all the ambiguities that this implied. Las Casas and Montesinos were the first to point out the dangers of confusing the political and

evangelical dimensions of this conquest. The Jesuits, with their mystique of direct subordination to the pope and the consequent relative independence from the crown, were to develop this basic missionary principle even further, although even here it is impossible to dissociate the cultural principle from the evangelical.

Hence, the method of the *tabula rasa* included in fact many cultural elements: the gospel that was transmitted was the gospel as incarnate in Spanish Christendom, even when the attempt was made to dissociate the work of evangelization from the military conquest.

The Inca Empire

Historians distinguish several stages in the development of the civilization that the Spaniards encountered in Peru. The oldest civilization in the high country was that of Tihuanacu. The inhabitants of this city developed a fairly advanced civilization which was destroyed, many think, by inundation, followed by a period of transition, without history and practically without archeological remains, preceding the formation of the Colla Empire. With these people we are in touch with the historical dimension: they spoke Aymara and were conquered by the Incas some fifty years before the Spanish conquest. The Incas never succeeded in imposing their language, Quechua, and unlike the Quechuas of the Andes, the Aymaras represent both a cultural and a linguistic unity.

The origin of the Incas themselves is disputed, although it seems certain that they did not originate in Cuzeo. Their language was, however, adapted from that of Cuzco, the Quechua, which they imposed on most of the peoples they conquered. The great extension of the empire took place under the ninth Inca, Pachacuti Inca Yupanqui, the conqueror of the Colla Empire. It was this same ruler who created the institution known as the *mitimaes*, which consisted in the translation *en masse* of whole peoples from one area to another, a systematic process of uprooting which made despotic government easy. Thus the Charca people, who originally lived in the area now covered by the department of Chuquisaca in Bolivia, were either killed in the wars with the Incas or transported, so that when the Spaniards arrived there were none of the original inhabitants living in the area.

In spite of this practice, it is doubtful whether there was time to impose the kind of monolithic unity desired. Pachacuti ruled until

1471, exactly fifty years before the arrival of the Spaniards. The administrative center for this process of transplantation seems to have been Cochabamba from the time of the eleventh Inca, Huayna Capac, since it was uninhabited after the wars with the natives although it was quite fertile.

The reign of Huayna Capac was occupied with local revolutions and wars along the frontiers of the empire, as well as being disturbed by rumors of strange and barbarous peoples: The Spanish from the north and some Portuguese from the southwest, where the Incas were at war with the Chiriguanos.

On the death of Huayna Capac in 1525, Huáscar was proclaimed Inca, although this was contested by his brother Atahuallpa, who had established himself in Quito. The short civil war that followed was won by Atahuallpa, who captured the Inca and, with a technique not unknown to kings in other areas, immediately had all men, women, and children of the line of Huáscar killed. After the arrival of the Spaniards, Atahuallpa had Huáscar hanged; the event being seized by the Spaniards as a pretext for the execution of Atahuallpa himself.

Here again internal factors favored the Spanish conquest. The absolute authority of the Inca and the chance of his capture in Cajamarca made possible a relatively peaceful transfer of power from the Incas to the Spaniards under Pizarro.

INCA RELIGION

Viracocha, creator and lord of all things, apparently the god of the Collas before the Incas, was the principal god of the Incas, followed by the sun, the moon, and a galaxy of minor divinities related to natural phenomena. It has been disputed whether or not human sacrifice was practiced, but the majority seem to think that it was, particularly of children. Later the sacrifice of animals was substituted for that of human beings, although at the death of Huayna Capac some two hundred people were killed to accompany him.

In spite of the *tabula rasa* technique of evangelization, the pre-Columbian religion persists to this day, although the names of many of the divinities have been changed by adopting those of the saints of Spanish Christendom.[10] In a way, it might be said that the *tabula rasa* evangelization gave itself to this continuity, since the religious motifs of the people were not really taken into account. This is

particularly true of the liturgy, which was frozen in the Middle Ages. On the other hand, the friars provided for a whole series of paraliturgical elements, processions, dramatizations, and the like, which had great value in the religious life of the people. Some of these elements seem ingenuous or even superstitious to the contemporary North American or European. Dussel remarks that a Christian from first-century Jerusalem might be just as scandalized at the sight of the Basilica of Saint Peter.[11]

It should not be forgotten that the first missionaries were not unaware of the difficulties in their situation. The churches in Peru and Mexico celebrated councils in the sixteenth century which were eminently pastoral in nature. In the Council of Lima held in 1551, the need for a catechumenate for all adults was insisted upon,[12] and rather than insisting on the formal aspect of the Easter Communion, the judgment as to whether these neophytes should be admitted to Communion at all was left to the pastors.[13] In short, the fact of baptism was not presumed to equip them for Christian life at the level of the Eucharistic community. The problem we now know as one of "sacramentalization" apparently appeared later when, coupled with the loss of missionary spirit, there came the conviction that the missionary effort was concluded.

The territory covered by the first generations of missionaries is little less than astounding; within fifty years they had reached practically all of the areas that support civilized populations at the present time, although in many areas they did not meet with the relative success encountered among the civilized peoples of the Inca and Aztec empires. In northern Argentina and Uruguay the Spaniards were faced with fierce and more primitive tribes and ended by exterminating them, much as was the case with many of the North American tribes. In Chile, the Araucanos resisted three centuries of efforts by Spanish colonizers and the Chilean Republic, to conclude a treaty of peace with the latter late in the nineteenth century. Largely Christian today, their evangelization was the work of the German Capuchins in the nineteenth century.

A word must be said about the population in America and the effects on it of the Spanish conquest. Dussel gives the following phenomenal figures for Mexico:

1532:	16,871,408
1568:	2,649,573
1580:	1,891,267
1595:	1,372,228

The figures are taken from S. C. W. Borah, *The Indian Population of Central Mexico*, 1531-1610.[14] The bishops from whom these figures were originally taken, who were required to send *informes* to the Consejo de Indias as to the population, attributed the drastic drop in population to bad administration, bad treatment, and injustice. Dussel adds that diseases brought by the Europeans, for which the natives had no resistance, must have contributed as well.

Cultural Shock and the Latin American Man

In spite of the importation of Spanish Christendom, the end result, even among "Europeans," was inevitably a new kind of man. They had to face not only the shock of encounter with a new culture, but also the shock of the uprooting from the situation in Europe. While this was of considerable importance for the first colonizers, the formation of a "new Christendom" in America was successful in avoiding a complete break with the traditional indentification with the Church. This was not to be the case with immigrants from Europe in the nineteenth century, and today one finds a large number of second- and third-generation Italians among Argentinian Protestants.

The quantity of paganism in any culture was considerably multiplied in the case of Spanish immigrants, who at the end of the sixteenth century formed about one per cent of the population, and even though the process of de-Christianization was not as violent as with the nineteenth- and twentieth-century immigrants we have mentioned, it was definitely a factor in the development of Latin American Christianity. In one way or another, native cultures were destroyed by the shock of the encounter with Spanish Christendom, but the culture that resulted was not simply a transplanted Spanish culture. In the words of Dussel:

> Christianity encountered an enormous difficulty in establishing a dialogue at the level of that which is most essential to the gospel, precisely because the Christian faith did not encounter an adequate dialogue-partner (there could be no Indian apologists). In addition, by the fact of existence in a pagan environment there was an inclination to accept, and even to increase, certain ancestral practices or practices begun in the epoch of the conquest—think of the importance, for the Latin American *ethos*, of the simple fact of "cohabitation" during the first years of the sixteenth century, and the systematic nonobservance of laws coming from the Spanish court, which produces an *ethos*

of customary antilegalism. What is certain is that the Spanish civilization brought Christianity with it, "Latin-Americanizing it," and the Indian communities began a catechumenal process that many of them have yet to terminate.[15]

NOTES

1. Bernardino de Sahagún, *Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España* (Mexico City: Nueva España, 1946), 4 vols.
2. Cf. Wigberto Jimenez Moreno, *Fray Bernardino de Sahagún y su obra* (Mexico City: Pedro Roberdo, 1938).
3. Cf. Laurette Séjourné, *Burning Water: Thought and Religion in Ancient Mexico* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1957).
4. Séjourné, *op. cit.;* Spanish edition (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1964), p. 8.
5. Richard Aldington, Introduction to *Plumed Serpent* by D. H. Lawrence (New York: Penguin, 1950), p. 8.
6. Séjourné, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-32 and 35-36.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-95.
9. Cf. Enrique Dussel, *Hipotesis para una Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina* (Barcelona: Estela-IEPAL, 1967), p. 35. In another context of the relation between culture and Christianity, cf. Gabriel Vahanian, *The Death of God* (New York; Braziller, 1961) and *No Other God* (New York; Braziller, 1966).
10. J. Monast, *l'Univers religieux des Aymara de Bolivia* (Ottawa, 1965), *passim.*
11. Dussel, *op. cit.*, p. 75.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 57, 63.
14. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960.
15. Dussel, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

2

The Emergence of Spanish America

A New Society

Speaking of the cultural shock involved in the establishment of the Spanish Empire in America, we have already mentioned that the result was not simply a transposition of Spanish Christendom to a new geographical location. Culturally speaking, this is impossible, since even a geographical uprooting was bound to produce changes in the kind of man who settled in the New World.

In short, the result was not only a geographically new world, but a new human world as well. Even while he brought many of his institutions with him, the late medieval Spaniard was changed when he came to America, a change accentuated by his contact with the indigenous population. All this varies, of course, with individuals, and we have all encountered immigrant Spaniards who appear to constitute exceptions to the rule. The very fact that they appear very Spanish to us is indicative of the fact that in spite of a common language, Latin America is different.

Nevertheless, many of the institutions of this new society in the making had roots in Spanish Christendom. One of the most important, particularly with respect to the development of the Church, was the *Patronato Real*, an institution which gave the Spanish Crown an almost complete control over the Church in the New World. Granted by various popes at the end of the Middle Ages in view of particular circumstances of Spain during the *Reconquista* of the peninsula from the Moors, the *Patronato* gave the crown the right to name bishops and other ecclesiastical dignitaries, powers over the administration of ecclesiastical properties, and even a right that amounted to censorship of communications between the Spanish Church and Rome.

This was extended to the "Kingdoms of the New World" and exercised jealously during almost the whole of the colonial period. Often, of course, political considerations were paramount in the

naming of bishops, although it must be noted that in many cases holy and zealous men were appointed, particularly in the first century of the colonial regime. Nevertheless, the system could only perpetuate the confusion of the ecclesiastical and political spheres.

Even during the colonial period, a double theory had developed with respect to the *Patronato*. That of the *realistas*, argued by men such as Solórzano Pereira,[1] held that the *Patronato* was an inherent right of the crown; the *canonists* maintained that this was simply a concession on the part of the pope. Both traditions were maintained into the republican period, and the royalist tradition, transformed by the nineteenth-century doctrine of absolute sovereignty, is presented in a manual of constitutional law published in La Paz in 1953.

The institution was in fact inherited by the Latin American republics and exercised in most of them throughout the nineteenth century. It was not abolished in Bolivia until 1961, although it had been a dead letter for some time before that. Nor were there lacking churchmen, even within the system, who were aware of the problems created for the evangelical mission of the Church by this identification of the interests of the crown and the Church, even when the *intention* of the monarchs was clearly missional, at least as expressed in the laws and decrees emanating from the crown or the Council of the Indies.[2] Much of this legislation was wise and appropriate, but as was the case with dispositions concerning the treatment of the natives and the social question, it was countered by the attitude expressed in the adage: *acatamos, pero no cumplimos*—we accept and reverence the authority, but we do not fulfill it.

The Inquisition, established in New Spain and in Lima in 1570, was another institution that helped to shape the Church in the Americas. It was not always as unpopular as might be supposed, although it became a nuisance during the latter days of the colonial period. Much of its work in practice concerned the morals of the clergy, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was more work here than with questions of dogma. Lea, the American polemicist-historian of the Inquisition, was quite at a loss to explain the leniency of the Lima Inquisition with respect to witches; Madariaga suggests that the theologians of the Inquisition did not believe in them.[3]

In the beginning of the Spanish conquest, the institution of the *encomienda* was devised as a means of evangelization; abuses in the practice of the system were to bring down upon it the wrath of Las

Casas and its eventual suppression in law. In fact the abuses continued. Solórzano Pereira defines the institution as follows:

> It is a right granted by royal privilege to the worthy men of the Indies to collect tribute from the Indians commended to them, for their lifetime and that of an heir, according to the laws of inheritance, with the obligation of providing for the temporal and spiritual welfare of the Indians and to defend and inhabit the provinces where they are *encomenderos.*

In law it was a system of collecting taxes from the Indian subjects of the Spanish Crown, annexed to the obligation of supporting a priest and catechists to evangelize them. They were forbidden to enslave them, and Las Casas himself was an *encomendero* until he came to the conclusion that the abuses involved were an inherent part of the system as it worked out in practice. For in practice it was more than a system of collecting taxes; it was a system of exploiting the land, and of exploiting those who worked it.

The *mita* was a system of forced labor used by the Incas for public works such as the building of roads. Under Spanish rule it became something else again, and was used particularly to furnish slave labor for the mines, as well as personal service to Spaniards, both Europeans and *criollos.* The great number of laws protesting against abuse give adequate witness to the fact that the institution was not limited to public works, even when the mines of Potosí and the building of private homes were included in an ample definition of public utility, as Madariaga shows.[4] Madariaga, of course, is writing a brief for defense of Spain, and cites the legislation in favor of the Indians even as he recognizes that these laws were seldom obeyed. In his favor is the obvious fact that the lot of the Indians hardly seems to have improved with independence, and in some cases became worse. Some of the large tracts of land acquired by *criollos* after independence were acquired at the expense of traditional Indian communes which had been protected by the crown. On the other hand, the crown controlled the naming of many local authorities, and must have been aware of the fact that its laws were systematically disobeyed.

The important thing is not really the assignment of praise or blame, but rather to understand the situation involved. In the question of the *mitayos* as well as in others, we find ourselves facing the curious mixture of legalism and anarchy that has characterized Latin

America from the beginning: legalism which is manifested in the attempt to solve difficult problems by law or decree, and the insistence on minute exactitude at the level of papers to be signed and documents to be drawn up, coupled with the illegalism of respectful but thorough disregard of laws on the practical level.

The theologians of Salamanca, responding to pressures created by Las Casas and the friars, insisted on the rights of the Indians, starting with a definition of the fact that they really were human and hence had rights to defend. Much has been made of the fact that the Spanish intelligentsia did ask such questions, which did not occur to colonizers such as the English and the Dutch. To the pragmatic and functional mentality of the Anglo-Saxon tradition, it is more important to know how the Indians were actually treated than to know how they were defined. One of the things we have to learn is precisely the value given to the formal, defining or legal aspect of things by Spaniards and Latin Americans. It is true that the Spaniards, as Dussel remarks, spent a lot of time determining *that* the natives were men and hardly any determining just *how* they were men.[5] To recognize their ethnocentrism does not imply that they could have done otherwise, but to realize that it existed helps us to understand them.

ECONOMICS AND THE SPANISH EMPIRE

Madariaga is not alone in affirming that the economic policies pursued by the crown constituted a disaster not only for America but for the metropolis as well; policies were determined by political and religious criteria rather than by sound economics. Madariaga mentions that complex economic problems were resolved by recurring to the moral theology of Thomas Aquinas,[6] and Dussel writes that it is anachronistic to criticize Spanish colonialism as capitalistic.[7] The fact is that the influx of silver and gold contributed to an inflation that Bodin calculated, toward the end of the sixteenth century, as something like 1,000 per cent. Rather than foment the development of industry and production to provide a long-term remedy, the policy of the crown was actually to discourage industrial development in an attempt to keep prices down, although Madariaga also points out that the high value placed on *leisure* (which he carefully distinguishes from laziness) also constituted an impediment to the development of industry, in both Spain and America.[8]

Latin Americans often cite restrictive legislation in an attempt to show that development of America was discouraged in order to protect the metropolis; here it should be pointed out that these laws were observed about as well as those made to protect the Indians from exploitation. Dussel concludes, "On the level of civilization, the great Spanish error was that of organizing a mercantilist system that purchased gold and silver in America at low cost with raw materials or manufactured products. Thus Spain was not industrialized, and at the same time the development of industry and agriculture in Latin America was impeded."[9] The later capitalist pattern of importation of raw materials and exportation of manufactured goods was not verified; the crown actually attempted in some cases to protect the exportation of Spanish raw materials to America! Another factor contributing to the economic ruin of Spain and Latin America in this period was the considerable portion of American silver and gold dedicated to military expenses, limiting industrial development even where policy favored it.

Madariaga insists greatly on the contrast between Spanish and other colonial legislation with respect to slavery, the former definitely favoring manumission and tending toward legal equality.[10] Here again the social reality tended to contradict the law, and while one might say that racial prejudice is absent from the Spanish character, social prejudice can be just as devastating in practice, especially when accompanied by what often seems to be an inbred attitude of social paternalism. In a missal published in Spain in 1950 we read the following: "Martin de Porres is the saint whom God chose to reward the generosity of Spain in mixing her blood with that of the indigenous peoples of America."[11]

THE COLONIAL CHURCH: A SUMMING UP (DUSSEL)

> We repeat then our question: must we speak of a superficial religion, limited to appearances, mixed, juxtaposed, or substantially Christian? It seems to us, as we have shown, that the problem is much more complex and that any univocal or global judgment is impossible. We repeat: (1) On the profound, intentional level of faith, the Indian masses have not adopted Christianity in a superficial or apparent way; rather they *began to adopt* it in a radical, substantial, and authentic way. This is

> neither a juxtaposition nor a mixture, but rather a *chiaroscuro* in which no one can say where one pole begins and the other ends. (2) On the level of "expressions," the Catholic liturgy continues to be the *official, substantial* expression which, however, the masses are unable to practice because of the lack of missionaries, distances, and other impediments. Thus paraliturgical substitutes appear—processions, cult of the saints, local cults built on pagan holy places, etc. (exactly as in the Greco-Roman and Caananite worlds)—in which the elements, the gestures, the symbols, in short, the "vehicles" or "mediations" of the old religions are very much in evidence. Can these *supplementary forms* or *substitutes* be called *mixed* religions? In no wise. They do represent creations or mixtures on a popular level—extra-official—which fill the gap left by the method of the *tabula rasa*: substitutions that will disappear when the catechumenate comes to an end. The so-called "popular Catholicism"—popular extra-official forms of cult, rites, and mediations—are not a mixed religion, but temporary supplementary manifestations of a people aspiring to the completion of their evangelization. Is this then a properly pagan religion? No. Rather it is the manifestation of a consciousness that is not yet entirely Christian.[12]

Dussel's judgment, of course, attempts what he himself recognizes to be impossible: to give a global picture. The picture, of course, varies greatly from place to place. The historical problem involved in the attempt to provide a balanced view of the colonial period mingles, of course, with the actual problem of the contemporary Latin American churches. It is very easy to say that these people are pagans, but at the same time we must be very careful of a new form of the *tabula rasa* apostolate, of a new form of ecclesiastical colonialism that confuses the cultural reality of our Christianity with the reality itself.

One of the first tasks of any missionary is to *accept* the cultural reality of the people to whom he is sent, attempting to begin or instigate a process of evangelization through a dialogue from within. In the long run this can never be achieved by outsiders; there must be what Dussel calls "native apologists," authentic Christians who fully share the culture with which they must establish a critical dialogue.[13] The *tabula rasa* method, starting from zero, did not permit the development of this kind of dialogue, and even though the foreign Christendom proposed (or imposed) was changed in its assimilation, this would hardly justify the imposition of another foreign

Christendom today. For North Americans, of course, the cultural crisis facing the Church in the United States at the present time provides some antidote against this, but it also creates a considerable cultural insecurity, which the missionary brings with him.

Independence and Further Development

Dussel characterizes this period of Latin American history as one of transition from the Christendom of the *Patronato* to the evolution of a pluralistic society. "Latin America has had to face in a century and a half a growing number of problems that Europe was able to assimilate and to create solutions for during almost six centuries. The young communities had to face successively: the crisis of the birth of nationalities, secularization, the injustice of a colonial economic system imposed by the great industrialized powers, [and] the constitution of a pluralistic society."[14] In the encounter with these problems, the Church would react instinctively in defense of her privileges, and only when these had been lost would a creative reply to the problems presented be possible.

THE ORGANIZATION OF NEW NATIONS

In spite of a certain continuity in the mentality of the ruling classes, whereby the *criollos* displaced the Europeans and the Indians continued to be exploited, the independence of Latin America involved much more than a mere break with the metropolis. The change brought about a crisis of organization that was in many ways more serious than that of the United States after independence, since the class structures in Latin America were more complex.

The colonial society was composed of five fairly distinct groups: (1) the Europeans, that is to say, Spaniards born in Spain; who comprised most of the ruling class and a majority of the episcopate; (2) *criollos*, or sons of Spaniards born in the New World; (3) *mestizos*, who made up much of the urban population, artisans, small tradesmen, etc.; (4) Indians, who comprised the rural masses, and (5) Negroes and mullatoes, ex-slaves or slaves who gained their independence with the revolution. The revolutionary movement was directed by the *criollos* and governed by their own interests, even in

those cases—not universal—when they were able to enlist the Indians on their side in their war against the Spanish Crown. In many cases the Indians supported the crown, and it may often have been in their interest to do so. Among the complaints of the *criollos* against the crown were the laws in favor of the Indians and the liberal tendencies of Spain after the Constitution in 1812. Even so, the *criollo* elite were largely liberal or physiocrat in their economic theories, and if they were socially conservative, they could hardly have been more conservative socially than the heirs of the French Revolution in Europe.

In spite of attempts by the crown—partly successful—to get the pope to condemn the revolutions, the new nations eventually succeeded in establishing relations with Rome, jealously maintaining the *Patronato*, which was passively accepted by Rome. To let it drop would have implied that they had less sovereignty than the crown. An attempt to celebrate a concordat between Bolivia and the Holy See in 1851 was wrecked over this point: Rome was willing to concede the *Patronato*, but the Bolivian legislators insisted on it as a right rather than as a concession.

The leaders of the new nations did not hesitate to ally themselves with foreign nations in order to obtain their objectives, and one immediate result was what has been called the *pacto colonial*, the system whereby Europe and the United States furnished manufactured goods in exchange for raw materials. As the system developed, the *criollo* oligarchies developed a vested interest in the maintenance of the system. The Church, allied through the hierarchy to the crown in colonial times, recovered from the blow of independence only to ally herself with the *criollo* oligarchy.

At midcentury the rupture began to take institutional form, as the power structures opened somewhat to *mestizos* and there arises a new generation of oligarchs. Positivism appears as a new ideology with a religious aura that cannot but be opposed to the Church. The militant laicism of the age enters the school systems, although these are still thought of in terms of a minority in some places (particularly in the Andean countries), and freedom of worship, permitting the entrance of Protestants, is decreed in many countries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The positivist and liberal trends give way to inevitable reactions against such trends, neospiritualism such as that of José E. Rodó in Uruguay, or various socialist and Marxist tendencies. In spite of the latter, the *criollo* oligarchies,

supported by the colonial powers, manage to maintain control of the power structures.

SECULARIZATION

Churchmen, with their usual conservatism, tended to oppose any trend toward the emancipation of the political from ecclesiastical control or pressure. Oddly enough, the trend toward the secularization of society was in direct opposition to the *Patronato*, which the Church had never officially accepted, and by mid-twentieth century, most Latin American Republics had renounced the institution. The economic power of the Church—and with it some of the danger of alliance between the Church and the status quo—was weakened during the nineteenth century by large-scale expropriation of ecclesiastical properties. Universities were laicized, and while some Catholic universities were founded, serious work in theology was effectively banished from higher education.

There is, of course, a considerable gap between the reality and the consciousness of clergymen, some of whom continue to proclaim the myth of a "Catholic continent," in the sense of a Christendom. Catholic schools continue to serve an elite: the old oligarchies, the old and new middle classes, and many clergymen seem unaware of the passage from the domination, in politics, of an anticlerical minority to a sort of new elite that regards the Church as irrelevant.

Dussel sees in various Catholic Action movements the rebirth of a vital Catholicism, although this comes at the same time as the population explosion.[15] His tendency to see the salvation of the Church in the development of Christian institutions—movement—may make him overly optimistic, although it must be admitted that the Church is beginning to find or define her role in a secular society, and that it is possible in most places to be a Catholic in public life without suffering the loss of respect endured by the priest-ridden Catholic intellectuals of one hundred years ago.

THE CALL TO REVOLUTION

Revolution seems to be in the air that we breathe in Latin America, although it is only in Cuba that a real revolution appears to have been achieved. Mexico is a special case, and the Church has

emerged stronger there than in most Latin American societies, in spite of—or perhaps because of—savage persecutions. The Bolivian revolution of 1952 left lasting effects but has not been followed through.

Minorities in many Latin American churches look with sympathy on the Cuban revolution, but the anti-Communist ideology keeps many Catholics solidly on the side of the status quo. Few of the Christians who sympathize with the idea of a revolution would want to imitate Cuba, although the Church in Cuba seems to be defining herself there as well as in the rest of Latin America. The "revolution in freedom" of Frei's Chile remains a hope for many who look for a solution along reformist lines, oriented toward the formation of a new Christendom, although Frei's government has encountered serious difficulties of late, and a minority of the Chilean Church seems to have awakened to the danger of identifying the Church with *any* ideology, even a "Christian" one.

MISSIONARIES AND THE CHURCH

The Latin American churches have enjoyed an influx of foreign missionaries in the last thirty or forty years, and while this has been of considerable benefit in the renewal of the Church, it has also created problems; the cultural shock involved is suffered not only by the missionaries, but by the churches as well. It is still too early to assess the long-term result of this missionary action, especially in view of the fact that changes wrought by the Council have given rise to crises of varying importance in the sending churches themselves.

NOTES

1. Juan de Solórzano Pereira, *De indiarum iure,* Madrid, 1641.
2. Enrique Dussel, *Hipótesis para una Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina* (Barcelona: Estela-IEPAL, 1967). p. 43.
3. Salvador de Madariaga, *El auge del imperio español en América* (Buenos Aires, 1955), pp. 216 ff. This work was originally published in 1947 under the title, *Caudro histórico de las Indias,* which included the companion volume of the present edition, *El ocaso del imperio español en América.* The works have been published in English: the *Rise of the Spanish American Empire* by Free Press, New York, 1965, and the *Fall of the Spanish Ameri-*

can Empire by Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1962. Madariaga definitely defends the Spanish position, especially against the excesses of the *leyenda negra,* and has been strongly attacked by many Latin American writers. Once his bias is recognized and compensated for, the work is well worth reading.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 138 ff.
5. Dussel, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
6. Madariaga, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-111 and 381-394.
7. Dussel, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
8. Madariaga, *op. cit.*, pp. 381 ff.
9. Dussel, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
10. Madariaga, *op. cit.*, p. 377.
11. *Misal diario según el rito de la Orden de los Predicadores,* Valencia, 1950, p. 1617.
12. Dussel, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 144 ff.

PART 2:

Cultural Considerations

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3.

The People

Since the treatment to follow is relatively short and an attempt was made to generalize the whole of Latin America, the presentation is necessarily schematic and the coverage partial. More of an effort has been made to help people make a healthy adjustment to life and work than to communicate information and statistics. Also, one recognizes immediately that the cultural and social organizations of Latin America are changing rapidly. Hence, a risk has been taken here of caricature. The attempt will not be at satire but at presenting certain emphases, past and present, in North American and Latin American cultures.

The point of view is always that of a young North American coming for the first time to a Latin culture. What are the most important similarities to be observed? How are the differences to be interpreted? What are some of the major pitfalls to be avoided and some of the principal opportunities to be capitalized on? In short, since the missionary is the agent of cultural change, how can his mission be fulfilled with maximum positive impact and minimum negative reaction?

The first of six more or less anthropological chapters will consider the people who inhabit the lands south of the Rio Grande. Racially, they are somewhat similar to their fellow Americans from the north, but there are elements of difference far greater. Not only is Latin America growing more rapidly than any other part of the world, but the very rhythm of increase is fantastic. Population distribution tends to concentrate the vast majority of the people within 200 miles of the coast, leaving the interior of the continent practically uninhabited. As a general rule each country has only one big city, the capital, which is another world when compared with the rural villages and communities. Finally, the movement of people from rural to urban centers, especially to the capital, is causing serious social, economic, and cultural problems. Many readers have

heard of the famous "brain drain" of professional and technical talent from these countries to the technically advanced countries, and especially to the United States, but soon you will experience the evil effects of this population movement in your own work.

A warning should be given before launching into the matter at hand: that "facts are not necessarily facts." One Latin American has said, "Statistics for us are like poetry, since for the most part they are interpretations of reality and not the factual reality itself." That is why no great insistence will be placed on the accuracy of statistical data given in these chapters as long as it suffices to give you an impression of the reality.

RACIAL GROUPS AND MIXTURES

Recently the United States passed the 200 million mark in population and for the first decade in almost a century it fell behind the estimated number of people in Latin America, which is about 225 million. Of this number 75 million inhabit Central America and the principal Caribbean Islands, whereas another 150 million are found in South America. Mexico has one half of the 75 million (38 million) and the other giant to the south, Brazil, has one half of the 150 million (75 million).

Five predominantly Indian-*mestizo* populations are found in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil constitute 45 per cent of Latin America and are genuine hybrid populations of Indian-*mestizo*, Negro-mulatto, and European-*criollo* whites. Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica appear to have white populations, although some *metizo* mixture is found in those families that go back to colonial times, since the Spanish conquerors brought almost no women for the first one hundred years. Asiatic peoples are hardly represented, although Lebanese merchants are scattered throughout the contenent, and about 300,000 Japanese, Chinese, and Okinawan colonists have immigrated since 1900. For the most part, the people with whom you will be working will be of one of four racial groupings: Indian, white, Negro-mulatto, and *mestizo*. You will find it very helpful to know some of the principal characteristics of each group to make your cultural adjustment easier.

The Indian. The very word "Indian" frequently carries a pejorative meaning here unknown in the United States. Someone

characterized as *un indio* is felt to be stupid, uncivilized, and lazy. The native peoples are preferably referred to, at least in Peru and Bolivia, as indigenous, *campesino*, or simply by their cultural bond, as Aymara or Quechua. There is, however, an opposite current that would preserve and glorify the indigenous people and their civilizations, as in Mexico, where native art and folklore are treasured both in museums and in practice. In Bolivia the second of August is a national holiday in honor of *El Indio*, the Indian. And well these two nations might honor their indigenous people, for they are descendents of the two advanced civilizations that existed at the time of the Spanish conquest, namely the Aztec-Maya in Central America and the Inca Empire in South America.

Historians estimate that the Spanish-Portuguese conquerors encountered 12 to 14 million Indians in Latin America about the year 1500. They existed in nine major groupings, with the Aztec-Maya and Inca civilizations being the most numerous and highly developed.

This contrasts strikingly with the estimated 350,000 Indians found in North America by the English settlers between the Atlantic and the Mississippi. The fact that the Spanish came to conquer, control, and Christianize the Indian meant that he wanted him to live, multiply, and serve as slave to master, or child to father. The fact that the English came to settle and colonize meant that they would push back the Indian or kill him if necessary to plant a new civilization. The Iberian conquerors came in the name of the king, with the power of the sword and the right of Christ to incorporate the New World into the Kingdom of Spain and into the Church. The English colonist came with his wife and family to seek refuge from religious persecution and to make a new way of life.

Within 100 years, 1500-1600, Latin America was divided into five viceroyalties (New Spain in Mexico, New Granada in Colombia, Peru, La Plata, and Brazil) and according to the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, all but that of Brazil went to Spain. The mother countries sent missionaries to save souls, soldiers to conquer and pacify, and governors to organize and rule. But most of all, adventurers came to seek power, fame, and gold. Among the major preoccupations in colonial documents are those of keeping the Indian alive, and deciding whether he is beast or man. Between epidemics, famine, and inhuman work, the native population was reduced to eight million at the time of the wars of independence. Though missionaries like Las Casas won the case before the king himself that the Indian is human,

the very human Law of the Indian was little respected, whether on the plantations or in the mines.

The thirst for silver and gold became insatiable, and the tributes in men and material goods rapidly impoverished the farming communities. Through the double system of *encomienda* and *reparticiones*, a continent was brought under the cultural, religious, and political control of the foreigner in a remarkably short period of time. The only place where European met Indian on something of just and friendly ground was the Christian mission. That is why even to this day a foreign missionary can enter territory normally hostile to "whites" with immediate confidence and friendship. The wars of independence only worsened the position and life of the Indian enjoyed under the king and the Law of the Indian. As *criollo* replaced peninsular white he gradually pushed the Indian communities to the barren lands or incorporated them into the hacienda system. Even the mission lost something of its interest in the Indian as it came under the power of church-state politics in the new republics.

The Indian you will meet today represents about nine per cent of the population; Indians number close to 20 million. Exteriorly he is excessively submissive, humble, and silent. Long ago he learned that survival meant three things: (1) go unnoticed, (2) do not cause trouble, and (3) do what the white man says. Even today his bowing, mumbling, almost whimpering approach says much about the previous 400 years of domination. However, interiorly he was never integrated into, nor cared to imitate, Spanish culture. He not only preserved his own language, style of dress, and way of life, but he also modified radically that which he was forced to adopt of religion, government, and work. He accepts Christ, the saints, and the Mass in public adoration, but his household religion includes *Pacha Mama*, llama sacrifice, and sun worship. Spain imposed its own rulers down to local *corregidores*, but native communities had their own *amautas* and *jilacatas*. His methods of cultivating the soil and mining minerals are still those of his forefathers even though he may be working alongside modern machinery. The Altiplano was never so well irrigated as in the times of the Incas, for they were principally an agricultural people and mining was secondary.

The Indian's moral code, "don't steal and don't be lazy," broke down badly under the survival needs of daily life. However, even today the best models of Christian marriage, family life, and community unity are found among the indigenous people of the Alti-

plano. The five Indian countries mentioned above are bicultural or tricultural, for they enclose two or three nations within their borders. It behooves you to study well the strong and weak points of your indigenous people, for they are still there today. For example, the fact that the Incas never had a written alphabet, nor did he discover the wheel, leaves them still today without a tradition of education, and resigned to carrying burdens on their back. However, their sense of family, community, and practicality in values makes them easier to work with than many other elements in the society.

The Whites. Latin America became "white man's land" only between 1800 and 1950. Even then, only 12 million Europeans came to Latin America during this 150 years, compared to the some 40 million who came to the United States in the same period. Colonization from Spain and Portugal was never very heavy; for example, only 15,000 Spaniards came to the New World in the first 50 years of conquest. Of the 23 million people at the time of independence in 1825, only four million were white (about 18 per cent). The vast majority of the Europeans came, and still come, from the three Latin countries of Spain, Italy, and Portugal (of the 12 million mentioned above, four were Italian, four Spanish, two Portuguese, and two from the rest of Europe). Hence, Latin America is not only Latin in language but, far more important, in temperament, cultural values, and outlook.

Peninsular whites tended to occupy all the top political, military, and religious positions until the wars of independence. After 1825, they were merely replaced by an oligarchy of *criollo* whites which to this day tends to hold caste-like domination over land, commerce, and political power. A handful of twenty-five to thirty families dominated the way of life in each country. Those who could ride a horse, carry a walking stick, and share titles of nobility were carefully limited in the New World. Subsequent arrivals from Europe or the United States, even though white, Catholic, and professional, remained as foreigners for generations and seldom penetrated this upper elite.

About 45 per cent of the people in Latin America today are classified as white (a little more than 100 million). The vast majority of them have some native blood in their ancestry. Most of the Spaniards who came during the first 300 years were adventurers interested in power and the pursuit of *el dorado*. Without either wife

or family they did not come so much to settle as to conquer (*conquistador*). Despite their small numbers, they conquered a continent by sheer stamina, courage, and perseverance. Proud, haughty, and at times ruthless, they were loyal to king and Church, since it served their highly individualistic goals to be so. They brought with them a system of agrarian feudalism which they implanted in the New World whether on the land or in the mines. Their scale of values was that of medieval Catholic Europe, prior to the industrial, social, and political revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Today these whites continue to think in terms of a natural aristocracy, where some rule and others serve, as willed by God. Life is centered in leisure and cultural activities, with politics and commerce as possible pastimes. Work, especially manual labor, along with industry and technology, is looked down upon as activity "for those who serve." Cultured in interests, genteel in manners, and elegant in life style, they make wonderful companions and friends. They live in sections of the large cities usually far removed from the misery and sufferings of their own workers. Gradually, new professional, technical, and industrialist classes are coming to the fore with a totally different mentality. Oftentimes, these new classes come from "marginal" peoples, such as recently immigrated Lebanese.

It behooves you to look into the European origins of your white friends. Most of the early Spaniards came from the north or south of Spain. Those from Andalusía (south) retain their love for music and dancing and their distaste for hard work in the New World. Even today there are few religious vocations among the Andalusians in Spain itself. The Basque people, as well as those from Catalonia, are very different in character and temperament, and take more readily to the northern European values of industry and democracy.

As a consequence of the Latin tendency to look down upon industry and manual labor, the Germans have tended to dominate in engineering and in hardware stores, the French in large department stores, the English and North Americans in railroads, mines, industry, and commerce, and the Lebanese in wholesale and retail merchandising. The Latin will readily admit the economic, industrial, and technical superiority of the United States, but he does not think of himself as culturally or spiritually inferior.

The Negroes and Mulattoes. About 13 million Negroes were brought to the Americas between 1600 and 1885. Most of them

arrived as slaves from Africa to the Caribbean Islands, Central America, and the coastline of northern America. Today about 8 per cent of the Latin American population is Negro (roughly 18 million). Haiti and Jamaica have upwards of 90 per cent Negro-mulatto populations. Cuba and the Dominican Republic also have high percentages. More than half of the Negroes and mullatoes live in Brazil, while the coastlines of both Colombia and Venezuela have large concentrations. Small groups will be noticed in the coastal areas of Ecuador and Peru and, inland, Bolivia has about six thousand.

The Negro has fared much better than the Indian in the Latin countries. He arrived here as an individual torn completely away from his people and culture. Hence, the Negro very quickly Europeanized his language, dress, and way of life. Even though his music and dance patterns are African in rhythm, beat, and movement, he has also adapted well to European and North American patterns and rhythms. He retains much of his spiritualistic and animistic religious nature from Africa, but may blend it well with Christianity. While he has never been as much the object of prejudice, discrimination, and segregation as in the United States, he nonetheless entered the caste-type society at the servant-slave level.

Even though slavery was legal in Brazil until 1888 and in Cuba until 1890, the Negro profited much by the wars of independence. In Brazil and Cuba many of the most prominent literary and professional people are Negroes or mulattoes. In those countries where there are both Negro and Indian populations, the Negro considers himself vastly superior to the Indian and on a par with the white man. He does not, as a rule, suffer the same psychological complexes felt by his brother to the north and, as a consequence, presents himself generally as out-going, confident, and at ease. However, recent studies indicate that perhaps more prejudice exists in Brazil and other countries than was previously thought.

The Mestizo. The "American" is the *mestizo.* Generally the child of an Indian mother and a European father, he was born into a schizophrenic world. By personal desire he would like to have been like his father, yet by social pressure he was often forced to be with his mother's people. Spurned by one and spurning the other, he was considered to embody the weak points of both races. White Latin writers tend to describe him as lazy, deceitful, lying, and stealing; in short, he is considered the reason why their countries are so underdeveloped.

By independence in 1825, he constituted close to 30 per cent of the population (about six million). Today about 40 per cent of the population is *mestizo* (about ninety million), although some would say the figure is closer to 80 per cent, if the dividing line is on blood and not on a cultural basis. He is now the hope of the continent, since he has found personal confidence and social acceptance in most lands. Though spurned as *cholo* in many circles, his initiative, drive, competitive spirit, and abilities are combining to force an opening into upper society. A child of the New World, he is seeking his place in the world through the new republics whose spirit he represents.

The *mestizos* began to achieve social status after the wars of independence, for they participated in the liberating armies as privates, sergeants, and minor officers. By 1850, they began to appear as generals in the armies and in high political positions. From 1900 on, they have been accepted in top military, political, social, and cultural roles throughout the continent. However, the price paid for their upward ascent was uniformly that of laying aside any identification with their Indian ancestry.

The change began by learning Spanish, putting on Western dress, abandoning their farming occupation for the town or city, and denying all ties with their indigenous community. In the next generation the children must have at least a secondary education, and preferably that of the university. He is forced into the unpleasant position of an imitator of the whites, in dress, manners, and speech, though he is seldom if ever admitted into their closed circle. Many times he is far richer and better educated than his white counterpart, but the color of his skin, his mannerisms, and his name prohibit entrance.

The case of Simon Patiño in Bolivia is very typical. Even though the family is among the ten richest in the world, and the children have been educated in France and Spain, nonetheless they have never been admitted into the upper class in Bolivia. However, today with the growing importance of professional, technical, and industrial preparation, the future of Latin America appears to be in the hands of the *mestizos.*

POPULATION GROWTH

South America is a young continent with a very young, dynamic population. The rhythm of increase is not only the highest in the

world, 2.9 per cent annually, but it is also constantly on the increase. At this rate the existing population will double every generation.

A comparison between North and South America, starting with 1650 and advancing in 50-year periods (with projections), would show the following interesting relationship:

	1650	1700	1750	1800	1850	1900	1950	1975	2000	(IN MILLIONS
N.A.	1	1	1	6	26	81	166	240	312	OF PEOPLE)
S.A.	12	12	13	19	33	63	162	303	592	

From 1920 to 1945, Latin America shows, among the continents, a 78 per cent increase, Africa 46 per cent, North America 44 1920 and 1955, the population doubled from 90 to 183 million. Couple this with the fact that economic growth is not on the increase, and one can see why international experts are worried about the situation. You, in your work, will be asked questions on methods of population control that are acceptable to Christian morality.

The causes of this extremely rapid growth are principally those of a high birth rate and of a rapidly falling death rate. At present the birth rate is somewhere between 41 and 43 per thousand and the death rate 13 to 15 per thousand. The average death age is between 52 and 56. Latin American women appear to be extremely fertile, particularly in the rural areas. In Brazil the average rural family has eight children, whereas the urban average is 6.1; in Venezuela the ratio is 8 rural and 5 urban; and Costa Rica has 8 rural and 4 urban.

Immigration is not a great contributing factor, for in the period from 1946 to 1954 only 1,189,000 people came to Latin America. Among these, there were 537,000 Italians, 295,000 Spanish, 181,000 Portuguese, and 174,500 from other countries. The countries of their destiny were: Argentina 567,500, Brazil 335,900, Venezuela 189,000, and the rest 96,600. The story is the same as that in all the underdeveloped countries, where modern medicine and education have cut back tremendously the death rate, especially of infants, without economic growth keeping pace. You must seek concrete and global solutions for this pressing problem in the areas where you work.

Youth dominates the scene in all the countries of Latin America. More than 40 per cent of the population is under 15 years of age, except in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Cuba where, how-

ever, it is still close to that percentage. Less than 5 per cent are over 60 years of age, which leaves about 56 per cent between the ages of 15 and 60. In the United States, 12 per cent are over 60 and only 28 per cent under 15.

The tremendous problems that arise in regard to primary and secondary education along with sicknesses characteristic of youth are obvious. Pressure for food, work, housing, recreation, and medicines will confront you no matter where you will work. Rising crime rates, unemployment, vagrancy, and a host of other difficulties are on the increase. The likelihood of political unrest and revolution increases as a Marxist mentality grows among the restless youth searching for a solution to their many problems.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CONCENTRATION

Even a passing knowledge of the geography of Latin America makes one aware of the fact that the vast majority of the people live within 200 miles of the coast. In general, South America is like Africa, and North America like Europe. Since it lies between 30° north latitude and 40° south latitude, almost 70 per cent has temperatures that average above 70° and another 20 per cent averages above 80°. Along the east coast, the vast majority live by the sea; for example, 89 per cent of Brazil with its railroads and cultivated land is near the coast. Along the west coast and in Central America, the people live in the mountain chains that parallel the coast. Only about 20 per cent of the people live in the remote interior regions (about 38 million). It would be as though the United States had not crossed either the Appalachians or the Rockies, for South America has no great interior cities like St. Louis, Chicago, or Detroit.

Nor does the continent have any great interior agricultural belts like that of the Midwest in the United States. There is a huge rain forest, which extends from Colombia to Bolivia and from the Andes to the highlands of eastern Brazil. This Amazon basin is about the size of the United States, but with a population under two people per square mile. More than 50 per cent of Latin America is forested, only 5 per cent is cultivated or under tree crops, 30 per cent is unusable, and the rest is pasture land. The heart of South America is so hot, humid, rainy, and jungle-like that it is more impenetrable than the Sahara Desert. Bolivia has 80 per cent of its population living on 15 per cent of its land, which is the cold, barren Altiplano,

for the interior 70 per cent consists of tropical rain forests and pampa grass.

Most of the countries, except for Ecuador and Brazil, tend to have one big city which is the capital. About 15 per cent of the people, roughly 30 million, live in the twenty capitals. One-third of Argentina lives in Buenos Aires and almost one-half of Uruguay lives in Montevideo. Latin America now has ten cities with more than a million inhabitants, but by 1975 it will have at least sixteen at the present rate of growth. By 1975, more than 80 million of its estimated 300 million people will live in cities of 100,000 people or more.

In a sense, these cities are the nation, for they are the nerve centers of all decisions and the source of employment. So it is that people say Lima is Peru and Caracas is Venezuela. A few countries, such as Ecuador, Colombia, and Brazil, have second and third large cities, but as a rule the provincial capitals are several steps below the national capital not only in size but especially in importance. The rapid urbanization of the continent is caught well by its three most advanced nations: Uruguay is 81 per cent urban, Argentina is 68 per cent urban, and Chile is 61 per cent urban.

Right now, Latin America is about 50 per cent urban and 50 per cent rural; in 1960 it was 46.1 per cent urban and 53.9 per cent rural. However, the distribution of the rural population seems unique to anyone who knows the rural areas of the United States. Three types of settlements are found: the small country village, the rural communities, and the hacienda-type dwelling. In Mexico, for example, 90 per cent of the towns have less than 2,000 people, and there are 100,000 villages with fewer than 400 people. This multiplication of small, closed-in, isolated rural towns is typical of rural Latin America. Besides this, one will find that in many parts the rural communities are mostly composed of indigenous people. Their houses may or may not be gathered around a central plaza but, for the most part, they are not widely scattered.

Some of the villages and rural communities are totally isolated in little mountain pockets, remote valleys, at jungle river stops, or in mining ravines. Of course, the most important rural settlement is the *finca*, hacienda, or *façenda*. Some authors say that the hacienda determined the tone and quality of Latin American culture for 400 years, so it deserves a fuller treatment and is taken up in Chapter 10, on communities. In most countries, 50 per cent to 70 per cent of the

people live in rural villages, communities, or plantations, so that most of you will have to understand well this type of life, for it influences a person's outlook even after he has migrated to the city.

POPULATION MOVEMENT

The first great movement taking place throughout the continent is from the country to the city, especially to the capitals. Between the years 1950 and 1960, it is estimated that 14 million people came from the rural areas to the big cities. Though the number of children under 5 years of age is twice as high in the rural areas as in the cities, nonetheless, in the ten-year period from 1950 to 1960, rural growth was only 15 per cent and urban growth surpassed 40 per cent. (Rural population grew 14 million whereas urban population grew 30 million.) Lima grows at a rate of about 6 per cent annually and Caracas 7 per cent annually.

Anyone who has seen the *callampas* in Santiago or the *barriadas* in Lima knows what housing problems exist. It is estimated that 4.5 million houses are needed urgently in the *barrios* alone of the large cities. According to several studies recently completed, the major reasons for the move to the city are: (1) economic, (2) family ties and friends, and (3) educational opportunities.

Another interior movement is that of colonization. Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru have all attempted rather large government-sponsored programs, but all three have been disappointing. Spontaneous colonization for economic reasons has been much more successful and much cheaper. The movement to the iron mines in Venezuela, the oil fields in Bolivia, and the eastern agricultural fields in Peru are good examples of economic motivation for colonization.

No great emigration of peoples is taking place internal to the continent itself. The most significant movement is from Paraguay and Bolivia into northern Argentina for economic and educational reasons. As a matter of fact, Bolivia loses people every year to Chile, Brazil, and Peru as well, and for the same reasons. The most serious external emigration is that of technical and professional personnel to the more developed countries for educational opportunities and work. Both East and West offer large scholarship programs, but under very different conditions. Those who go to Russia, Cuba, China, Czechoslovakia, or Poland almost always come back to Latin

America for ideological reasons. But those who go to the United States, Canada, Germany, or England frequently do not return at all, or if they do, they leave again after one or two years.

CHOICES TO BE MADE

Precisely because the vast majority of you are Christian missionaries, several very basic questions should come to mind. With what class, group, or part of the society is the structured Church identified? There is no doubt that it is much easier and more pleasant to work with the upper-white group. As a matter of fact, this tends to be the Church-identification in most of the larger cities throughout the continent. What can be done to place the Church at the service of the "unwashed" 80 per cent, especially in the *barrios* and rural areas?

Another burning issue is the position of the Church in regard to population growth. Within the framework of Christian morality, what can be done to give parents the opportunity to beget and educate the number of children that they can care for? What advantages are open to you and your work by the fact that youth constitutes such a large percentage of your people? Some of the very difficult decisions facing the Church concern the leaving of traditional rural parishes and coming to the big cities. There is a grave danger that, along with other local customs, the new city dwellers will abandon the faith in which they have never been instructed. Many times the structured Church appears to cling to parish and diocesan commitments that no longer have meaning, while leaving untouched the new masses in the cities.

Finally, perhaps the most general and urgent apostolic problem is the Church's position in regard to development. A well-thought-out theology of development still begs to be done, but meanwhile, pastoral decisions have to be made. Success or failure in this area will no doubt determine the future of the Church in Latin America, for this generation of youth will judge her severely by her actions or sins of omission.

4

Social-Cultural Values I

This and the next chapter, to the writer's way of looking at it, are by far the most important in the series. While it is true that every author thinks his material is much more interesting than that of others, these two chapters on social-cultural values are the key to your psychological and apostolic adjustment on the missions.

Every distinct people throughout the world has its own "way of life," the accepted way of acting and reacting to life situations. The style of its houses, schools, and roads, the accepted language, dress, and conversation, and the internal mental, emotional, and volitional patterns are all important elements of a people's culture. Yet the most important aspect of any culture is the unity and interpretations of life given to the people through its value system. In general, every distinct way of life has its familiar focal point, themes, attitudes, and motivation. Also to be found are the idealized images of man and woman, of leader and follower, and of leisure and work.

You, as an agent of cultural change, will many times have to decide whether certain values are to be accepted or rejected by Christians, purified and ennobled, or permitted but eventually replaced. But most of all you will consciously or unconsciously introduce new values into your life pattern and into the lives of your people from your own cultural value system. This chapter will deal with what have been the archetypes of man and woman in the more or less dominant Spanish value system, and the forced relationship between the white man and indigenous people as leader to follower.

IDEALIZED IMAGES OF MAN AND WOMAN

Perhaps the one most important observation to keep in mind in making your cultural adjustment is that the "way of life" in Latin America is *personal* before it is *purposeful*. Each individual is unique and important just because he is a person. Personal qualities and interrelationships are much more important in life than substantive

achievements and contributions to society. The dignity of man as a person calls forth respect from others and demands expression. Each individual is evaluated much more according to his name, background, and personal qualities than he is according to his efficiency, accomplishments, and training. Bonds of trust and loyalty are more effective in getting things done than are talent or training.

Both individual and social status are based on positive and negative aspects of personalism often carried to great extremes. The manner in which man and woman express personal qualities and interrelationships is very distinct in their youth, in maturity, and in the family. Since in any society male and female roles must necessarily complement each other, one of the best ways to bring out the differences and contrasts is to compare them at three stages of life: youth, maturity, and married life.

Archetypes of Young Man and Woman. Most of you have heard by now of *machismo* and how important it is that the young adolescent boy in Latin countries be considered *macho, muy macho.* The best literal translation would be "maleness" and for some it would include a heavy sexual emphasis. The young man must prove to himself, to his friends, and to the world that he is a man.

Several idealized qualities go into the make-up of this image, of which three should be singled out as basic: active to the point of being aggressive, competitive leading to domination, and braveness backed up by conquests or victories. In the first place, a young man should be confident of himself, capable of expressing himself well, and able to do things that catch attention. If this is carried to excess, and it frequently is, the "show-off" is idealized. After-dinner speaking, serious or light, and the ability to dribble all alone the length of the court or *cancha* and make a basket or goal is great. Bashfulness, drab dress, inability to speak fluently and impressively, and mediocre actions are frowned upon and feared. On the other hand, young men are deeply resentful and hurt if few pay attention to them or if they have to play second or third fiddle to others.

The second series of qualities manifests itself even in informal conversations among themselves, where the "best talker" dominates. A kind of personal competition for first place is present. Offices and positions of leadership are highly treasured for their prestige value, even though subsequent interest in meetings and concrete programs may be altogether lacking.

Thirdly, the need to conquer is ever present. Here is where the sexual emphasis for some starts early and remains very much at the center of things. It is not uncommon for a father to take his 14- or 15-year-old son to the brothel for his first experiences with women. To know where the most interesting houses of easy virtue are in the city can be important, and among some university students the number of conquests a week is a frequent subject of conversation. Few things are feared or laughed at so much as signs of impotence or of being a "fairy."

Conquest, however, is by no means limited to sexual experience. Heroism and bravery to the point of folly are noticed in sports, pilgrimages, demonstrations, car races, endurance contests, and sacrifice for family and friend. Perhaps something of the perfect *macho* could be caught well by the three words, *uniqueness, superiority*, and *bravery*. To be uniquely self-expressive does not place one in competition with others, whereas to be superior usually does. To conquer brings into play a whole series of assets like good dress, kindness, perseverance, bravery, and friends, which superiority may well leave out. To say the least, these qualities are by no means negative from a strictly Christian point of view, nor on the other hand are they uniformly fostered by members of the upper, middle, and lower classes, even among the whites.

The young girl longs for the day when she will be a *señorita*. If the qualities desired by young ladies were listed in contrast to those of the *macho* they would be: passive to the point of sentimentality; protected and inclined to self-abnegation; and charmingly beautiful in an ornate way. Since the woman is not expected to make a mark in life either academically or professionally, she is not to be active or aggressive. She is not to be a leader, but a good wife in the family circle and a good mother to her children. Her sentimentality shows itself especially in religious piety where tears, sighs, and kisses punctuate genuine devotion to the saints and ordinary prayers. Frequently she does not know how to take the initiative in conversation, especially with young men of her own age. Often a kind of giddy laughter and childish bashfulness are carried over into mature years.

Secondly, the father and older brothers are as eager to protect their sister from the perils of life as they are eager to expose their younger brother to them. That is why many young women from the better families know very little about their own sex processes, let alone how they should conduct themselves with young men. Often a

girl's social life is restricted to the family circle, so that her personality develops in a very limited, one-sided way. Ideally, her proper education is thought to consist of religion, the domestic arts and crafts, and finishing-school refinements in manners, dress, and the courtesies of life.

From the years of babyhood, when the earlobes are punctured to hold ornate rings, through the years of childhood when girls are dressed like dolls, a growing emphasis is placed on style of hairdo, high heels, silk stockings, fashion gloves, fancy purses, expensive jewelry, and very costly coats and dresses. The better families spend excessive sums of money on fine imported clothes from the leading fashion centers in Paris and New York. All of this external ornateness is not so much to catch a fine husband as it is to symbolize the family name, social prestige, and the personal dignity of the woman. To sum it all up in a few words, one would have to say that the ideal *señorita* is ornate, accepting, and affectionate and, as many men have remarked, charmingly beautiful.

Archetypes of Mature Man and Woman. A mature man ought to be a *caballero*, which is to say literally that he alone is expected to ride a high horse. This terminology probably goes back to colonial times, when the Indian and *mestizo* were strictly forbidden to mount or ride a horse—the sign of prestige, nobility, and leadership. A man is expected to be a gentleman, a "Don," who is, first of all, ambitious to be a leader. This applies not only to his social inferiors, but very competitively to his own social peers. Rhetorical excellence, political astuteness, and a commanding presence are very desirable talents. Professional capacity, ability to make money, and hard work are neither necessary, nor at times, desirable traits, for the ambition is not to be rich but to be uniquely important as a person.

Other important characteristics are generosity and gentility. A man, by his dress, manners, and speech, displays his family name, prestige, and personal dignity. If at all possible, the educated gentleman has been to the European universities to study law, medicine, literature, the humanities, or social science. He is a literary man capable of high-level conversation about cultural subjects, and capable of at least appreciating good literature, painting, and music. His generosity extends not so much to the poor and needy, even if they are his own workers or family servants. Rather it displays itself in the luxurious parties, clothes, and services with which a man sur-

rounds himself. A seemingly endless supply of drinks for everybody, a broad circle of friends well dressed and dined, and a seemingly educated disdain for "what it all costs" all belong to the character of the *caballero*.

Finally, he is a man who is courageous and even cruel if necessary. In times past some adopted a military career, at least momentarily in life, to know how to use the sword, shout commands, and discipline men. Capable of the extremes of bravery and courage in battle or in the conquest of women, they are equally capable of extremes of cruelty and hardness with servants and *peones*. Strange contrasts of ambition and indifference, broadmindedness and extreme narrowness, refinement and crudity mark his life.

"Lady beautiful" would well characterize a *caballero's* counterpart. The *damas, señoras*, or *doñas* of any city are indeed a very select group. First and foremost, they have the right names, for they come from a long line of aristocracy. They have a large, but rather closed circle of intimate family friends, relatives, and socially important acquaintances. The latest small talk, social gossip, and spicy tidbit is shyly, but slyly, shared over delicately brewed cups of tea.

A second very important feature of a *dama's* life is the large number of servants who surround her daily routine, especially to care for the elegant fiestas. Four to ten household servants mean great bounty and prestige, more than efficient service. Family and social fiestas on a grand scale, fifty to seventy-five people, are required several times a year. On these very special occasions, no guest must ever have an empty glass in his or her hand, and the number of dishes served will be counted very carefully by all the ladies. The fact that the music came all the way from the capital city only indicates how important it was to be there.

Ornate dress is even more important than it was as a *señorita*. A trip or two annually to Miami, New York, or Paris only indicates just how selective and refined are their tastes. A *dama* in public is on stage, for her dress, associations, and conversations will be watched from a thousand corners and shouted from the rooftops in whispered tones. Cost what it may, and this must never be an issue, a lady is a lady for all that.

Finally, there are the carefully chosen and secretly publicized acts and programs of charity for the sick, suffering, and poor. Thank God for the poor and afflicted because otherwise charity balls, toy collections, food and clothing programs, and a host of other services

could never be organized by the *doñas*. Who, then, would know how they really feel about the poor, even though they cannot afford to pay the maid any wages? Even though the picture you have just been presented is somewhat cynical, there is much to be said in a Christian way for the bountiful generosity and goodness displayed by many of Latin America's leading ladies.

Archetypes of the Married Man and Woman. A good husband and father should be a *patrón*. Ideally, he should be paternalistic to all, a protector of the weak, a sponsor for the needy and, in all, a wise man. To be paternalistic, a man must know what good living is and wish to share it with others. Leisure, culture, and versatility characterize this man within his own family, as well as with others. What is more, it is still necessary to prove virility and masculinity to the boys. A man's social life is not something that the rest of the family should even know about, let alone be interested in. The head of the family must be a strong man, not only capable of caring for his own economically, but even more of continuing the family name and its social prestige on a high level. Masculine challenges to a man's honor must be met even if it means a drunken stupor or a duel. Violence, cruelty, and inhuman treatment may at times be necessary to keep the masses in line or make the servants work. After all, there is a natural aristocracy created and willed by God and it is the only language that the uneducated understand.

To be a sponsor not only refers to baptism or marriage, where a real patron will be asked time and again to carry out these roles, but it means fostering civic programs, public works, and football teams. It also means that grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, and close friends have a right to home, jobs, and promotion through their sponsor.

A most necessary trait of any patron is that of wisdom. Somehow, while disdaining manual work and material concern over money, he must be generous at paying bills. A master at maintaining friendship with both sides in any dispute, he must know how to make the right political ties and moves. Fluent in speech and educated in law, he must be able to convince one and all of truth and justice in property holdings, export-import commerce, and political office. The demands made on any patron are all but limitless, for he is as a little god to his people.

Mother's Day is celebrated in Latin American countries with

much loyalty and sincerity. Among the ideals presented, perhaps that of the wife and mother, *Madre*, comes closest in nobility and perfection to the Christian ideal. Her personal virtues are especially those of modesty and self-effacing humility, whereas her domestic qualities include those of being a good mother to her children and having the ability to organize and manage a large household. Besides this, she is thought to be the model of sacrifice for others and profoundly given over to religion and Christian piety.

Conjugal fidelity to her one husband is an absolute must, even though he may indulge in many extramarital relationships. Not only that, women are expected to understand that men are weak in sexual morality and badly in need of a wife's disciplined modesty. She basks in the light of her husband's prestige, name, and fame without contesting for intellectual or professional fame of her own.

In domestic life the children are exceptionally close to their mothers and deeply loved by them. This is so true that character training is often missing for the youth, and particularly for young boys. In a poor country many mothers literally sacrifice their daily bread that their children may have a little more.

Besides this, a good mother must be very capable in household management. She must be capable of distributing daily tasks, supervising their execution, and maintaining peace among all. To keep the children well dressed, the servants happy, and her husband reasonably faithful is no small task. Her all-pervading quality is that of sacrifice. Restricted as she is to the family circle, her social, recreational, and cultural outlets are very limited. The wife is not permitted the same independence in her friendships as her husband. Her education is frequently sentimental and anti-intellectual, so that reading and study are not great delights. The endless round of tremendous trivialities that fill each day can easily be a sacrificial sequence of monotony.

Her great release from this seeming drudgery has been the Faith. Not only are the interior consolations of deep prayer treasured daily, but strong exterior expressions of piety serve to release many pent-up emotions and sorrows. Processions, sighs, tears, kisses, and exclamations are psychologically good for the soul, as well as religiously. Pious, modest, and sacrificing, she does not lack a strong side to her character. Strengthened in the crucible of sacrifice, she has been known to pick up a rifle in the wars of independence, starve herself to educate her children, and work heroically as a widowed mother to maintain her family.

LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS IN SPANISH CULTURE

The leader, any leader, is a leader because of the person he is and not because of the office that he holds. He is superior to his followers because of his name, social prestige, striking qualities, virulent manliness, warm-hearted generosity, convincing speech, boldness, and gallantry. It has been this way since colonial times, when the governor and Church hierarchy were first, followed by peninsular landowners, merchants, and mine owners, and in third place *criollo* landowners with a title of nobility.

Men are leaders by birthright and natural endowment, not by elections and power of office. That is why the basis of civic authority is custom and not constitutions, and ideas are to argue about or play with but do not serve as a basis for programs, norms of conduct, or codes of behavior. Leadership is personal and power is absolute, but moral or legitimate. Good things like authority and justice come from the leader and if things are going badly it is because the leader is weak, corrupt, or fearful and never because the system is basically inefficient. To speak of decentralized authority or division of power in government is to utter childish inanities. Social, economic, and political life function with a natural aristocracy of leaders surrounded by followers and servants.

The Leaders. A good leader must embody in himself all that is good in the three words *caudillo, patrón* and *cacique*. The word *caudillo* says daring, aggressive, and strong: *patrón* says paternal, protector, and sponsor; and *cacique* implies dazzling demagoguery and political bossism.

Most Latin American leaders, whether in the political sphere or in ordinary life, give the appearance of being strong men. That is why you will observe such a constant military tradition in leadership. To be able to shout down, overpower, and suppress opposition is frequently necessary. To destroy the opponent before he has time to organize is the part of the daring, aggressive *caudillo*. Flashy in dress, spectacular in accomplishments, and flamboyant in conduct, he charms the ladies, challenges the men, and delights the children. To seize power and make it legitimate by postmortem elections is no cause for alarm. Drunkenness and moral debauchery can be overlooked in a "good" leader, but weakness and drabness are inexcusable. Efficiency may be a good quality, but it really is not important,

especially if it leads to a lack of sumptuous banquets, ostentatious speeches, and foreign travel, along with magnificent monuments and buildings.

Few of you coming to Latin America have any idea of the importance of paternalism in public office and officials. Personal contact and friendship are needed to solve all problems, hence the top leader must be personally available and interested in his poorest subject who has a sick child. Subjects expect to be told in detail what to do, to be policed in doing it, and to be rewarded according to the good or bad they have done. The patron gives jobs, protection, and security for allegiance, fidelity, and honor. Public works are gifts from the leader, and the people render homage in civic honors, titles, speeches, and banquets.

The people are willing to ignore moral lapses and abuses in their leaders if they are good *patrones*. A potentially good leader is expected to run campaigns of handouts, promises, smiles, and flowery speeches. A good *patrón* is expected to receive endless people and listen to all levels of problems and complaints. The leader is expected to ignore or by-pass the law for personal solutions. Human interest is much more important than regulations, and public works receive their direction and priority according to friends and influence. A friend or person of influence is necessary to expedite paper work in offices or to guarantee the approval of official requests. All initiative is expected to come from above and the subject is accustomed to await the leader's decision with an external attitude of servile respect and obedience. Efficiency must never make the leader cold, inaccessible, or seemingly indifferent to people.

Caciquismo or *un politico* are graphic terms for political bossism and a politician. However, the element of personalism enters into political skullduggery here in a very interesting and human way. The political machine is built through a whole personal process of family ties, friendship building, and loyalties. Even business transactions are ordinarily done with persons of confidence and through friendship. The ability to sway crowds with emotional speeches, to dazzle women with flattering words, and overcome opposition with evident sincerity are all requirements of the *cacique*.

If these tactics fail, however, the bag of tricks is deep with intrigue, plots, double-dealing, and endless promises. Beyond this comes the nasty necessity of violence, bloodshed, and murder. And all this must be done without dirtying the hands or working up a

sweat. Foes are destroyed by personal accusations against moral life or family background and not at all because of poor programs or a lack of accomplishments. Personal attacks must be answered or it will amount to an admission of defeat in political life. Adept at clandestine meetings and concealed promises, the *cacique* must maintain exterior respect and decorum at all costs in public appearances. The convenience of the moment may demand promises to friend and foe alike, which both men know will never be fulfilled; yet the elastic conscience includes and excuses all that is necessary to win and maintain power.

The Followers. The follower under consideration is, for the most part, the exteriorly submissive but interiorly resentful Indian or *mestizo*. His is the life of adapting and reacting to superior power, which often amounts to brute strength, though he has little trust or confidence in the leader. The native peoples of the Inca Empire, such as the Quechuas and Aymaras of Bolivia and Peru, had a scale of individual and social values almost diametrically opposed to that of their Spanish overlords and masters.

The cult of personalism is unknown among the indigenous people, at least in its highly individualistic Spanish sense. This is perhaps why the Indian has refused to become a "good" European, at least as based upon the models he has seen up to now. Although he has lived in cultural symbiosis with his white masters, he has refused to be integrated into the new way of life. That is also why some cultural anthropologists feel that the Indian is much closer to the values of the industrial and technical Western civilization than to those of the medieval, aristocratic, status society to which he has been exposed up to now.

From infancy on, the young Indian boy and girl are trained in social circumspection and conformity. They are frequently admonished by parents and elders not to do such and such a thing because they are being watched. The aggressive, competitive personality is frowned upon, with the warning not to be a "big cheese" or not to imitate the "blue man." Most Indians are considered to be very stoical because they are taught from childhood not to express their feelings or emotional reactions strongly. Self-preoccupation is disparaged with the well-known phrase, "don't be a bellyacher."

Overt sexual expression is frowned upon whether by men or women and the Aymaras especially have a strong tradition of matri-

monial fidelity. A man is respected for his substantive achievements and social contributions more than for his name, personal qualities, and relationships. Manual labor is in no way looked down upon, but rather a hard worker is admired by both his friends and the community. Little distinction is made between work and leisure in daily life. Leisure moments for the most part are simply breaks in work for resting, relaxing, and conversing with fellow workers. The orgies of patronal fiestas are marked exceptions and surely serve well to release pent-up emotions and resentments.

The indigenous people are first and foremost community men. They have a deep sense of mutual aid and community dependence. There is a profound fear of ostracism, scorn, and public ridicule. Community punishment for adultery, robbery, or broken promises is often drastic and very efficacious. A strong in-group feeling and trust prevail for the members of their own community, but seldom extend far beyond, even to fellow Aymaras or Quechuas. Communities often have common properties for grazing or for other community needs. Religion is a community affair and failures to have children baptized, abortions, or separations will call down *castigos* from God on high. Frequently they have their own community leaders, who are chosen according to proven virtue in life, contribution to community needs, and generosity in fiestas. Community decisions are not taken by the leader apart from the members, but only after discussions and consensus with them. Even after centuries of imposed leadership from above, under both Inca and Spanish rule, they still retain some of the community-leadership values most respected in the modern world.

Living as we do in a period of existentialist philosophy and personalist psychology, it is much easier to appreciate many of the strong points in the youth, adult, and marital ideals for man and woman. The amount of impersonalism and coldness in the North American way of life will be brought home to you very quickly. Certainly the refinements of a cultured man and woman dedicated to domestic ideals are not opposed to Christian virtue.

A balanced appreciation of industrial, egalitarian virtues could redress many of the *macho-señorita, caballero-dama* excesses. Only a sympathetic approach on your part will enable you to see what is good in paternalism, even with its endless delays and inefficiencies. The first time someone steps in front of you in line, and the fiftieth time, you will feel like responding violently. Also interruptions with-

out excuse, during important meetings and conversations, to deal with petty problems, will irk you. Long delays in business transactions caused by discussions of familial problems and relationships will drive you all but mad. Employing friends to move along paper work in offices and seek favors will seem beneath your dignity and contrary to all that you have learned about objective justice.

Yet—yet—is it not perhaps a much more human, personal kind of unhurried, rational, Christian existence? Is this not what movements like the hippies are saying to a luxurious, materialistic soft people? If nothing comes through but a sympathetic feeling for what is good in the value system of the Latins, then this analysis has been worthwhile and very necessary. The first step in cultural adjustment is to accept the other in his otherness, even before trying to understand him. Then after years of trying to understand the similarities and differences a mutual, balanced adjustment is possible.

5

Social-Cultural Values II

In this second chapter on sociocultural values, the matter to be treated will touch very close to home. You may, in fact, see more clearly what the American way of life is. Since World War II, a cultural invasion from the north has been bombarding the way of life in Latin America more effectively than 400 years of Spanish conquest ever did. This is especially true starting with Mexico and including most of the Caribbean area and passing down the western side of the continent. Havana before the Cuban revolution, Caracas, Bogotá, Lima, Quito, and La Paz, to a lesser extent, and even Santiago show signs of the North American cultural invasion.

American consumer goods and industrial products, supermarkets, and shopping centers, superhighways, and modern airports, American cars, radios, and television programs along with books, music, and movies from the United States are making a daily impact on the traditional and Spanish cultural values that have prevailed for centuries. USAID programs and USIS propaganda are as nothing compared to bicycles, radios, movies, records, television programs, General Electric products, Sunbeam kitchen equipment and razors, Fords and Chevrolets, industrial parks—in short, all that an industrial-consumer way of life stands for.

Overwhelming riches and power are a cause of fear and envy, but capital and technical know-how bring products and services that the humblest desire and possess. Yet, with this desire comes an eagerness to industrialize and produce these same goods in abundance and more cheaply than imported merchandise. This means a change in mentality, value schemes, pace of life, attitudes toward education and work, and it implies new personal and social status ideals.

Personal Status Ideals

If memory serves rightly, Sorokin divides cultures most basically, according as ideals, persons, or material goods are the principal values

and preoccupations of a people. This is done on a descending scale from youthful vigor to mature corruption, starting with the initial period of great ideals, passing through a time of personalism, and terminating in a decadent stage of materialism.

Both Aristotle in his *Ethics* and Thomas Aquinas in the *Commentary* see human happiness as consisting in a balance of three kinds of activities: (1) The leisure activities of the mind, especially that of contemplative study; (2) the bodily activities of work for the necessities of life; and (3) the diversion activities of recreation. Both leisure and recreational activities bring rest to man, but in very different ways. Leisure activity produces *rest in a good* because of the nobility of the activity itself and its intrinsic content value, whereas recreational activities produce *rest from a good* to rebuild wearied mental and physical energies. Of least value in life is recreation, for it is only sought that a man might go back to the really important activities of leisure and work. Of greatest importance are the leisure activities, which could be appreciated only by cultivated and noble minds and hearts. Hence, in Aristotle's mind any well-ordered society would always have many *natural slaves* to do the manual work and their happiness would come from participating in the leisure contribution of their natural masters.

Even in the Christian era this concept of life prevailed down to the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. It was with the Protestant ethic that a work-centered life and culture became the important value in life, and leisure became identified with free (nonwork) time. Basically, the way of life in the United States is work-centered and purposeful in this context, whereas the way of life in Latin America is leisure-centered and personal in its basic orientation. The differences are basic and the clash in your daily life will be all too real.

WORK- OR LEISURE-CENTERED VALUE SYSTEM

If you were to list the values that characterize an ideal American from the United States, they would run something like this: single-minded, purposeful, efficient, well-educated in the sciences or a technical expert, a hard worker with good business sense, a man on the run who does not waste time in idle gossip, a rich young man who makes a lot of money and knows how to save and invest it well, a man who has time for only a few friends and never allows friendship to interfere with business—in short a truly compe-

tent professional who by his achievements makes a substantial contribution to the world.

This has been the success story of the United States as a land of endless opportunity for those who work hard, use their time well, and really know how to get things done. There is no deliberate attempt to run over people and use them for material gain, but the business world is cold, competitive, and tough. No one may stop to think what happens to a person who works under tension and pressure all day, trying to achieve the efficiency of automation.

Who asks the questions: why work hard, save your money, and get ahead? The coldness, insensitivity, and obtuseness that enter into an impersonal daily life are scarcely noticed. Is substantive achievement and social contribution really a greater good than personal warmth and friendship? Why make a lot of money, save it, and get rich if loneliness and eventual death are man's lot? Science, technology, the machine, and industry are all products of the work-centered ethic that has built the modern world. In a real sense, both the so-called people's capitalism and socialistic communism are children of this same ethic. Liberal democracy and totalitarian despotism find their basic explanations in this concept of man and life. Is it really the only way of life, or even the best way to seek happiness? Are other ways of life perhaps equally good or, at least, could not much good be learned from them?

Those same values, so highly esteemed in the United States, are the very causes of misunderstandings, accusations of materialism, and verbal insults from the Latin American. To him they seem to contradict and make meaningless much of what he holds sacred and important in life. For instead of being single-minded, purposeful, and efficient, he is broad-minded, versatile, and cultured. He has been taught to be indifferent to great wealth and to live well according to his state in life. That is why he cannot understand someone who is worried about making money, saving it, and getting rich. Science and technology have produced cars and tractors, but they also have produced atomic bombs and concentration camps. He has an artistic heritage with emphasis on literature, politics, and foreign travel.

Professional competence gets things done rapidly and well, but it is all too often cold, insensitive, and indifferent to human beings. The Latin prefers to be warm, friendly, and human at the expense of efficiency and progress, if necessary. He feels that a life of ease and tranquillity is a far better lot than one of constant haste and tense-

ness. He surrounds himself with many servants to achieve comfort and security rather than achieving these goods through multiple gadgets. Yet he finds that development in the modern world only comes through the other system of values, for a leisure-centered life inspires neither entrepreneurship nor capital savings.

He wants the best of both worlds without being caught on the horns of the dilemma. Already he sees his way of life seriously challenged, and in this generation he fears the pendulum will swing far to the other side. If only it were possible to blend the two and achieve a new synthesis in something of a leisure and work-centered value system: this is the hope of those who are searching for a third ideology which is neither capitalistic nor Communistic in its socio-economic theory, but somehow profoundly humanistic.

PERSONAL OR CONSUMER-CENTERED "OTHERS"

A man not only has an image of himself but he also forms a projected self-image in relation to others. There is a vast difference between the American way of life and that of the Latin in the way in which "the others" are valued. As mentioned above, the Spanish value system would see each individual as unique because of his dignity as a human being. In brief, the Latin is a humanist.

Ideally, he would be compassionate to the poor, the lowly, and the suffering; even though at the same time he is competitive with his equals and somewhat obsequious to his superiors. He would never seek to change these relationships radically so that all men would be treated equally. He himself is a gentleman and for this reason he should be courteous and genteel toward others according as God and man have made them. There is a God-given order, a natural aristocracy if you will, and this he respects.

By contrast, in the American way of life the individual is one of many, a consumer, part of the masses. To them, we surely seem to be materialists in the most basic sense of the word. All men are equal but in a dehumanizing, impersonal way. The North American way is much more revolutionary, for it would remove distinctions and differences between men, so that all men would be equal in life and opportunity. Life is a kind of struggle and may the better man win. If he is successful and professional enough, he can produce unlimited technological gadgets to better the life of the consuming masses.

To do this, he will have to be very efficient with his fellow human beings, very much in a hurry with his work and saving on time. He is a man apart, almost oblivious to and disdainful of others, except that they are necessary cogs in the producing or consuming machines. He is not particularly concerned about the niceties and refinements of human relationships and is often crude, abrupt, and cold toward others.

The Latin is an idealist whose life and work have a wholeness about them. The North American is pragmatic and he sees life and work with a partialness: each distinct piece of which has its time, place, and excellence. The Latin enjoys talking about ideas and playing with them in a leisurely way, but he does not think of them as a basis for programs and projects. He must have an ideology for life and for his organizations; otherwise he is uncomfortable. The North American is anxious to get things done and his thinking is operational and functional. He is the great pragmatist who achieves through specialization and accomplishes with professionalization. Everything is in its place, and so well organized that automation can do it even better than a man. In fact, the latest IBM machine can even plan some things better than any human, absolutely free of error, and fast.

Wholeness is humanness, for it always has time to be friendly with the other as other. There is a *mañana* for things and work, but my friend is important now. Business is never done just for business' sake nor is money made just to be rich, nor is anything else to be done for this or that purpose. There are always people involved and the personal dimension takes precedence over the purposeful goal. To them, we seem to push people around and use them just to get things done. It is true that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts in mathematics—where we can abstract from the physical realities involved. But a house is more than the sum of its parts and a man is much more than a combination of drives, desires, and accomplishments. In his wholeness, integrity, and dignity, he is the source and goal of the multiple activities, products, and services that he and his fellow men realize.

Many of us feel after several years of work with these very fine people that they have much to teach us, perhaps even more than what we have to teach them. Their life may be slow, inefficient, poor, wasteful, unscientific, without technology, superficial, and unrealistically ideal. But it is also warm, friendly, personal, unhurried,

easy, courteous, genteel, and human. Once again, is some blend, combination, or unity of the best from both ways of life not possible? Yes, if a third ideology can be worked out which is neither excessively work-centered nor leisure-centered, but man-centered.

Social Status Ideals—The Societies Image

The difference between agrarian feudalism and egalitarian industrialism is the global difference in social-status ideals between Latin America and the United States. The one is a patronal, señorial society of elites, whereas the other is a mass society of consumer-equals. Graphically speaking, in the one, no man rides a horse, be it high, medium, or low.

Agrarian feudalism is best expressed in the hacienda system. This consists of a limited number of large landed estates, 2,000 acres or more, whose owners live in cities. A majordomo, generally a *mestizo*, oversees the work, which is done on a non-money economic basis by 50 to 500 families living in clusters on the land. Each hacienda is a self-contained socioeconomic unit which even enjoys considerable political autonomy, like a small feudal kingdom. The privileged families form the upper class in the society and have set its tone and quality for 400 years. During the last fifty years, there has been a gradual breaking down of this oligarchical group, but only in Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba has it been destroyed by revolution.

Egalitarian industrialism is best expressed by huge corporations like General Motors, big cities like New York, and the new megalopolises. Fifty million people live in a small area, the East Coast from Washington to Boston, having access to the same markets, same schools, same hospitals, same television, same churches, and same recreation. Absolute equality in opportunity for all is the ideal, though badly marred by racial and poverty problems. The values and ideals present in each system are often in open conflict, a conflict in which you will be asked to play an important part.

GLOBAL IDEALS—AUTHORITARIAN VS. DEMOCRATIC

The twenty-one republics of Latin America are, in theory, constitutional democracies. However, in practice, they resemble oligarchies more than democracies. A well-defined social hierarchy of

persons and families exists in many of the countries and controls government, politics, and life. All administrative functions are highly centralized at the national level in the president and his bureaucratic ministries. Local and regional officials have little to do except carry out orders from above and maintain political stability and loyalty.

Social life is stratified and static with traditional names, families, and privileges carrying on from one generation to the next. These same people are the owners of the large landed estates, mines, export-import commerce, and they dominate the life of culture. They are the writers, poets, historians, polemicists, and artists. They constitute the main pressure elites of the educational, cultural, economic, military, and religious life who are resisting strongly the new industrial, *artesanal*, rural, and labor elites in a valiant struggle for power.

Things have always been this way since the time of the king and his colonial representatives, and each man more or less knows his possibilities and limits in life from cradle to grave. It has been and still is, for the most part, a closed society with very little social mobility. As explained before, power resides in the hand of the individual leader with very little division even to the national congress or decentralization to regional or local authorities. Constitutions are changed frequently but life continues much the same according to custom. The social order is sacral and spiritual, with religion playing a seemingly conspicuous part in public life. Actually, in practice, the postconciliar Church is undergoing some profound changes which may well change the concept of a hierarchical, stratified, traditional society.

On the other hand, for a little less than 200 years, the United States has been the great hope and symbol to the world of liberty and democracy. As a matter of fact, the American Revolution, along with that of France, has been the inspiration for Latin American democracies and their frequent revolutions. The fact, however, that the United States is in the English tradition of democracy, and not that of continental Europe, makes much difference. Federation, decentralization, division of power, and elections at all levels are peculiar adaptations in the United States. A great trust and confidence in the ordinary man and a profound sense of social equality are treasured values. Vertical and horizontal social mobility are open to those who with talent, training, and hard work prove themselves capable. Titles of nobility have been constitutionally forbidden from

the beginning and the need for aristocratic privileges died with Hamilton.

The social order is largely material and secular in its orientation and values, with religious liberty being a long-standing tradition, sometimes carried to ridiculous lengths in the controversy over separation of Church from state. The industrial barons exercised much power in political and legal decisions, but never in the form of exclusive social elites as in Latin countries. It is with this idealized social-image background that the racial problem causes so much damage in the modern world. To so many new peoples, from the so-called Third World, it is an apparent contradiction to all that America stands for. It is also why such conspicuous propaganda can be made of it by Communist countries. You are going to find the authoritarian, inherited-status, aristocratic mentality difficult to understand and hard to accept in the beginning. Even after some years, it is hard to conceive of a whole way of life based on privileged, hierarchically determined position.

GUT IDEALS–FAMILIAL OR LEGAL SOCIETY

It has been said that Spain is like one big family with Franco as father, and many times in his speeches he refers to Spaniards as "my children" and not "my people." Most of the Latin countries likewise contain and continue strong elements of a familial-type society. All of what was said in the previous chapter on paternalism enters here. The importance of family name, numerous well-placed friends, and inherited privilege cannot be overestimated. When a new program or project is tried for the first time, many will say: "But we have no traditions or customs like that." Titles, especially of aristocratic significance, are much sought after and leadership is frequently sought for this reason. Appearances are maintained even when there is no substantive content, or when it has been radically diminished for years. This is particularly damaging in academic degrees and professional titles.

Two things that will cause you much surprise and many difficulties before too long are the hiring and firing of workers. Once you have a good teacher, secretary, or cook he or she feels obligated to get the rest of the family a job. If you do not employ other members of their family or personal friends when jobs are available,

it is frequently interpreted as a lack of trust or appreciation of them. Even worse is the difficulty caused by getting rid of a worker who simply is not producing on the job. One of the worst crimes you can commit is to confront a man directly with his shortcomings. This is even worse if it is done in public. Indirectly, very indirectly, he must be told to look for another job even though he is a very good man and important. Respect for others, social prestige, and personal relationships are central in life and work.

Almost the reverse of this is found in the United States, where jobs and promotions are based much more on talent and training than they are on family name and inherited privilege. Society in the United States is functionally competitive, whereas down here it is personally competitive. Tradition and custom are not very important in a rapidly changing society like the United States, for tomorrow there will be new gadgets and better methods. People can afford to be direct, open, and outspoken, for there is a certain confidence in talent and training. If a man does not produce in any job for which he has been hired, both he and the company part ways with a mutual understanding of why it happened.

North Americans seem very naive in Latin societies, for their lack of diplomatic tactics makes them like exposed victims at one time and like raging monsters at the other. To say openly what one really thinks without calculating the damage done to the other is most unwelcome, to say the least. You are used to dialogue among equals and majority decisions, but your Latin friends have very little experience with either. In open meetings those who have a right to talk make the decisions while the others are expected to execute them. That an objective order could come to prevail where the same rules and regulations are interpreted in exactly the same way for everybody is unheard of. That job openings are really open to those who have the best talents and training even though they have neither pedigree nor title is incredible. That across-the-board democratic elections could be held with good results at all levels of public life is still far in the future as long as present value systems remain dominant.

The Latin glories in his large amount of individual liberty, warm friendships, leisure approach to life, spiritual heritage, and sense of beauty. To him, the North American seems locked in the rigidity of law and organization, cold to persons, a slave to work, materialistic,

and overly concerned about how much nice things cost. People in North America value highly efficiency, single-mindedness, hard work, directness, achievement, money and material goods, a good education, and technical know-how, with everything being purposeful. In this framework, the Latin seems lazy, inefficient, evasive, slow, disinterested in money and costs, unconcerned with technological advance, an idealistic dreamer, terribly unprofessional and backward.

Whether a way of life is work-centered or leisure-centered may sound like so much philosophizing, but it is the root ethical difference between the two. The social implications of agrarian feudalism or egalitarian industrialism are likewise numerous. Authoritarian or democratic, personally competitive or functionally competitive, familial or legal, and cultured or scientific are some of the basic differences of a social nature. Your new friends in Latin America will be sensitive to appearances and expressions that make them seem inferior in a cultural, spiritual, or moral way. They feel that these have been the precise values sacrificed for the material, technical, and industrial superiority that they readily grant to the north. To be able to appreciate the differences and good points in both ways of life is at least a beginning in your initial cultural adjustment.

6.

Popular and Traditional Cultural Expressions

Ordinarily, when people think of culture they call to mind poetry and painting, drama and literature, music and opera, architecture and sculpturing. However, there is another sense of culture which is much more fundamental in daily life than the highly technical and formalized fine arts. The way in which a people go about socializing the personality of their children and assimilating ideas is basic to culture, continuity, and growth. Signs and symbols used to show respect and give social prestige, or not, are very significant and different in distinct cultures. Not only language is used to communicate to others; dress, tone of voice, titles, posture, facial expressions, greetings, and smiles speak much more eloquently than words.

SOCIOCULTURAL PROCESSES

Social conduct is watched carefully for the values and attitudes that it contains and expresses. Waiting one's turn in line, not interrupting business conversations, going through the proper chain of command, smoking only where permitted, not spitting in public are a few of the common courtesies which, you will see, are not often observed in many Latin American countries. Brusque conduct, throwing books or letters on the secretary's desk, strictly formal business relations with no personal interest, a lack of good appearance, and conversing with only a restricted number of people at any social gathering are common faults in Americans from the north. Common diversions and sports say much about the value system in any culture, for they relax people and catch them in unguarded moments. Finally the popular heroes on pedestals in public parks and plazas, names of streets and buildings, monuments and holidays all tell you very much about cultural attitudes, motivations, and inspiration. This is subject matter for the following chapter.

A young child is born without a social personality. Yet the moment he leaves his mother's womb he begins to relate to other persons well or poorly. In this process of good and bad relationships, under the guidance of parents and various other culture teachers, the human person gradually builds his peculiar social personality.

Ordinarily, in each culture there are certain key events marked by social ceremonies that indicate major steps in a lifetime process. In Latin America the newborn baby starts off well because he is warmly received, accepted, and loved, especially by his mother. Protected from physical injury almost to the point of fault, he is clothed like a doll to demonstrate his social importance. In most homes baptism is the first important social and religious ceremony. The sponsors are very carefully chosen, if at all possible, to give future prestige and security to the child. Relatives and close friends are invited and, at times, it is a community event. After this, when the youngster is between two and three years of age, comes the ceremony of cutting the hair for the first time. The baptismal sponsor officiates at the ceremony and manages the fiesta. At this time, the youngster is more completely accepted into the family circle and, in some Indian homes, is given his name.

First Communion is the next religious event. The young boy and girl are beautifully dressed in suit or white dress with a large arm band and are accompanied by sponsors to the communion rail. After the religious ceremony comes a large banquet. This event is so important socially that parents and relatives will fiercely insist on it even if the child has no idea of the religious meaning.

Family feasts and fiestas are celebrated at home in their annual cycle, including birthdays, religious holy days, and civic holidays. They are important, for the youngster gradually grows in bonds of loyalty, friendship, and mutual dependence with those who will mean so much in his mature years. As the young boy reaches adolescence, he is introduced to the *macho* process and the young girl to what it means to be a *señorita.* The period of *noviazgo*, when the young man and woman are scrutinized carefully for mutual social fitness by their families, is terminated in the wedding, which is preferably a religious ceremony. Ornately beautiful and highly emotional, the marriage ceremony is remembered as the high point of social maturity.

The process of idea assimilation will be very important for you in teaching, giving conferences, and in preaching. As a rule, it is not a

logical, scientific process, but rather rhetorical and impressionistic. It is especially important to realize this in the area of instructing for action programs. For example, the three-step program used for years in Catholic Action of "see, judge, and act" is not effective, especially among the poorer, uneducated people. Rather they must *feel, be convinced,* and *imitate* some concrete project already completed. Beautifully prepared conferences and sermons fall on deaf ears unless this is taken into account.

Even movies and demonstrations, though as a rule much better, are not very effective unless the rhetorical approach is used. Suppose, for example, that you want a group of *campesinos* to use a certain kind of chemical fertilizer on their potatoes next year. The first step is to paint a very graphic picture of their present crop failures and the misery it causes them. If at all possible, they should be moved to tears in this step. Then they must be convinced that they must assume responsibility for the solution to this problem, not the national government, the Yankee imperialists, nor the Communists. The hardest part is to convince them that it does not cost too much and is really good. Here is where practical demonstrations help, right in the field, for there is distrust of the unknown and the uncertain. Finally they will have to be shown a successful crop which came out better than what they have had up to now.

Even university students are more adept at the rhetorical, impressionistic process of learning than at the more logical, scientific one. Sometimes it may make you wince to hear a speaker move a crowd with no profound idea content nor careful logical sequence in his thought. Yet this is the way the job is done and you will have to adapt your own method to that of the audience.

SIGNS AND SYMBOLS OF STATUS

In a status society it is very important to read signs and symbols well. If not, you will miss the significance of much that is going on around you and innocently hurt many people. Since it means much to be "white," the color of one's skin, features of one's face, and body size are made to resemble those of the white race. The two initial breaking points for an indigenous person or family to enter the *mestizo-blanco* world are the Spanish language and Western dress. Indians from various parts of the country, and even from particular

communities, have peculiar colors and styles of dress that set them apart. One of the important changes is to abandon the traditional sandals for factory shoes. The quality and make of clothes will be observed carefully, especially if they are imported. Spanish is the initial break with the past, but vocabulary and accent will be listened to carefully to indicate the place and level of cultured education.

Titles and inherited privileges are watched carefully. Personal titles like Señor, Señora, Señorita, Don, and Doña say much about the social position of the person involved. The family name and ties will be listened to carefully and checked out as to tradition, marriage and, perhaps, relationships. Professional titles are highly cherished and used in conversation: Doctor, Patrón, Maestro, Licenciado, and Ingeniero. Most professionals are careful to carry a pack of name cards to indicate their full pedigree and accomplishments. Friends will be referred to affectionately as *mi padre, mi coronel*, or *mi patrón* if they are a notch up the social ladder from the speaker. A multiplicity of servants, a broad circle of close friends, good manners, and property are signs of social position.

Dress is very important to indicate status. Imported clothes, ornate beauty, the latest fashions, jewelry, stylish purse, hairdo, and the good use of cosmetics are signs of breeding and class. In meetings of university students only those girls who have high heels and nylon stockings have been known to speak up. In times past, all important men carried their business portfolio whether it really had important papers in it or not. Slicked down hair, a good quality suit, and a generally well-groomed appearance in men merit attention here but may gain the title of dandy in the United States. The upper and middle class people spend about 20 per cent more for good clothes than the comparable group in the United States, and a recent study in Bolivia says it runs up to 50 per cent more.

Education has been a commodity for the better class of male whites. It is very important to attend and graduate from the better-known private schools for social reasons. Foreign travel and university education abroad are very significant steps. Even more highly desired, at least in times past, was some time in the French schools. The literary, artistic heritage prevails and so the faculties of medicine, law, and the humanities have been unusually popular. Manual labor is looked down upon as the lot of the indigenous-*mestizo* group, or for those who lack friends or influence. Ostentatious and luxurious living with big fiestas, rich food, and much drinking—all

this is engaged in more for social-status importance than for pleasure.

SOCIAL ENCOUNTERS

The word *simpático* says much more than just good looking. It implies an attractive, charming, delightful personality, which is highly desired at social gatherings. One of the reasons that President Kennedy and his wife were popular in Latin America was the fact, as they say, that "the Kennedys were *muy simpático*."

On entering any social gathering you will be expected to greet each person there individually and warmly. At least a handshake, if not an embrace, will be called for and a pleasant exchange of personal conversation about the family and friends is expected. Again when leaving the party you are expected to repeat the same performance, individually and effusively thanking one and all for the delightful evening. Even in the course of daily events, friends are greeted with handshakes, embraces, and backslapping, depending on closeness and the importance of the person.

At banquets and social gatherings, the guests offer many toasts, at which time it is customary to drink, and not between times. It is very important to observe this, for an empty glass in anybody's hand is unthinkable, so that too much too often will greatly increase the chance of inebriation. When commemorating important family events or dedicating homes, the first bit of liquid may be spilled on the ground or on the floor to acknowledge *Pacha Mama* in countries with an Inca background.

Meals may have upwards of five or six distinct servings, so you must be careful about the quantity consumed in each one. National foods are "hot" in a way that can be very uncomfortable to the inexperienced palate, and it depends on the region in a country what kinds of food are popular. In the rural areas, the astounding thing is the huge quantity of starchy food eaten at one sitting. On one occasion, the main serving was a plate of twelve medium-sized potatoes, about two handfuls of rice, two large *pansitos* and two eggs. How the indigenous people can put away all that food at one sitting without terrible indigestion and torpor is a well-concealed secret.

Social gatherings are as a rule on a familial, intimate basis where relatives, close friends, and a few outsiders are invited. Heavy drinking by both men and women may be in order, along with pleasant conversation and, ordinarily, guitar playing and dancing. The local

music varies from one part of the continent to the other, as do the traditional dances. Music and dancing will be considered in the following chapter.

SOCIAL CONDUCT

Bodily composure, manner of walking, and especially gestures have to be watched very carefully. Particularly in certain countries, Chile being most notorious, half the words seem to have a double meaning, the second of which has some sexual significance. Gestures that in the United States would be meaningless, or at least harmless, will often convey some popularly understood sexual implication. Conversation is personal and respectful, respectful even to one's enemies. This is very noticeable between political enemies who may be in a very bitter campaign and yet, after devastatingly destroying one another in public, can sit down and drink together.

Both in speaking and writing, the style will seem excessively flowery and in superlatives. Praise is lavish for insignificant accomplishments. To receive the same marks of honor in the United States you would have to be a conquering general or a sports hero. The importance of your appearance, dress, and manners cannot be overestimated. They are signs of good breeding, good education, and mutual respect for others. On the other hand, some habits that would be very vulgar in the United States are rather common here, such as spitting in public, grinding cigarette butts into newly tiled floors, and urinating in public. This may be explained by a lack of public toilets and disposal containers, but it goes deep in accepted habits.

The tendency to go straight to the top with all problems is very pronounced. Nobody likes to deal with the second or third man in government ministries or in private businesses. People will send commissions from remote areas of the country directly to the president, members of congress, or cabinet ministers with relatively small, local problems. They not only expect to get a hearing, but to get it promptly on their arrival, without previous notice. On the other hand, people like to come to the top man as well for insurance, buying and selling, or solving disputes. If not, these important persons will interpret it as a lack of respect for them and a belittling of their importance.

Perhaps the most annoying custom here in Bolivia is the total disorder in lines, offices, and means of transportation. People step

directly in front of you in line or simply crowd to the front with no apparent awareness that anything might be wrong. In offices at very high levels, conversations will be interrupted for personal reasons at any moment. In trains and buses that cater to the poorer people, all sorts of farm produce, animals, and junk clutter up racks, aisles, and passageways. Peels, cores, rinds, garbage, and left-overs are simply thrown on the floor for others to step on and to attract flies. Lice and fleas live in poorer homes, country chapels, and public transportation vehicles, so that much resignation is needed to use these facilities. In offices run by North Americans, on the other hand, the secretaries complain much about brusque conduct, the throwing of letters and papers on desks, and just plain boorish manners.

DIVERSION AND SPORTS

Holidays are frequent and long. In some countries there are as many as twenty national holidays each year with no work. This may be a carryover from Inca customs, for it is said that almost one-half the year was given to free days in the old empire. Be that as it may, there is a need to cut back nonwork days or else labor laws will have to change. Besides this, many one- or two-day celebrations are continued for a whole week, and carpenters, plumbers, and ordinary workers do not show up for work during this time.

Fiestas are numerous and of many different kinds. Some are strictly familial, whereas others are local or regional. Some are patriotic or religious and others are given for special occasions such as dedicating a new house. Music, drinking, dancing, processions, firecrackers, colored streamers, balloons, and fights are all part of the celebrating. *Carnival* wraps up the fiesta spirit in a whole week of water-throwing, clothes-ripping, dancing, dynamite and firecracker blasts, music, dancing, confetti—and nine months later (so people in the general hospital tell me), a boom in babies.

Religious fiestas bring the whole community together once or twice a year in merrymaking and celebration, but they are almost pagan orgies in regard to drink. Men and women are found dead drunk in the middle of the roads and in the streets. Music and dancing continue on through the night and what started as genuine fun often ends in fighting, debauchery, and human degradation.

Foreign clergy and religious find these so-called religious blasts hard to manage, for to curtail them completely would be to sever brusquely the only connection many of these ill-instructed people have with the Church of Jesus Christ. However, to purify them and use them as occasions of instruction and dignity as well as a time for relaxation and community unity is all but impossible.

One of the very necessary experiences is to visit a country fair on market day. People from the surrounding farms and villages bring their merchandise to barter or sell with their neighbors. Early in the morning they start to arrive with all sorts of colorful cloth and clothing; grains, meats, and vegetables; cows, oxen, chickens, pigs, sheep, and mules. The buying and selling continue until late in the afternoon, accompanied by a good deal of drinking and socializing. Now many merchants from the big cities are bringing things out to the bigger country *ferias* because of the amount of commerce that takes place. Prices and weights have to be checked very carefully, for a lot of cheating, shortchanging, and deception is taking place. Many attempts are made to put some kind of tax on this commerce, but the indigenous people resist it vehemently.

Cards, pool, and many gambling games are found in the rural areas, especially in cattle country. Just as in the days of the "Old West" on the frontier in the United States, there are bands of cattle rustlers, gun duels in the streets, and shootings. Cattlemen seem especially fond of card playing, pistol carrying, and heavy drinking. Pool playing, guitar playing, and singing are favorite pastimes among old and young alike in villages and small country towns.

Football (soccer) is the principal sport throughout the whole of Latin America. It is played vehemently, watched passionately, and practiced constantly. Young boys use grapefruits, rag balls, and tin cans to acquire agility with their feet and to play with their friends. Alleyways, backyards, streets, and polished athletic fields serve for the villages', nations', and continent's principal distraction and pastime. Professional players are national figures and the better teams have national followings. Stadiums are crowded hours ahead of time and headlines in Monday's paper are given over to football scores from the day before. Major games are occasions to let office and factory workers free, to stop traffic on busy thoroughfares, and to turn all radios on full blast.

It is not just a sport but a good gauge of national consciousness.

In some countries, Bolivia included, it is very much a defensive, unimaginative, hesitant game. In general, Latin American football is highly individualistic, with few carefully organized and planned maneuvers, much as is the general way of life. Besides football, volleyball and basketball are popular among middle-class and poor people. Leagues are formed and much interest is shown, by the youth particularly. A different type of handball is played which is extremely hard on the hand and exhausting.

Gymnastics, track, and swimming depend much on the region, available facilities, and national temperament. Golf and tennis are the more or less exclusive sports, because the courts belong to social clubs and the equipment is fairly expensive. Horse racing and baseball are more popular in Central America and the Caribbean area. The ancient Spanish sports of bullfighting and cock-fighting are popular in a few places. Bogotá, Quito, and Lima have seasonal bullfights, and cock-fighting is popular in Mexico. However, these two sports seem to be losing popularity as new interests, such as bowling, come in.

POPULAR HEROES

All the early national heroes were rebels against Spain and were military-political figures. This is one of the reasons why revolutionary figures are very popular with the people, as is noticed with Che Guevara now. The *macho-caudillo-patrón* figures dominate in statues and as heroes. A man like Melgarejo, who as president almost ruined Bolivia a century ago, is admired as something of the perfect *macho*-figure. Former presidents and political figures are highly idealized and serve to inspire youth to political careers even today. Most of the streets and plazas are named after battles and heroes from the wars of independence or subsequent battles and wars. A definite military tone runs through hero worship.

Some religious, literary, and historical figures from the past are likewise held up for civic admiration. However, for the most part, they have connections in their inspiration, courage, polemics, and writings with patriotic causes. Women show up occasionally as models of honor because of being mothers, or from literary prominence, or as independence heroes. Today several monuments to workers, miners, fishermen, and farmers will be seen, evidencing the proletarian mentality of modern Latin America. In general, you will

have to read textbooks, go to movies, plazas, and public monuments to understand much of the mentality of your people.

Popular culture is so much a part of any people that it goes unnoticed and is simply taken for granted. Nobody can give you much of a course in it. If you are attentive to life, dress, speech, conduct, parties, and meals you will learn much. Imitation and attention will be your best allies in this cultural adjustment. All that has been attempted here is to give you some idea of the differences, their importance, and their relative significance. Some things may seem ridiculous to you, but they are important simply because it is the way your people have learned to cope with life. Frequently, there is no better nor best way to carry on daily life and it suffices that it be a good way. People resent very much to hear, "but this is the way we do it in the United States," or "but that hairdo is so silly." To accept, understand, and adjust to others, as other, can either be a delightful education or a painfully tolerated experience. It depends much on your attitude and on you.

7.

The Arts as Cultural Expression

Two basic facts set the context of the general history of the arts in Latin America. First, there is a pervading substratum of high indigenous cultures that in some cases had arrived at great development by the time the Spaniards arrived. Such was the situation of the Mayas, Toltecs, Aztecs, Incas, even the Chibchas and the Mochicas. Some authors hold that these cultures are somewhat collectivist and communitarian in their spirit. Secondly, there was a great "Spanish contribution" in the New World, which created a series of European institutions. This contribution more or less adapted and fused with the indigenous substratum.

The sixteenth century was the century of "clashes" between the Spanish and the indigenous. Moving into the seventeenth century, one sees a triumph of the European; with this, the indigenous seemed to become hidden or benumbed. The eighteenth century saw a new rise of the indigenous. It was in this century that mutual understanding, mutual assimilation, cross-culturation and crossbreeding into a new kind of oneness took place.

The eighteenth century was one of great achievements; in a way, it was the most important century. Its accomplishments stand today in the cathedral of Mexico, the Jesuit church in Quito, churches of Cuzco and Potosí. Its most notable painters were Cristobal de Villal Pando in Mexico, Antonio Montufa in Guatemala, Miguel de Santiago in Ecuador, Gregorio Vasquez de Arce in Colombia, Diego Quispe Tito in Peru, and Melchior Perez de Holguin in Bolivia.

The nineteenth century was one of great decline because the catalysis deriving from Spain was cut off. The equilibrium found in crossbreeding was destroyed. A new vision appears at this time. Whereas the religious spirit dominated the scene, with the Church taking the role of patron of the arts, now nationalism (expressed in

buildings, paintings of heroes, military men, statesmen, national poets, and artists) was in vogue because the government now became the patron of the arts. Positivism, liberalism, and Freemasonry were substituted for Catholicism. The terrible instability of governments retarded and almost halted the cultural development, but some new art did appear, mostly through importation from France and England. With regard to some art forms, especially sculpture, the century was almost negative. Argentina and Chile were best at assimilating the neoclassicism and romanticism, probably because they had almost no great indigenous culture to be crossbred or to impede this tendency. So the nineteenth century can be classified as neoclassic and romantic.

New currents of the twentieth century were late in finding roots in Latin America. Impressionism, for instance, entered Bolivia in the years from 1920 to 1930. One could better describe what took place in Latin America as an artistic leap from the ancient to the current, occurring very brusquely, *un salto de arte.*

Today there are a number of artists in Latin America of international fame. Most of these tend to express themselves in themes portraying some form of social unrest.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Before referring to particular art forms in Latin America, something should be said about certain general characteristics and attitudes concerning the arts. First of all, art in Latin America is usually imitative and not original. For example, Latin Americans are somewhat like the French in literature. Secondly (and this is enormously important for us), Latin Americans do not mind being considered second-rate in comparison to Europe. They cannot stand to be considered second-rate in anything artistic in comparison to North America.

Thirdly, all other art forms generally tend to be subordinate in quantity as well as quality to literature. Of all art expressions, literature takes the lead, and this in spite of the development of Latin American music (which is the art form most of us will experience most) and in spite of certain exceptions like the folkloric dance in Mexico.

Fourth, there has always been a tendency to dabble. There are

few really first-rate artists in any field (including philosophy if one cares to include it here; one might say especially philosophy). Whereas the Greeks were artists by reason of their ideals and the North Americans are frequently said to be artists for monetary reasons (this judgment is perhaps too harsh), the Latin Americans became artists by reason of diversion. They did not wholly dedicate themselves to it. It was something a "landowner" or a "gentleman" did. There is some slight similarity here to the gentry of the old South in the United States.

Fifth, besides dabbling, there was the problem of isolation from Europe and the isolated nature of the "big farm," the hacienda. There was a great lack of communication and crossfertilization not only with European artists but even with countries in Latin America. Sixth, until recently, the artist "as professional" has not been superior to the professional artist in the United States. In this respect, the North American has generally been superior. But the artist "as integrated," as incorporated into his own culture, as being an "insider," and as being able more easily to be personally integrated, the Latin American is superior. In the last thirty to forty years, we now see clearly the Latin American professional artist influencing, interpreting, and projecting his own culture.

PAINTING

Painting in Latin America moved from "colorist" before the Spanish conquest to religious in colonial times; to "customary" (the snow, a wedding feast, children playing in the marketplace) and portraits of people expressing the individualism of republican times; to social consciousness (for example, in the Palace of Government of Mexico, where clerical and military oppression are so clearly depicted) in this century. Now there is a somewhat late development of present trends such as abstractionism.

ARCHITECTURE

Architecture moves from monumental in the period preceding the Spanish conquest, through religious (e.g., churches) in colonial times; through civil (e.g., palaces, towns, municipalities, barracks, museums) in republican times; to an attempt to return to an indigen-

ous inspiration (eminently successful in the building of the University of Mexico, and eminently unsuccessful in the University of San Andres in Bolivia, whose building is supposed to recall a Thiahuanacu monolith) and to an attempt to become contemporary (e.g., Brasilia, where one can find gathered together in one place the works of Brazil's truly great architects, some of the greatest in the world).

LITERATURE

Literature enjoys a notable development over a long period of time. The works from the sixteenth to the beginning of the eighteenth century were especially histories and religious chronicles.

The Europeans were surprised by the New World; they wanted to express this new wonder. Since they were not professional writers, they are frequently described as soldiers improvising as writers. Such was Bernal Dias del Castillo, *Conquest of Mexico*, and Pedro Freya de León in Peru, *Chronicles of the Conquest*. In the religious chronicles, one especially finds religious men writing of the excellence of their own religious orders. There were P. la Lancha of the Augustinians, P. Lelendey of the Dominicans, P. Diego de Mendoza of the Franciscans. In the tropical zones there was the "Amazon group," most notably Jesuits but also including Franciscans. The most important works of the "Amazon group" are *Missionary Accounts, Legend of El Dorado*, and the *Anthropological Descriptions*. The poetry of this epoch was European baroque. Juan de Castellanos in his "Eulogies of Famous Men in India" is an example. In some regions, the poetry was expressed in song, as in the "Yaravis." There were no novels at this time.

The republican era of the nineteenth century saw the rise of romanticism in literature. The poets sang of nature, and they sang of liberty, love, and solitude. The novelists' movement begins around 1820 as an imitation of the Spanish novel. More and more, the novels became romantic, expressing "despair," coming from French influence.

Modernism begins in the twentieth century. Here we see the "realist causes," "novels of social protest" such as the famous *Huasipungo* by Jorge Icaza portraying how badly the Quechua Indians were treated in Ecuador. This social protest gradually became incorporated into the world, and especially included the Latin American "revolutionary movement."

MUSIC

It is hoped at this point that readers will be able to hear the selections of music to be described below. What Latin Americans frequently refer to as serious music will be taken up, then popular music will be considered.

Creativity, after suffering a largely dormant period from the beginning of the republican era, begins in contemporary times. Here we find new musical treads. The more important of these are found in Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. In Mexico, the most important figure is Carlos Chávez, who composes within a modern style. In Chávez, there is a general predominance of rhythm and syncopation; this is seen in all Mexican productions. Chávez's most notable work is *La Sinfonía India* in one movement, in which he uses percussion abundantly. There is quite a similarity between Chávez and Aaron Copland; whereas Copland utilizes actual folkloric musical themes, Chávez uses material of folkloric inspiration but with themes created and elaborated by himself. It is also easy to make a comparison between *Silvestre Revueltas* (Seramaya) and Stravinsky's *Rite of Spring*; they are strikingly similar.

In Brazil, and in all of Latin America, Heitor Villa-Lobos is the most notable figure. He composed in practically all the musical genera but within musical forms inspired by baroque. *Las Bachianas Brasileiras* are very representative of his music. Of his more important works, three are for symphony orchestra and the rest is chamber music. It is easy to compare Villa-Lobos' "Bachiana No. 7" to a Passacaglia and Fugue by Bach. Other important Brazilians are Camargo Guarnieri and Carlos Gomez.

The music of Argentina is divided into two periods. The first is represented by Alberto Williams, Carlos Lopez Buchards, and Felipe Boero. The more interesting period is the present, in which the most important composer is Ginastera, a serialist composer, *música dodecafónica*, not unlike Schönberg. Ginastera composes especially for opera and ballet.

Chile is fourth in having its serious music diffused internationally. Its most important composers are Orrego Salas and Conrado del Campo, whose works are heavily experimental, using contemporary music and styles. Perhaps the one thing that most of

the other countries have in common concerning their serious music is that their serious creative work, which is frequently quite extensive, does not reach beyond the borders of their home country.

The main purpose in taking up the serious composers, few as they may be, is to show that such composers exist and that they are competent. Far more important from the standpoint of cultural adaptation is popular music. The first group is the Mexican, represented principally by the *el corrido, huapango* and *la canción* (ballad).

The second group is the Caribbean. It is very complex, very rich in musical forms, and very much influenced by Africa. The most diverse examples of this genera are the Cuban *danzón*, the Venezuelan *guaracha*, and the Colombian *cumbia*. Most North Americans seem to think that the *chachacha* and the *mambo* are the sum total of all Latin American music, but these are not even greatly representative.

Brazilian music has been especially rich. The most typical forms are the *samba*, the *batucada*, and the *frevo*. The *Carnival Carioca* of Rio de Janeiro introduced the *marcha*. The Andean group is represented by a great variety of types such as the Ecuadorian *pasillo*, the *marinero*, the Peruvian *vals*, the *cueca* of Sucre and Tarija, the *bailecito, huayño*, the *tonada* of San Lorenzo, the Bolivian *taquirari*, each with a whole series of derivations.

The Argentinian *zamba* seems to be connected with and derived from the Bolivian *cueca*. In fact, Argentina and Chile do not seem to have any pure indigenous folkloric music properly their own. Many hold that what Chile and Argentina have is derived largely from Bolivia (they are reluctant to admit this, however); the Bolivian is ordinarily very fond of the music of northern Argentina (the Argentinian *vidalita* and *chacarera*). Buenos Aires did introduce an innovation in the republican epoch which is often said to represent "the true folklore of Argentina," the *tango* and the *milonga*; they are actually of European origin. The Chilean *tonada* is often said to be the "daughter" of the Argentinian *zamba*, and the Chilean *cueca* is said to be the "first sister" of the Bolivian *cueca*. A similar relation is made between the Bolivian and Chilean *cueca* with the *zamba*, or *resbalosa* (Peruvian *marinera*). All of these genera are *criollo*, that is to say, they come from the colonial period.

Practically speaking, few examples of pure indigenous music have been preserved. The more important examples are found in

Bolivia and Peru. In Bolivia, the *kullaguada, sicuris,* and other indigenous dances are of precolonial origin. The same is said of the *tonada de Erke* and *tonada de caña* of Bolivia.

Popular music is one of the most important expressions of the emotional tone of a culture, and if one is to capture a people's culture, one must listen to its music. However, younger people seem to be turning away from the traditional forms of music to a considerably greater degree than was the case before.

8.

Socio Cultural Categories and Groups

Not only physical persons have personalities; social groups acquire special traits peculiar to themselves which are cultural modifications of the general way of life. Sometimes these groups have a racial basis with their own special language, style of dress, and an essentially distinct way of life.

Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Mexico are at least bicultural, if not tricultural. A *campesino* from the Altiplano in Peru who goes to Arequipa or Lima adopts a very different way of life from that of his native community. Bolivia still has some 100,000 natives in the eastern tropical rain forest and in the southern Chaco area who live in tribes of 200 to 2,000 members. Classified as uncivilized and at times savage, each of them has a culture proper to its members, embodying a value system very different from that of Christian-inspired, Western civilization.

PREDOMINANTLY SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPINGS

At other times, the bond of unity and distinctness is principally social and concerns the work, commerce, or profession of the group. The modern industrial world with its tendency toward socialization stresses social organizations. Still other groupings are principally cultural with religion, political regionalism, or nationalism as the major bond of oneness. Many times it is all but impossible to say whether the group is predominantly racial, social, or cultural, hence the title of this chapter refers (in a general way) to sociocultural categories and groups. The major racial groups have been treated in Chapter 3, so there is no need to repeat the matter here.

The working class for the last 150 years has been a conspicuous phenomenon in Western civilization since the Industrial Revolution.

Capitalism caused two markets, that of consumer and that of labor, to come into existence. Not only was there class distinction between owner and worker, but as interpreted by Karl Marx, there was necessarily class warfare. In order to defend his rights and promote his well-being, the worker formed syndicates, which became as strong as powerful capitalists at the bargaining table.

In many Latin American countries the labor movement is not at all well developed nor effective. However, more and more the word *obrero* takes on meaning and importance in these societies. Ordinarily he is poor, very poor, so much so that his family eats only one real meal in the house a day. His home is frequently a hovel in one of the *barrios* of recent immigrants into the big city. He may find solidarity and pride in being a member of the syndicate. He has a very special mentality filled with resentment against the rich, capitalistic, land-owning class.

His education is meager and he sacrifices much so that his children can get the education for which he never had the opportunity. His family life is not good and he may have a woman or two on the side to relieve his pent-up emotions at night. He lives from day to day an almost hand-to-mouth life, without savings. He relies for medical attention, unemployment pay, and retirement on government-sponsored programs. Frequently, he has drifted far from the Church into Communist-Marxist camps seeking comrades to better his lot in life. Though he may put on suit and tie for special occasions, he is proud of his blue overalls or coveralls as a sign of his class.

The *obrero* should first of all be distinguished from the *peón*. A *peón* in the cities is the unskilled, pick-and-shovel man, a day worker. He belongs to no union, has no steady job, and simply lives from day to day on the work that he can pick up. An *obrero* has a steady job, belongs to a union, and may well perform some specialized task in factory or shop. Secondly, an *obrero* wants no part of being an *empleado*, or office worker. It is the difference between the blue and the white collar. *Empleados* can wear suits at work and frequently have titles, which in a status society means a lot. This makes the *obrero* reactionary against much that the whole society stands for because according to traditional categories he has no status. Thirdly, the *obrero* is not a *maestro* like a taxicab driver, a skilled carpenter, or a foreman in construction. As a rule he has no

highly skilled profession and his wages show the difference. Titles mean much in life and he simply is not a *maestro*.

Finally, the *obrero* stands furthest removed from, and opposed to, the *patrón*, or owner of the shop, factory, mine, or industry. His exterior conduct in the *patrón's* presence is obsequious and humble, but in his own syndicates he speaks out strongly in favor of a violent struggle against the capitalistic exploiters. Sharp class distinction is maintained in most factories and industries between owner-management on one side and worker on the other. The worker's syndicate ordinarily has strong political overtones and party affiliation. This can be a negative factor in the class struggle because the politicians make many promises which they have no intention of keeping.

Among *obreros* themselves there is much difference between miners, fisherman, factory workers, workers in small shops, and transportation workers. Yet a solidarity prevails in their general resentment against those who hold money power and exploit the only commodity they have to sell, their human dignity and work.

A growing class of people dedicated to commerce is found in Latin America. They are the people who make their living by buying and selling just about anything from sandals made from worn-out car tires to new diesels for power plants. The *comerciante* is not a worker, for he either runs some small store or shop or he is something of a traveling businessman. The small country villages are filled with tiny *tiendas*, each of which buys and sells pretty much the same wares. Traveling through the countryside now, and especially attending the local fairs, are another group of small-scale businessmen and women. One thing to be noted is the prevalence of women *commerciantes*, who not only set up small shops on street corners, but often run whole chains of contraband import services. They are tough, competitive, and hard bargainers whether buying or selling.

The *commerciantes* are not to be confused with the artesan class, who dedicate themselves to making hats, shoes, suits, painting, carving, and silver and gold work. An artesan is stable and has some kind of professional skill. The commercial people travel much, do a good bit of wrangling over prices, and are unscrupulous about making money. Many of them have already come into better days and own fleets of trucks and four or five homes and are investing in major construction works.

Among the traditional commercial elements in the rural areas are the much-hated *rescatadores* of fruit, coffee, leather, meat, potatoes, and just about anything else the small farmer comes in to sell. Seldom does he pay cash for the products but gives credit or merchandise in exchange. The rate of interest charged by these small-time "Shylocks" rises as high as 40 per cent on small loans. Many farmers and indigenous people are permanently in debt as a result of this system. It is one of the ways of keeping them working on the land for nothing and in total ignorance of what their products are really worth. Large export-import commerce is, as in the past, controlled by the name families in conjunction with large international name firms, like Grace from New York and Hansa from Germany.

Professional people such as teachers, doctors of medicine, lawyers, and industrialists do not, by reason of their profession, enter into the upper echelons of society. Status is not based upon functional contribution or achievement, but rather on inherited privileges, landholdings, and high culture. Among the various professions, that of education offers many interesting groupings and titles. Since the university is much admired in the society for its prestige value and political power it is very important to be *un universitario*. Some people are almost lifetime students, either as payed agitators or simply as prestige seekers. Career students may flunk the same course in economics five times before moving on or the same year of medicine two or three times.

Most university professors are part-time teachers, for it means much to be a *catedratico* in the university. The rectorship of the university is a much coveted political position, even though the man may not be too concerned about the business of higher education. Deans of the various faculties are little feudal lords within the university, which makes their position politically very competitive.

Students are eager to receive their titles of *doctor, licenciado, ingeniero, técnico*, etc., because it means social prestige as well as a job. Those who graduate from the normal schools (*normalistas*) are carefully distinguished from those who have no academic titles (*interinos*). Both federations of teachers and of students are powerful politically. Many school days are lost every year over nonacademic problems that cause strikes, demonstrations, and political fights. These federations may have a heavy Marxist influence, and are often focal points of revolutionary doctrine and organization.

In the rural areas, the principal difference is between the

campesino who lives on the land and works it and the *vecinos* who live in the small villages. Many times the *campesino* is an Indian or *mestizo* who speaks no Spanish and wears the traditional clothing of his people. He is referred to as *burro* or *no son civilizados* by the townspeople. The *vecinos* are the *gente* who are *mestizo-blanco* people racially, and act as small commercial agents in their tiny stores for buying from and selling to the *campesinos*. They act as sponsors in baptism for their trade clientele, which cements the commercial loyalty of these clients.

In the old hacienda system the *patrón* or *hacendado* lives in the distant city and belongs to the upper, *criollo*-white aristocracy. The *mayordomo* runs the *finca*, with the families of workers called *colonos* or *peones*. It was, and still is, a feudal-type setup where very little money is used in any way. Small acreage is given to each family and, in exchange for this, they work two or three days a week for the *patrón* on the large tracts of land under the *mayordomo's* care. They also do service in the large town house or bring produce from the hacienda to the *patrón* in town to be sold or used by him. In exchange for this, he receives seed at planting time and can use some of the machines of the *finca* if necessary to till his ground. He never has much cash to buy or sell outside the hacienda limits because he lives in a barter economy there. In fact, he is almost always in debt to his master from the cradle to the grave. In the cattle country of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the large *ganaderos* or *rancheros* have many cowboys (*gauchos*) who watch the herds and drive them to market when ready. Theirs is something of the hacienda life, though modified very much in its human rigor.

In the Amazon Basin are to be found the people who tap the rubber trees and process the rubber for market (the *siringueros*). They, along with the Brazil-nut harvesters, live in river outposts of 100 to 500 people. It is a lonely, isolated life that takes them on treks of two to seven days into the jungle to gather the rubber or nuts. When an area has been exhausted, it means moving on to a new location with household goods and all. Family life is very weak, since the men may take off at any time for a new area and totally abandon their families.

Another group of farm workers whose condition is very poor is that of the sugarcane harvesters in northern Argentina or, as a matter of fact, in most of the large cane plantations in Peru, Argentina, and Cuba. Many times they are foreigners who have entered the country

illegally to make money. As a consequence, they have no title to social benefits, minimum wages, educational benefits, or health coverage. Theirs is a hard lot and not unlike that of the Mexican wetbacks in the United States or the migrant agricultural workers.

PREDOMINANTLY CULTURAL GROUPINGS

The first people to be mentioned among the cultural groups are the so-called *cholos*. Racially they are *mestizos* who have recently come to the big city and want to make good. They are found among the *comerciantes*, artesans, *obreros* and now the new industrial-technician class. Their children are coming into the universities and technical schools, and winning many of the *becas* to foreign countries. For many reasons, they are feared by the privileged aristocratic class, but basically because they are beginning to challenge seriously the old way of life.

Frequently they are aggressive, pushy, and ill-mannered. They simply do not have the time and interest to acquire the mannerisms of good breeding. At times they can be extremely selfish, individualistic, and ready to take advantage of anyone and everyone. At the same time they are intelligent, hard working, and thrifty with their money. Since they are on the way up, they are great imitators of the white aristocracy in dress, speech, and life.

In many ways, they are something of a bridge between the *gente* from the old oligarchy and egalitarian-industrial values. Those young men and women who have studied in European or American universities exemplify industriousness, professionalism, efficiency, hard work, and a host of other sacrosanct values from the modern industrial world. At the same time they retain enough of the personalistic values to feel and be at home with their own.

Regionalism is very strong in all Latin countries. Geographical isolation and governmental centralization account for much of it. People from the mountain villages and countryside are strangers to those of the coast and big cities. Those from the provincial capitals resent the privileges and domination exercised by the national capital. Sometimes national groups have concentrated in a certain part of a country, giving it peculiar customs, initiative, or characteristics.

For example, the Cochabambino in Bolivia and the Antioqueño in Colombia are extremely active in commerce, politics, and in-

dustry, to the extent that they tend to dominate their countries. Bolivia the Tarijeño is known for his musical speech, slowness, and love of music and dancing. The people from the tropical interior are considered to be lazy, lighthearted, and loose in family morals. Some centers are known for their cultural traditions, like Bogotá in Colombia, though anybody who has visited Santiago or Mexico City of late cannot help but think that the latter two have become the cultural centers of Latin America.

Latin America has been traditionally 100 per cent Catholic, However, it is a Catholicism with strong emphasis on processions, statues, large churches, saints, fiestas, sentimental piety, and an aristocratic clergy. Real evangelization has been weak and little evidence of intellectual faith is to be found. Expensive Masses, infant baptism, and external piety have been too much a part of the Church for centuries. As a consequence, Protestant groups are making many genuine converts to Christ in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. Many times a converted evangelist is described with these four praiseworthy qualities: (1) he prays at home; (2) he does not get drunk; (3) he is faithful to his wife; and (4) he does not take part in the community fiestas. A good Catholic is described as one who has his Masses said, is baptized and married in the church, and participates in the community fiestas.

Some missionaries say that Protestantism is like an eighth sacrament, for it is forcing more authentic Christianity into traditional Catholic life. The Masons are making a strong comeback in some countries. Their influence in high government circles in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru is notable. For many years, they remained as a numerous social group but were not militant. However, it appears that a decision has been made to become militantly active once again.

SOCIOPOLITICAL CATEGORIES AND GROUPINGS

Just to get some idea of the richness of groupings based on political ideologies, it will be good to take a look at the political left in Bolivia today. There are the Castroites, *izquierdistas*, Peking and Moscow Communists, Marxists, and Trotskyites. The followers of Fidel Castro and Cuba speak of Latin America for Latin Americans. They want communism as in Cuba without imperialistic domination from either Russia or the United States. As a rule, they are the most

revolutionary body right now backing the guerrilla activity on the continent.

A wide variety of groups would fit under the banner of leftists. Almost anybody opposed to the old oligarchy will get painted with this brush even though he may be a dedicated priest, religious, or militant Christian layman. There is today a strong tendency to polarize politically either to the far right or far left, so that young Christian Democrats in Chile look more like militant Communists than Christians. Anybody in favor of agrarian reform, national industries, social reforms, and a weaker military will be called at least a leftist.

Peking Communists are on the upswing among the young and the workers. For one thing they have more money now. They are more militant and lead many of the strikes, demonstrations, and subversive plotting. Moscow Communists are very *burgués* and frequently are prosperous university professors or businessmen. Theirs is the soft sell and the long-term approach. Recently they have been on the decline especially among the young and the workers. A Marxist mentality is formed in almost all the secondary schools on the continent by the concepts, social theories, and philosophies taught in the civics, history, and philosophy courses. Most of the universities have many Marxist professors in their economic and law faculties. Textbooks, notes, and reading material are outdated and very limited, so that good students have a very difficult time finding an intellectual antidote. A more orthodox communism continues in a few centers following the militant revolutionary line of Leon Trotsky.

Some of the more commonly heard, economically based distinctions are between proletariat and capitalist, workers and the *rosca*, and the proletariat opposing the local *bourgeoisie*. Even though industrialism has not really hit these countries in a big way, still, European-flavored thought penetrated long ago. Hence, there is much writing on walls against North American capitalism, imperialism, and exploitation. That there has been and still is exploitation by big international companies is true. But "proletariat" and "capitalist" have become emotionally charged slogan terms exaggerated all out of proportion to their actual influence.

Political leaders like to lump together small farmers, workers, and commercial people as the proletariat suffering under the capitalistic heel. The *rosca* is simply that small oligarchical group of families which has held the social, economic, and political reins of these

countries for centuries. In the profound social revolution in Bolivia in 1952, the revolutionary party made much of undoing the famous *rosca* of tin barons, big landholders, and high military officials. This small group of famous names and inherited privilege are especially detestable to the worker, who sees himself still subservient to the few powerful rich families.

Finally, the proletariat in general is opposed to those who live in a *burgués* style in the midst of so much misery and poverty. One of the very serious causes of many problems is the amount of conspicuous spending done by people who really are not very rich. Shopping for better bargains, saving for tomorrow's needs, and putting money away for educating the children are foreign ideas to the middle class and wealthier families. To live far over one's head in nonessential luxuries is the accepted way of life.

Several very interesting observations should be made about the way Latin Americans see other nations. The obvious monster and common whipping boy for the evils they suffer is the United States. The "Good Neighbor Policy" of Franklin Roosevelt and the "Alianza para el Progreso" of John Kennedy are as marked exceptions to what seems to them to be a policy of exploitation, imperialism, and unfounded superiority. "Yankee go home" signs are commonplace and refer almost exclusively to the United States. The word *gringo* extends to Northern Europeans, Canadians, and the United States, but has special application to the latter. The word itself appears to have originated in the Mexican War with the green uniforms of the Americans coupled with the shout, "Go." However, be that as it may, it implies someone who is marked by the traits of the egalitarian-industrial society of efficiency, haste, abruptness, money-making, blunt, and not too friendly. *Sajones*, the Saxons, seems to apply most properly to the English, Canadians, and people from the United States. It carries implications of a cold business attitude as well as ruddy complexion and physical strength. Even though they too are Americans, the word refers in a very special way to North Americans, and even more especially to those from the United States. It conveys something of what they respect in the United States of a practical genius in getting things done, a profound sense of human equality with others, and a willingness to pitch in and work hard. It is surprising how many Latin Americans who work for large American firms only wish that they could work more directly under the owners themselves and not under their own national professional and tech-

nical personnel. There is a friendliness, appreciation for the ordinary man, and deep sense of what work is in North Americans that communicates well with ordinary people.

Mexico is the idol of most of the other twenty-one republics, and Argentina at times seems to look down on the others. Latins see in Mexico a revolution that has made good. When they look to see how they might industrialize, introduce agrarian reforms, and bring education to the poor, Mexico is their model. Of course, Mexican movies are popular with the working class and have much to do with the country's popularity.

Peru, for Bolivians, is a friendly neighbor but a country with many "fairies." The national holiday in Peru falls on July 28 and in calling class role among boys in Bolivia it is common to skip number 28, (27-A, 27-B, 29, for example), because that boy who happens to be number 28 is automatically labeled a homosexual.

Chile is working hard at becoming the cultural leader of the continent and doing a pretty good job. At least ten of the bigger international cultural programs for Latin America have their headquarters in Santiago.

Argentina is big, advanced, and proud, scarcely able to think of herself as one of the Latin American republics. From some points of view she is not an underdeveloped nation and yet her political stability is very weak. She resists most AID programs from the United States and seeks to solve her own problems in her own way.

Europe has always been looked up to for cultural superiority and social theories even as the United States is respected for economic and industrial know-how. France is the culture darling of Latins and particularly of Colombia, Uruguay, and Chile. The Italian influence in Argentina, Brazil, and now Venezuela is strong, so that nation is much loved also. Germans are respected for their military discipline and engineering capacities. Among nationalities in Bolivia from Europe only the Germans have penetrated the upper social circles with any amount of success. The English are remembered for commerce and the railroads. The Spanish are looked upon with mixed emotions for their colonial domination over 300 years. However, the proud, haughty, closed, superior attitude of many Spanish is uniformly rejected by young Latin Americans as having no foundation in reality and one of the major causes of their own underdevelopment.

Among Orientals, the Arabs (Turco as they are called) are known to be good merchants, but generally are not accepted into the upper circles even after several generations in one of the Latin countries, except in Brazil, where they are said to have captured all the prizes but the presidency. The influx of Japanese, Chinese, and Okinawans is still recent and consequently no general reactions are felt as yet.

Running the broad gamut of sociocultural categories and groups reminds one how important are the intermediate structures in any country. Too often we think of a country like the United States as being composed of two elements, 200 million people and the national government, forgetting all the social, cultural, and political groupings of these individuals and families. In fact, one of the important functions of good government is to build up a strong social organism which can assume many of the coordinating and directing roles of society. If not, top-heavy bureaucracies automatically result. One of the noticeable signs of underdevelopment in Latin countries is the lack of professionals and well-structured professional organizations. Too much is left, as a consequence, to the national governments, which are not capable enough or well enough organized.

In this, the last of the anthropological chapters, a transition has been made into the sociological realities of groups and their interrelation. A quick glance at the people and their values will explain many of the successes and failures they have in forming social groups that are vital and dynamic. A consideration of both the formal and informal culture will account for much of what happens in the sociology of group life. Finally, this chapter on sociocultural categories and groups is a preparatory step toward a more detailed analysis of the groups themselves. The next seven chapters will build on these six and presuppose them as foundation material.

PART 3:

Sociology

C. H. GERAETS

9

The Family

The importance of the family can never be overestimated. Whether it is considered as the cell of civil society or the Church in miniature, there is no doubt that it is the first and most basic group. Marriage itself is held by most peoples to have something of the sacred about it. Even though the monogamous, indissoluble ideal of Christian marriage has never been realized perfectly, nonetheless it has guaranteed the fundamental stability and uniqueness of marriage in Western civilization for two thousand years. Based upon marriage, the family comes into existence with its peculiar relationships with relatives, children, and friends. Even though the school can care rather well for intellectual education, only the parents can do, or not do, a good job with moral formation.

However, much depends on the building and the human facilities available to the parents in rearing children. It is very difficult to establish a household without a good house, for without the security, protection, and convenience of good human living the family will suffer much in its unity. So, too, public health programs are condemned to failure if family health and hygiene are not in good shape. If the diet is unbalanced and meager, the water dirty and contaminated, the clothing insufficient and dirty, and the house itself dirty and without sanitation facilities, the family is bound to be sick much of the time. But all that has been said above about education, housing, and health depends upon a fourth factor, namely, family economy. This is so basic that Aristotle, in his division of sciences, calls this the study of family economics. Even in the highly industrialized economies of the modern world, consumer needs, which are family needs, should be the final goals aimed at. In this chapter, then, we shall consider the family in Latin America.

ACTUAL FAMILY TYPES

There are three basic family patterns found throughout Latin America. In the first place, and in general, the dominant model is

that of the Spanish value system which prevails in the *mestizo*-white element of the society. As a rule, it is a family with fewer children than the other models, for marriage is relatively late (the man is 26 to 28 and the woman 20 to 21). A nuclear-type family is established, though strong kindship ties remain. Due to the man's position in society in general, he is definitely the head of the family and tends to make all the major decisions. He is responsible for the economy and prestige of his family, and is expected to bring home enough money and to care for the family's name without much help. In times past, he may have spent little time with the children, except with his sons in their maturing years, but this is definitely changing among younger families. His compensation was an independence in social, political, and extramarital life unknown to the husband in the United States. As a rule, the man has a wide circle of friends outside the family and contacts that his wife neither enters into nor knows about. He may have a permanent concubine or two on the side without worrying about his wife's reaction as long as this situation is not flaunted publicly.

The position of the mother was considered in some detail in the first chapter on sociocultural values, so that it can be handled briefly here. She receives support and prestige from her husband and is restricted to a small circle of relatives and close friends for her social life. She is closely identified with the children in their care and education, and manages the household. Known for her modesty, piety, and sacrifice she approximates the ideal, Christian mother.

A very distinct pattern is found among the indigenous people of the Altiplano, especially among the Aymaras and, to a lesser extent, the Quechuas. Some of the *mestizo* families who live in the same areas share likewise in the basic family pattern, particularly if they live in the same rural communities. Basically it is an extended, not a nuclear, family pattern that prevails, with some patriarchal tendencies. The sons bring their wives to the family property and construct a new house close to the paternal home. Trial marriage is practiced in many parts for two or three years. It has three goals in mind: to find out whether the wife can bear children, to see if she can get along with the extended family or is too quarrelsome, and to test her capacity for hard work. If she passes the test and has one or two children, by this time a civil and religious marriage is desirable. However, because of the expensive ceremony and fiesta, many of them

postpone the religious rite for years, even though there is general recognition by the community that it is morally wrong.

The parents are much more closely involved as equals in family life and functions than in the previous model. Major decisions are made by the two of them jointly and most of the social visits and other activities are in common. Since they work together in the fields as a family unit, not much distinction is made except that the man does most of the heavy plowing and cultivating. The mother spends more time with the children and few, if any, sexual liberties are permitted to either husband or wife. Troubles come in this regard at the drunken fiestas and it is not unknown that a husband will kill his adulterous wife.

Thirdly, common-law unions are indeed common. They not only prevail in many of the *barrio* sections of big cities, but provincial cities, villages, and certain rural sections are also characterized by this model. The man is 18 to 20 and the girl 15 to 17 when they start living together permanently, and this type of family has more children than either of the two previous models. It is a nuclear family with strong matriarchal tendencies, for the man stays for three or four years and then simply disappears. While he lives with the woman he is expected to contribute to the family economy and take some responsibility in watching the children. However, for the most part, he lives a social, economic, and personal life apart. As a rule, the mother must seek full-time work to maintain the family. As a result the household gets little care and the children scanty attention. Though the mother is the source of unity and strength for her children, the unstable arrangement seriously weakens family love and effectiveness. If there are seven or eight children, they have as many as four distinct fathers, and as a consequence, one whole aspect of parental care and support is missing.

GENERAL SOCIAL FACTORS IN THE MODELS

Some very positive elements found in the Latin American family are missing in the United States. In the first place, family love is strong and freely expressed. Except for the upper class in the society, a large family is desired and the children enter this world accepted and surrounded by love. Healthy expressions of love be-

tween parents and children, between brothers and sisters, and among relatives are frequent and uninhibited. It tends to be the only strong social group in the society and that makes it very important. Both security in economic life and prestige in social life come from the family. A good job, promotion at work, political success, and moral support in difficulties all come from the power wielded by the family. In moments of unemployment or failure, the members of the immediate family as well as relatives are ready to lend a helping hand. Finally, the system of *compadrazgo* extends family bonds into a broader society. *Compadres* are carefully chosen at baptism for the prestige, economic strength, and political power that they can give to the child and his family. It is a system which is not only useful to the family itself but also to the society as a whole. When there are extended bonds of friendship, the society is much more stable and harmonious. This is especially true in a society where so much depends on name, prestige, and influence.

However, there are also some very powerful negative factors in family life and they account for some of the underdevelopment prevalent in the continent. In the first place it is frequently a family without a man. *Madres solteras* (unwed mothers) are very common, and bearing children out of wedlock has little social stigma. Unions of the moment or for a few months or years are the rule in many small villages and rural communities as well as in the poorer sections of large cities. As a consequence, the dignity of the woman is weakened and there is often no total giving of self in human love in marriage. Children are missing a strong side to their character which they should receive from the example and interest of their father, but he is not there. Besides, the family discipline is weak. Frequently there is no schedule for rising in the morning, eating meals together, and carrying out family chores. Later on in life, the youth are not trained in application at work and study by their parents. Finally, there is little example or instruction in Christian morality in regard to sex. The permissiveness in regard to the young boy and the protectiveness toward the young girl do not build healthy sex patterns.

Another weak aspect of family life is the fact that family living together is not strong. Many homes have little conversation or recreation as a family because the daily diversions do not involve the whole family. In those fiestas which are family affairs, drinking becomes a great problem. Not only is it an expense which can be ill afforded, but it opens the gateway to overall moral degradation.

FAMILY HOUSING

Housing is one of the most depressing problems in the underdeveloped regions of the world. But in the fastest growing population on the face of the earth, it approaches disaster proportions. Right now it is estimated that Latin America needs 26 million homes, 77 per cent or 20 million should be entirely new, and 23 per cent or 6 million redone. The surprising thing is that housing in the rural areas is considered to be much worse than that in the cities, even that in the very poor *barriadas* like Lima's. For example, of the 26 million homes needed now, 15 million are in the rural areas, 5 million in the big cities, and 5 million in the smaller cities and villages. Of the actually existing houses 60 per cent have only two rooms, which complicates family life immensely and multiplies moral problems. In the United States only 10 per cent of the homes have only two rooms. Caracas and Lima have 38 per cent and 25 per cent marginal populations, respectively, which means that the problem has tripled in Caracas in the last ten years and doubled in Lima in the same period of time.

Poor countries like Bolivia have close to six persons per house and two and one-half people per room. In Bolivia right now only 17 per cent of the housing is adequate and between 1962 and 1971 some 850,000 units were needed. The frightening truth is that in the previous ten-year period from 1952 to 1961 only 2,000 new units were built. In general, 80 per cent of the houses are inadequate, affecting 85 per cent of the people in their family lives.

It is something of a rule of thumb that a poor family will not stay together in congested city slums longer than five years without improved housing. The ideal housing project should be able to build a simple prefab home in two or three days that can be paid for by the poorest in one or two years or else the program will fail. In Santiago, Chile, Father Vander Ryst is in charge of a program to build 30,000 houses a year for poor people. His basic thesis is that every family has a right to good housing under the conditions mentioned above. His program alone houses some 100,000 people every year. But outside of Chile few other countries are beginning to face up to the housing crisis.

The houses that do exist are little conducive to family unity,

morality, and a good life. To say the least, they are not attractive, well-ordered, or clean. The lack of sewerage and garbage disposal is most serious, for fully one half of the city homes, or 36 million people, are without minimum sewerage or garbage disposal. Lacking are also basic furniture and services in the average and poorer homes. For example, over 90 per cent of the homes in the United States have electricity, 77 per cent have it in Argentina, 39 per cent in Brazil, and in only 20 per cent of the homes is it adequate in Bolivia. It is safe to say that, in general, the homes are dirty and disordered. In some of the rural areas thatched roofs with adobe or cane walls and nothing but dirt floors are the best that is available.

Many small farmers are building second stories and roofing their homes with galvanized tin or cheap aluminium metal. This makes possible for the first time a certain cleanliness on the inside and the removal of insects, fleas, and lice. Also with eave-troughs on the sides, it is possible to store rainwater for washing and small garden irrigation. The situation would not be quite so bad if only there were hope instead of going backward year after year.

FAMILY HEALTH

An adequate, well-balanced diet is necessary to good health. But in Latin America the average calorie intake per person per day is around 2,450. In Europe it is 3,000 and in the United States, 3,200. Only Africa is below Latin America, with about 2,350 per day. In a poor country like Honduras it is about 2,000. On the average, about 55 to 70 per cent of the income is spent on food, whereas in good budgeting the amount should not rise beyond 25 per cent. Besides the lack of an adequate calorie level, there is a lack of protein and an excess of starch. In Bolivia, 84.5 per cent of the diet is from starchy grains and vegetables, whereas only 15.5 per cent is from animals or their products, milk, cheese, eggs, and meat. Couple the food problem with the fact that more than 40 per cent of the people lack drinkable water, and you see why sickness is high and work output low. The poorer countries lack drinkable water in 70 per cent of their homes. This is most serious in tropical countries, for the number of bugs, germs, and insects that infest tropical waters is great. As mentioned before, sewerage and garbage disposal is lacking

in one-half of the city homes and this complicates tremendously the problem of sanitation and health.

The effect of all this is very clear in the causes of death. Stomach ailments and diarrhea are number one on the list, and flu and pneumonia are number two. Indirectly, malnutrition and anemia cause 27 per cent and 11 per cent respectively of all deaths. A full 48.9 per cent of all deaths are of children under 5 years of age. For example, in Latin America infant mortality in the first year is 84.5 per 1,000, whereas in the United States it is 26.4 per 1,000. It all adds up to a very dark picture for any serious public health program.

FAMILY ECONOMY

Solid family economy consists of three factors: an adequate income, good budgeting, and careful use of food and leftovers. There are serious problems on each point here. In general, a full 50 per cent of the families have an average yearly income of $120, which constitutes only 16 per cent of the total income of families. Another 45 per cent average about $400 per year, which comprises 51 per cent of the income of families. A small 5 per cent receives $2,400 per year and this constitutes a large 33 per cent of family incomes. Thus the perennial problem in Latin America, of the very few who live well and the vast majority who scarcely get by, is repeated once again. There is also a tremendous discrepancy between urban and rural family income. For example, in Brazil the urban average is $440, whereas the rural average is $110 per year, and in Cuba it is $368 urban and $92 rural.

However, farmers ordinarily live off their own crops most of the year without this entering into the money calculations of their economy, whereas a city person ordinarily lives entirely off his cash income. There is little concept of the family wage and a full 50 to 80 per cent receive very low salaries. Yet the biggest reason why *campesinos* come to the big cities like Lima is the economic incentive. As mentioned before, those small farmers who live and work on the large haciendas and plantations are generally not within the money economy. Hence, for them to come to a large city like Caracas and receive even a meager wage is a big event.

Consequently, the average family has very little money for any-

thing except food. In La Paz, recently, the Michigan State study showed that some 70 per cent and more of the daily family income went to food. That is why money collections, fines, or entrance fees pose such a hardship for medium-level and poor families. And it is also why religious institutions, schools, and hospitals, which have rather high admittance fees, quickly become identified with the rich. Even the accumulated capital is not great, for no such things as automobiles, household appliances, or a large modern house are possessed. As a consequence, almost everybody is in debt to somebody else and at times the interest rates run fabulously high. Some of this is due to the fact that money is loaned at great sacrifice by friends or because there is a real risk of not getting it back. However, often enough it is due to selfishness.

This is one reason why you can render a tremendous service to your poor people through service and loan cooperatives. People will need much education on the necessity to save, and how to save, for they have no previous experience. The rural people are often victims of seasonal products or salaries. For example, in regard to coffee, fruit, and wheat it is a question of earnings once a year and then distributed spending. When a person has very little experience in handling money, he finds this diffiuclt. There is a general tendency to live well while the money is there and tomorrow to starve, when there is no longer any work or any fruit to sell. What it amounts to in the long run is a subsistence existence that does not allow enough to educate the children, get necessary medicines when sick, and put away a little for the future.

Family budgeting is almost unheard of among the poor, and certainly in rural areas there is nothing to budget. Yet workers in the cities should be taught from a model budget where they can cut expenses and how to get the most for their money. What percentage goes for recreation and what goes for the essentials is almost never thought of by poor people. The ability to put something aside for savings is another big surprise when expenses are planned ahead of time with care.

One of the outstanding differences from the United States here is the concept of living well when one has money. That a person would shop all over two or three towns or in several stores in a big city is rare in Latin America. That a person simply lives within and beneath his means is seldom heard of. It is said that the rich spend

fifteen times as much as the poor here, whereas in the United States the difference is at a ratio of ten times as much. To make good use of every penny received, to make over old clothes, to heat two and three times left-over foods, to make do for one more year with that old coat, all speak of a mentality of saving and careful planning. It is part of the difference between the work-centered industrial economy and the leisure-centered symbolic status society.

The advantages and disadvantages of family life in Latin America are quite clear from the foregoing presentation. Frequently when people hear that 50 to 70 per cent of the children are *hijos naturales* (born outside recognized wedlock), they get the impression that the society is collapsing. However, the frequency of divorce in the United States creates something similar in regard to sexual problems in married life. Another great difference here is the total lack of the puritanical tradition in sexual matters. It may be very true that the Latin is more passionate as a person, but it is also true that human love is more authentic in its expressions. Extramarital sex life may be legalized by easy divorce, or mechanical gadgets may conceal the effects in regard to children, but the effects in human love are all the same. The growing problems in housing, health, and income are very grave. It almost makes one throw up his hands in despair and give up after some experience with these impossible problems. If anything would justify socialistic programs financed and controlled by the national government, it would be both long- and short-range solutions to these problems. Just what role the Church can and should play in the area is still not worked out.

10

Social Organization: Communities

A new appreciation of the problem of community has grown up in the modern world in the past decades, perhaps due to the coldness, impersonality, and hardness of big cities. Primary social relations which are personal, intimate, and spontaneous are found to be necessary for balance in life. Hence, much study has been given over to community, both in developed and underdeveloped nations. Community development through self-help projects is considered to be one of the keys to progress in any developing nation. Highly industrialized countries such as the United States are seeking to reestablish neighborhood bonds, intimate social groups, and authentic religious communities.

The problem with communities in Latin America is complicated both by geography and by historical antecedents. The result today is that most countries are composed of cities, towns, and villages without strong links. Large cities such as Lima, Caracas, and Quito are surrounded by a vacuum. Between 50 and 70 per cent of the people live in villages and plantations of 100 to 200 families, except in Argentina and Uruguay. The countries are composed of two worlds, the city and the country, and between them there is little connection, be it physical or cultural.

URBAN COMMUNITIES

The city consists of the national capital and some of the provincial capitals, and the country is broken into unarticulated villages, communities, and plantations. All this makes for local and regional communities which are very much closed in on themselves and isolated from the rest of the nation. In fact, it is difficult to speak of one nation since regionalism and cultural

differences are strong. Here we will attempt to present something of a global urban and rural sociology of present-day conditions in Latin America.

In most countries the national capital is the nation. With some exceptions it is the only really large city. Many times it is larger than the other cities combined; for example, in Uruguay almost one-half of the population lives in Montevideo. The twenty-one capitals together have a population of over 30 million and are growing at a rhythmic pace of close to 6 per cent anually, which is utterly fantastic. When people think of Peru, Lima immediately comes to mind. And yet, a Peruvian born and raised in Lima has almost no idea what such different areas as Puno, Juli, Chimbote, or Tacna are really like. Cities such as Antofagasta and Arica in northern Chile are much more like Peruvian or Bolivian cities than they are like Concepcion or Valparaiso. And all of them are quite different from cosmopolitan, busy Santiago, the capital. The centralized nature of governmental ministries accounts for so much concentration in the nation's capital. If one wants to get his local school accredited, the best way to make progress is to go personally to the capital and camp in the Ministry of Education for a couple of weeks. The same holds true for getting land titles under the agrarian reform, juridical personality for your cooperative, or liberation from taxes.

Another important feature of the national capital is centralization of taxes and taxation. Most of the larger public works are taken care of by the national government, like road building programs, or colonization projects, which means that the tax money goes first of all to the central government. In theory, a certain percentage is supposed to be redistributed, but only a very tiny trickle ever gets back out to the provinces. The mining dispute in Bolivia is a good example. Less than 4 per cent of the people are involved in the nationalized tin mines, although these make about 85 per cent of the foreign exchange for Bolivia annually.

Another major source of employment is the government. This is one of the reasons why people flock to the capital for work. Also services for the sick, education, recreation, transportation, and communication improve considerably as you near the capital. For these, and for many other reasons to be mentioned later, most of Latin America is gradually building up deep resentment against the capital and the national government.

Other urban centers are not as important, but they still consti-

tute a good percentage of the people living in each country. How does one draw the dividing line between urban communities and rural ones? The United Nations in their reports puts it at 2,000 to 2,500 inhabitants. Beyond this number, the city is no longer just, or principally, a center for the farmers who surround it. With a population of 3,000 people, it must have its own services: school system, hospital, fire department, postal service, etc., which do not exist to serve the farmers but primarily the people who live in town.

Many of the eight or so characteristics of cities listed in sociology books do not apply well in Latin America. Cities are supposed to be characterized by secondary groups, anonymity, heterogeneity, social mobility, multiple goods, services, facilities, and institutions, artificialness, and specialization. Even cities of 100,000 people down here do not bear those traits. They are not at all highly industrialized, well-organized, nor planned. They do have a "personality" all their own based on history, growth, and tradition, with very little industry, modern transportation, and specialization of services. Urban sociology needs to be modified a great deal when one gets outside the capitals and those few other large cities which are so much like London, Paris, Chicago, Tokyo, or Berlin.

One of the fruitful approaches to these smaller cities is to look carefully at the ecological patterns they contain. The old theory of five concentric circles derived from the study of a big city (Chicago) does not work. According to this theory, the heart of a city was the downtown business section; this was surrounded by a transitional slum zone; thirdly came the homes of workers and some factories; then came the residential section; and finally the suburbs with large industries and fine homes intermingled from one section to another. Rather distinct from this pattern, though having some similarities, is Santiago in Chile with a population of 2.5 million. It has about 1,100 distinct *barrios*, but after careful study some experts conclude that forty of these are so important that whoever controls these controls the city. In its expansion, it has incorporated some fourteen smaller urban areas into "Greater Santiago." Even as part of the larger city for some years, these former cities retain something of their personalities and institutions and must be studied accordingly. In 1970 Santiago incorporated four more urban areas and this in turn modifies the larger city, but in turn they are even more radically changed in structure, institutions, and function.

All cities have natural areas broken by rivers, hills, deep valleys,

and winds. Yet far more important are the man-made divisions of roads, railroads, street patterns, factories, communication centers, shipping centers, churches, and housing projects. It is both necessary and possible to plan a city's growth today and predict what will happen when certain changes are made, such as paving the streets, putting in sewerage and water lines, and connecting automatic telephones. The big push to the suburbs is only possible when modern transportation is present and cheaper housing available for middle-class families. The most important sociological consideration is the oneness or unity of the city. What are the structures and systems that tie the conglomeration of people, families, and services into a functional whole?

The problems facing the majority of Latin American cities are in the areas of organization and service. Since they grew up without any particular planning, it is now very difficult to reorganize and restructure them on more functional lines. The installation of modern transportation, water and sewerage systems, garbage disposal, communications, housing, and educational and health services is no small feat. In this expansion there is a concern for beauty that has frequently been missing in the United States. Parks, architecture, space, monuments, and statues are planned more carefully than industrial parks or shopping centers in future growth. Some cities, La Paz, for example, have little trouble with fires because in the high altitude there is so little oxygen that only chemical factories, gas storage tanks, or paint factories are likely to burn completely. Other cities have a serious problem with smog, and Santiago ranks in the third place after Los Angeles and London on this black list.

Among the worst social problems are the glaring contrasts between elegant *barrios*, like Miraflores in Lima, and the *barriadas* that have both the stench and the appearance of animal-like poverty. Somehow, when one looks at these inhuman contrasts, a judgment wells up within one that this should not be, and that something is seriously wrong with any socioeconomic theory and system that leads to these effects. Many times, there is both inefficiency and corruption in city government, which further complicates the solution of problems. The large cities are so closely identified with the national government that it is hard to separate them politically. Likewise the oligarchical families live in the larger cities and exercise a controlling voice in major political events. These are some of the social, economic, and cultural problems facing urbanization in Latin

America, and they are doubly complicated by the general state of underdevelopment. When such cities as Lima, Caracas, Bogotá, and Santiago grow by as many as 150,000 people a year, it is hard to cope with the ever-increasing problem of organization and service.

RURAL COMMUNITIES

Turning now to the rural areas, one finds three rather distinct ways of life prevalent. In the first place, there are literally thousands of small villages dotting the countryside. If Mexico has over 100,000 small towns with 400 people each, or less, the same could be said proportionately of each of the twenty-one countries. These small *pueblos* or *aldeas*, as they are called, are closed in on themselves, quiet, proud, and exclusive. Many times they are walled on the outside and each of the families lives in a patio-type home which in turn is closed in on itself. The quiet is that of a cemetery for lack of commerce, cars, and small industries.

Traditions and pride account for the exclusiveness experienced by outsiders. Incidentally, these so-called outsiders are not foreigners, but anyone who does not live there even if they come from the same country. The villagers are referred to as *vecinos* or *gente* in contrast to the *campesinos*, who are farmers living on the land outside the *pueblo*. Most of them are white-*mestizo*, at least in appearance, although by blood they may well be indigenous. There is bad feeling between the surrounding *campesinos* and the villagers as a rule. The last person to ask an objective question of concerning *campesinos* and their well-being is someone from the nearest *aldea*. They look down on the small farmer as scarcely human and by nature a slave-servant to them. If the *campesinos* are poor whites, as in ranch country, the relationship is much better. But when they are Indians, then the possible racial difference aggravates the sociocultural discrepancy.

Almost all the families in town are related either by blood or by the baptismal system of *compadrazgo*. Matrimonial fidelity is very low and there are many children born to unwed mothers. The high percentage of physical and mental cripples indicates close inbreeding, which permits the weaker strains to crop out excessively. In the larger country towns the landowners of the haciendas nearby maintain a town house. This is used to store the produce before marketing it, and as a place for the children to stay and go to school.

Though these tiny villages are in the midst of landed estates, they render almost no service to them. Some of the indigenous communities nearby do use the small shops for their buying and selling, although now they prefer to go to the nearest big city for better prices and cheaper merchandise. In Bolivia, after the revolution of 1952, many of these small towns were all but depopulated for three reasons. Since some of the *vecinos* were rather large landowners or overseers of properties for others, they were fearful of the new freedom felt by their former slave-servants. In the second place, there was no longer any income or work, so they had to go to the city to make a living. Finally, the education in the *pueblos* is very bad and, besides, there is something of prestige in being able to send one's children to the better private *colegios* in the cities.

The *finca,* hacienda, or *facenda* should be treated in considerable detail, for it determined much of the tone and quality of Latin American culture up to World War I, and in many parts it is still the most potent social, economic, and political force in the country. It is safe to say that one-half of the agricultural land was in tracts of 15,000 or more acres and owned by only 1.5 per cent of the people. In Cuba in 1955, 1.5 per cent of the people owned 46 per cent of the land in huge plantations worked by *peones* who lived with their families dispersed in small clusters throughout the property. It was the system for controlling and organizing a continent in such miraculously short time. Some peninsular white or *criollo* family was given responsibility for 40 to 200 families of indigenous people, called an *encomienda.* He was delegated to build a chapel, Christianize the Indians (at least have them baptized), and keep them busy and peaceful. For doing this, he was given a large tract of land, called a *repartición*, upon which he had to pay a meager tribute to the king's treasury.

Many of these large landholdings eventually fell into the hands of the Church and religious orders. At independence time, all the peninsular whites who remained loyal to the king lost their landholdings to *criollos*, who simply replaced them. The Church also lost much land then, and it was one of the reasons for the slowness in appointing native, non-Spanish bishops. During the first one hundred years of independence these *fincas* were increased at the expense of Indian communities that had maintained their independence. Gradually the Indians were forced onto the more marginal lands, mountain sides, and remote valleys.

The hacienda was much more a way of life than a business. In the first place, the owner was a member of the ruling oligarchy and had his principal house in the city. Besides this, he had a town house in the nearest village and a large house on the plantation or *finca.* During the vacations, the family would visit the *finca*, but ordinarily they lived in the city with the aristocracy. A *mayordomo* would live permanently on the hacienda and manage the farm work, for which he was relatively well paid and cared for. Around the center house were the storerooms, shops, barns, and machine sheds.

Many of the *colonos* or *peones* necessarily lived close to the center house to do the chores, maintenance, and marketing, and to care for the large building itself. The rest lived on the hacienda in small clusters to do the field work and care for the animals grazing on the outlying tracts of land. One of these *fincas* would have anywhere from 15 to 500 *colonos* with their families. There were lifetime social bonds of *compadrazgo*, loyalty, and debts. In prerevolutionary Bolivia, advertisements would appear in the paper to sell a *finca* that had 5,000 *hectareas* of land and 200 *peones*, just as in the Oriente a large ranch would be advertised with 5,000 *hectareas* and 200 head of cattle.

Each family was given a small tract of land as its own, 3 to 5 acres, which had to be cultivated for the family's livelihood. In return for the house, land, and security of the *finca* the family had to work two or three days a week on the hacienda for the *mayordomo* and the owner. Wife and children did turns in the large center house preparing crops for market, cleaning rooms, and doing other household duties. Some *peones* were detailed to the town or to a city house to bring merchandise to market or food for the patron's family. A very intricate, detailed system was worked out for rotation of duty and a minimal efficiency. Each Sunday, whether or not there was Mass in the *finca* chapel, all the families gathered for social exchanges. The annual fiesta was sponsored by the *patrón* as a mark of his generosity, and free drinks, food, and fun were furnished to his large family. All paths led to the center house, where education, health, and religion were cared for. A law was passed in Bolivia in 1929 that *fincas* with more than twenty families had to have a primary school, but it was never fulfilled. In fact, by 1952 many of the larger haciendas still had no educational facilities—deliberately, for a "little learning is a dangerous thing."

These large haciendas were self-contained social and economic units that operated outside the money economy. In Peru, for example, they would start from the coast and run all the way to the high mountain ranges. That way they could produce all that was necessary for the lives of the owners and they would have a variety of products to sell the year around. In some of the larger *fincas* not a purchased item appeared in the center house, on the table, or at work. A kind of autarchy prevailed, like a small feudal kingdom, to the point that at one time some of the owners even printed their own money to be used among the *peones* on the *finca*. Here is where the term "agrarian feudalism" tooks its origin and still finds its reality in much of Latin America. The *peones* were born, baptized, schooled, nursed back to health, married, and buried on the *finca*. Sometimes it was forbidden to them to travel to the city and too much contact with the local *pueblo* was openly discouraged. Sacraments were, and still are, administered at fiesta time and during Lent. If the ladies of the *finca* were exceptionally religious, some instruction was given to the children.

The *patrón* himself, and his *mayordomo* in his absence, ran little islands of justice and punishment for failure to work or for crimes. Some rare forms of cruelty were practiced in many parts in order to make the *peones* work, even to the point of uncontested death sentences. Whipping, hanging by the thumbs, blows, and days in prison were ordinary events, and still are in certain parts. The often heard justification is, "There is no other way to make an Indian work." Most of the *patrones* were able to control the local political situation as well.

Their children were educated in the cities and abroad, preferably in Western Europe. One or two of them would study law and enter politics, another two would enter military service, a fourth might become a doctor and still another one or two would be interested in the land. The *patrón* was a cultured gentleman himself, who dabbled in literature, poetry, painting, politics, and polemics, and with his family found time for considerable foreign travel. Some members of the family would be in export-import commerce to make money and be able to bring into the country equipment for the hacienda. These were, and still are, the aristocrats who rule the land. Theirs is a genteel way of life, slow in pace, without worry about money and without competition; full of the good things this world

can offer and, as good Christians, a hope in life hereafter. When the way of life is challenged as inhuman, slave-like, unjust, and cruel, their defense is tradition and the right of private property.

Slowly the system is giving way to the twentieth century with its emphasis on science, technology, industry, and the consumer economy. Only in Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba has it been broken badly, and in each instance by violent revolution. It is not a particularly productive system economically and under present population pressure the continent can ill afford to have its better lands in the hands of such inefficient, noncompetitive persons having a medieval way of life and work. Many land reforms are now in effect, but in no country are people really tackling the problem at its root, and rapidly. It is one of communism's favorite targets and against their attacks a Christian has little defense.

Alongside villages and haciendas in the rural areas are the indigenous communities that have successfully defended their lands against *patrón, políticos*, and government alike. These traditional communities never were organized into the hacienda system and have continuously chosen their own traditional authorities. They have common lands for grazing, mining, and agriculture with a strong community spirit in life and work. In Bolivia, where the ex-haciendas are just now beginning to use their freedom well, the traditional communities are much better off in regard to education, local government, and community spirit. These indigenous communities did some trading with the small villages nearby and established bonds of *compadrazgo* with the *vecinos* in town. They all have their own chapels and celebrate their own annual fiestas there.

In the cattle-country section of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador a different system of community life prevails. There is something of the hacienda way of life, but also something of the free community spirit, due to the endless expanses of land for grazing and cultivation. Also, deep in the rain forests of the Amazon Basin, the river communities of rubber and Brazil-nut gatherers have a very isolated, lonely existence. Many of them work for big international companies that pay them a pittance for their heroic lives and work.

Such, then, is urban and rural community life in Latin America today that it is at one and the same time an explosive occasion for

revolution and a lazy, tranquil atmosphere of life and work. In many ways, the old way of life has been passing more rapidly since World War II than meets the eye. Modern educational reforms are opening up schools for isolated regions and the poor as never before. The influx into the city continues because of the glamour of bright lights and of better prospects. Industrialization is slowly becoming a reality even if the new entrepreneur class is slow in coming forth. Just how urbanization programs can cope with the problems of poverty in the city slums is an open question. As far as the Church goes, the one burning issue has to do with the formation of authentic Christians and Christian communities. The people have been used to a religion of externals for so long that a change is hard to produce. Yet there is hope in the new theology and spirit from Vatican Council II. It is very difficult for the structured, institutionalized Church to move with the people, especially when there are so few human and material resources to get the job done. However, there are many interesting experiments underway and things look hopeful.

11.

Social Organization: Communications

One of the sixteen documents coming out of Vatican Council II was that on The Instruments of Social Communication. It was certainly necessary, for the rapidity of communication today is so great that it is one of the most effective ways to form minds and shape consciences on public issues. Within a few hours what happens in Japan is household news in Washington, London, Berlin, or Moscow. Nations are more concerned about their public image than about unemployment, and propaganda has been a very effective weapon in the Cold War. This is doubly true in Latin America with its large, inaccessible rural areas and poverty. By television, transistor radio, and radio telephone it is possible to penetrate the remote mountains and dense jungles without having to pass through many of the intervening barriers physically.

In several countries the illiteracy rates run as high as 65 to 70 per cent. The only way that this large segment of the population can participate in national social, cultural, and political life intelligently in through mass media: radio, television, and movies. One problem that comes immediately to the fore is that of the motivation and attitude of the senders. Frequently it is that of making money, to the point where much of the positive value is lost in jingles and commercial propaganda. This is particularly damaging with very simple people who need information, instruction, or training so badly. Accurate, up-to-date information is very scarce in this area but an attempt will be made to present what is available.

THE PRINTED WORD

For over 500 years now, mankind has had access to the printed word in one form or another. It has advanced to the point where the very poor have easy access to newspapers, magazines, books, librar-

ies, and international news. The only requisite is the ability to read, which in the continent is improving in some parts, but in the most backward areas is almost at a standstill. The daily newspaper is a cause of interest and great joy to the curious human mind. In Latin America there were about 920 dailies in 1965, some of which have good quality. This is not, however, a very large number for nineteen distinct countries, since in the United States alone there are about 1,760. Brazil has close to 300 dailies, Argentina is second with about 240, whereas Paraguay and Costa Rica have 5 to 7. However, only 7 per cent of the population is reached by the newspaper in Venezuela, 5 per cent in Colombia, 3.8 per cent in Guatemala, and 1.8 per cent in Honduras, which points out its drastic limitations in poorer countries. For each 100 persons in Latin America an average of 7.4 read the newspaper regularly while in the United States 32.7 per 100 read a daily newspaper.

Besides the newspaper, magazines (both are spoken of as *revistas* and *folletos*) are very important. Something should be said here about the intellectuals or the cultural elite in most countries. They, along with the military, are truly national groups that can afford to rise above factional interests and speak out for the common interest and good. Because of the unstable political situations, magazine criticism is much feared by *políticos*; intellectuals, as a consequence, are very often in exile. This, along with the unity of language, accounts for a real bond of fellowship and camaraderie among Latin American intellectuals. It is not at all uncommon for a renowned professor, writer, or speaker to have lived and worked in more than one-half of the countries during his lifetime. To publish articles in the leading intellectual journals of Mexico, Uruguay, and Chile is to guarantee oneself a continental following. If you want to know what the temper of the intellectual world is, suscribe to *Cuadernos* from Mexico.

As a rule, this group of select individuals is very anti-North American. To them the United States is like a big, rude, uncouth, and uncultured monster with little refinement or capacity for ideas. There are about 7,700 magazines and 2,000 other literary publications in Latin America. Though this is not extremely high, their intellectual influence is great. Other important types of printed matter are the comic books, picture magazines, and pocket books read by teen-agers. Much of it is pornographic in a way that the United States has only recently begun to experience.

Sometimes it is hard to get the latest scientific, literary, and historical books in Spanish without long delay. However, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, and Madrid all have first-rate publishing houses and do a good job in getting out the latest in Spanish. The four leading countries in Latin America in publishing books, including textbooks, are: Chile, Mexico, Brazil (but obviously in Portuguese) and Argentina. The figures recently for new titles were: Chile, 1,556; Mexico, 4,293; Argentina, 3,645; Brazil, 4,659. This is a deficiency which makes serious study and research difficult without journeying to foreign countries to get the books. It is interesting to note that some 350 to 400 years ago, the Jesuits in their Reductions and the Franciscans in their missionary centers had libraries of 5,000 to 10,000 volumes, but these unfortunately have not been kept up to date.

The major news agencies which serve Latin America come from the United States, England, France, and West Germany. Both AP and UPI come from the United States, AFP from France, UPA from West Germany, along with CTK from Czechoslovakia, and they reach almost all of the countries. Argentina and Brazil have partial services to the continent but only Cuba has a daily service to all of Latin America. In Bolivia for many years there were direct contacts between the mining center of Siglo Veinte and Havana, ostensibly as a news center. This was so strong that *becas* to Cuba were administered in the same Siglo Veinte.

RADIO AND TELEVISION

Radio is by far the most popular and best used of the media for information. In many polls it shows almost twice the coverage of newspapers, and reaches an audience totally untouched by the printed word. Within the last five years there has literally been an invasion of transistors into the remote mountain, valley, and jungle areas. People carry them on foot, on bicycles, and in public transportation. It was calculated that about 29 million receivers were distributed and in use.

Programs aimed at *campesinos* and *obreros* are listened to avidly and the Church has many stations in every country transmitting to the lower classes. Another important use of radios is thought to be in literacy work. Radio Sutetenza in Colombia is probably the best known in this field. However, recent research casts grave doubt on the effectiveness of literacy programs by radio, and especia'ly by

crash programs. Many people are, indeed, taught to read but they do not remain *functionally* literate, even if they had achieved this level at one time. Radio serves many other useful purposes, of course. Radio programming is controlled by law in Bolivia so that it should be 65 to 75 per cent music, 25 to 35 per cent education and information, and less than 5 per cent advertising. However, it runs about 85 per cent music, 10 per cent education, and 5 per cent information, including advertisements. Radios are supposed to be licensed, especially public transmitters. However, in remote areas there are a number of clandestine stations in operation which come to the foreground in moments of agitation and revolution. Small ham sets are licensed and controlled, but here also there are many abuses.

Television is still very new, expensive, and technically inferior in most of Latin America. As one approaches the Caribbean area and the United States it improves, but the farther removed from this zone the worse it is. There were 6 million sets in 1967, whereas there were 78 million sets in the United States in the same year.

The possibilities for TV are tremendous in the field of education, where ground is constantly being lost with the rate of population growth going up every year. It is interesting to see how popular television is in small towns in Peru even though it is mediocre and the programs are old movies or repeats from twenty years ago in the United States. Private homes are rented out each night and filled by neighbors, friends, and farmers to watch anything. People are starved for news, instruction, and entertainment and it is a wonderful opportunity to give them almost anything, including aspects of the Faith. Up to now, the Church has been remiss in penetrating this very new but very costly field.

TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH

Data are extremely scarce and unreliable in this area. Relative statistics show that Brazil had 2 telephones per 100 people, Mexico 12, Ecuador 7, Bolivia 75, and the United States 50. This just about indicates the basic difficulty one will experience with communication down here. And it is not only a question of having a telephone or not, but they malfunction a good part of the time. When a bishop of a town of 100,000 people was being visited by his brother from New York a few years ago, the latter wanted to make a phone call to another part of the city. But he was told by the bishop to walk over there instead, since the chances of the phone working were so small

it would not even pay to try. This indicates something of underdevelopment even in services which have been installed and appear to work. The state of maintenance and repair is so bad at times that people lose all confidence in the apparatus. Another interesting thing is the difficulty of keeping iron or wooden posts and telegraph lines up in the country area.

THE MAIL

Mail service is interesting. There are no reliable statistics on the number of letters, packages, and parcels sent through the mail annually, but to know the facts would be a real lesson in inefficiency, banditry, and just plain stealing. Christmas mail is especially notorious for the amount that does not arrive at all or that has been checked to see whether any money was in the envelope. It is well to advise relatives and friends not to send checks, cash, or other valuable papers through the mail. They have a way of disappearing in an alarmingly high percentage of the time. During times of crisis and revolution, when there are many plots and counterplots, your mail may be checked regularly, so be careful what you write. Once they find money, checks, or important information in your letters, you will never again be safe, nor receive half your mail again. One good tip to remember is to give the clerks in the post office a Christmas gift. It helps considerably to facilitate regular delivery. Mail, interior to the country, is slow, irregular, and unsafe. You will have to rent a small box in the post office, where you go daily to pick up the mail, for there is no delivery service in many places.

MOVIES

Movies of all kinds are popular but especially those from the United States, Italy, France, and Mexico. If you want to know what the poorer class of people are thinking and talking about, go to the Mexican theater and you will find out. Among the countries in Latin America which produce longer movies, and there are ten that do, Mexico is number one in every sense. Quantitatively, Mexico produced forty-eight in 1967, whereas Argentina made twenty-five in the same year. Mexico has many of its own actors and actresses, who are famous throughout the continent. Their music is enjoyed for its Latin style as is the mentality expressed in the movies. There are close to 15,000 theaters in the continent with about four seats per

100 people. The average Latin goes to the theater about five times a year and this is increasing rapidly. The *cine* is not only growing in popularity as one of the leading diversions, but it does a lot in forming mentalities, and romantic customs are imitated quickly by the young. This is another area where the Church has not made a major contribution in forming the mentality of young moviegoers, although *cine foros* are being introduced into many youth-movement formation programs.

The importance of the modern media of communication cannot be exaggerated. Hardly any penetration has been made into the giant continent of Latin America. The future of television, movies, and the printed word is wide open. People are starved for good entertainment, instruction, and news. The possibilities for education and communicating the Faith have hardly been explored. The fact that over 40 per cent of the population is under 15 years of age means a lot in the future of news media and television. The modern world can destroy hundreds of years of custom and tradition in one generation if nobody orients the programs. A people who have never gone through the industrial revolution, or been exposed to the consumer-society mentality, is being shocked into the twentieth century and beyond. If there is something of a culture-gap between parents and teen-agers in any way of life it amounts to an impossible leap down here. Youth is captivated by the image, picture, and novelty of that which "is with it," no matter what the ideological content is. Only by anticipation, and not by subsequent correction, can the new media of communication be the good things that they should be.

12

Social Organization: Public Health

Health is not only of personal and family interest; it belongs to the great common goods of society in general. Society's interest in the control of contagious diseases like tuberculosis, whooping cough, smallpox, and measles is obvious. Likewise food and drug laws are clearly necessary for control of products and medicines that are advertised for public consumption. What is contested very bitterly is that broad area of insurance, hospital care, ordinary doctor bills, ordinary injuries, and surgery. To what extent should medical problems fall under compulsory national programs? Is it really cheaper, more efficient, and more effective to have compulsory medical coverage from the cradle to the grave on the basis of socialized medicine? In countries on the way to development there does not seem to be any other way to cope with the problem. People are very poor, ignorant of modern medicine, and fearful of hospital costs, and this leads to neglect and early death. Not only that, but work capacity is considerably reduced when the population is in bad health. An owner of one of the factories in La Paz says that his workers can stand only about six hours of hard work a day because of poor health and weakness. Such fundamental problems as malnutrition, bad diet, and constant fever reduce work output very quickly.

DOCTORS AND RELATED PROFESSIONS

Medicine has always been one of the most popular courses of study for the oligarchical element in the society, and it still remains one of the most popular courses in universities. Despite this fact, there is a scarcity of doctors. It is estimated that there is a total of 100,000 medical doctors in South America, which would be about 3.5 per 10,000 people. By contrast, the United States has 13.2 doctors per 10,000 people, which makes it four times as well off proportionately as its neighbor continent to the south.

A second factor makes the situation far worse than the general statistic would indicate, and that is bad distribution. For example, in Guatemala the capital city has only 10 per cent of the population but it has 70 per cent of the doctors and 80 per cent of the dentists. The rest of the country has only one doctor per 32,4000 people. Peru is totally lacking in medical care for broad segments of the indigenous people.

A third difficulty is that young doctors are specializing in certain limited fields while other areas of medicine are becoming neglected. Medicine is a seven-year course in the universities in Bolivia. The entrance examination is difficult. Despite the fact that libraries are poor, laboratories mediocre, and the students have poor facilities to study, they turn out a reasonably good practitioner. Another grave problem is the fact that few countries outside of Chile and Argentina have postgraduate work or specialization. As a consequence, many of the new graduates go to the United States, Canada, or West Germany, never to return to their native land to work.

One of the reasons is that young doctors cannot find full-time employment in the cities and they are afraid of the rural areas. They need political pull to get any of the better government jobs with the national petroleum, mining, railroad, military, or social security programs. Many of the well-established doctors have three or four different jobs that pay well, besides teaching in the university. Young graduates are supposed to put in one year in the provinces, where there are no permanent doctors, before they can get their licenses. However, this prospect fills them with fear and there are a thousand ways of dodging this social obligation. One serious difficulty is the lack of social orientation in the last year of studies. As a consequence, medicine is one of the truly *burgués* faculties in the university, and young doctors come out with dollar signs in their eyes, thinking that the government and the world owe them a living. The idea that somebody would sacrifice for his people and have to build his clientele in a relatively poor part of the country never seems to be a serious possibility for most of them.

South America has about 92,000 nurses, which is 1.8 per 10,000 people, whereas in the United States there are 21.9 nurses per 10,000 people. The strange statistic is that in the United States there are 2.3 nurses for every doctor while in Latin America there are more doctors than nurses. This speaks eloquently of the lack of education opportunities for women south of the border and also for the lack of

professional interest among young Latin women. The same story is true in regard to laboratory technicians and auxiliaries.

There is a large number of pharmacists and drugstores in every city. Medicines are expensive but people use them freely. The cities are crowded with dentists, as the statistic from Guatemala indicates. Right now the surprising thing is the large number of young girls studying pharmacy and dentistry in the universities. Departments of veterinary medicine are scarce. The national ministry of public health generally has a small annual budget and, as a consequence, public health programs of preventive medicine are extremely weak. Also, public clinics are poorly staffed, poorly equipped, and ill attended. Even though medicine and the related professional services have been prestige professions for centuries, there is a woeful lack of professional sense in most of the personnel. Medicine promises leisure, prestige, and money but it is a very difficult course of studies and the dedication required can border on the heroic.

FACILITIES FOR THE SICK

In 1960, Latin America had a total of 627,879 hospital beds, which makes a ratio of 31 beds per 1,000 people. Some hospitals are owned and run by the state, but the service is very poor. Patients are expected to furnish their own medicines and any "extra" food that may be desired beyond a woefully insufficient menu. And "extra" care must also come from the patients' friends or relatives, for there are few nurses or auxiliaries available in the hospital itself.

Hospitals are specialized according to sickness (for example TB, lung and heart, etc.) and by profession, such as the hospital for workers or the general hospital for the poor. Clinics are privately owned and privately run. As a rule, they are more expensive but the service is vastly superior. The clinics do not have as many beds either. Dispensaries generally belong to a parish or to the community. They may be staffed by a permanent nurse or two, with regular visiting hours by a doctor who attends several dispensaries a day according to a schedule. Many dispensaries receive free medicines from charitable organizations, so that only a minimal service charge is made to the poor. Besides, the doctors have private offices where they receive and treat patients, and these are referred to as *consultorios*.

The government has a series of first-aid stations distributed

throughout the city to handle vaccinations, accidents, and emergency cases. These stations have ambulances and render services to hospitals, clinics, and doctor's offices with stretcher cases. In the rural areas each province has a sanitary post, or at least is supposed to. These medical outposts are not staffed by doctors and some tragic cases are reported.

About four years ago a *sanitario* was called to a small provincial town to observe what was feared to be a case of bubonic plague. He arrived, but judged that the initial swellings where the neck meets the body were ordinary infections. Just to prove his point he pulled out his pocketknife and cut into one of them. When it produced no puss, he suspected that it really was the plague (which it turned out to be). Immediately the swelling became like a balloon and the young boy died two days later. This kind of butchery is not uncommon, for many of these appointments are purely political and go to people who have no formal medical training. Another *sanitario* was called to an Altiplano village where 20 per cent of the people had died in one month from some kind of epidemic (which, incidentally, is common among the Indian peoples). He arrived after one week, and on his arrival was drunk. During his stay of three days in the nearest *pueblo*, he never did sober up nor did he ever visit the community itself. He talked to several of the white-*mestizo vecinos* and judged that it really was not so important and promptly returned to the provincial capital.

Such epidemics occur yearly and simply run their course without any medical attention. One of the bitter lessons for anyone working in remote areas is to see a family of five in bed on Monday morning with the knowledge that three will be dead by Friday and two well—without a doctor, without medicine, and almost without tears. It causes profound meditation on the providence of almighty God, for they are human beings like the rest of us. Yet life seems so cheap and death so natural, without the great mourning or expense over sickness and death that one sees in the United States.

A number of related services are found in each country peculiar to the problems there. One of the best-received programs goes under the name of SNEM and was sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation. It has done such a marvellous job that in ten years Bolivia has been freed from *paludismo*, or malaria. It is one of the few proofs that a national program can be organized and effective. It, along with Point Four in its road building and maintenance, has done more good

for public relations than $200 million in large AID projects. Another program peculiar to Andean countries goes under the letters of IEMA and is a study of the effects of high altitude on the human body. So far its conclusions concur with the general opinion that after the initial adjustment, no special difficulty is encountered with the exception of shortness of breath and rapid tiring when working hard physically.

There are generally one or more leprosy asylums. They are usually poorly cared for by the state. The same is true of mental health facilities. The methods of treating mental patients are generally antiquated and only recently have the places been cleaned up and put in reasonable order. As might be suspected, they are overcrowded, understaffed, and terribly underfinanced. There are usually few psychiatrists and, even among these few, all are not well trained. Mental health care is among the most underdeveloped areas of medicine in many countries.

A few words should be said here about the national social security programs. They are sometimes based on those of Mexico and France and, as abstractly conceived and thought-out programs, they are beautiful. But they frequently do not work. The monthly payments by employers are very high (about 32.5 per cent of basic salary in one country), which would break most firms in Latin America. Hence, almost all companies have three sets of books, one for government tax officials, one for the *Caja*, and one for themselves and their international headquarters. Besides this, the medical service received through the social security program is frequently a disgrace. Employees prefer any form of private medical program in its place because they end up buying all the medicine themselves and ultimately seeking attention in private clinics. It is one more example of the unrealistic, idealistic concept of law and organization which, however, has tragic effects on workers and the poor.

KINDS OF SICKNESSES

Most people coming to Latin America for the first time do not realize that much of the continent is tropical lowland and rain forest. This means that many of the diseases prevalent are not only those characteristic of underdeveloped peoples the world over, like tuberculosis and anemia, but those peculiar to tropical regions. When it is

said that South America is like Africa, this applies especially to the fevers, sleeping sickness, and elephantiasis found here.

However, at the top of the list of killers are the very ordinary stomach diseases with consequent diarrhea, intestinal infections with high fevers, and liver infections like hepatitis. In the subtropical and tropical areas most of the people are anemic more from worms in the stomach than from insufficient food. The lack of drinkable water is another cause of so much stomach, intestinal, and liver trouble. Parasitic infection is very common and indirectly one of the biggest killers in tropical countries. Hepatitis is a frequent disease for foreigners. Bad water seems to be the principal cause, although fresh vegetables and meat are next on the list.

Other killers and time losers are the respiratory diseases, all the way from common colds to terminal TB. Grippe tending to pneumonia is very common in the high altitudes, where it is cold, windy, and hard to breathe normally. Tuberculosis is the most common disease in several Andean countries. It is estimated that 95 per cent of Bolivians have at least latent TB. Some of it comes from the long years spent in the mines, where eventually the whole family becomes infected, and then whole populations. Starting with silicosis after three years in the interior of the larger tin mines, it turns to advanced TB by five years and renders the worker all but useless after eight to ten years. This spreads and spreads over most of the country. In the relatively germ-free climate of the Altiplano it is dormant under normal eating and sleeping conditions. However, as soon as the people move to the colonies in the subtropics or in the tropics they die within two or three years. The treatment is long and fairly expensive and up to now the national government has no well-planned program to combat this widespread disease.

After this it is necessary to say something about the epidemics which spread through poorer communities in the countryside. Most people are interested in vaccinations against contagious diseases, but they are ignorant of what kind of medicine is necessary or of the necessity to repeat it after three or seven years. Consequently, rural communities are frequently hit with waves of whooping cough, scarlet fever, measles, smallpox, yellow fever, typhoid, and tetanus. As described above, it is very disturbing to see the fatalism present in these people when confronted with an epidemic. One either lives or dies and this without great exterior preoccupation as to the way it goes. This has brought on the exaggerated charge that *campesinos*

love their animals more than their wives, and mourn over a dead ox more than over the death of their own children. Nobody really knows how high infant mortality is in the rural areas, but the baptismal records in some places make it certain that more than 60 per cent of the children born never reach their second year.

In several of the studies done of late, there has appeared a surprisingly high incidence of venereal disease. In a study done in five different areas of Bolivia two years ago it showed up as high as 70 per cent in some communities, with whole families being infected. Certain areas are heavily infested with all classes of tropical fevers, which seem to come from some virus infections in the blood which are all but impossible to kill. Goiter trouble is common in these areas where the iodine content is low, largely because of a weed which takes it out of the soil. Consequently the crops grown in that area have small iodine content and the people have a deficiency in their diets. In certain parts goiters grow to unbelievable proportions. Diseases rare elsewhere, like bubonic plague and leprosy, are not at all uncommon in various tropical regions of the Amazon Basin.

All classes of bugs, insects, snakes, spiders, and beetles are to be seen. Tarantulas and scorpions are frequent house visitors in the tropics, and shoes should be carefully shaken out in the morning before putting them on if they have been sitting in the open over night. Some of the snakes of the python family, the anaconda for example, grow to incredible lengths and diameter. A priest on his vacation two years ago, deep in the interior of the continent, claims that one was killed that was 16 meters long and more than a foot thick in diameter. Many of the larger ants are poisonous, as are several classes of spiders commonly found under ordinary rocks. Vampire bats are common along many of the eastern rivers, but rarely do they do any bloodsucking from humans. Venchukas are found in many subtropical valleys and they can be very dangerous. Their bite is unnoticeable, but the liquid which they secrete while sucking blood can cause a fatal heart disease after some months or years. Couple this with the presence of small tigers, jaguars, crocodiles, man-eating fish, and mountain cats and life seems unreasonably perilous. However, as a matter of fact, certain basic precautions are learned rapidly, and life goes on much as in the big cities.

Most of the poor people have a great fear of medical doctors, hospitals, and modern medicine. Part of the fear comes from

ignorance, some from rumors of the terrible expense involved, and a third cause is a lack of confidence in the unknown. As a result, rural areas are infested with their own quacks called *curanderos* or *brujos*, who have a whole series of potions, incantations, plasters, rituals, dances, and shouts to get rid of the evil spirit. Traditional medicine is still very popular and inexpensive. Even well-educated people have their teas, brews, and inherited cures. There is a tribe of native healers in a part of Bolivia called Charisani who move from Panama to the bottom of Chile with their art. They use herbs, plant roots, and pressure to produce striking cures. These Yatiri are something like the "punch doctors" in the United States, who may have a real medical art. Unfortunately the Catholic priest is looked upon as something of an official *brujo*. His sacred oils, hosts, and blessings are valued for their curative powers in the body more than for what they can do for the soul. At times, the sacristan will sell unconsecrated hosts or small amounts of the holy oils to sick persons. Besides this, holy water is desired more for drinking than for sprinkling. How to change this image is a serious problem in many parts.

Modern medicines are available but are very expensive. There are many delays in customs with free medicines sent from the United States, both for political and business reasons. There is some truth in the charge about the competition with pharmacists, doctors, and clinics through giveaway programs in parish dispensaries. However, there is another side to the same problem: the open robbery carried out by these same drugstores and doctors with the poor. Vaccinations are sought to cure more than to prevent diseases. People expect miracles and instant cures from injections and are very disappointed if the sickness continues for some days after taking the medicine. There are a large number of phony druggists, peddlers, and practitioners. Speaking from experience, in rural areas it behooves one to beware of administrators of hospitals, private injection places, and abortion mills. Traveling "doctors" are also common and should be carefully checked out for credentials before being allowed to practice.

Health is certainly one of the pillars in any development program. It seems to be an expense that produces nothing constructive, and so poor people let sickness go until the suffering is unbearable. One interesting thing to note is that people who grow up in countries that

have only one season have no resistance to extremes of cold or to insect bites. The Altiplano is almost free of mosquitoes, bugs, and even ordinary houseflies. When these people go to the tropics they have neither resistance in their blood against small bites nor experience in how to cope with them. As a consequence, ordinary mosquito bites swell all out of proportion to their normal size in people not from the area. This has been one of the serious problems in moving people from the mountain areas to the tropical colonies. Couple this with latent TB, which immediately becomes active, and one sees why so many of them return home after six months or a year. Much good work has been done, and is being done, by the Church in the field of sickness and suffering in Latin America, but the problems are going to multiply geometrically with the population increase. With more than 40 per cent of the people under 15 years of age, the emphasis is on sicknesses of the young, the poor, and the underdeveloped in tropical countries.

13.

Social Organization: Education

In any long-range program for development, education is a very important factor. It is from the schools that a country will gain citizens capable of voting intelligently and participating in government. Professional and technical competence also depend upon schools and high-level instruction. The Church likewise looks to good schools to prepare its leaders for their roles. It is precisely because of its importance that education is a great problem in development in Latin America. The Incas and others had no alphabet nor written culture, so many indigenous people have absolutely no remote basis for reading and writing. In an authoritarian society, education is for those who are naturally superior and not for the masses. In Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Guatemala less than half the population speaks Spanish. Hence, in many countries both traditions are opposed to easy and rapid advances in education.

Besides this, the overwhelming cost of multiplying buildings, equipment, teachers, and administration is prohibitive in many instances. This is particularly true in modern scientific and technical training, which demands so much in the line of laboratories, experimentation, and machines with which to practice. The whole question of value systems hangs in the balance, for such problems as education for the masses, equal opportunity for all students, highly qualified and well-prepared teachers, adequate classrooms and laboratories, modern libraries and texbooks, and technical and vocational schools all depend upon the willingness to sacrifice other short-range advantages for education of all types and levels as top priority.

LITERACY AND ILLITERACY—SOME FACTS

A functional democracy rests on two things, justice and truth. The truth spoken is practical truth available to and participated in by the ordinary citizen. Elections, referendums, meetings, and majority

decision can be effective only if people can at least read and write. Yet it is estimated that in Latin America, across the board, a full 43 per cent of those who are 15 years old and more cannot read nor write. In Haiti only 19 per cent are literate; in Bolivia, Guatemala, and El Salvador, 30 per cent; while in Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica, it is up to 85 per cent. These calculations do not count people with less than five or six years of schooling as illiterate. Yet it is a proven fact that usually only those who go beyond five years of primary school remain literate for life and the vast majority of the rest lapse back. That is why many people feel that another 20 per cent should be added on to the 40 per cent and there would be about 60 per cent across the board who cannot read nor write with any degree of adequacy for literate life. In Bolivia, for example, 80 per cent of the indigenous people are illiterate and 60 per cent speak no Spanish.

In the rural areas of most countries the illiteracy rate is much higher than in the cities. For example, in Brazil, the ratio of urban to rural is 6 to 27 per cent; in Costa Rica, it is 8 to 28 per cent; in Paraguay, 14 to 37 per cent; and in Venezuela, 30 to 72 per cent. Despite many efforts made by programs in the schools, through radios, and by private tutoring, there is almost no progress. If only in the generation of young people actually of school age there were anything like 100 per cent coverage, the situation would be hopeful. But in the following section statistics will show that primary-school dropouts in the first year in some places are as high as 50 per cent, and that only 9 per cent of those who begin ever finish as much as five years. These are the figures which make one conclude that education for the masses is still largely a fiction, and that no serious attempt is being made to attack the problem at its root cause.

The problem starts with the building itself, for just as the house conditions the family's daily life, so too the school building conditions the whole learning process. In some countries 90 per cent of the schools are converted buildings which originally were never intended for classes. This means inadequate space, lack of light, poor distribution of rooms, and a general lack of orientation toward education. Besides this, each school sometimes has three different groups that meet there: one in the morning, one in the afternoon, and a third at night. This means short classes, no outside study time at school, no individual help from teachers, and a concept that schooling is only a part-time, lackadaisical affair. Most of the rooms are

badly crowded, lacking in the most rudimentary equipment such as seats and blackboards, and almost completely without textbooks.

The situation grows steadily worse as one goes from private to public schools and from urban to rural ones. It would be impossible for many of you to realize the abominable conditions under which the very few years of instruction are to be given in rural areas. Many of these indigenous communities were told in recent years to build schools. No one told them what a school should be like, so they imitated their own homes, which are without windows, without floors, and have almost no furniture. In some areas at least half the buildings proved totally useless or had to be rebuilt in part. But with the tremendous rate of population increase, and 40 per cent of the people under 15 years of age, nothing short of a crash campaign will even touch the problem. The sad fact is that other needs are more politically expedient than education as long as the elite have their children in reasonably good private, urban schools.

In regard to students, here are some of the awesome threats for the future. While percentages of enrollment in primary school range from less than 50 per cent of the school-age population in some countries to about 90 per cent in a few countries, the dropout rate is very high. Moreover, since most dropouts occur in the first year or two, a high proportion of persons thus become functional illiterates who lose their reading skills.

As an average for the Latin American region, people over 15 years old had less than 2.2 years of primary instruction, as calculated from the last large census in 1960. On the other hand, there is a new hunger for education, as evidenced in the enrollment rate, which grows at 6.1 per cent, double the population growth rate. At the secondary and higher levels, the educational situation continues the general outline of pyramid begun in the primary grades: only about 20 per cent of those between the ages of 15 and 19 begin secondary schools and, from that reduced number, only about 7 per cent finish secondary school, 3 per cent start any kind of higher education, and less than 1 per cent finish higher education.

That any school is as good as its teachers is somewhat axiomatic in educational theory. Here, too, the picture needs gigantic improvement. A full 44 per cent of the primary teachers have no degrees, and in the Dominican Republic it is as high as 80 per cent, while in Argentina as low as 10 per cent. In secondary schools, the situation is much better, for about 70 per cent have their basic degrees for

teaching. Fully one-half the teachers in Haiti have no training whatsoever, and one-half the primary teachers in Brazil have only primary education themselves. Many teachers have two and even three jobs, and some of them have businesses or factory jobs besides. This is due to low salaries, but also to a tendency to look down on teaching as a profession. So many teachers are such by default and not by desire that it can hardly be called a prestige profession.

Another problem is found in regard to the curriculum and academic instruction. In primary and secondary schools, each student may carry as many as fourteen subjects a week. Oftentimes, the curriculum is still based on ancient European models from countries with far different educational needs and traditions. This makes instruction superficial, decorative, and formalistic. No depth is reached in any subject, nor is there any serious attempt to penetrate and master the matter at hand. Education continues to mean information memorized, mechanical copying in notebooks, and routine passing of classes and grades until the diploma is gained. Both teaching and learning tend to be nonscientific and lacking in creativity. A nonfunctional, nontechnical education is presented, with few texts and fewer laboratories for individual experimentation and study.

School days are many, 200 for primary and 180 for secondary, but much conniving goes on to fulfill the law. In some rural areas, seldom do professors or students actually fulfill one-half of what the law requires and what they put into their reports. Absenteeism, strikes, and demonstrations use up much time every year. The lack of classroom discipline is something that has to be experienced to be believed. The fact that a student is supposed to be listening and participating in a learning process by active contribution has nothing to do with what goes on. Crowded conditions account for some of the nonsense, but family background, lack of interest, teaching methods, and a totally nonprofessional atmosphere are far more responsible. A Marxist mentality in words, concepts, and ideas is communicated in many books and notes used by professors and dictated to students. Some of the teachers are trained as Marxists in their normal-school days or in the universities. This is less true, but not lacking, in private schools, even those controlled by the Church.

Education is administered under the national Ministry of Education and Arts in most countries. Theoretically, there is academic freedom, but in practice there is state monopoly in both control and the planning of courses and examinations at least. At times, the

centralization and political interference is so stifling that no real freedom is left. Only 2 per cent of the gross national product goes to education down here, whereas it is close to 4 per cent in the United States, so that even on a proportionate basis public education is ill-supported. However, national budgets gave about 11 per cent of public money to education in 1957, and it was up to 19 per cent in 1961, so there is considerable hope. This is about the proportion spent on the various sectors of public education. In general in Latin America, the Church is responsible for a third of the education.

Throughout the educational systems some of the serious problems have to do with the politics of entrance conditions, marks, and make-up examinations. Parental influence, family prestige, and political pressures are brought to bear to get children into the schools of good repute, be they church-sponsored or private. After acceptance the same pressures are tremendous for good marks, or at least there is the feeling that social prestige is not hurt by failing. Finally, a farce is played out in the form of make-up exams that have little to do with academic ability and much to do with social prestige.

Both student and teacher federations are highly political and only in a minimal way are they academic structures. They call strikes, ask for pay increases, and participate in public demonstrations more for political than for educational reasons. Now that many of them are infiltrated and dominated by Communist-Marxist tendencies there is even more agitation than before.

To sum it all up, one would have to say that something of a great deception is being worked on parents, society, and the Church under present conditions. Yet with the weight of tradition, politics, and money being what they are, it is difficult to change. However, all is not black and in many countries there is something of an authentic awakening among students, teachers, and society to the realities of genuine academic excellence.

THE UNIVERSITIES

The ideas of Latin American universities are in for a change. Throughout the continent two cries are heard, for reform and revolution of, and in, the university. The goal of a literary, artistic, legal education aimed at by the sons of the oligarchical families is passing through a proletarian crisis. The children of the masses are beginning to knock at the doors, clamoring for admission. Once in, they are

insisting on new courses in keeping with the needs of their development. Professors who are ill-prepared, or worse yet, little capable, are being challenged and threatened with boycotts and strikes. The clamor is heard for more books, laboratories, classrooms, and dormitory facilities. More financing and open financing are being asked for, both in private and public universities. Political and prestige ideals will soon be bitterly contested in favor of concrete, realistic objectives aimed at the professional, technical, and human needs of the society.

Curriculum and course sequence is badly fragmented by the *facultad* structure of the university. Basic courses in mathematics, language, economics, and sociology have to be duplicated for relatively small groups in each *facultad* because of their autonomy and academic independence under their own deans. Course sequence from first through final year is not carefully structured so that one subject builds on another, with the last years being concentrated in the profession desired. There is much stress on a speculatively technical or professional training. For example, the percentage of students in the various departments has run like this: (1) medicine, 20 per cent; (2) law, 20 per cent; (3) engineering, 18 per cent; (4) social science, 17 per cent; (5) humanities, 11 per cent; (6) pedagory, 4 per cent; (7) exact sciences, 4 per cent; (8) fine arts, 3 per cent; and (9) agriculture, 3 per cent. Thus you can see the heavy preponderance, as traditionally, on law, humanities, social science (which generally is not sociology), and medicine. Engineering is rising rapidly because it is a prestige profession in life and not necessarily because it marks a change in mentality or values.

The students who enter are still predominantly from the upper classes, although this is changing rapidly. So many of them are part-time students, at least as to dedication of time and interest, that they cannot give their whole life over to the university work. As a consequence, some of them are almost career students, who may need eight or ten years to finish the four or five years' course sequence. Many of them are so caught up in the politics of co-government and political parties that academic excellence falls into third or fourth place. There is still much copying, cheating, and preference shown for family name, prestige, and politics in marks. Universities have little campus life as in the United States, so that many students have poor housing, food, and moral conditions for study and professional excellence. Many times there are no textbooks for the courses but

only notes from the professor, which often enough are badly outdated. Library and laboratory facilities are very limited so that it is hard to supplement class work with good outside reading or practical experiments.

Most of the teachers are part-time and there is much interest in being a prestigious *catedrático*. They tend to constitute a closed circle of older men who resist the new blood in their midst, persons who have new ideas and a much more professional career sense as full-time teachers. Sometimes they have a worse record of class attendance than the students. In one university last year, an economics teacher showed up twice out of ten times in two weeks, and then his students were not there because they had no advance notice that he was coming. Many of them are using notes from their own course of studies twenty years ago that have not been modified since. Some follow a strict method of dictation in the classroom and there is little opportunity for questions or discussion on the part of the students.

There is much politicking for the position of dean in the faculty and for rector of the university. Political and ideological convictions have much to do with teaching positions and promotions, with minimal concern for competitive excellence. Many of the older teachers have never made postgraduate studies outside their own country, or even outside of their own university. There is much favoritism in accepting and marking students according to ideological convictions and prestige.

Administration is very complex and weak. Not only are there many financial problems, but duplication of jobs uses up what little money there is. It often happens that the rector is such for political reasons and not for his abilities as a known educator. Buildings, libraries, laboratories, textbooks, offices, and a host of other curriculum-related services are very weak. Co- and extracurricular services like housing, lunch rooms, cafeterias, dormitories, cooperatives, book stores, social rooms, study rooms, and recruiting and placement services are all but nonexistant.

To sum it all up, four major problems exist: 1. The whole question of co-government needs to be evaluated and modified. To what extent students should have full voice and equal representation in the running of all aspects of the university is a very important point. 2. The much talked-of autonomy needs to be looked at carefully. Not only politicos, but many serious educators question its absolute validity, at least as put into practice to shield all types of

shenanigans. However, on the other hand, in the concrete order it seems necessary in order to protect academic freedom. 3. The extreme influence of political parties and ideologies is very detrimental to the intellectual goals of the student. Often it happens that academic excellence falls into second or third place among priorities. 4. The whole restructuring of the university along different lines than that of fragmented *facultades* with autonomous deans needs to be considered to prevent wasted talent and time.

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

The situation of vocational education and training differs greatly from country to country. The spectrum includes some countries with only token programs as well as other countries with many schools and lines of development. In general, the picture has been changing rapidly in the last fifteen years. There are many more opportunities for vocational education than there had been in Latin America and the variety of types of institutions and curriculum is much greater. As yet, however, the rate of increase in this type of education in many countries does not match the rate of school-population growth.

As in other parts of the world, vocational education in Latin America, when poorly planned, can be a trap. It amounts to an inferior type of secondary education. It thus closes off access to the university and effectively keeps the lower classes out of the general secondary schools. Moreover, if the skills taught in the schools are too narrowly technical and limited in their applications, they will be outmoded quickly with the advent of automation or lesser types of technical modernization. On the other hand, technical and vocational schools sometimes afford opportunities to potential secondary-school students who otherwise would not have the chance to enter that level of education.

Vocational education must be conceived in larger terms than formal schooling, for a great deal of vocational, especially technical, training takes place on the job. Some countries, notably Brazil and Venezuela, have been advanced in their programs of cooperating with industry to help furnish on-the-job training as well as academic education after work hours.

Most of the vocational schools in Latin America are to be found

on the secondary level. Generally these are commercial, technical, and teacher-training institutions. It has been interesting to note over a period of years how the level of education required to enter these institutions has risen steadily. In addition, there are smaller numbers of nursing schools, middle-level agricultural schools, seminaries, and military colleges. While most of these schools grant the coveted *bachillerato* diploma, there are other schools which frequently do not show up in the official statistics but which afford vocational training, nonetheless. Such are the rather numerous schools of *corte y confección* (dressmaking), the military-band schools, noncommissioned officer schools, short-term secretarial schools, and language institutes.

In recent years many countries have established or strengthened superior industrial institutes. One typical pattern is that of having two levels of training at these institutes: the secondary level for what are called in some countries *expertos* in auto repair, cabinet making, and the like, and the superior level for *técnicos*, who may or may not approach engineers in their expertise.

Despite elaborate plans, the state of repair of the training equipment and the level of training in these vocational institutions is inferior in many parts of Latin America. Where the level of training is adequate or superior, a further problem asserts itself more strongly, the loss of talent through immigration. In the case of one well-developed industrial institute, 60 per cent of its graduates left the country in a three-year period. A further problem is the distribution of schools in the city and the country areas. In many rural areas the only vocational training available is teacher training.

For the future, since vocational training has to be adjusted to occupational realities, a few educational planners are urging training institutions for middle-level skills. For example, either more highly trained nurses or medical specialists with two years of university training may be a better answer for the needs of remote areas than fully trained doctors. Also, such planners are thinking in terms of more general, more profound, and more flexible education in mathematics and science than of training in specialized skills which may be outdated within a lifetime.

There are still many long-range decisions to be made in regard to education in Latin America. Does Latin America want a system something like that of England, which has recognized a sharp break

early in the program between those supposedly capable of university work and those who are not? The latter can receive very fine technical and vocational training and make a good contribution to society in this way. Continental education in northern Europe is somewhat like that of England, with a competition in examinations and a discipline in classes that are close to inhuman. Russia has a selective process also, with a very heavy emphasis on instruction in ideology as well as on physical sciences and engineering. Here, too, both the pedagogy and discipline are severe. In the United States great stress is put on education for the masses and equal opportunity for all. Some feel that this is wasteful and fails to recognize the God-given distinction in talents among students.

Whatever decisions are best according to the needs of developing countries, a much more authentic approach to the problem is needed. Political and prestige factors have to be reduced and more responsibility placed in the hands of parents and the local community. When money is scarce to do even a minimal number of the projects demanded by social, economic, cultural, and community development, there is a tendency to slight those things which produce only long-range effects, like education. Some of these problems come up in the schools sponsored by the Church, although their academic level may be better. One major problem is class identification with the upper middle class and the rich. Generally a combination of expense and academic standards keep the poor away. Suffice it to say that the problems are gigantic and getting worse as population increases geometrically.

14.

Social Organization: Justice, A Case Study

There is a three-part refrain which says: beware of the Chilean woman, of the Peruvian worker, and of Bolivian justice. It is not only the fact that a good bit of injustice is found in Bolivia, as in every country, but the way in which justice is carried out is somewhat unique. However, it has much in common with other Latin countries. It is not so much a question of robberies, murders, lies, promises unkept, or cheating, as it is a problem of institutionalized injustice. Injustice in public office at all levels has become a way of life to the point that it may be expected by some ordinary people in seeking jobs or public service.

GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

It is said that in pre-Castro Cuba, $2 million a year disappeared into politicians' and friends' pockets, money that should have gone for public works and necessities. Many people say that at least now under the Communist regime nobody is putting his hand into the public till for fear of having it cut off.

Salaries are low and there is little hope of advancement or reward for hard work over long years. There is generally no such thing as a civil service system, and the type of spoils system at work is based on family ties, social prestige, and political influence. Many supernumeraries are hired and poverty is everywhere, so there is constant temptation to make that "quick buck" on the side. Once again an element of paternalism runs through government, public duties and offices, law-enforcement agencies, legal processes, and traditional justice. In this chapter, questions of contractual and personal justice are going to be left to one side in order to concentrate exclusively on public or social justice.

Once an election has been won or a palace revolution successful, the new president and his party (or, in some cases, the new *caudillo* and his henchmen) look upon the government as their business. Lifetime service to a cause is unheard of and the attitude is very much one of a "once in a lifetime" opportunity to make money for yourself, your friends, and the party. During the elections many promises are made which are never kept because there was no intention of keeping them. Ballots are distributed by the controlling party with great caution, and if the election is by colored ballot then it happens that only the green ballots ever arrive in many parts of the country. The actual balloting itself is under political control and opposition votes are destroyed and substituted for by the controlling faction. One of the things to be noted is the lack of democratic experience in elections and government at lower levels. In many countries, the only elections even provided for by constitution are for mayors of large cities and for president. Hence, there is no feeling for "town-hall democracy" and honest, open elections. After taking over his office, the president will be expected to place relatives, friends, and political colleagues in good positions whether they have the talent and training or not.

High government officials in cabinet positions and in congress do the same on lower levels and to a lesser degree. Nonetheless, they are expected to take on superfluous office personnel, multiply jobs in projects under their control, and listen to the needs of friends and constituents with endless patience. Another interesting thing to note is the discrepancy between wages paid to manual laborers and those paid to personal or political cronies. Even when money is scarce, as in the present mining situation, salaries of $10,000 a year and up are not uncommon in the central office, while people working in the mines are lucky if they make a yearly total of $500.

Public works are frequently chosen according to political advantage and opportunism. When passing through the country area one may wonder why this road curves so far inland; he finds that it was approved at a time when the owner of the hacienda was Minister of Economy and he conveniently rerouted it to pass his *finca*. The same holds for railroads that strangely enough just happen to go past certain tin mines or have long spurs going into a close friend's mine. Another interesting thing is how many public projects are left unfinished or, if terminated, go unused because they are practically useless. A rather large percentage of public money goes for "pres-

tige" projects, such as a new location for the marketplace whether or not anyone really wants a new market. Another fair percentage of projects never get off the ground because the alloted money disappears before the work is started. Many of the people will not contribute anything to public works unless the priest or some religious is in charge of finances. This even holds for credit and savings cooperatives in the beginning. It would be interesting to see how many times priests and religious are the treasurers of public monies, or at least occupy responsible positions, where they can watch expenditures closely.

PUBLIC DUTIES AND OFFICES

Much has already been said on taxes and tax programs so they can be handled lightly here. Only a small percentage of people ever pay much attention to their taxes because the very system is often antiquated and unjust. It is not at all uncommon to sell a car for one price and have the legal contract drawn up for several hundred dollars less. The same holds for income taxes, where a basic salary is put down and then a whole series of benefits or gifts is worked out which will give a man a just salary without his having to pay the exorbitant tax. As was mentioned above, the social security program is so unrealistically high that every company keeps several sets of books, and uses the same system of benefits and gifts to avoid paying the full salary according to the law. Land and property taxes are frequently uncollected and there are certain rural areas where government tax collectors are afraid to enter for fear of their lives. Among the most urgently needed reforms to prevent revolution in Latin America, that of taxes and the tax system is high on the list. New forms of income tax are badly needed, as well as a system which will allow local and regional governments to keep a certain percentage and avoid centralizing everything in the national capital.

Interior *aduanas* and check points along the frontiers are national disgraces. The amount of stolen and damaged merchandise at times exceeds that which arrives in good condition. Cases of whiskey arrive with all the bottles filled with water, and cartons of paper or food come with two or three packages missing per box. The complicated system of red tape, fines, and jacked-up prices to get merchandise out of the government's *depositos* is another scandal. Companies simply pay $50 or $100 a month to officials as a kind of regular fine

just to expedite service. If one is unwilling to pay bribes or to give substantial gifts, a way is always found to complicate the paper work for another day, or to figure out some fine for illegal procedure. Here again it is so necessary to have a few well-placed friends who can help you out in need, and in general at Christmas time to remember the ordinary workers in a small way. This is well understood by everybody and is much more just than paying under the counter every time something comes in.

Besides this, the problems with contraband are unbelievable. Small items that enter Bolivia from Peru, Argentina, or Brazil are deliberately winked at as a way for poor people to make a living. But at one time the train running from the Brazilian border to Santa Cruz was estimated to be carrying 95 per cent contraband. During the mid-fifties, when the financial crisis was bad and there were food shortages in La Paz, regular businesses were set up in contraband between the Peruvian border and La Paz. The number of indigenous women who engage in small-time contraband is surprising; the trains that come from the frontiers to the major cities are half filled with women who conceal nylon stockings, rings, and a host of small items in their many skirts and dresses. Of late, there are women *aduana* agents to check the clothing of these women.

The amount of duplication, red tape, and inefficiency in getting immigration papers straightened out is absolutely fantastic. Many religious communities have someone who is entirely specialized in these complicated steps, one who is preferably a good friend of some well-placed people, to get things done. Before too long you will have to go the city hall for permissions regarding water or property titles. This is an interesting experience, though exasperating. It all functions on a basis of personalism; the first in line, the top paper in a basket, or promises for tomorrow are meaningless when a friend or someone willing to pay a little on the side walks in.

LAW AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

The Minister of Government is a powerful man. He is not only in charge of law and order throughout the land, but he appoints lesser governmental officials and policemen, and is in charge of the national police force. His files on all political parties and factions are voluminous and up to date. He is an expert at smelling out plots and

he knows how to nip them in the bud through a system of arrests, torture, and imprisonment. Through a system of veiled threats, house visits, and surprise beatings his men are able to keep rival political groups off balance. The final step is to exile major leaders accused of plotting against the government, to remote spots inside the country or to neighboring lands.

This is a kind of game played and understood on all sides, for there is no such thing as "her majesty's loyal opposition" as in England. When one party is out of power it can rightly be taken for granted that its supporters will set out to humiliate, weaken, and destroy the victors. This is why it is so hard to find leaders who are honest and are seeking the genuine common good. Immediately they are suspected of stealing public funds, accused of favoritism to friends and relatives and of using terror methods to remain in power. This is part of the tradition of the *caudillo-cacique-patrón* in leaders and it is impossible to think that someone is so naive as to really be anything different.

There is a kind of *secret police for political crimes* called the DIC, Department of Criminal Investigation. Their obligation is to investigate and solve crimes, but it is utterly unbelievable how few crimes are ever solved, including murders. What they are really competent at is political infighting and investigation of political plots and intrigues. They have highly refined techniques for making people talk, such as coming into the suspect's room at two in the morning and punching him in the nose while he is sleeping because people are more likely to confess their crimes then. Several of the top men were trained in Russia during the fifties and are really men to be feared for their tactics of infighting.

The *carabineros*, those in olive-drab uniforms, are the real policemen. They keep good order and are well trained and efficient against riots. They are the envy of the army and at times there are fights between the cadets in their respective national officer training schools in La Paz. The *carabineros* have a large national academy headquarters in La Paz, where they receive the latest training from FBI personnel from the United States. The military forces are in their *cuarteles* except during times of revolution or training. They may man certain frontier posts or check points, but outside of actual trouble they are not too important in law enforcement.

There are a host of lesser civic officials in the provinces, cantons, and smaller cities called *corregidores, intendentes*, or simply

inspectores. These men have a role to play both in settling *demandas* brought to them and in investigating certain types of crimes. All of these jobs are political appointments and fall under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Government. Even the subprefects, who are the top government officials in the provinces, and the mayors in smaller cities are appointees of this same minister. As you can see, he is a powerful man and capable of running a tight ship for the president.

PROCESSES OF ORDER AND JUSTICE

There are many distinct processes for order and justice because the written law does not have much meaning to people, since they live by custom and not by law. The first process is that of car registration, traffic control, and direction by *tránsito* (the men in the blue uniforms). To get a license to drive may cost a pretty penny, but there is seldom a test for competence. Vehicles have to undergo a periodic inspection for their functional excellence, for which a stamp is given that is to be affixed to your windshield or kept in the car. This is really a form of tax on cars, besides a way of making business for friends in garages who will be carefully recommended to negligent owners of faulty vehicles. When traveling in the countryside you will need a permit called an *hoja de ruta*. These can also be hard to get at times, for it is another opportunity to put a road tax on drivers.

By far the most interesting thing to observe is the control and direction of traffic. It is a very poorly paid job given to poorly educated and trained people who have recently arrived in the city from the *campo*. At moments of difficulty such as traffic jams, rush hours, or accidents, there is a flurry of whistle blowing and shouting, but little direction. Violations of secret regulations are frequent and call for a defined list of fines to be read to you. Ordinarily, however, a long talk with the *tránsito* official may save you a trip to the central office and a much bigger fine. It is surprising to see how much more carefully they check traffic, parking, and speed when holidays are near or when foreigners are involved. Money is needed for holiday gifts and the foreigner is relatively easy bait, so such opportunities should not be missed. If you buy or sell cars, it is not only a question of license plates and a paper to show ownership, but you have to check carefully on import taxes, sales taxes, and papers of registration in the *tránsito* office.

Another system of order and justice is run by the Ministry of Labor (*Trabajo*). Labor legislation is modern but once again not fitted to the reality of a developing country, so there are a million and one dodges by people seeking justice outside of the written law. Once an employee has stayed ninety or more consecutive days, one cannot fire him without social benefits. It is difficult to say just what the benefits are, but they fall under at least four titles. In the first place, one has to give him one month's salary for every year he has worked. Secondly, all the back vacations the worker never took have to be paid. Ordinary workers get ten days a year, professional people fifteen days, and executives twenty-one. Thirdly, one will have to pay a percentage on the thirteenth month which workers receive at Christmas time in the form of *aguinaldo*. Finally, there will be the question of a fine for firing the worker; it is called *desahucio*. Only if one can prove that the worker stole something or was molesting other workers are you exempt from these worker benefits. If the worker leaves voluntarily, then he obviously forfeits all his social benefits. Another system used frequently is to hire employees on *contratos de obra* for a definite period of time to accomplish specified tasks. Here too, there is no question of social benefits but the *aguinaldo* must be included. The Ministry of Labor has its own system of courts to receive claims, gripes, and *demandas*. They have their own judges, who operate independently of ordinary avenues of justice and can even resist presidential decrees.

The whole system of ordinary courts, judges, jails, and sentences is most interesting. It is a combination of oriental and occidental justice. There are no juries to try cases but different types of judges to prepare cases and to judge on which side lies justice. These judges have almost the worst reputation of anybody in the country for honesty. They are subject to so many political pressures, pressures of friendship, and offers of bribes that it is all but inhuman to expect them to be anything different than what they are. The delays, pay-offs, and downright deceptions are the most tragic aspect of legal procedures. One judge said that he always receives bribes from both sides and that way no one can say that he plays favorites. The maximum sentence in Bolivia now is thirty years since the constitutional elimination of the death penalty eight years ago.

In the preparation of any case, the criminal and civil aspects are very carefully distinguished. The difference between a felony and a simple misdemeanor is whether the action was completely voluntary and malicious, or not. It is not based on the gravity of the action

itself. Seldom does a sentence pass ten years and this is considered to be extremely severe. The principal factor in heavy or light sentences, just as in oriental justice, depends on whether the criminal repents or not. A really heavy sentence will be imposed on somebody who maliciously premeditated the crime for months and even now manifests not the slightest sign of repentance. On the other hand, a murderer who acted in a moment of passion and is now truly sorrowful for the wrong, and even willing to pay money to those whom he wronged, will probably be walking the streets tomorrow after the judge has finished the case.

Jails are extraordinary places, especially in the provinces and cantons; as a matter of fact, they are unbelievable places. There is no money to feed the prisoners so they have to get a job during the day if they want to eat. At night they come into the jail to sleep in adobe shacks half fallen down, where there is nothing but an adobe floor for a bed. At the national level, jails are larger and built more according to international custom. Political prisoners are more common than anybody else and more feared. The gravest danger is not to have enough friends who will not only visit you, but will also come to feed and clothe you, and care for you if you are sick. One very interesting sidelight regards the correction homes for women. If the man goes to jail, then the woman and children have to be cared for in the correction home if they do not have relatives and friends who will take them in.

Another side of legal paperwork and cases is the role of lawyers. In the first place, the *facultades* of law in the universities have very little to do with the practice of law in courts or in drawing up legal documents. Students in *derecho* are much more students of jurisprudence in the old Roman sense and come out prepared as philosophers more than as lawyers. They are the masters of the overcharge and the extra charge for "items." There is a basic retaining fee for their services and then extra fees for documents, hearings, briefs, trips, conversations, and office time. As a rule they will contact the lawyer for the opposition and see whether they cannot work out an arrangement outside of court. Most important of all is their relation with the judge. Much more will depend on their political influence, power, and friendship than on any strict merits of justice or injustice. As you can judge for yourself, the system functions so differently from what you are used to in the United States that one experience of it is indeed bitter medicine.

TRADITIONAL JUSTICE

Caveat emptor!: "Let the buyer beware!" should be written over stores, public markets, and country fairs. There are no set prices, as a rule, for merchandise, food, or animals and the contest of buying something is delightful. Prices set by sellers start high and buyers start low. In the back and forth process there is an interesting exchange of personalities and prices. As a rule, there is a point beyond which the seller will not go, and this is fairly close to the just price. However, for North Americans to enter into this process is difficult. As a matter of fact, prices double in almost every store when the blond-haired *gringo* steps up. A *gringo* is thought to be exceptionally rich, naive, and ripe for the picking. Besides the wrangle over prices, you must check carefully both quantity and quality. A kilo frequently is not a kilo and it is hard to distinguish between a juicy rabbit or a well-prepared black cat.

Another problem current among Latin Americans is the question of usury in interest rates. Fantastic rates are charged, especially to those who can least afford to pay. A man who cannot read or write or even speak Spanish is as helpless as a child when he comes to borrow money.

The Indians do not like Western ways of justice and they exercise a system that has been inherited from centuries past. Community judgment and punishment is not uncommon among the Aymaras of Bolivia and Peru. A woman who has a child out of wedlock will have her head shaved and be put on public work for the school or church for an entire year. If the young man will not marry her, she may eventually be driven from the community.

There is much fear of divine *castigo* for public sins such as abortion, failing to have children baptized, or notorious incest between brother and sister. Hence, such crimes against the community cannot be overlooked nor tolerated lightly. Another punishment in these same communities for very serious crimes like murder is to catch and kill the perpetrator. That these and similar cases still take place could easily be proved. Wrangles over land are the principal cause of fights within the family to the point of murder. Another evil is the drunken fiesta where ears are chewed off, hands mangled with dynamite, and ordinarily peaceful people turned into raving maniacs. Yet if you live and work with these simple people and treat them

kindly they will be the best friends you ever had. They have much more sympathy for the foreigner, especially the priest or religious, than they have for their own from the towns or the cities.

Perhaps you now understand the refrain, "beware of Bolivian justice." There are many positive things to be said for this sense of law, crime, and order in society. It is a very human, tranquil way to get things done. Surprisingly enough, it does not lead to an excessive multiplication of crime nor injustice. One element is extremely bad and that is the large amount of institutionalized injustice. Public morality is the greatest need in Latin America. Starting with the president and moving on down the line there has got to be good example in the area of justice. People can complain about sexual looseness but justice is the public virtue. Even after a generous allowance is made for what is good in personalism and paternalism, there is a bad overdose of injustice remaining.

Some people feel that the only way to purify the society after centuries of public immorality is the strong-arm method of Castro in Cuba: to the cemetery with anyone who gets his hand into the till. The only alternative seems to be a much more effective role of the Church in society. After the vision of faith, which opens new dimensions to man's life, the greatest contribution of Christianity to development is moral integrity. The ideals of hard work, a spirit of love and sacrifice for neighbor before self, equality and fraternity of all in Christ, the dignity and worth of each man in God are some of the pillars of Western civilization that have enabled it to make such giant contributions to world civilization and progress.

15

Social Stratification; Conflict, and Change

Why must a society based on agrarian feudalism give way to egalitarian industrialism? Or must it? Why cannot the Third World of Asia, Africa, and Latin America go its own way, at its own pace, and according to its own values in life? After all, the first two worlds, one inspired by a people's capitalism and the other by a people's communism, have arrived at a *modus vivendi* of "live and let live." Is it not possible that a people's personalism could inspire the Third World in its struggle for development, as well as incorporating what is best in the two systems of communism and capitalism?

It seems that the basic answer is no. And the reason is not only that the other two worlds will not let Latin America go her own way, the one for ideological convictions and the other for economic motives. Nor is it just another phase of the perennial balance of power between international giants. The people of the Third World have been awakened and new nations have been born. They want the good things that movies, television, and travel tell them are being enjoyed by "the others," and they want them quickly—so quickly that values built up and treasured for centuries by their forefathers are being lost in one generation.

Cost what it may, this generation wants to make the "great leap" into the modern world of science and technology and there is no holding it back. But how? Can it be done through a process of law and evolution or must it come through violence and revolution? Pope John XXIII said in his encyclical *Mater et Magistra* that the relations between those countries which are socially and economically advanced and those countries just now awakening to socioeconomic development are the most difficult problem of our day. Pope Paul VI has repeated several times that development is the new name for peace. What are some of the causes of the cry for revolution in Latin America today, the beginnings of conflict, and the two opposing theories of social change?

Social Stratification

For 400 years Latin America was a caste-type society rigidly closed at the top. There was little vertical mobility into this small, oligarchical group from below or from without. "The others" were incorporated into the social structure, but *down below*, to participate in the good things of an inherited status—authoritarian society in the position of inferiors and servants. There never has been much prejudice or discrimination, nor eventual segregation as with the Negro in North America. But it is hard to say which is worse: to be the minority out-group in an egalitarian-industrial society, or the "untouchables" in a caste-structured agrarian feudalism. Both involve a basic denial of man's equality with his fellow human beings, and the consequent right to equality of opportunity for all, regardless of creed, color, or nation.

As a result of this caste-oligarchical domination for 400 years, there is not a very strong middle class today in many countries. Some beginnings of change have been made during the last fifty years, but progress is slow and resisted by the very people who could prevent revolution and could champion reform. Those countries that are bi- and tricultural have marginal groups that are more numerous than the group that controls the way of life from its nonmarginal position. Only countries that are composed predominatly of white, European immigrants (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica) have anything of a large, fairly prosperous middle class. The rest have at best 5 per cent in the upper elite group, and the famous 80 per cent constitute the marginals, the untouchables whose way of life is to serve the few.

UPPER ELITE

In colonial times the upper elite was composed of three elements: (1) peninsular whites from Spain and Portugal in charge of the king's government in the New World; (2) members of the Catholic hierarchy, who were generally also peninsular whites of good breeding; (3) owners of the large plantations, mines, and export-import companies, who were mainly peninsular whites, with an increasing number of *criollo* whites entering into the make-up of this group. When the wars of independence were finished, the *criollo*

whites simply stepped into the places left vacant by those who returned to Spain and Portugal, but the caste system remained just the same.

As a rule today, the upper elite constitute less than 2 per cent of the people in any country. For example, it was a common saying until recently that 1.5 per cent of the people own 65 per cent of the cultivated land in tracts of 2,500 acres or more. They are members of this exclusive group by inheritance and family name. By now, there are kinship ties among most of these families, and if not, at least the ties of *compadrazgo* have been multiplied many times over. In Bolivia they may have lost most of the land and the big tin mines, but they still control much large-scale commerce and capital investment in hotels, apartments, and office buildings. Their sons and daughters are just as averse to manual labor as their parents were, and they find it very difficult to see its dignity.

In some instances a new management spirit is rising in those who have been technically trained in foreign countries, though little risk capital is invested by them in new industries to this day. There is still a strong tendency to continue the literary, artistic heritage in the universities, and to travel and seek education in Western Europe. However, the scholarship programs from both Russian-dominated countries and the United States are encroaching on the old type of education. In most countries, the upper elite still dominate the political scene as well as exercising an influence in the military. Although they may not be the president, the vice-president, or the top general, nonetheless, if one scratchs the carefully veneered surface of real power, one finds them very much in control.

ILL-DEFINED MIDDLE CLASS

Aristotle, in his book on *Politics*, says that a large middle class is highly desirable because it guarantees political stability against revolutionaries. In few countries in Latin America do the upper and middle classes together reach 40 or 50 per cent of the population. By contrast, in the United States these same two classes would constitute about 80 per cent of the population. In Chile they comprise 21.4 per cent, in Argentina 35.9 per cent, in Venezuela 18.2 per cent, in Mexico 16.9 per cent, and in Guatemala a meager 7.7 per cent of the total population.

Grouping countries together gives one results like this: Argen-

tina, Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica have 32 million people, 20 per cent of whom are from the upper and middle classes; Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia have 31 million people and 15 to 20 per cent in the same classes; Brazil and Mexico have 120 million people and 15 to 17 per cent in this group; in all the rest, there are 42 million people and less than 15 per cent are in the upper two classes.

Almost all foreign immigrants of white blood who have been reasonably successful belong to the middle class, especially if they have arrived since 1850. Members of other races, like some of the extremely wealthy Jews, Arabs, and Japanese, can never rise above this group and as a rule are forced to form their own nationalistic social clubs in the bigger cities. A few of the "fallen" whites are found here. However, for the most part they are *mestizo-cholo*, who as industrialists, professionals, artisans, and commercial people have made out well. Even so, they find the top closed to them in most countries, although some notable exceptions exist now. Another group which would be classified here, but in the lower middle class, are the small-town shop-owners, politicians, and merchants along with the medium-sized and small landowners. From of old, these people have sought to imitate the life and value scheme of the upper elite, so that when they make good, there is easier acceptance in the closed circle. At the same time this only perpetuates the same system, but now it has a little bigger head.

PROLETARIAN LOWER CLASS

To be identified with the 80 per cent is to be with the workers and *campesinos* in most countries. In the cities and mines are to be found large numbers of poorly paid workers who live in hovels and resent their lot. Even though they belong to unions, speak Spanish, and dress in suit and tie for special occasions, they are the lowly servants of the rich and powerful. Whether they are rail, textile, mine, or factory workers makes little difference in their mentality. However, at least they have enough hope to struggle for their own children's education and a better lot in life in the next generation.

Beneath them are the poor, illiterate, and often jobless *peones* who look day by day for pick-and-shovel work. Many of them have recently come into the cities trying to better their poor lot in life from the hand-to-mouth, drab country existence. They have no

steady work, do not belong to the prestige unions, and frequently wear the clothes of their rural communities.

Another step down below the urban worker, though a bit better off economically, is the small, illiterate, white or *mestizo* farmer. Generally he lives in some remote area in the mountains, along the rivers, in a clearing in the jungle, or isolated in the tall grass country. He lives as his ancestors have lived for centuries on the big haciendas or apart, without schooling, without health care, and without a future.

Last of all are the indigenous who speak no Spanish, do not know how to read or write and cultivate their poor land as did their ancestors before them with oxen, wooden plough, and stick. People ask: "Why do they come to the big city when at least they had something to eat and a piece of land before?" Their only response, and a rather forlorn one at that, would be: "It can't get any worse."

Social Conflict

The Latin is volatile by temperament and he enjoys firecrackers, action, and noise. This is clearly seen in his forms of protest against real or imagined oppression. The first step is to hold meetings, assemblies, and *foros*. Generally, there are paid agitators who can harangue crowds better than either Hitler or Castro. The purpose of this demagoguery is to arouse sympathy for the cause even if there are few reasons. This is the talking stage and can last for some months, for the Latin loves speeches and speech making.

Then comes the second step of public propaganda with wall writing, slogan-symbols, radio programs, loudspeakers on cars, and campaigns of leaflets. Anybody who has visited Latin America is astounded at the amount of wall writing. No building, no house, no street, no vehicle is so sacred that it cannot carry a propaganda message. This is not only tolerated but frequently used by public authorities. Slogans and symbols are absolute musts to carry the mystique. Every successful movement must have an ideology and a mystique if it is to captivate followers. The best way to popularize such subtleties is by sign and symbol. Since radio is by far the most popular way to reach people, it is an obvious method to employ for propaganda even to the point of having your own station. Loudspeakers are used to advertise movies, football games, and bullfights.

But they are also useful to get political messages and doctrine across. Leaflets are good for the intellectuals and are much used in high-school and university campaigns.

The third and last series of peaceful means to be employed to promote a cause is that of the strike. Sit-down strikes are not too common, but hunger and sympathy strikes are. Hunger strikes may be more sensational than real, for by night friends may bring all sorts of food to the strikers. General strikes have political motives behind them for the most part. They may start with sympathy strikes to show solidarity for some cause and then be extended to the whole nation.

The fourth phase is action. A whole series of buildups to violence starts with demonstrations and manifestations. These will be accompanied by tear gas, arrests, torture, and exile. Anybody who has not had the opportunity of seeing a demonstration is in for a real scene. The rapidity with which the demonstrators move and take decisions like a mob is frightening. Ordinarily, they are under the control of a handful of capable demagogues whose whole purpose is to keep the fever high. Rock throwing, window breaking, tearing up streets, damaging buildings, fist fights and kicking, injuries, and perhaps a few deaths are all part of the action. Then comes the reaction of the police with their tear gas, arrests, clubs, guns, and blood. If the demonstration is sponsored by the government, as frequently happens, the police are conspicuous by their absence. Revolutionary groups have an interesting way of using terror tactics to silence opposition and gain public support. If this goes far enough, the government may declare martial law and impose curfews, prohibit meetings, and restrict travel.

The final phase is the planned violence of plot and counterplot. The bringing in of contraband arms and ammunition is a necessary part of it. Opposition political parties are constantly in the government's hair with these tactics. As mentioned before, there exists no such thing as loyal opposition. When an attempt is made at revolution, it is amazing how well organized the underground network is and how extensive. Whether it fails or succeeds, there is seldom much bloodshed or major violence. When the new group comes in, there is really not much of a change, for the same old faces have a remarkable way of showing up under different labels and party banners. A few of the leaders may be killed and some are shipped off into exile and the whole story starts all over again.

Social Change

Some authors classify the countries of Latin America in five groups in relation to their state of development and social change. At the bottom are the countries of the Caribbean and Central America as follows: Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Haiti, Santo Domingo. Then come Bolivia and Paraguay, where there are the beginnings of an awakening. A third grouping of Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, and Brazil takes in the giants that have begun to move, but are still faced with huge problems. Fourthly, there are Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, and Venezuela, all of which share the prosperity of the Colossus to the north in some way. Finally, there are the three big countries to the south that have made much progress in development, though truncated here and there: Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina.

There are many theories on how to bring about desired social change in the quickest, easiest way possible, but no magic formulas are known to exist. It takes time and plenty of sacrifice before much progress can be seen, no matter what the human and material resources are. However, in Latin America two main theories are in conflict as to how development can best be accomplished.

The first is that of law and evolution, which is generally backed by the oligarchical elements and the rising middle class in the countries themselves. Strangely enough, from one historical point of view, the United States is generally in favor of this theory even though it means supporting hated dictators, military take-overs, and strongman tactics. One of the reasons is the still unreasonable fear of anything labeled communism and anti-American. Lacking a positive program for Latin America, since the Alliance for Progress has been abandoned in its original conception, the official American policy seems to have gone back to supporting the status quo with strong military power.

The second theory is more radical and says that only through violent, bloody revolution will development ever get off the ground in Latin America. A few exponents of this theory come from the 80 per cent who have almost no share in existing progress. However, the leadership comes from the universities, young professionals, and a few ideological renegades of the elite group. They feel that legal

reforms are too slow and that the only way to prepare the way for rapid progress is by destroying those who are impeding it from their privileged positions. Many times they are all painted with the same brush as Communists, Castroites, and just plain hot-blooded Latin revolutionaries. But many of these young men are the best Christians in the whole continent, whose blood does boil when they speak of exploitation by international business backed by United States diplomatic and military power. They are only indirectly interested in international communism as a force which will enable them to throw off the stranglehold which they feel the old oligarchy with its allies still has on their countries. The pro and con arguments generate more heat than light, but with the changing position of the Church in relation to the world, you will soon be deeply identified with the problem.

SOCIAL CHANGE BY LAW AND EVOLUTION

The advocates of this first theory think that political change not only precedes social reforms but is the way to bring it about. This was the basic thinking behind the Alliance for Progress in the beginning, when grants and loans would be given for education only if the country had made educational reforms in law and practice. No money was given for agricultural programs if there was no agrarian land reform in practice. This theory holds that the three great cries, for more vertical mobility all the way to the top, access to the best schools, and a better distribution of income, are all valid, but the way to achieve them is by steps and stages.

They believe in creating special development banks, ministries, and agencies, and perhaps placing them all under a special ministry of planning. Agrarian reform is a must, not only as a social issue; the old system is not even economically productive. With 65 per cent of the cultivated land in the hands of 1.5 per cent of the people in tracts of 2,500 acres and more until recently, there has not been sufficient competition and incentive to raise production rapidly. Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru all have agrarian reforms in law but are terribly slow in practice.

Powerful unions are a second reform necessary to get justice in the field of labor. Whether it be in factories, mines, or on the farms, organized bargaining power is a must. Universal suffrage and mass education are being demanded across the board as moves toward

authentic democracy. Civil service administrative reforms along with new tax structures are being slowly put into operation. Basic reforms in the areas of housing, labor laws, social security, and control of foreign capital are being urged.

The one objection heard throughout the continent is that it is a repetition of the old failure of "too little, too late." For some years the status quo forces can hold, backed up by strong military aid from the United States. But whether in this intervening period of five to ten years enough social change can take place is a doubtful question. The alternatives are not many nor are they pleasant, but neither is the prolonged agony of groveling misery.

SOCIAL CHANGE BY VIOLENCE AND REVOLUTION

All the nations of the Americas achieved their independence from political colonialism through rebellion against the mother country. Many of the young, dynamic elements in these societies see another form of colonialism holding them back and in submission; only this time it is economic, social, and military. They feel that as long as the lid is on, there is no question of equality in opportunities for everyone, nor of economic well-being at a more human level, still less of political power for the masses. They look upon demonstrations, mob action, rocks, fights, and tear gas as child's play, for theirs are stronger methods. *La violencia* in Colombia is one example: an estimated 350,000 people have died in the last twenty years in bloody struggle. The current terrorism in Guatemala has claimed at least 10,000 lives in the last five years. Venezuela and Bolivia have seen guerrilla bands of foreign import fight for communism in their countries.

There is much talk of revolution and civil war even if it means going backward economically for many years. The leaders speak of cultural servility to the United States and of economic serfdom under their own oligarchical barons. For the moment, it is difficult to do anything against the overwhelming military power, but how long this will last is a difficult question.

One very important change right now is taking place in the Catholic Church. Previously, it was a third force aligned alongside government and the military. Today, renewed by the spirit of Vatican II, many of the bishops and younger clergy are openly speaking

out in favor of putting the social teaching of the Church into immediate practice. Others are clamoring for a committed Church in the face of grave social injustice. Still a third element is looking for a renewed Christianity to redefine its position in regard to development and basic Christlikeness.

One long-range theory of world development emanating from the United States would concentrate giant technological, scientific, and capitalistic power in a few centers in the world. All the other people would be allowed to share in the abundance produced without having the sources of the production in their own land. Some feel that eventually it will mean specialization by each nation in a few products or the industrial goods that it can best contribute to a world growing smaller.

Another theory comes from France and sees each nation-state as necessarily the master of its own destiny and development. This means that the basic industries must be present in each country or else it is being exploited by the powerful few. As long as some nations are committed to a one-crop or one-product economy, they will necessarily be in human and cultural bondage to the others. International cartels are so powerful today that they have more to say about relationships to the poor, underdeveloped nations than the governments of the mighty. Who can possibly control or compete in the international sphere with the giants? The answer comes back: only other cartels equally big. Perhaps a few big companies with extensions in other countries, under laws that favor national industries and plants, is something of a middle solution.

Nationalization of industries, with or without indemnification, is one big threat that small countries hold over the heads of the mighty firms from without. They have the lessons of Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba to go by, for these are the three countries that have undergone profound revolutions in the last fifty years. The outcome in each case is not very clear except in Mexico, where real development is taking place. Perhaps the other two revolutions are still too recent to predict their ultimate results. Whatever the future holds in store, you have before you the challenge of hard work and the promise of trying days.

PART 4:

Characteristics of Integral Development

THOMAS SHANLEY

16.

Aspects of Integral Development

In his encyclical On the Development of Peoples, Pope Paul defines integral development as: "freedom from misery; the greater assurance of finding subsistence, health, and fixed employment; an increased share of responsibility without oppression of any kind and in security from situations that do violence to their dignity as men; better education—in brief, to seek to do more, know more, and have more in order to be more: that is what men aspire to now when a greater number of them are condemned to live in conditions that make this lawful desire illusory" (No. 6).

All the structures of society, cultural, social, economic, political, and religious, must be so organized and operated as to encourage the spiritual, moral, intellectual, and physical growth of each man and every man, the growth of the whole man.

There is no need to stress the fact of the overwhelming poverty and misery in the world; it is everywhere to be seen if one wants to see it. Men have a deep desire to rid themselves of this misery. All current movements, social, economic, and military, are efforts by mankind to rid itself of misery and want.

To succeed in this task, oppressive structures must be destroyed or changed and new liberating structures brought into existence so as to aid men to realize fully their potential. Every man has a God-given right and a call to responsible self-fulfillment. Every man, as a member of the human race, has an obligation to do what he can to bring about this self-fulfillment. The work of development is the responsibility not only of the so-called technocrats; it is also the responsibility of wise men concerned about their brother, a concern motivated by love and friendship.

There is a grave and urgent duty for people to direct their rights, including their property, toward the well-being of all mankind. Private property is not an absolute right, and where there is a

conflict between private rights and public needs, it is the duty of public authority to look to the solution. A most evident example in Latin America is that the common good may demand that governments expropriate large unused landholdings by means of agrarian reform laws in the interest and for the common good of the masses.

Since industry is an absolute necessity for the development of a country, industry must keep in mind the common good of the people. The rich are acting against the common good when they transfer large portions of their income abroad without consideration of the damage inflicted on their own country. Liberal capitalism based on profit alone, with competition as the supreme law and private property as an absolute right without social obligations, is condemned. Free competition does not assure integral development. Both public and private authorities have the obligation to see that development is for all citizens, that the income realized through development is distributed equitably throughout the population.

Economic growth depends upon social growth. Hunger for education is just as debasing as hunger for food. Illiteracy is a basic reason for the lack of development.

Human solidarity, social justice, and universal charity demand that the rich nations help the poor nations in a time when the gap between the rich and the poor is growing rather than narrowing.

The benefits of financial and technical aid can be partially nullified by inequitable trade agreements among nations. This happens when the aid flowing into poor countries flows out again because of an unfavorable balance of trade. As a result, poor nations, even with aid, remain poor, while rich nations grow richer. In order for international trade to be human and moral, it must give equal opportunity to both participants. Furthermore, the developing nations should organize common markets among themselves to develop through trade.

In the face of hunger, destitution, ignorance, and other needs of the people, it is the task of all and especially of those in positions of power to create an economy that will serve mankind. By doing all in our power to bring about those necessary changes in the economic, political, social, cultural, and religious structures so that each person will be free to realize his potential, we contribute to the integral development of man.

Perhaps the most objective definition of underdevelopment is that of a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the

United Nations: "We have had some difficulty in interpreting the term 'underdeveloped countries.' We use it to mean countries in which real per capita income is low when compared with the per capita real incomes of the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe. In this sense an adequate synonym would be 'poor countries.' "

Comparative Population Figures for 1965

	POPULATION (millions)	RATE OF INCREASE
World	3,285	1.9%
Europe	444	.9%
Soviet Union	231	1.6%
North America	241	1.6%
Asia	1,825	1.8%
Oceania	18	2.2%
Africa	310	2.3%
Latin America	243	2.7%

N.B. Raw birth rates tend to be twice as high (40 per 1000) in the less developed countries as in the others. High mortality rates; low life expectancy; inadequate nutrition and dietary deficiencies; rudimentary hygiene, public health, and sanitation; and rural overcrowding are other characteristics of developing nations.

ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS

1. A very high proportion of the population in agriculture, usually some 50 to 90 per cent.
2. "Absolute over-population" in agriculture; that is, it would be possible to reduce the number of workers in agriculture and still obtain the same total output.
3. Evidence of considerable "disguised unemployment" and a lack of employment opportunities outside agriculture.
4. Very little capital per head ($100 per capita—U.S.A. $3,000 per capita).
5. Low income per head and, as a consequence, existence near the "subsistence" level.
6. Practically zero savings for the large mass of the people.
7. Whatever savings do exist are usually achieved by a landholding class whose values are not conducive to investment in industry or commerce.

8. The primary industries, that is, agriculture, forestry, and mining, are usually the categories of residual employment.
9. The output in agriculture is made up mostly of cereals and primary raw materials, with relatively low output of protein foods. The reason for this is the conversion ratio between cereals and meat products; that is, if one acre of cereals produces a certain number of calories, it would take between five and seven acres to produce the same number of calories if meat products were produced.
10. Major proportion of expenditures on food and other necessities.
11. Export of foodstuffs and raw materials.
12. Low volume of trade per capita.
13. Poor credit facilities and poor marketing facilities.
14. Poor housing.
15. Tendency toward inflation.
16. Slow economic growth in relation to that of the advanced nations.

Three of the more acute problems of integral economic development in Latin America should receive more expanded treatment. These are the last three points mentioned above.

RELATIVELY SLOW ECONOMIC GROWTH

The gaps between the economically advanced nations and the developing nations are widening rather than narrowing.

The rate of economic growth between 1950 and 1955 for Latin America averaged 5 per cent, while from 1960 to 1965 it was 4.6 per cent. Between 1950 and 1964 the per capita gross national product in Latin America increased by only 33 per cent, while the world averaged an increase of 42 per cent and the developed nations 52 per cent. Western Europe enjoyed an increase of 71 per cent.

The 1965 per capita GNP for Latin America was $360, that of Western Europe $1,500 and of the United States $3,000. This per capita income ranged from $886 for Venezuela to $80 for Haiti and $146 for Bolivia. Total investment between 1961 and 1965 for South America averaged 3.3 per cent a year.

Increases in Gross National Product

(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

COUNTRY	1960	1965
Argentina	10,155	11,750
Bolivia	558	689
Brazil	12,250	14,400
Chile	3,331	3,935
Colombia	4,136	5,140
Costa Rica	446	540
Ecuador	811	1,000
El Salvador	561	814
Guatemala	1,053	1,375
Honduras	383	485
Mexico	13,552	17,450
Nicaragua	368	535
Panama	410	605
Paraguay	322	388
Peru	2,263	3,121
Uruguay	1,340	1,367
Venezuela	5,495	7,000
Total 17 Republics	56,900	70,700
United States	504,700	739,500

TENDENCY TOWARD INFLATION

The tendency toward inflation seems chronic in Latin America. It is well to understand some of the reasons why. What is inflation? Either a country maintains economic growth through existing amounts of money or it is forced to monetary expansion policies and new credit creation. When money supply is increased at a more rapid rate than the demand for goods warrants, then prices rise, and there is a rush for goods, which pushes prices up further and thus the inflationary spiral has begun.

Underdeveloped countries are more prone to inflationary pressures and have fewer policy alternatives available for effective control of inflation. Inflationary policies are by no means all bad and have several things in their favor. For one thing, inflation permits the employment of underemployed workers, some would argue, although an inflationary recession such as the United States has re-

cently experienced may prove this false in some circumstances. It may be more certain that credit expansion is necessary in order to allow development authorities to bid resources away from consumption. Also, in the early stages of inflation, the money illusion encourages the workers to work harder and encourages an increase of investment, which in turn expands output, and the increase in output may then be saved and taxed to further investment. Moreover, none of the alternative methods for the financing of rising investments is free from hardships.

If a country wishes to grow at a rate considered necessary for sustained growth, then the government has to be able to control this growth in some manner. This cannot be done by gathering savings because in poor countries savings are very slim. This being the case, there are alternatives that the government may use to create the necessary savings needed for investment.

Some of the principal alternatives include: requiring people to work harder and longer without increasing wages, thus increasing output without costs; taking away more of people's income through taxation or compulsory lending to the government; curtailing private investment; or forcing savings through inflation.

The first three methods could be too grim for weak governments to face and either for political or administrative reasons countries may be forced to use the last method of forcing savings through inflation.

On the other hand, inflation harms the efficient allocation of resources. It causes distortions in investment patterns. Especially evident in smaller countries is the fact that the balance of payments is hurt as a result of the adverse impact on exports. Also, inflation discourages foreign investment. Some economists would predict that at home the volume for investments may fall as savings decline. Finally, governments generally lack the power to constrain inflation.

In the poorer countries one can never be sure that income realized from increased production (the result of deficit financing) will be put into savings because most of the poor may use all of this new income for consumption purposes and save nothing. Another danger is that the money that is saved may go into private investment rather than into investments that would help bring about the development of the country. Another problem is that government plans to draw off some of the increased income through taxation may fail, since

real money taxes may even decrease because of the deflationary aspects of the currency.

Another important factor that must always be kept in mind is the time lag. Money invested today may not come back in the form of more money or more income until one, two, five, or ten years later, during which time real purchasing power is deteriorating. Moreover, the large portion of the poor population usually does not enjoy increases in wages which compare with the increases in prices due to inflation and therefore their suffering is the greatest.

Inflationary Cost of Living
(Index in U.S. dollars: 1958 = 100)

COUNTRY	1960	1965
Argentina	272	771
Bolivia	134	172
Brazil	185	2,050
Chile	155	512
Colombia	111	199
Costa Rica	101	114
Dominican Republic	96	110
Ecuador	102	123
El Salvador	99	100
Guatemala	98	99
Haiti	91	109
Honduras	99	114
Mexico	108	118
Nicaragua	95	103
Panama	100	105
Paraguay	119	154
Peru	122	191
Uruguay	194	710
Venezuela	109	109

Another problem faced by a country encouraging increased investment through deficit spending is the lack of skilled labor. Even though the increased investment may bring about an increase of employment, there is an ever-worsening chronic shortage of technical people such as engineers, managers, foremen, operators of complex equipment, and so on. Besides the lack of skilled workers, there may be an increasing shortage of tools, machinery, and even raw material.

There are two possible effects inflation could have upon the labor force which depend upon the extent of labor organization. If

the labor force is unorganized, the wages will usually lag far behind the increases; the workers instead of earning more in terms of real money will earn less. If, however, the labor force is well organized, inflation will be accompanied by strong labor demands for an increase of wages, through frequent wage-contract negotiations, escalator clauses, and the like.

The rates of savings and taxation in underdeveloped countries are often low. This is due to the low levels of incomes, the nature of tax systems, the difficulty of effective tax administration, the lack of savings institutions, and a high propensity to consume. Hence governments are always tempted to create their own funds for use in development projects.

Speaking specifically about inflation in Latin America, it is neither simple nor self-evident to say that there is a connection between inflation and development. An underdeveloped country's attempt to grow rapidly faces tensions which may result in inflation.

Whether inflation happens or not depends upon the pace of economic development; external developments favorable or not to the poor country; the flexibility of the domestic economy, that is, the productive and institutional structures, for example, banks; and, finally, the extent to which the government favors economic growth.

There are many conditions which must be met if a developing country is to respond to the rapidly increasing population pressures and thus avoid inflation. What are the facts?

First of all, the industrial sector, which should be, along with the government, the leader in responding to change, is unable to do so at the requisite rates of speed. It suffers from a lack of statistics, entrepreneurial vision, capital equipment savings, and raw materials. Increased production is won only at greatly increased costs.

The labor force suffers from a lack of skills, immobility (geographic and occupational), low productivity, low wages, strikes for wages that match prices, and high unemployment.

Agriculture for the most part is divorced from the market economy and for many reasons either refuses to or is unable to respond to food demands.

The government is plagued by instability, incompetence, decisions based on political expediency or ambition rather than on economic demands, and inefficient tax systems.

Foreign countries refuse to invest because of all these factors.

Result: increased demand forces prices up—perhaps government resorts to printing money—inflation.

POOR HOUSING

One of the gravest problems in South America is housing. Thirty-three per cent of the population earn only 10 per cent of the income. Their monthly income is between $36 and $45 a month. They spend about 50 per cent of income for food, 10 per cent for clothing, 10 per cent for transportation, 20 per cent for sundries, which leaves about 10 per cent for housing. A low-cost home costing $2,000, with a mortgage for twenty-five years at 7 per cent a year, would require monthly payments of about $14 or about 30 per cent of their income. To this must be added taxes, utilities, maintenance, and other costs. In addition there is a general lack of marketing and financial institutions to underwrite such operations. The few financial intermediaries in the country cater to middle- and upper-class groups and usually such people are able to pay as much as 50 per cent as a down payment for their homes.

Approximately 50 per cent of the population of South America now live in urban areas. The influx has been so quick and so great that there have been no means of supplying these people with homes. In Caracas, more than 35 per cent of the urban population live in slums called *ranchos*; in Rio de Janeiro, approximately 38 per cent live in *favelas*; in Recife, about 50 per cent live in slums; in Lima, about 20 per cent live in the *barriadas*; in Buenos Aires, about 10 per cent live in the so-called *villas miserias*. In these slums there abound poverty, overcrowding, social diseases, social delinquency, family instability, and absenteeism from school. Moreover, because of high unemployment and a scarcity of land there is little possiblity of home ownership, sufficient food, clothing, or an education.

Presently it is estimated that to satisfy the annual demand for new homes, approximately 1.1 million units would have to be built annually and that by 1975 new units would have to number approximately 2.6 million per year. Actual construction has lagged far behind these needs. To aggravate a bad situation, the poor who are housed live in places that are poorly constructed, deteriorate quickly, and demand constant repair. Other aspects, especially social, are considered in Chapter 9, "The Family."

Hence it is obvious that housing is one of the most serious and basic problems in South America and that international assistance alone cannot solve this problem. Programs including low-interest financing, low-cost housing, home mortgage markets, savings and loan associations, cooperatives, self-help and mutual aid construction programs, and individual community development programs must be stressed and implemented.

As is evident in the problems of housing, inflation, and the growing gap between the developed and the underdeveloped countries, the economic problems of the Latin American countries do not admit of facile or simplistic solutions. Most of the problems mentioned can only be solved by slow steps over rather long periods.

17.

The Major Sector: Agriculture

Geography exerted a profound influence on the settlement and early development of Latin America. It is also the mold in which present-day development is being cast.

The size and physical relief of the region, particularly the high mountains and tropical forests, have been obstacles to communication and transportation which are only now being overcome by roads and air travel. Four major river systems, Amazon, La Plata, Orinoco, and Magdalena, provide transport for interior areas.

Latin America has 15 per cent of the earth's surface and extensive mineral and maritime resources. In total, 42 per cent of the region is lowlands and plains, 33 per cent plateaus and tablelands, 14 per cent hill lands, and 11 per cent mountains. The cultivable land is estimated at 70 per cent, with less than half in agricultural use.

The region lies mainly within the tropics, but many valleys and plateaus are at high altitudes cool enough to permit production of temperate-zone crops.

Agriculture is still the major economic activity, but minerals, oil, and fish products are becoming increasingly important for many countries.

Recent Growth Trends

While economic growth has been increasing in absolute terms, in relation to population growth (2.9 per cent) per capita growth has been negligible. Inflation, capital shortages, and fear of risk-taking have been the major obstacles to growth.

From the table overleaf one can see that the food crisis in South America is worsening. Although productivity has advanced and there are a few notable successes, such as Mexico, agriculture in general is unable to keep pace with the rising demands of urbanization and the

population explosion. Agriculture is lagging behind industry and is acting as a brake on economic growth. The gap in living standards between the underdeveloped and developed nations, instead of narrowing, is widening dangerously.

Agriculture: Growth Trends 1965 - 1966

COUNTRY	FOOD PRODUCTION %	LIVESTOCK %
Mexico	+ 5	+ 5
Cuba	- 17	- 20
Dominican Republic	+ 4	+ 2
Haiti	+ 3	0
Jamaica	+ 1	+ 1
Trinidad and Tobago	- 6	- 12
Costa Rica	+16	+11
El Salvador	+ 7	+ 4
Guatemala	+12	- 1
Honduras	+15	- 1
Nicaragua	- 5	- 3
Panama	- 5	- 5
British Honduras	- 1	0
Argentina	+10	+14
Bolivia	+ 2	0
Brazil	- 8	0
Colombia	- 1	+ 4
Ecuador	- 2	- 2
Guayana	- 7	- 13
Paraguay	- 3	- 3
Peru	- 1	- 1
Uruguay	- 2	- 5
Venezuela	- 1	+ 2
Chile	- 1	0

Ten years ago it was believed that the agricultural know-how of the developed nations could be transported to the underdeveloped world and the result would be a rapid increase in food production. Most of these programs have failed. Ten years ago it was believed also that one or another technique could solve the problems of bringing new technology to underdeveloped farm areas; these too, in general, have failed. Ten years ago it was commonly believed that industrialization was the key to economic development. While industry has advanced in parts of the underdeveloped world, it has failed to bring the agricultural sector into the market economy, nor has it provided the higher incomes that the planners believed it would.

To correct this situation, a monumental investment would be required of between $1.1 and $1.7 billion. In other words, an increase of 60 to 100 per cent over the current rate of investment is essential to bring agricultural output to a level that would satisfactorily feed Latin America. This capital would be used for economic and social infrastructures such as land reclamation, irrigation, transportation, fertilizers, schools, and equipment, as well as credit instruments for farm improvements With such additional capital input it is estimated that farm output, which presently is around $20 billion, would rise by another $8 billion over the next ten years and generate another $500 million in complementary goods and services. Fertilizer expenditures alone would require an additional $80 million a year or an increase of 40 per cent over the present level.

Agrarian Reform

Until recently, improvement in the pattern of land distribution and tenure in most Latin American countries has been rather slow. Political, economic, and technological obstacles were the main reasons for the lack of improvement. Implementation of agrarian reform laws was slow, land redistribution was unequal and, while semifeudal rural conditions were slowly disappearing, the *campesino* class as a whole is still far from achieving satisfactory income levels and integration into the main streams of the sociopolitical and economic life of Latin America. In Chile, only 1,800 families received land in 1966. Since 1953, when the Bolivian Agrarian Reform Law was enacted, only 9 per cent of the *campesinos* have received clear titles to their land and the average time required to obtain a clear title is seven years.

Colonization (the settlement of new lands) also proceeded at a slow pace between 1961 and 1966 because of the high cost of project implementation. Bolivia, which has one of the most active colonization programs in South America, has settled 7,000 families on average-size farms at a cost of $650 per family and has settled another 1,000 families on intensive units at a cost of $2,800 per family, most of these settlements being in the Santa Cruz area.

Public investment costs in Venezuela averaged $3,000 a unit and in the more intensive farms up to $12,000 a unit. In Ecuador, costs to the government run between $1,200 and $4,800 per family.

The Chilean program costs about $3,700 per family. Between 1962 and 1965 approximately $1 billion has been allocated to the land-reform programs, or $250 million a year. In Peru, where less than 0.5 per cent of the landowners owned 77 per cent of the land, many thousands of families are now being provided with clear titles to the land.

In Colombia considerable progress has been made in granting titles to thousands of squatters on confiscated land formerly claimed by private owners but left unused by them for ten years or more. Under the reinforced provisions of the 1936 law, over 67,000 hectares of public and unused farms were allocated to *campesinos* in 1966. However, only 21,000 hectares from the private domains were redistributed, to about 2,000 families.

Hence, all indicators make it clear that a substantial speedup in the rate of agricultural investment will be required if the economic and social goals of the countries are to be achieved. This speedup must come from the countries themselves, along with a substantial increase in the flow of external financial and technical assistance.

A Case Study: Andean Agriculture

A large part of the population of the Andean countries is made up of farmers and their families. The proportions range from 33 per cent in Ecuador to 70 per cent of the population in Bolivia. More farmers live in the Andean region than in the lowlands on either side. In Peru the ratio of the highland to the lowland population is 2 to 1; in Bolivia it is higher than 3 to 1. The per capita income of the highland people is much lower than that of the lowland people; for example, while the per capita annual income for Peru as a whole was $179, the per capita income of the highland people was about $60. The economic possibilities for development of agriculture in the three countries must take into account two basic factors: the historical economic dualism that has existed in the Andean regions for the last 400 years, and the competition that now exists between the highlands and the lowlands in the production of any particular goods.

Despite such formidable obstacles, there are areas in the highlands which have seen impressive growth in recent years.

In 1952 a group of anthropologists from Cornell University took over a 19,000-acre hacienda at Vicos, Peru. The team rented the

hacienda for a five-year period. On this hacienda lived 1,800 Indians, who as serfs tilled the land under the traditional feudal system. The Indians were required to give three days' labor a week to the *patrón*. Four thousand acres of the best lands were cultivated; the Indians also had their own subsistence plots.

As the new *patrón*, the Cornell group attempted to win the confidence of the Indians, to discover their needs, their motivations, and their social structures. All projects were planned only with consultation of the Indian community. The aim was to set in motion a process of modernization and thus increase agricultural output. Contrary to expectations, the Cornell group found that the Indians did not mind the three days of work for the *patrón*. They did object strenuously, however, to the extra services exacted by the former *patrón*. Cornell abolished all extra unpaid work and in this way won the confidence of the Indian community.

The three days of labor each week were used to introduce new methods of cultivating the lands and to provide new capital equipment. Potatoes, the staple food of the *finca*, were severely damaged by blight and pests. Cornell introduced effective controls.

The rapid increase in the production of potatoes provided enough money for the purchase of a truck to carry the potatoes to market and also to support social projects such as education, especially the training of leaders. In ten years, per capita income at Vicos rose from $40 to $250 (the national average was at that time $179 per capita).

The overall aim of the Cornell project was the development of local initiative and self-government, toward the day when the Indians could replace the *patrón* as owners and managers of the hacienda. When the five-year rental period was up, Cornell petitioned the government to expropiate the land from the absentee owners and transfer ownership to the Indians. As a result of political interference, this process took five years. During this time, Cornell observed that the production at Vicos rose and fell according to the Indians' expectations of winning title to the *finca*. When the Indians won the title to the land, agricultural production doubled. Vicos has continued farm production successfully under an elected council based on the traditional Indian community manner of government. Cornell now acts only as assessor.

The lessons to be learned from the Cornell project are (1) the agents for change were foreigners and were therefore completely

outside the bureaucratic system; (2) community attitudes were carefully examined before any practical projects were undertaken; and (3) the development of self-government was a primary goal and the existing traditional structures were used but adapted to the agricultural development needs.

REGIONAL PROBLEMS

Limitations of the Physical Environment. Andean agriculture exhibits great variety in the types of crops and their yield as one moves from the lower regions to the higher regions. At lower altitudes temperatures are higher, frost is absent or unlikely, and the soil beds are deep and productive with ample irrigation possibilities. At higher elevations, there is a constant danger of frost and of hale damage. The growing season is shorter and the average temperatures are lower. Usually the soils are less productive. At very high altitudes (in the Altiplano of Peru and Bolivia) there are extensive areas where only hardy grasses and creeping vegetation can grow. Because of this, millions of acres of land are adaptable only to sheep and to llama and alpaca, and more extensive grazing areas are needed.

Throughout the Andean highlands rainfall is low and variable. This brings about irregularities in the planting season, which in turn increases the possibility of frost at harvest time.

All these factors add up to greater inputs (especially in labor) and relatively lower outputs.

Physiographic Limitations. The rugged Andean terrain is characterized by fragmentation of agricultural zones. For example, adjoining farms may require different methods of cultivation for efficient crop production. The highway systems in the mountain areas of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia are inefficient, of limited mileage, poorly maintained, and leave most of the area without farm-to-market roads. Even some of the best roads leading to markets are washed out during the rainy season. Perishable goods are lost in nonrefrigerated trucks, while slowness of traffic and rapid deterioration of trucks drive transportation costs upward.

Economic Limitations. The great majority of farm units in the Andean highlands are small and located on less productive land. Small farmers living at a subsistence level cannot effect any savings.

In many cases, they do not have clear titles to their lands, nor are they eligible for credit. Even if they were eligible for credit they are either too far from lending agencies or they do not know how to request a loan, and if they acquired a loan they would not know how to use it effectively. The loans they do receive are usually secured from usurers who charge high rates of interest.

Furthermore, farmers on the Altiplano have little knowledge of the efficient use of fertilizers, improved seeds, and pesticides. According to a 1961 census in Peru (three highland departments, Cuzco, Agamarca, and Ayacucho), only 0.7 per cent of the farms had machinery, while 36 per cent used human power alone. The Economic Commission for Latin America indicated that in the early 1960's the highland farmer in Ecuador produced 1.2 kilos of corn per man hour, while a farmer in Argentina produced 25 kilos per man hour.

There are in the Altiplano large haciendas which are greatly underutilized and this with a high concentration of population. For example, according to the 1961 census in Peru, there were over 800,000 hectares of cultivable land not being farmed. All of this land could be made agriculturally productive.

Development programs in the Andean region are risky at best, but (with study) appropiate use and more successful assignment of land could be made. Surveys could show land capability, soil types, geologic formations, surface waters, underground waters, climate, vegetation, human resources, infrastructures, and existing land use. At present, hardly any new data are needed for effective agricultural development programs. The best existing Andean research program today is established at Columbia University and is supported by the Rockefeller Foundation Agricultural Program.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Land Tenure, Migration, and Reform. Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela have extensive reserves of public lands, especially in the eastern slopes and lowlands. Colonization has begun and penetration roads are being constructed in these different countries. The Ecuadorian Institute of Colonization is at present engaged in the resettlement of people in the Oriente. Peru has located 50,000 people along the Central Highway on the eastern *selva*; other penetra-

tion roads are being constructed by the government. Bolivia has one of the most ambitious programs in South America for the colonization of the eastern lowlands. This has come about especially as a consequence of the construction of the Cochabamba–Santa Cruz highway.

Market Oriented Production. The five northern Andean countries have at least thirty-four urban centers which could serve as markets for agricultural production. The produce grown for these potential urban markets would create employment for millions of farmers. Available studies make it clear that the food demand of the urban population is highly elastic; that is, food demand is highly responsive to price fluctuations. This means that if Andean farmers increased their production of fruit, grain, potatoes, milk, cheese, eggs, chickens, vegetables, and beans, they could expect with outlets to build up their sales without too much difficulty. Furthermore, allied industries such as packaging, processing of food, refrigeration, and food preservation would also benefit through the increased food supply.

Such an optimistic outlook for the Andean region is going to require a gigantic effort in the rural area. It will require reorganization of farms, construction of highway systems, new feeder-road systems, education in the use of fertilizers, water, production techniques, crop and produce quality control, increase of ownership of trucks, use of credit, and so forth.

Furthermore there will have to be extensive government support through subsidies, programs of price stabilization, a rationalization of transportation taxes, and price supports for those products considered essential.

If and when the Andean region takes care of its own domestic needs, then export possibilities of its products can be taken into consideration.

Changes in Institutions and in Attitudes. While the five governments recognize the great potential for agricultural productivity of the Andean region, the major difficulty is coordinated action programs. The governments now suffer from the following limitations: (1) a lack of trained personnel, with too many autonomous, uncoordinated, and even competing government programs at

both the national and the local levels; (2) strong personalism and personal ambition, with ministries or credit organizations or universities wishing to advance their own programs in their own ways with a minimum of outside interference; (3) a lack of incentives among many bureaucrats to apply themselves wholeheartedly to progress; (4) a lack of understanding by those in power of the mentality of *campesino*; (5) an insufficient allocation of public funds for agricultural development; (6) no control over price subsidies, marketing systems, taxing systems; and (7) only feeble attempts to bring the 10,000,000 *campesinos* living in Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia into the national market economy.

MOTIVATING CHANGE

The traditional feudal system which has existed in the Andean region for the last 400 years has prevented the *campesino* from learning how to cooperate in development programs. In addition, the simple farmer is often looked upon as a political tool for manipulation rather than a great potential force for agricultural development. What, then, are some of the ways to encourage a desire among the *campesinos* for change?

The following are some suggestions. Modern means of communication can be employed, as they already are in several areas. Radio stations throughout the Andean region could regularly transmit agricultural programs in native languages. It would be feasible and inexpensive to pass information along to farmers along with musical and news programs. Secondly, greater cooperation with priests and other religious workers has proved to be fruitful in a number of areas. In the case of the land reform laws, greater effort should be made to redistribute the land to the *campesinos* who have an attachment to the land. Efforts should be strengthened to improve livestock and grazing methods. Finally, cash-crop production must be oriented toward the market economy.

Much of what is said in this case study of the Andean region and its problems finds a resonance in most of the areas of Latin America. The needs of motivation, structural changes in marketing, increased capital availability, and the like are felt throughout the region. Some notable progress has been made in such areas as wool production and livestock breeding. Considering the potential of some areas, at least, the possibilities for the future seem very great indeed.

18

Labor Relations and Labor Economics

Large numbers of the people living in *barrios, favelas*, or shantytowns in Latin America are working class. The growth of industry, even though this is not as rapid as might be desired, does indicate a continuous increase in the size of this group. The problems in these poorer sections of the cities are aggravated by the migration from the rural areas. In Bolivia probably one fifth of the total population belongs to the semiskilled or unskilled laboring class.

It oftens happens that workers in Latin America wield a political power and rate an importance far beyond what their numbers warrant, and very often beyond what is desirable. This is because they are one of the few groups that are organized, and oftentimes their country is largely monoproductive. Bolivia may be cited as an example. Eighty-seven per cent of all its exports are comprised of tin and other minerals. More than two thirds of this figure is accounted for by tin. Yet fewer than one out of every twenty-five people employed works in the mining industries. On the other hand, almost two thirds of those who work are engaged in agriculture. They produce less than one quarter of the country's annual product and account for less than one tenth of its exports. However, at least until six years ago, the mining segment of the workers exercised tremendous political power.

Industrialization in Latin America is relatively recent. As a consequence the labor movement is, by comparison with Europe and North America, quite young. Viewing the continent as a whole, one may say that the vast majority of the workers are still unorganized and do not belong to labor unions. At least until recently, less than one in eight of the workers in Brazil were members of organized labor. In 1960 only one and a half millions out of twelve were union members. In 1967 in Chile only 10 per cent of the 2.6 million workers were organized. For the remainder of the countries the percentages are much lower.

One might say that the advent of the industrial revolution to Latin America is recent and is concentrated largely in the cities or their environs. A major part of the workers are found to be first-generation farm laborers or peasants, still in the transition stage of adjusting from rural to urban life. As a consequence, there is great social disorganization, with the worker trying to adjust his life-values. He has moved from a fairly static to a highly mobile way of life and has great difficulty in accommodating to the new tempo. Generally he is unskilled, and he is further handicapped by his lack of education. The overall rate of illiteracy for Latin America is excessively high.

THE UNION AS A SOCIALIZING FORCE

The social significance of the labor-union movement cannot be ignored. The union is not to be considered merely as an instrument for defending the rights of the workers, nor merely as an organization to promote his economic betterment. In view of the marginal condition in which the worker finds himself, the union serves, or at least should serve, as a strong socializing influence. The worker can begin to enjoy voice and vote in other aspects of urban society. He becomes highly susceptible to political and ideological influences.

The family of the worker is in constant economic crisis. The desire to cover even basic needs in balked by the problem of insufficent income. Thus satisfaction in regard to nutritious food, clothing, decent housing, good schooling, medical and hospital care, sports, movies, and cultural recreation is enjoyed to a very limited degree. Often the wage is no more than $25 per month, and it may even be less. This partly accounts for the long hours worked; perhaps the worker occupies himself in making mud-bricks or adobes, as a sideline. His wife may sell cigarettes, candy, fruit. Very often the children do not take advantage of the educational facilities available. They may cut short their attendance at school in order to earn a little to increase the family income.

In the small family-owned industries, the patronal system of the old *latifundias* or large landholdings tends to carry over, exerting a dominant influence on employer-worker relationships. The absentee landlord may become an absentee owner who appoints a manager to run the business. The erstwhile paternalistic "generosity" of the landowner is manifested in occasional bonuses in the form of gifts of

wood, blankets, medicines, secondhand clothes. Any attempt by the worker to organize in a labor union is looked upon in some areas as a deep Communist plot, or political conspiracy aimed at destroying the privately owned industry. And this even though the national laws recognize the right of workers to form labor unions.

Union activity itself may be said to put more emphasis on political bargaining rather than trying to develop the process of collective bargaining. In "negotiating," success is often more directly related to the amount of political pressure that the union can bring to bear on the government, or on a political party, or vice versa. Political action is frequently necessary in order to make collective bargaining or legal enactment meaningful. In many cases to go on strike does not mean simply that the workers walk off their jobs; they may march into the streets for a public demonstration. This very widespread characteristic of political bargaining is a result of the general economic weakness of the labor unions, and the peculiar nature of the political and legal structures throughout Latin America.

LABOR LEGISLATION

Labor organization in the countries of Latin America historically has its origins in, or has been closely connected with, political parties or movements. The MNR (National Revolutionary Movement) gave a strong impetus to the labor movement in Bolivia. The growth and strength of unionism in Mexico is closely dependent on the Institutional Revolutionary Party which holds political power. The Apristas in Peru, the Autenticos in Cuba before Castro, and the Peronistas in Argentina have all been closely identified with organized labor movements.

Though the rise of unionism has been recent, labor legislation is considered by some as ranking among the best in the world. The laws protecting the worker in Bolivia are numerous and good. They include a social security program which provides medical attention for the workers. Freedom to organize unions is guaranteed in any place that has at least twenty employees. Legislation provides for collective bargaining contracts between unions and employers. Generous social benefits, including a Christmas bonus, are included. The laws also determine a minimum wage and lay down regulations to be observed when employees are dismissed. There is also a Council for the Voca-

tional Rehabilitation of Workers. Each country has its particular legislation.

Weak law enforcement and political systems often prevent the implementation of these laws. The general ignorance of the workers is another factor which prevents them from receiving their legal rights. The poor caliber of union leadership often reduces the union's power to insist upon their observance. In many cases there is too much in the law; for example, in the laws governing collective bargaining in some places. This actually hinders the efficient development of the practice.

UNION ORGANIZATION

Local unions are organized according to factories, and they often take their name from the factory. Union leadership tends to be paternalistic or even dictatorial. Decision making is highly centralized. The officers make decisions in closed sessions and simply use a monthly meeting to inform the rank and file of the decisions which have already been taken. Often the purposes and objectives of unionism are not understood clearly. The result is that partisan politics has more importance for the leaders in making decisions than the socioeconomic needs of the members. The political ideology of the leaders is thus of great importance; it often leads to the disregard of the workers' complaints, in order to advance the interests of the party.

Union solidarity is rarely existent. There are many small unions divided according to political ideology, to the neglect of the promotion of the workers' economic interests. As stated, unions are organized in factories or firms, and there is little or no organization on an industry-wide basis. The local unions are organized in federations. But these federations are not organized according to function or industry. The Federation of Factory Workers includes every kind of factory in a region, and not factories in the same industry. The Federation of Miners includes all kinds of mining. Taxi-drivers and truck and bus drivers are all grouped together. In Bolivia, it is only recently that a distinct organization is taking care of those who are employed to drive vehicles; previously, owners and employees driving vehicles formed one union.

The confederation is the tertiary or peak organization uniting the federations on the national level. This top-level organization in some countries has only begun to function regularly since the 1950's.

A reading of the national congress reports will show the confusion that exists concerning its true function. Many policy statements of a political nature will be found in the conclusions, while urgent socioeconomic objectives remain unimplemented.

International groups of various ideologies have strong interests in Latin American labor organizations. Much money is spent and trained personnel are employed to promote the work. The fight for greater influence in the national labor movements often absorbs their energies. Their political interests obscure their understanding of the basic socioeconomic needs of the workers they attempt to influence.

The World Confederation of Labor (previously the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions) has its headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. CLASC (The Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions) is its regional organization for Latin America. It recently transferred its center from Chile to Caracas. Union education courses are conducted, with a heavy insistence on Christian Democratic ideology. It seems to be closely identified with that political movement, and probably receives heavy financing from it. There is not a sufficient insistence on socioeconomic needs of the poorer laborers. White-collar workers make up the majority of its members.

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World Confederation are almost as bitterly opposed to each other as both are to the Communist Federation. ORIT (Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers) is considered in Latin America to be the child of AFL-CIO. The difficulties experienced in penetrating the working classes hinge to a large extent on the strong anti-U.S. feelings encountered in Latin America. There is a strong influence among white-collar workers, but it is treated with deep suspicion by the blue-collar workers. It develops basic labor education courses and programs. There is a strong insistence on political ideology, with the emphasis on democracy. More positive results might accrue if the strong tendency to interpret democracy as anticommunism could be overcome.

AIFLD (American Institute of Free Labor Development) began its activities in 1961. In 1967 more than $5 million was spent in Latin American countries. It conducts a variety of programs: training programs conducted both locally and in the United States, housing projects, training programs for farmers. Financial support is provided by U.S. labor, business, and government. This very laudable effort at

collaboration in the United States presents difficulties which hinder the effectiveness of the work overseas. The blue-collar worker sees a very obvious connection with business and government policies. He is thus highly and almost incurably suspicious of its objectives. Since a major part of its finances are administrated by AID, its activities are monitored by the current political policy of the United States in the country where it operates.

Activity in the field of labor organization in Latin America is very complicated. Efforts to develop a growing movement and assist it to mature are divided, are inspired by intense rivalry, and are deeply opposed at times to each other. Many groups approach the worker, at times only anxious to communicate their political persuasions. Too often the straightforward drive to promote the socioeconomic improvement of the worker is absent. Ignorance of the worker about the potential inherent in sound unionism still persists. The development of a political action suitable to the culture of Latin America would seem to necessitate the complete divorcing of labor unionism from partisan politics.

Millions of workers are not yet alerted to the necessity of forming unions to defend their interests and promote their economic and social welfare. The doubt is real whether the workers have a sense of solidarity as belonging to the same industry. The necessary solidarity of workers on a national level has not grown either. The emergence of leaders who can guide the workers in the development and control of their own movement is urgently awaited. An appreciation of the role of labor in industry, with its rights and responsibilities, is in the incipient stage. There is little understanding of the place of the various industries in the national economy. And only a garbled and partial explanation is given to workers about the severe problems experienced by their countries in the area of international trade and investment.

The issues raised in labor relations require the use of historical, political, and legal methods of analysis. Labor economics deals with questions of wages and employment, and these questions arise in any economy. They do not depend on the existence of labor unions. But where labor unions do exist, a definite influence is exerted on wage rates, distribution of jobs, and the operation of the labor market. When collective bargaining is well established, this influence is undoubtedly strong. Labor economics tries to appraise the economic

impact of collective bargaining. Only when one has all the facts and has gathered all the evidence, should one begin to make any general judgments. But a study of the achievements of the labor movements in Europe and North America, combined with a first-hand experience of the conditions in Latin America, can lead to only one conclusion. The labor union is an effective instrument for bringing about an improvement in the economic life of the worker. In addition, it has wide social significance; it has great value potentially as a social institution.

19

Progress through Community Development

In approaching the subject of community development one can be consoled by remembering the little boy who one day declared that he had been speaking prose all his life and he had not known it. Community development has been going on since the beginning of the world. However, since the end of World War II it has assumed a new significance and importance, especially in democratic countries. The evolution in theory and practice of the principles and techniques, the objectives, and the content of community development is facilitating a clearer understanding of all that is involved. The emphasis on community development as a *process* will clarify some of the muddled thinking prevalent in this area.

The report of the Cambridge Summer Conference on African Administration in England in 1948 provides useful reading and study. Community development is described as a movement to promote a better life for the whole community, with the active participation of the community and, if possible, from the initiative of the community also. However, if this initiative is not forthcoming spontaneously, special techniques will be used in order to awaken and stimulate it, so that an active and enthusiastic response is assured. The report says that all forms of betterment are embraced by community development.

It includes all development activity in a district, whether this be governmental or not. Such activity includes the agricultural sector, where the adoption of better methods of soil conservation, improved farming methods, and greater care in animal husbandry are fomented. In the field of health, the promotion of better sanitation and water supply, child welfare, and the care of mothers are included. Development in the area of education includes alphabetization programs and adult education, as well as extension and improvement of schools for children. Further, community development should make

use of the cooperative movement, and put itself in close contact with local and national bodies.

DEFINING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Since 1948 many descriptions and definitions of community development have been offered. Many consider it as a movement; many others place the emphasis on material progress; while others consider it as an aspect of administration. However, the concept of community development does imply a positive technique in human relations. It seeks to develop the initiative of the individual and of the community, and to obtain the voluntary participation of the people in programs which promote their betterment. The importance of community development work in preparing the way for economic development programs, and the contribution which it can make to the successful implementation of such programs can be seen. And not all government ministers display the enlightenment of a Minister of Home Affairs in the West Indies who said: "Economic programs which do not enjoy the support and participation of the people will be as barren as the dust."

Community development has its own proper content in informal education and in the training of people. This includes such subjects as: alphabetization, practical projects, education of parents to help them raise their families, the promotion of new techniques, the promotion of youth movements and, of course, leadership training. In addition to having its own educational content, community development participates in other works. When extension and technical services of government departments seek the help of community development, the community supplies its own techniques and uses its own personnel.

It is easy to summarize briefly the goals of community development under the headings of social, economic, and political, in the broadest sense of these terms. But, it is not simple when one talks of the means or methods used. One of the essential characteristics is that they must not be imposed from without. The community itself is inspired to examine its problems and to seek solutions for them. In order not to cause an abrupt rupture with traditions, the community is urged to solve its problems by using its own resources and those of local organizations. Outside assistance may be obtained in the form of technical advice, materials, and even money.

In this way are united or integrated two forces which have human welfare as their goal. Neither is sufficient alone. The first is at least latent in every human group and includes the opportunity and capacity to cooperate, self-help, as well as the ability to assimilate and adopt new ways of living. The second is that vast body of knowledge comprising theory and technique in every social and economic discipline. It has been gathered from world experiences, and it is now being used by national governments and various agencies throughout the world.

The people of Latin America do not enjoy equal opportunities even within the same country, and the inequalities are excessive. The God-given right to enjoy a full and abundant life is denied to the majority of the inhabitants. Profound change must come about, in order that each person may develop his whole personality. Drastic changes in the structures of society and the creation of new structures and infrastructures are necessary.

The objective is to enable every person to progress in such a manner that he may become a good individual, a good member in his family, and a good citizen of his country. Taking part in community activities is seen as an essential element in personality development. Community development is the process through which participation in community activity is achieved in democracies. Its net result is cooperative action.

Community development may thus be defined as a process which facilitates a face-to-face meeting of the people, in order to define accurately and efficaciously their interests and problems, to provide the environment which they desire, and to establish the relations which are necessary in order to bring about such an environment. To make this description clearer it will be helpful to spell out in detail some key points:

Objectives of Community Development

1. To inspire and stimulate the people in a community so that they will provide that environment which will facilitate the social growth and development of the residents.
2. To help the people to understand and exercise their rights and duties as citizens.
3. To provide the mechanism for dealing with community problems and coordinating activities in the community.

4. To assist the people to see themselves, their problems, and their community in the light of regional, national, and world perspectives.
5. To seek agreement of the members of the community in defining their interests and common problems and the type of action to be pursued.

Principles

1. The initiative in community development programs must come from the people. From their knowledge and convictions, the people make the decisions and execute the necessary action.
2. In order to be effective, community development must be an educational program.
3. The programs must arise from the local situation, and be specially designed for it.
4. The democratic process must be observed in all plans and programs.
5. Leadership must be representative of the people.
6. The process of seeking information necessary for the programs must be guided by the principles of scientific investigation.
7. Constant revision must be made, and if necessary, changes in the policies, procedures, and programs.

THE FIELD OF ACTION

The migration of the rural dwellers to the cities has created additional problems for the cities and for themselves. There is the difficulty of integrating into city life. In Latin America these difficulties are aggravated by the problems created by marginal cultures. All the problems of urbanization are present, and the extra ones caused by the growth of shantytowns. In most cities will be found some kind of development programs dealing with health, housing, schooling, recreation, sanitation. These may be carried out by national government, municipality, civic groups, private agencies, or voluntary groups, through various types of extension and technical services. Very often quick results are sought for, and the approach is paternalistic. An approach which observes the objectives and principles enunciated above would be of real value for a greater number of people, but it demands more time, patience, and expertise.

Rural work requires that agricultural extension, home economics, and youth work go hand in hand. Rural extension work is

simply "helping the rural people to help themselves." Improved methods of farming taught by the agricultural extension worker will obviate the necessity of women and children working with the farmer. It will then be possible to teach the women how to manage their home, in which they will now be spending more of their time. Children will be able to attend school, but it will be necessary to occupy their leisure hours with pursuits that will help to build their character.

Both in the urban and rural areas the people will need to be made aware of the problems that exist. Their interest will have to be awakened before they can be inspired to do something to solve their problems. Until the need is really felt and understood by the people, they will not be ready for the following step of trying to find a solution. Even after they have understood something of the problem, and discussed some possible solutions, and arrived at some decisions, it will still be difficult to inspire them to continue on into effective action. The difficulties are greater in Latin America because of the retarded basic social education and consequent low level of social behavior.

There are many positive elements that will become known through study and experience. One must get to know one's people, the physical community in which they live, and most important of all, oneself. Personal humility is absolutely necessary if one is to win the confidence of the people. The reading of pertinent books and pamphlets, combined with careful observation and experience, will gradually increase one's knowledge of the people and the community in which they live. Local and national customs, traditions, and laws will provide the bases for many developments in the social, economic, and political life of the community.

EXISTING LEGISLATION AND PROGRAMS

It will be found that the laws contain provisions for various organizations which would permit greater participation in the decision-making processes at various levels.

Many times these laws have not been put into operation, or have been allowed to fall into abeyance. Bolivia may be cited as an example. The General Law of Cooperative Societies makes provision, among other things, for a Cooperative Institute and a Confederation

of Cooperative Societies, neither of which yet exists. The only federation legally recognized is the Federation of Credit Unions. There are nearly four hundred agricultural societies; a Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives was recognized by decree, but before the enactment of the present general law for cooperatives. Most of the agricultural cooperatives do not function well, because they were founded before the people really understood what a cooperative is. The necessary educational work was not done. At present, efforts are being made to learn from the experience of the past.

Consistent and continuous and progressive programs of education have been planned and are already underway. Leaders are being trained who will in turn pass on their knowledge to the members of their own cooperatives. Already the need is being felt for provincial and departmental groupings; some centrals have been formed or are in process of organization. Soon the cooperatives will feel the need for their federation and it will be successfully launched. It is by understanding the process of community development and its objectives that the surer approach to cooperatives is made. If community development principles are applied, success will be more likely. Community development is cooperative *action;* a cooperative concretizes this action in a permanent way in a cooperative *enterprise* (or business). The continuity of the cooperative action will determine to a large extent the permanence and success of the cooperative.

Committees of parents, public works, and health are provided for in the law of some countries. However, their potential has not been explored. One can envisage the committee of parents making a real contribution to the educational system, and not just fund-raising and the organization of graduation ceremonies. The possibilities open to the committees of public works are really too numerous to mention, but some serious thought will bring them to light. And what an amount of work is awaiting the committees of health. One can easily see in these committees the nucleus of a system of local government. How wonderful it would be to see the emergence of village or community councils in the rural areas. Representatives of the committees named, sports groups, women's institutes, cooperatives, the equivalent of the 4-H clubs, and cultural groups would make a council representative of the whole community.

In this way would the ideals of participatory democracy be realized. With the growth of responsibility, financial assistance for community programs could be allocated by the regional govern-

mental administration, or by the national government through its allocations to the regions. A little thought will show the possibilities for democratizing regional government. In the cities, the neighborhood committees could be developed, incorporating the ideas outlined. How significant is it of a prevalent social inertia that no councillors have been elected to assist the mayor of La Paz for many years, although this is also a provision in Bolivian law?

In the fields of health, housing, child welfare, and care of mothers much can be done. In Trinidad and Tobago the pioneer work done by a voluntary organization, the Child Welfare League, led to the organization by government of maternity nurses to serve even the rural areas. There should be closer supervision of all home-building even in the rural areas, to make sure that minimal standards conducive to better health are observed. This would necessitate a greater contribution from the medical profession: study of light and ventilation requirements, size and number of rooms, toilet facilities; it would also mean that a serious effort would have to be made to serve the whole population, and this would require a dedication to the profession which is not yet apparent.

It must surely be obvious that there is great need for an understanding of the implications of community development. The community development worker is not a social worker, using "social worker" in the technical and professional sense. There are very few professionally and technically qualified community development workers in Latin America. A professional social worker helps a person to help himself through the process of case-work, group-work, or community organization. The community development worker helps people to cooperate through the community development process, so heavily emphasized throughout this chapter. The catalyst who can grasp and use this process effectively is a tremendous asset for the work of integral development, so that every man may have more and be more.

20.

Cooperatives for Integral Development

Missionaries serving the people of Latin America are becoming aware in increasing numbers of the need to concern themselves more and more with the social and economic problems that affect their adopted countries. If they come from Europe or North America they cannot but fail to note the disparity that exists between the standard of life in their home country and that in the country in which they now work.

Even cursory observation in any Latin American country will lead to the inference that there is a great inequality in the distribution of the riches and resources available there. The great majority of the people are underprivileged: illiterate, undernourished, housed very inadequately, receiving low wages if engaged in the industrial, manufacturing, or commercial sector, pursuing merely a subsistance farming if in agriculture. In general, it may be stated that the basic social education facilities available to these people in their communities have been very inadequate and also inadequately used. As a consequence, the basic social behavior of the masses of the people has not developed those standards of social integrity and loyalty which together with functional and technical competence are necessary for generating a spontaneous socioeconomic development.

During the evolution of the Industrial Revolution in Europe and North America the ordinary people were able to change their attitudes with changing circumstances, assess their problems, recognize their social duties, acquire the technical knowledge to perform their duties and secure their rights. Thus evolved the trade union and the cooperative. The transfer of these two movements to Latin America poses special problems not only because economic progress has been slower there, but more so because social progress has lagged so far behind.

In order to understand the possibilities inherent in the cooperative for improving the economic conditions of the people, it is not

necessary that every missionary should understand the development of a philosophy of cooperation from the earliest times through the Middle Ages with the guilds and Montes Pietatis; the influence of Robert Owen of England, Charles Fourier and Louis Blanc of France, and Victor Huber of Germany. Neither is it necessary to study in detail the history of the Rochdale Pioneers of England, the credit societies of Schultze-Delitzsch and Raiffeisen of Germany, and of Luigi Luzzatti and Leone Wollemborg of Italy—to mention but a few from the Old World.

But it is necessary to avoid a simplistic approach: that somehow or other a cooperative is the solution to the economic oppression being suffered by so many people and that it can be founded overnight without any prolonged effort to prepare the people for its acceptance and adoption.

WHAT ARE COOPERATIVES?

Every cooperative is an organization of people who associate as human beings in order to promote their economic interests. Since these interests cover a number of areas, there are different types of cooperatives. A credit union is a cooperative in which the members save regularly and provide accumulated funds from which they can borrow at reasonable rates of interest for provident and productive purposes. It teaches its members the wise use of money by inculcating the habit of thrift and giving a true understanding of the value of credit. It is an absolute necessity wherever there are high interest rates, sales pressure through the apparent convenience of hire-purchase (time payment or installment) facilities, and the abuse by local merchants who advance goods to the peasant farmers, who pledge their crops when harvested. An agricultural cooperative might engage in the bulk purchase of seeds, fertilizers, tools, and implements in order to pass on to its members the economies thus effected; it might be concerned with the sale of the commodities produced, seeking better prices by selling directly in the larger centers and thus avoiding the innumerable host of middlemen who plague the peasant, who is not yet an active agent in the emerging market economy. A consumer cooperative could make available to its members the essential foods and fats which, at least in the rural areas, they must now purchase at very enhanced prices.

A cooperative may be defined as a society of persons who vol-

untarily join together to found and control it democratically, and in which they collaborate as persons in order to promote their own economic interest, according to definite principles accepted universally. It is essentially a business or an economic undertaking but it has very wide social significance. It constitutes an economic entity, but it is equally a society of people. The business and associational aspects of the enterprise must always be borne in mind.

As a society, the cooperative is distinguished by its special form of organization, which is intended as a means toward the achievement of its specific economic and social objectives. As a business, it takes its place among other types of business—private, partnerships, companies, and state bodies. Thus, if it is to survive, it must use modern techniques of efficiency and management. It is distinguished from other types of business through its characteristic of service to all its members by a combination of democratic control and efficient management of its own activities. Thus, if there is negligence in its management and operation, either as a business or as an association of people, there will be a lessening of its impact on the social and economic development of the community.

An analysis of the definition will highlight certain important constituents which must form part of every cooperative:

"Freedom of association": as a consequence of the respect in which the human person should be held, the cooperative emphasizes the importance of free will. A person enters the association freely and he may leave when he desires. His membership is voluntary and membership is open to all who are eligible.

"Democratic organization and control": those who organize the cooperative do so according to democratic principles and practice; subsequently, all the members control it in a democratic manner. There is equality of control in that each member has only one vote—and this irrespective of his nationality, race, religion, political or religious affiliation, or the value of his economic holdings in the cooperative. The supreme authority in the cooperative is the general assembly of all the members duly convened. This body elects the various committees which manage and guide it until the next general assembly. Nonmembers of the cooperative may not interfere in its affairs. Even the government should only have the right to legal and fiscal supervision to ensure that it conducts its affairs in accordance with the laws which regulate cooperatives.

"As persons": the quality of the human person is of supreme importance in the cooperative—honesty, intelligence, diligence, industry, and mutual love. The personal dignity of the member is kept to the fore by the principle of one vote by each member, and generally by a limit being placed on the share-holdings that may be owned by any individual in relation to the total worth of the society. A bond of mutual interest helps to cement such personal values. There is continuous stress on the need for each member to be informed and educated in what concerns the cooperative. Only in this way is he able to participate well in the discussions, form his own opinions, and express them freely.

"Their own economic interest": this distinguishes the cooperative from specifically social-betterment societies. The cooperative is concerned with activities that are related to the economic improvement of its members. This of course includes health, education, and other social services. The cooperative is organized to serve the needs of its members. All those who have the same interests and needs may become members of the cooperative and thus share in its economic benefits. It will at times, through its influence in the community, ameliorate the condition of those who do not join.

"Universally accepted principles": the International Cooperative Alliance, founded in 1895, is the authoritative body in what pertains to the essentials of cooperatives. Its listing of the principles is accepted throughout the world. Basically they are an enumeration of the principles followed by the Rochdale Pioneers. A commission formed in 1930 proposed the seven cooperative principles adopted by the I.C.A. in 1934. Thirty years later, a new commission was set up to study and revise the principles if necessary in view of modern economic development. This commission prepared a new formulation after two years of work. This was approved at the twenty-third Congress of the Alliance celebrated in Vienna from September 5 to 8, 1966. The basic principles were reduced to six:

1. Open and voluntary membership.
2. Democratic control.
3. Limited interest, if any, on capital.
4. The surplus belongs to the members.
5. Provision should be made for education.
6. Cooperation among cooperatives.

It is interesting to note that the sixth principle, which requires that cooperatives cooperate in every practical way with other cooperatives on the local, national, and international levels, is completely new as a principle.

It would be a mistake to think that the diffusion of the cooperative movement throughout the world owes its success to the efforts of ministers of religion and lay missionaries. It would also be a mistake to think that in Latin America the Church must play the principal role. But it is probably an even greater mistake that more missionaries do not consider the possibilities which the cooperative movement offers to those who go abroad to serve peoples who are in dire need of social and economic uplifting.

St. Francis Xavier University of the diocese of Antigonish, Nova Scotia, through its Extension Department, and in recent years through the Coady International Institute, has wielded increasing influence since the 1930's in the spread of cooperatives in the Caribbean, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. To mention but a few, Fr. Sullivan, S.J., in Jamaica, Fr. Long, O.P., in Trinidad and Tobago, Sister Alicia in Dominica, Fr. Danial McLellan, M.M., in Peru, and Fr. Gerard Beausoleil, M.M., in Bolivia have been pioneers in introducing the credit-union movement to these countries; Fr. Ganey, S.J., as a result of his pioneer work in British Honduras was invited to the Fiji Islands to undertake a similar apostolate; Fr. McIvor and Fr. Steele of the Scarboro Foreign Mission Society were the pioneers of consumer, production, and credit cooperatives in the Dominican Republic. The tremendous success in the development of cooperatives in Puerto Rico is due in great part to the energy of Fr. J. McDonald of Antigonish, who was invited to that island and remained to die there many years later.

VALUES TO BE FOUND IN COOPERATIVES

The task is not an easy one and good results do not come about in a short time. By reflecting on the cooperative principles one can see the utmost importance of recognizing that their doctrinal content is profoundly human. All the members of a cooperative have an equal voice in the conduct of its affairs. The general assembly operating within the limits of the national cooperative law and the society's own statutes and by-laws is the highest authority. In the assembly the members evaluate the work accomplished and make the necessary adjustments. They elect their administration and vigilance committees by democratic vote.

It is thus easy to see how cooperatives foster and promote the principles and practice of democracy among the membership. Both the members and the leaders of cooperatives must of necessity become more aware of their duties and responsibilities, not only as cooperators but also as members of their communities and their country. But it is only by a vigorous program of continuous and progressive education that the members of the cooperative will be able to fulfil these expectations.

In a special way, the spirit of service must be stressed in the cooperative, which is "not for profit but for service." The imperatives of justice—to respect the interests of others and to interpret one's personal convenience in the light of the good of all—come to be understood and observed. A spirit of confidence and mutual respect grows through the discipline of deliberating, planning, and deciding together. The cooperative becomes a school of experience where the members learn that by agreeing on their common aspirations they can realize them by working together.

Therein lies the social significance of the cooperative movement. The members are helped directly but there are also repercussions in society at large. Social justice is promoted in the area of trade; fair competition in the buying and selling of articles of good quality helps to establish reasonable prices; a deeper understanding of democracy in practice is born; the spirit of social well-being is fostered; through the educational programs essential human values are respected and the individual improves his personal character to the benefit of his family and of the community in which he lives.

In brief and by way of resumé the essential characteristics of a cooperative may be stated to be:

1. Associational; i.e., the members unite to accomplish what they cannot accomplish as individuals.

2. Providing services, i.e., all members have the same objective of providing a service that answers to the felt needs of the members.

3. Mutual help; i.e., the members look at themselves as a group capable of solving some of their problems through working together.

4. Service; i.e., the impelling motive in all functions of the cooperative is not that of profit but one of serving one another.

PRACTICAL WORKINGS OF COOPERATIVES

A missionary will find that he is to work with people in a defined area: city, town, surburb, slum, countryside. In order to be

of service to the people committed to him he must go to them; he cannot expect them to come to him in an office or at his home. He must approach the people frankly and honestly and with a sincere determination to help them. This means putting aside all superior airs of officialdom or position. By being helpful, friendly, and patient he lays the foundation for winning the confidence of the people. A genuine interest in any matters they wish to bring to notice must be manifested, whether or not such matters seem to be relevant or not.

They must be approached through the levels of their own understanding so that they do not feel uncomfortable in the presence of one who has come to work with them. The resources and opportunities of the people must first be used in order not to upset them by demanding what is not easily available or what is too difficult for them to offer. When their confidence and cooperation have been won, the missionary can offer the benefits of his experience and knowledge in order to help them overcome their problems. In this way the avenue to improved standards of understanding and living is opened up for them by their own efforts.

The effective worker with cooperatives pursues his objectives gradually. He will lead his community, not drive it. He will never forget that one good project evolved by the community itself is worth several imposed by him or imported from elsewhere. He must be aware of all that is happening in the community and of everybody in it. He cannot afford to be impatient and he will not successfully start a cooperative if he proceeds too rapidly. More exactly, he should not organize a cooperative for the community but rather he should help the community to organize it.

In order to accelerate the process of development in many parts of Latin America the missionary may find that he has to assume roles of leadership which, in more socially advanced countries, are the responsibility of other members of the community. He then assumes this role as a substitute and must not forget that his primary function in serving his people is to animate and inspire them and to educate and train them to assume new social and economic responsibilities.

The danger, once this substitutive role is assumed by the missionary, is that he forgets his obligation to educate and train his replacement. And unfortunately the longer he holds the position, more often than not, the more he begins to see the necessity for continuing in it. The society cannot be handed over fully yet because: "They do not trust one another." "They are not honest."

"They are not dedicated enough." The missionary must try to teach his people the importance of honesty and trust and dedication. He must remember that the people will make mistakes; he must show them how to profit from them. The judicious apportioning of responsibility helps to bring forth in the one who is trusted many responses hithertofore never seen.

The successful working with people in helping them to launch their cooperative will necessitate a certain technical ability and knowledge in this field on the part of the missionary, or at least that he is able to bring to bear in his community the specialized resources otherwise available. He will assist his people more if he is himself prepared to develop his knowledge by reading, consultation, and studying the experience of others. In all countries in Latin America there are others with varying degrees of knowledge and skill in this field; also there are government agencies, representatives of international organizations, and private institutions which are concerned with cooperative development. The missionary is not alone when he decides that he must try to meet the felt need of his people for a cooperative.

PART 5:

Politics

MICHAEL ELMER

21.

Latin American Political Parties

Latin America has at the present time an extremely wide variety of political parties which operate within several different types of political system. The simplest way of classifying the political systems encountered in Latin America is according to the number of parties working effectively within them. Thus may be distinguished multiparty, two-party, and several varying types of one-party systems, which operate with differing degrees of competitiveness and efficiency. The most typical Latin American system, in the sense of the one most commonly met with, is the multiparty system, where three or more major parties compete for power. During the last fifty years roughly half of the Latin American countries have had multiparty arrangements, of which the best functioning contemporary example is to be found in Chile, where ideologically diverse groups ranging from conservative to socialist have competed for power.

While, however, there is general agreement regarding the classification of Latin American political systems, no such agreement is forthcoming with regard to attempts to group the parties themselves. Various competing attempts at classification have been put forward, from Professor Robert Alexander's ten-group arrangement to the simpler ordering of parties into pragmatic, ideological, and traditional, suggested by Almond and Coleman. This question of the best grouping of Latin American parties is an interesting one, though it must unfortunately fall outside the scope of this present work. Instead of attempting a new classification, therefore, or synthesizing existing ones, it will prove clearest to examine the differing types of parties currently found in Latin America in order of their historical appearance during the national period; indeed, before the wars of independence, political parties as such did not exist.

Before adopting this procedure however, examining the party types as they emerged, and considering their present-day importance

in the twenty republics, there are a few general points worth making.

An important point to grasp is that, on the whole, political parties in Latin America are personalist rather than ideological. In other words, they are founded not so much on issues and in accordance with a general political outlook, as upon the personality of a strong leader, or *caudillo* and this is true to a great extent even of parties that expressly claim to be ideologically based, such as the Communist Party. Chile is something of an exception to this tendency, politics there being essentially ideological in a degree similar to France or Italy. In other countries of Latin America, political parties are often in fact simply temporary vehicles for the political ambitions of a politician, which fact is commonly reflected in the tendency to call the parties after the leaders; e.g., the Odrista party of Peru. Frequently such parties are ephemeral and are concocted only for one election campaign and disintegrate soon afterwards, as was the case, for example, with General Barrientos' Bolivian Revolutionary Front, which was formed to fight in the 1966 elections and which fell apart a short time later. The idea of a successful politician's being rejected on ideological grounds is a difficult concept for most Latin Americans; such as, for example, the British electorate's rejection of the great war leader, Winston Churchill, in the polls of 1945 because of the attraction of the Labour Party's program rather than the personality of Clement Attlee.

A second general point of importance is that when compared with European parties or parties throughout the English-speaking world, Latin American political groups appear extremely weak in terms of organization, discipline, and financing. There are, of course, some Latin American political parties that show a high level of organization—the Mexican P.R.I. is such an example—but nevertheless in most cases organization is chaotic, discipline weak, and fund-raising spasmodic and corruptly handled. Full-time party workers are a rarity in many republics, and where they exist, turnovers are very high among them. It is no exaggeration to say that in some Latin American states, certain of the more important soccer teams exhibit a higher degree of organization than do the parties, and the same is true of discipline and financing. None of the Bolivian parties could have equalled the financial recovery of "The Strongest" team following a tragic air crash, because of their dependence upon occasional badly administered levies, rather than possession of an efficient systematic fund-raising machine such as that of the football club.

CONSERVATIVE PARTIES

The oldest political groupings still active in Latin America are the conservative parties, which date from the earliest days of the national period and still exist in half the republics. These parties arose at a time when politics was the exclusive concern of the upper-class elite whose wealth was mostly based upon land ownership. It is still true, of course, that in most Latin American countries political power is wielded by minorities, but during the nineteenth century these landed minorities were microscopic at the side of the total population. The two basic arguments in which conservative parties were concerned during the nineteenth century were what should be the status of the Catholic Church in their countries, and whether federal or unitary structures were more suited to their countries. The conservatives stood for strong government support for the Church, a centralized state, and policies aimed at safeguarding the economic interests of the landed oligarchy.

Today conservative parties still represent the interests of the upper-class social elite, but, besides the landed class, their stage has now been widened to include many business and industrial interests. In fact three distinct currents can be discerned within modern Latin American conservatism.

The majority section holds to the original conservative position, making few if any concessions to the times. The second group, a minority one, recognizes the need for change in order to preserve as much as possible of the status quo and therefore its members' privileges. This is the attitude portrayed so well by Guiseppe di Lampedusa in *The Leopard*, that "things have to change so that things can stay the same." Lastly, there exists in some countries a third and somewhat fanatical strain of conservatism, which believes that any means are licit to maintain order and the status quo and defeat innovating forces.

The *Weltanschauung* of the Latin American conservative parties, and the vision they wish to preserve, is that of a stable, ordered, and hierarchical society led by themselves. In such a society, social inferiors either inherently know, or can be taught, their place. Indeed, for conservatives one of the churches' most important functions is to teach the lower classes a resigned acceptance of their lot. Any attempt at change, or even suggestions that the present division of wealth is unjust invites bitter opposition. Plans to introduce land

reform, progressive taxation, or an extension of the franchise are quickly smeared as Communistic plots to overturn and destroy Christian society.

During the 1950's, several conservative parties achieved power legally but did little once in office. Almost all of these governments imposed austerity programs which resulted in virtually no economic growth and increasingly retrogressive income distribution. Chile between 1959 and 1965 provides perhaps the clearest example.

Clearly today such programs have less and less appeal and therefore, to maintain themselves in power, conservative parties have increasingly resorted to such abuses and malpractices as ballot rigging. The most marked current example of antidemocratic practices is to be found in Colombia, where the two traditional parties, the conservatives and the liberals, who are today ideologically almost indistinguishable, have so modified the constitution as to exclude political participation by other parties until 1974.

In other countries, conservative parties, conscious of their poor electoral chances, have sought to infiltrate centrist, especially radical, parties, or have encouraged and cooperated with the military in mounting coups against democratic regimes. A recent example of the latter attitude occurred in Chile, where despite the apolitical reputation of the armed forces, the Partido Nacional ran a propaganda campaign encouraging military intervention. Elsewhere also, conservative parties have attempted to improve their chances and gain a better public image by name changing. Thus the right-wing conservative Partido de Acción Nacional of Mexico now usually refers to itself as Christian Democratic.

At the present time, victory in honest elections for conservative parties almost completely depends on either a fragmented opposition ranged against them, as was the case when Ponce Enriquez of Ecuador won the presidency with only 35 per cent of the vote, or else upon the formation of a broad right-wing front with other parties, e.g., alliance with the liberals and radicals in Chile.

Fanatical conservative groups like Laureano Gomez's group in Colombia merge to the right with more or less openly Fascist parties or groups such as the Unzaguista wing of the Falange Socialista Boliviana, the A.R.N.E. of Ecuador, and the Argentine Tacuara. Large Fascist movements in Latin America, however, were a phenomenon of the 30's, when the movement was strong in Europe. But today the Mexican goldshirts, Plinio Salgado's green-shirted Integralistas of Brazil, and Von Maree's Chilean Nazi Party are political dodos.

Manuel Prado's party in Peru is a more moderate conservative group, as is the following of Mariano Ospina in Colombia.

In a few of the smaller Latin American republics, conservative parties have provided a vehicle for personalist dictatorships. Thus the Nicaraguan National Liberal Party is a tool of the ill-famed Somoza clan, and the Paraguayan Colorado Party has performed a similar function for President Stroessner.

LIBERAL PARTIES

Liberal parties appeared during the nineteenth century as more progressive counterparts to the conservatives. They stood at this time for separation of Church and state, especially in the realm of public education, and federalism in the political organization of the new republics. Federalism has everywhere today ceased to be a live political issue, though some of the few remaining liberal parties maintain their anticlericalism. In general, liberal parties have stood the passage of time less well than the conservatives and most of those still extant today have a very small support base. In Colombia, however, the party is still the main alternative to the conservatives. In fact, since 1927 no other political party besides these two has been represented in the legislature, with the sole exception of the Colombian Communist Party, which enjoyed a brief four-year stay. In Chile, aided by a well-functioning multiparty system, the liberals kept an importance until recent years as one of the six major parties right up until the 1966 merger with the conservatives which formed the Partido Nacional. In general, liberal parties have been more progressive and open than the conservatives and have therefore lent themselves to evolutionary development. They traditionally upheld the rights of the individual, of parliaments, and of local government against the crushing centralization of the conservatives and the latter's preoccupation with order at all costs. Traditionally the liberal parties drew their support from upper-class elite groups, but predominantly from those of the cities rather than *estanciero* circles. They were particularly strong among members of the learned professions.

RADICAL PARTIES

It was precisely because of this openness to change that in some countries new political parties evolved as offshoots of the left wing of the liberal parties, usually taking the name of radicals in imitation

of the French Radical Party. This process occurred for the most part during or shortly after World War I, achieving its biggest effect in the southernmost republics of Latin America, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. In all of these countries radical parties remain important today. The radicals were reforming parties that made a strong appeal to urban middle groups. They stood against the oligarchs and sought to work with the masses to improve their conditions. They introduced tax reforms, expanded public education, and in Chile and Uruguay coupled this with policies to separate Church and state. They attempted to open up public administration to talent, and to secure a better distribution of wealth by some agrarian reforms. In short, by their social legislation, they laid the first shaky foundations of the welfare state in Latin America.

The radicals' failure, however, has been their inability to appeal to the working class in the southern republics, and their identification with the setting up of massive state bureaucracies which have proved unable to solve national economic problems and have developed instead into employment and pension-distributing agencies.

In Argentina the radicals completely absorbed the liberals and in 1912 introduced the famous Sáenz Peña Law, which provided for male suffrage and secret voting. This reform resulted in the radicals' gaining the presidency in 1916, though the economic power of the conservatives was not broken until the Perón era. Thus only the radicals remained as opposition to the Peronistas. When the latter fell in 1955, the radicals once again became Argentina's strongest political force. In 1957 the party split into Intransigent and Popular factions, which remain the major Argentine parties so long as the Peronistas stay outlawed.

In Chile the radicals also remain a major party, predominantly of the middle class. As a centrist party, the Chilean Radical Party occupies the strategic middle ground of the political spectrum, again very much after the style of its French namesake, and has therefore been able to ally itself with left or right as the occasion demanded.

SOCIALIST PARTIES

The socialist parties were the next to arrive on the Latin American political scene, emerging generally in the early 1920's as a result of European immigration. Socialist parties therefore tended to de-

velop only in those countries that received relatively heavy immigration, in particular in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. The socialists played a pioneering role in trade-union organization in the three countries and also won considerable intellectual support. Their history, however, has been one of fragmentation and discord. As has been the case with their European forebears, they have divided into moderate social democratic parties and more extreme Marxian socialist groups. This discord has greatly weakened their effectiveness. For example, in Argentina the socialist party (P.S.A.), owing to its ideological divisions, was in no condition to combat Peronism, and therefore lost control of the union movement, which it subsequently never regained. Today the Argentine socialists, split into two parties, possess a certain prestige because of men like Juan B. Justo and Alfredo Palacios who were members, but have no real importance.

In Chile, however, the socialist party is one of the big six, normally polling about 12 per cent of the vote. It usually fights elections jointly with the Communist Party, but is considerably more radical. The Chilean Socialist Party rejects Soviet tutelage, and the parliamentary system, and has consistently refused to subscribe to the Communists' *vía pacífica.* It also refused, unlike the C.P., to support the progressive legislation of the Christian Democrat government. Together with the C.P., the Chilean Socialist Party was in control of the trade unions, which gave the party a strong support base. Thus it was the only Latin American socialist party with a realistic chance of achieving power, and is now part of President Allende's coalition.

INDIGENOUS PARTIES

The political parties described so far were all essentially patterned upon European models. The Aprista parties, however, came close to being indigenous political groups, falling outside of standard European classifications. These parties take their name from A.P.R.A. (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) of Peru, the oldest and best known of the genre, which was founded by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre in the early 20's, and whose influence has been great throughout Latin America. The original plan was to create a single movement of continental proportions based upon the following five principles: opposition to imperialism, nationalization of land and industries, international control of the Panama Canal, economic and political union of Latin America, and solidarity with all op-

pressed peoples of the world. This grand concept failed, but some elements of an international approach still remain. There is, for example, a loosely organized Aprista Internationale.

Broadly, the Aprista parties, A.P.R.A. of Peru (now called P.A.P.), Acción Democrática of Venezuela, Liberación Nacional of Costa Rica, the P.R.D. of the Dominican Republic, besides other parties of lesser importance, all represent attempts to marry European socialist concepts together with elements which are distinctly native, or as Apristas would say, *indoamericano*. In these parties many influences combine: the Mexican revolution, European Marxist and syndicalist thinking, the university reform movement, and in the Peruvian case, study of preconquest Quechua and Aymara political institutions.

Although the early Aprista leaders considered themselves socialists and preached socialist policies such as state ownership of land and industry, the modern Aprista parties are extremely pragmatic and nondoctrinaire, almost to the point of having no political principles at all. Thus the modern parties have no fixed policy regarding state ownership. Their line on this varies with the circumstances.

One of the most important characteristics of Aprista parties is their wide appeal. They are mass parties embracing several different social classes such as urban workers, peasants, and middle-class intellectuals. Although originally radical, the parties today are best considered as moderate reformist parties; many in fact claim to be of the democratic left. Their lack of ideological rigor has led some of the parties into making compromising pacts with local elite or reactionary groups, which has discredited them in the eyes of the workers, e.g., the P.A.P.'s dealings with Dictator Odría.

Others, however, continue to be extremely successful. In the 1970 elections the Costa Rican Liberación Nacional, a typical Aprista party, again won most convincingly on a platform of economic development and social progress. Liberación Nacional has not lost its worker support, a fate that has in part befallen P.A.P. and A.D., and also strongly attracts professional groups.

Two parties which resemble Aprista parties but yet are really in a category of their own are the Mexican P.R.I. and Bolivian M.N.R. Both are reforming nationalist parties based on a wide coalition of interests appealing to peasants, workers, and intellectual middle sectors. However, both have been at one time official parties; the P.R.I. still is. They were charged with carrying on the Mexican and Bolivian

revolutions. Thus, despite the presence of other parties, both parties (the M.N.R. between 1952 and 1964) functioned as the official party in what were essentially one-party systems. The P.R.I., thanks to the continued economic expansion in Mexico, has been able to satisfy its different sectors though doing less and less for the peasants, whereas the M.N.R., faced with a continually worsening economic situation, could not maintain itself before conflicting pressures. It finally fell in 1964 to renewed military political intervention, but not before having achieved the three basic revolutionary measures of universal suffrage, the land reform, and the nationalization of the mines, the first two of which radically altered the status of the Bolivian Indian.

Another kind of Latin American party which can broadly be termed populist emerged in Argentina and Brazil just before and during World War II, and seemed likely at one time to spread to other republics.

Both Peronismo in Argentina and Getulismo, or the doctrine of Getulio Vargas, in Brazil were strongly influenced by European fascism, but Perón especially tried to develop a third position ideology, or *justicialismo*, which was non-Communist and intended to bolster the Latin American states against United States power. This resembles to some extent the A.P.R.A. concept of a Latin American anti-imperialist alliance.

At the time of the appearance of these two doctrines, Argentina was predominantly urban (65 per cent of population) and Brazil overwhelmingly still rural (urban population 32 per cent). This sociological difference determined the differences between the two types of populism very considerably. Vargas, faced with a powerful landed oligarchy, sought an alliance with them, and they were reassured by the Estado Novo and its anticommunism. Vargas' economic policies were at first essentially traditional ones aimed at keeping the coffee economy thriving. He did, however, turn much more to the masses once it became obvious that the Axis would lose the war, and that fascism was a bad long-term bet. Thus followed job-providing development projects like the Volta Redonda steel mill and Vargas' attempt to project himself as national *patrão* to the masses "o pai do povo." The Brazilian working class, however, was never well organized. There existed no strongly structured trade-unions which could have threatened the ruling class. Realizing this, the oligarchy were not terrified by the *queremista* demonstrations ("We want Vargas") as the Argentine upper class were by the Peronista mobs.

Peronismo was an altogether more radical populism. Perón's power base was explicitly the *descamisados*, the urban proletariat, and his attack was deliberately aimed at the oligarchy. The emphasis of his regime fell upon redistribution of income in favor of the working class, and their real wages rose steeply, helped also by financing from blocked wartime credits. This massive economic improvement awakened the political consciousness of the workers, and brought them into the Argentinian political arena as an organized force. Probably the Argentine case represents the only massive redistribution of income in a capitalist state. Unlike Vargas', Perón's economic policies ran contrary to the interests of the landed, and were in fact disastrous to them. Indeed his economic nationalist policy of industrialization at all costs ruined the traditional agrarian export economy and caused stagnation throughout the 50's and 60's. Peronismo, however, was highly successful politically and is still a living force in Argentina, whereas in Brazil Getulismo has been superseded. Indeed there is but little doubt that any honest election in Argentina would show the Peronistas to be the strongest political force.

COMMUNIST PARTIES

Latin American Communist parties were also products of the early 1920's, the first groups being formed by European immigrants in the southernmost republics, sometimes with Soviet financial assistance. They soon spread all over Latin America and within a decade came to exert considerable control over the trade-union movement. During the 30's the Communist parties increased their influence in the unions so that by the end of World War II they enjoyed decisive control in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. In this the period Communist influence on Latin American student bodies also greatly increased.

In this early period these Russian-tutored Communist parties were genuinely revolutionary, offsetting their small numbers by activity and zeal. Thus in El Salvador the Communist Party actually led the unsuccessful rising of 1932, and in Brazil the famous flying column of Luis Carlos Prestes engaged the military for some three years.

Although the Guatemalan Communist Party made an unsuccessful attempt to take over the Guatemalan Revolution in the early 50's, in general most parties became increasingly less active and more gradualistic in their policies. This was partly on Soviet instructions, partly owing to an aging leadership, and partly because, in some republics, the Communist parties had become corrupt, making deals with dictators such as Batista, Odría, and Ibañez. In return for being left alone, or for occasional handouts, the Communists were able to guarantee freedom from labor unrest by virtue of their control of the unions. This type of behavior became increasingly attractive at the height of the Cold War, when some fifteen states in Latin America outlawed the Communist parties. This convenient pose was justified on theoretical grounds by claiming that, since by definition no revolutions could occur until an industrial proletariat had grown up, the correct revolutionary line was to keep labor unions docile so as to favor outside investment, which would build up national industry and bring about the formation of such a proletariat. This type of political casuistry by the old Communist leaders, together with their general lack of revolutionary inclination, alienated most young party members and led to the growth of pro-Chinese factions in many countries which declared themselves in favor of armed struggle. Of the generally Russian-influenced parties only four, those of Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Guatemala, objected to the following of the "peaceful road to socialism" resolution at the XXIII Congress in Moscow.

In terms of direct seizures of power the Latin American parties have no chance at all, but the Cuban party led by Hanibal Escalante did notably assist the conversion of the Cuban Revolution from a vague reformism into a Communist one. In 1959, Castro entertained a vague liberal democratic ideology, but the events of the following two years of confrontation with the United States produced takeovers of property until over 90 per cent of urban industry and more than half the land was state owned. Having admitted hard-working Communist cadres to high positions because of their efficiency and political expertise, Castro came to adopt their ideology because it seemed the only intellectual framework that seemed capable of making sense of the postrevolutionary situation. Thus, whereas in Russia in 1917 ideology was an essential preparation for revolution, in Cuba it came trailing far behind.

Other aspects of the Cuban Communist Party are novel when

compared with general practice. So far, there has been a total rejection of the market as a mechanism, and of material incentives; in short, a policy of "no concessions to capitalism." Thus there has been no equivalent of the Soviet New Economic Policy of the 1920's. Also heretical in terms of strict theory is the Cuban party's attempt to have both socialism and communism at the same time, thus confusing "to each according to his work" with "to each according to his need." This latter is normally considered a utopian ideal which will only be attainable with the development of the socialist countries into Communist societies over many years. In practical terms this means that the Soviets disapprove of such experiments as the free telephone service in Cuba.

With the setting up of the Organization for Latin American Solidarity and policies of exporting the revolution, one sees a return to the old idea of the Internationale, and this has given rise to the growth of Fidelista-type Communist groups throughout Latin America. These small groups tend to attract those who see Latin America's existing social, economic, and political structures as inadequate and unsalvageable and consider that the only option is to tear them down; in practice, the recruits are chiefly students and middle-class intellectuals. However these Fidelista Communist groups lack popular support and to date all their attempts, e.g., of the M.I.R. in Venezuela and E.L.N. groups in several countries, have proved failures, discrediting the theory of the guerrilla *foco* and strengthening the arguments of the official Communist parties, which insist that the Cuban revolution is not a model to be followed. The debacle of the Guevara campaign illustrates well the shaky nature of the *foco* theory, and also the highly corrupt and opportunist nature of many Latin American Moscow-line parties, in this case the P.C.B. led by Mario Monje.

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

Christian Democratic parties have grown up in Latin America since the end of World War II and today form the continent's newest political force.

Traditionally in Latin America, parties that claimed a special Christian affiliation were without exception rightist conservative groups, but by the late 30's this situation had begun to change. Some of the youth sections of conservative parties and Christian student organizations, particularly in Chile, became influenced by the teach-

ing of the social encyclicals and the Christian humanist thought of Jacques Maritain. These groups rejected the practice of the conservative parties as being at variance with Catholic social teaching, and split off to form separate progressive Christian parties, in the Chilean case, the Falange Nacional. Groups of this kind remained unimportant for almost twenty years, but after 1957 the Chilean party in particular achieved phenomenal success.

Although Latin American Christian Democratic parties were inspired to a large extent by European models, especially the Italian party and the writings of Don Sturzo, and were helped by the postwar success of Christian democracy in Europe, today the two streams have little in common. The European parties such as the Italian P.D.C. and the German C.D.U./C.S.U. are procapitalist conservative parties, whereas the Latin American parties have a strong anticapitalist bias. They see capitalism as "merciless" and "anti-Christian" and generally degrading of human dignity. In place of it, they put forward "communitarianism," which is a middle or third way, being neither capitalist nor Marxist socialist. This doctrine provides for joint organization of management and labor. Labor is to participate in management decisions and in profit-sharing schemes. Heavy emphasis is placed on cooperatives as part of an eventual system of state capitalism. Christian Democratic parties admit to being Christian-inspired, but deny that they are in any way Catholic or confessional. Non-Catholics and nonbelievers are welcome to join, though in practice few do. Any notion of class conflict is rejected, and this divides off the Christian Democratic parties from the revolutionary socialists.

The success of the Chilean P.D.C. in 1964 has been both a strength and a weakness for the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America. The movement gained in prestige from the Chilean victory, and this undoubtedly helped the Venezuelan C.O.P.E.I. to electoral success. At the present moment perhaps three of the sixteen active Christian Democratic parties stand a realistic chance of gaining power in the near future. However, the Christian Democratic philosophy has been harshly judged according to the performance of the Chilean party, and radical young Christians in Latin America have in general been highly critical. They have castigated its failure to enact a thoroughgoing land reform and its tendency to compromise with entrenched right-wing conservative and foreign interests. In Chile this has led to the splitting off of the left wing of the P.D.C. to form

M.A.P.U., and a similar process has occurred in Bolivia giving rise to a new party, the Revolutionary Christian Democrats (P.D.C.R.). Both M.A.P.U. and the P.D.C.R. declare themselves to be revolutionary socialists, specifically rejecting communitarianism and the very possibility of any third position. These new socialist Christian Democrats claim that any political party attempting to stand between the capitalist and socialist poles of force will inevitably be drawn to one pole or the other. The Frei government, they accused, was being increasingly drawn in the capitalist direction, and was therefore ceasing to be in any way revolutionary. This tendency of Latin American Christian Democratic parties to fragment into ideologically distinct groups is very likely to increase.

PERSONALIST PARTIES

The last category of political parties does not fit an historical time scale. These are the personalist or *caudillo* parties which have existed throughout the republican period, and doubtless will continue to do so for some considerable time. These parties are personalist in that they exist only as vehicles serving to put a strong leader into power, and to endorse his political opinions. Examples are numerous, but some recent ones include the Union Nacional Odrísta of Peru, the Federación Nacional Velasquista of Ecuador, and the Alianza Nacional Popular of Colombia. These parties were founded specifically to back Odría, Velasco, and Rojas Pinilla respectively.

Because these parties come into existence to further one man's political ambitions, they are of necessity as diverse as the *caudillos* they serve. However, some general remarks can be made about them. Personalist parties usually stress the need for decisive and able leadership (which they of course claim their man can supply) contrasting this unfavorably with the slow workings of democratic regimes. These parties also almost always promise large wage increases, better living conditions, and generally an improved life for the masses. In fact the relationship between a *caudillo* president of such a party, and the people is essentially the same as the *patrón-peón* relationship of rural Latin America. General Barrientos of Bolivia typified this paternalism during his many gift-bearing helicopter trips to isolated Altiplano villages, and his party or, rather, front, the F.R.B., served to help exploit the publicity that accrued to him from these actions.

Personalist parties tend to be a feature of the political life of the smaller and poorer Latin American countries. In some Central American republics they are little more than a clique of toadies gathered around the dictator, as is the case with Somoza's party in Nicaragua. Occasionally a personalist leader will have concocted a spurious ideology which his party then has the responsibility of proclaiming. An example of this is "Trujillismo," the doctrine invented for Rafael Trujillo to justify his tyrannical rule of the Dominican Republic, volumes concerning which his hardworking party staff sent to influential sources.

Since all these *caudillo*-type parties exist for no other purpose than to serve a leader's ambitions, should he for whatever reason be removed from the political scene, the party usually collapses within a very short time. Such collapse also often occurs when the party has served its purpose of getting its man elected and it is allowed to decay.

22.

Latin America and the United States

Vital to any understanding of the present-day relationship between the United States and Latin America is a knowledge of the historical background, a background little known to North Americans. The key determining feature in the realtionship between the two areas has been the Monroe Doctrine which, though undergoing development since its formulation in 1823, has remained the basis of most subsequent American policy in the Western Hemisphere. It can, for example, be clearly seen at the bottom of such modern arrangements as the Organization of American States.

In 1815, following the ending of the Napoleonic wars, reactionary despotisms were restored in Europe, and the United States as a new, weak, and progressive republic was preoccupied with the danger of a Spanish reconquest of the South American colonies aided by France and Russia. She was also worried about the threat of Russian designs upon the Pacific Coast territories of North America, though this was considered a lesser threat. The Spanish colonies, fighting for their freedom in the protracted revolutionary wars, looked to the United States as an example and moral leader, and the United States Government attempted to respond. Conscious of the country's physical weakness, the United States Government realized that this response must be by clever political moves. Thus the United States gained great prestige in Latin America in 1822 by being the first state to accord recognition to some of the new republics. This action was copied by Great Britain soon afterwards, chiefly for reasons of trade. Some of the new Latin American republics, e.g., Colombia, had threatened to close their ports to countries not granting recognition and the British government was above all concerned to ensure free-trade access.

In 1823, France invaded Spain and restored the Bourbon despotism, of which it was said that they had learned nothing and forgotten nothing. The British feared that this presaged an attempt at

intervention in Spanish America. Since any such reestablishment of control would have restored the old mercantilist restrictions and cut British trade with the area, Canning, the British foreign minister, suggested a joint Anglo–U.S. Latin American policy aimed at preventing outside interference in the wars dragging on between Spain and the colonies. This suggestion gave the American Government just the chance it needed. Fearing European intervention yet lacking the armed might to defend the Spanish colonies, it now knew that the world's greatest sea power was not disposed to allow any European adventures. Not wanting to appear "as a cockboat in the wake of the British man-of-war," the United States Government could now take prestige-gaining unilateral action with impunity, and warn off the European powers independently of Britain.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

President Monroe put forward four main principles. The United States (1) would not intervene in European affairs; (2) would respect existing European colonies in America; (3) would not allow the new republics of South America to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power; (4) could not view any interposition by a European power other than as evidence of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

This declaration of doctrine assumed no real international inportance at the time of its formulation, as it was no more than a unilateral statement by the United States. However, some small use was made of it in this early period when Quincy Adams, U.S. secretary of state, invoked the doctrine in warning Bolívar against attempts to free Cuba and Puerto Rico from Spanish colonial rule. The United States kept silence, however, in the face of British occupation of the Falkland Islands and Honduras. This arbitrary use of the Doctrine gave Latin Americans their first fears that it would prove a weapon to be used against them, rather than in their defense as had at first been hoped.

President Polk next revived the Monroe Doctrine in 1845 when it seemed that the European powers might try to prevent the United States' annexation of Texas from Mexico. In Latin America the Doctrine began to be clearly seen as an imperialistic weapon ready for use against them.

Not until the end of the nineteenth century, however, did the

Monroe Doctrine assume real importance, when the United States awoke to Latin America's existence and the opportunities in store there. The main reason for this interest was economic. By the 1890's, practically all of the United States was explored and much of it settled, albeit sparsely. This meant that capital was available for investment abroad, and at the same time the country's industry had reached a production point where it now needed foreign markets. Before, the United States had offered mostly foodstuffs for sale; now she began to compete with Germany and the United Kingdom. Speaking of the earlier part of the nineteenth century Professor Humphreys has stated: "British trade, British capital, and the British fleet were of more importance to Latin America than were those of the U.S." By the end of the nineteenth century this was becoming ever less true.

This new economic strength of the United States brought forth a new political confidence that was joined with a rising national feeling after the Mexican War, a feeling which between the war's end and 1895 had manifested itself in literally hundreds of small-scale interventions in Central America, and some, like the exploits of the filibuster William Walker, not so small in scale. Interesting though this period is, we have insufficient space to consider these many and complex cases in detail. Their collective importance was that usually the interventions appeared to Latins as at least semisanctioned by the United States Government (some completely so) and that those responsible for them were never punished. By now the enthusiasm with which the Monroe Doctrine had been received in Latin America had practically vanished.

By 1895 United States confidence has risen to new levels. When the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute occurred over the question of the border with British Guiana, Secretary Olney declared that the Monroe Doctrine gave the United States a duty to prevent British expansion in the area, and that the case ought to be submitted to arbitration and not decided by force, which would be "regarded as injurious to the interests of the people of the United States, as well as oppressive in itself."

Britain, preoccupied with the South African political situation, and not wishing to be involved in a second conflict, agreed, in fact acquiescing to Olney's claim: "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

The Venezuela case marks something of a watershed. After it, United States Latin American policy became ever more forceful and openly imperialist. In 1897 the United States helped prevent Central American federation, which would have produced a state better able to have resisted American pressure, and in the following year seized the incident of the probably accidental explosion of the U.S.S. *Maine* in Havana harbor to launch the "splendid little war" against Spain with the object of taking Cuba. The American Congress, egged on by eager capitalists with their eyes on Cuban sugar and cheap Negro labor, and the military lobby wanting bases, passed a resolution declaring Cuba independent and calling on the Spaniards to withdraw. They refused, and war was declared, a brief three-month walkover for the American forces that resulted in the acquisition of Puerto Rico as a United States possession and effective control of Cuba, together with the Guantanamo naval base in perpetuity. More than this, by United States *diktat*, the Cubans were obliged to accept the right of the United States to intervene in Cuba whenever, in the opinion of the American Government, life and property were threatened. Under this arrangement Cuban independence was a farce, a meaningless formality and, in fact, the United States intervened time and again until 1934. Secretary Elihu Root gave it as his opinion that the Platt Amendment, the instrument allowing this intervention, was nothing more than the Monroe Doctrine in treaty form.

Under President Theodore Roosevelt, the Monroe Doctrine with his famous Corollary of 1904 became perfected as an imperialist weapon. The Corollary stated: "Chronic wrongdoing or an impotence which results in the general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."

Armed with this power, the United States proceeded to intervene in the affairs of Latin American states, on average, twice a year during the next thirty years. These interventions caused massive ill-feeling in Latin America that lasts to this day. Several Caribbean states were occupied so that "order" might be imposed—sometimes for a period of years. For example, in the case of Haiti for nineteen years, Nicaragua for twenty-one years, and the Dominican Republic

for eight years. It is some measure of the civilizing influence of the United States Marines that these occupations eventually led to the establishment of some of the nastiest, longest-lasting, and generally most vicious dictatorships that Latin America has ever seen. Both Somoza of Nicaragua (assassinated in 1956), and Trujillo of the Dominican Republic (assassinated in 1961) were the chiefs of their countries' U.S.-trained National Guard.

However, the application of the big stick ("speak softly and carry a big stick"—President Theodore Roosevelt) which caused the most Latin American fear and resentment was the seizure of the Panama Canal Zone.

President Roosevelt, extremely conscious of the strategic importance of a canal through the isthmus, made several attempts to lease a strip of land from the Colombian government, which enjoyed sovereignty over the area, but these were rejected as being unfavorable. Whereupon a small uprising broke out in Panama province, meant as an indication by the Panameños of their disappointment at the breakdown of the canal negotiations, which if successful, would have brought prosperity to the region. The American government intervened promptly. Warships hindered the landing of Colombian troops sent to put down the rising, and two days later, Washington recognized the independent republic of Panama. This new entity then granted the United States full rights over a ten-mile-wide strip of land needed for building the canal, on precisely the terms that Colombia had rejected as unfair, i.e., payment of $10 million in gold, and $250 thousand yearly thereafter.

"I took the canal," Roosevelt was afterwards to boast at a reception. He was not oblivious to the damage done the United States' reputation by his ruthless policies; he was simply of the opinion that because of American strength adverse comment could be ignored. "The United States does not have in the world—and does not need to have—more than one single friend—the United States."

During the period until 1933, imperialist use of the Monroe Doctrine reached its high point. The Doctrine was even granted a kind of recognition in international law when, much to the horror of the Latin American states, it was written into the Covenant of the League of Nations, which they had hoped to be able to use as a defense against the predatory policies of the United States.

Seemingly approved, therefore, by the new international body, the Monroe Doctrine continued to be used to justify "dollar diplo-

macy," a combination of bribery and naked force. Thus when, in 1926, the American Government wished to ensure the continuance in office of President Chamorro of Nicaragua, a U.S.-installed leader, intervention was declared an urgent necessity on the ground that the country was menaced by an international Communist conspiracy. Marines were landed to bolster the unpopular statesman, and an attempt was made to hunt down his rival, Augusto Sandino. This operation led to the killing of some 300 people in the small town of El Ocotal during an air attack, a Nicaraguan "Pinkville." Sandino was finally murdered by the Somoza clan in an ambush, in which killing the United States ambassador was alleged to have been involved.

In 1928 the United States Senate went so far as to declare that the Kellogg Pact in no way prevented the United States from using force in furtherance of the Monroe Doctrine, which attitude caused particular resentment in Latin America.

But by this date the perilous state of Latin American–U.S. relations was beginning to cause concern also in the United States among more liberal political circles, and others who felt that from motives of pure self-interest America stood to lose more by continuing Rooseveltian policies.

THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

In 1928 a secretary of state, J. Reuben Clark, criticized the Roosevelt Corollary as being, "unjustified by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, however much it may be justified by the application of the doctrine of self-preservation." The new note was echoed in President-Elect Hoover's goodwill tour of Latin America, but the real change of policy came with the new Roosevelt. In his inaugural address of 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared: "I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor. We now realize, as we have never realized before, our interdependence on each other; that we cannot merely take, but we must give as well."

And more importantly for Latin America: "The good neighbor respects himself and for this reason respects the rights of others." F.D.R. thus announced an end to interventions and a new respect for Latin American sovereignty, and indeed the policy was applied to a considerable extent.

At the Pan American Conference meeting at Montevideo in 1933, Cordell Hull renounced the right of intervention in the affairs

of other states, and in May of the next year the Platt Amendment was abrogated. Occupying forces of Marines were also withdrawn from Haiti and Nicaragua, and a number of special trade agreements were concluded.

All of this gave F.D.R. a reputation in Latin America such as no other United States president had enjoyed for decades, perhaps since the revolutionary wars, but how genuine was this Good Neighbor Policy? A major test of Roosevelt's sincerity presented itself in 1938 when the Mexican government under Lázaro Cárdenas nationalized the American oil companies working in that country. Relations over this act became extremely strained, but no intervention occurred and, once compensation was agreed, the Mexican right to expropriate was not attacked.

Much of the new policy, however, was by no means disinterested. Because of the world economic slump, the United States needed the Reciprocal Trade Act more to speed its own recovery than to assist Latin Americans. Similarly, the heavy investment program begun in 1940 was not conceived of as aid, but rather as a way of ensuring the continued dependence of Latin America. The policy was justified by claiming that war conditions demanded a united, economically integrated hemisphere in so far as this could be achieved. Another basically imperialist trend that remained was the maintenance of the separate American system, which was United States-dominated as any such system will always be in the foreseeable future. This policy of deliberately weakening and excluding the influence of the League of Nations (which since the United States was not a member was not U.S.-dominated) almost certainly prolonged the bloody Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay.

During World War II, almost all Latin American countries received American aid and assistance under the lend-lease program, but this neighborly help was by no means stringless. For example, the United States Government, on threat of withholding assistance, forced the dropping of M.N.R. ministers from the Bolivian cabinet following the 1943 coup. It was alleged that the party was pro-Nazi and generally sympathetic to the Axis, though no real evidence could be produced other than the party's vague anti-Semitism. The real reason for the American hostility seems to have been that the M.N.R. was attempting to secure better tin prices from the United States in order to permit higher wages to be paid to the miners, and this in wartime was considered subversive.

In general terms, however, the Good Neighbor Policy succeeded

well for the United States during the war. All Latin American states except Perón's Argentina received aid, and all these recipients eventually declared war on the Axis, or at least became benevolent neutrals, though some, it is true, did this only a matter of weeks before the war ended. Brazil in contrast took an active though small part in the fighting, sending a division to join the Allied armies in the Italian campaign.

This participation in the Allied war effort, even if it consisted only of the providing of airfields and carrying out the odd anti-submarine patrol, was taken very seriously by some Latin American countries. Great, therefore, was the bitterness when, once the war was ended and a quiet hemisphere was no longer an imperative, the United States appeared to lose interest in Latin America. The failure to provide an aid scheme in any way equivalent to the massive Marshall Aid program mounted in Europe was regarded as an insult by Latin Americans, especially as former enemies Germany and Italy were included while they were not.

This extremely low priority allotted to Latin America by State Department policy makers just after the war changed somewhat with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the onset of the Cold War. The Latin Americans, although concerned at what many felt to be a serious and divisive philosophical dispute, hardly felt themselves to be in the front line of a new conflict. However, their countries were very soon drawn into the United States' anti-Communist crusade. This spirit was behind the Rio Pact of 1947, which reaffirmed Monroeism in the setting of the Organization of American States, and again a year later at Bogotá.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

The O.A.S., financed largely by the United States and with its headquarters in Washington, became from the first moments of its existence a mechanism to foster American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. The O.A.S., by the very fact of its existence, neutralized and excluded the United Nations Organization, in which the Latin American states possessed a much greater measure of equality. The new equation equalled the old; O.A.S. was to be to U.N.O. as the Pan American Union had been to the League of Nations. According to this new Monroeism, not only were European powers warned off the Western Hemisphere, but world organizations were denied an effective foothold also.

With the new O.A.S. as its instrument, rabid anticommunism

became the dominant theme of American policy in Latin America, and any government was supported, no matter how dictatorial and repressive, provided it made suitably hostile noises toward the Kremlin. Thus it was that Batista, Trujillo, Somoza, and others received favored treatment despite their tyrannical regimes. This policy was particularly damaging to the United States in view of the fact that American, unlike British, diplomatic recognition has always been understood as implying some degree of approval rather than just an acknowledgment that a government can be seen to be in effective control of a state. Thus the United States laid itself open to the charge that its anticommunism was retarding the progress of democratic government in Latin America; precisely that democracy which it sought to promote.

At the O.A.S. Caracas conference of 1954, American pressure succeeded in getting the Guatemalan Arbenz regime branded and condemned as Communist. Arbenz, who came to power in 1950, had attempted to obtain better conditions for the country's Indian majority by expropriating uncultivated lands from the large estates and redistributing them among the landless Indians. Compensation was offered in the form of government bonds according to the value of the land that had been declared for tax purposes. An intelligent maneuver this, in that tax avoidance had been chronic. In 1952 this reform affected lands owned by the United Fruit Company of Boston, the country's biggest single landowner and one that wielded immense economic power. Almost at once a smear campaign against Arbenz was begun, aimed at depicting him as a Soviet puppet. In fact he was never a Communist, though it is true that in the absence of other hardworking political cadres he accepted assistance from the Guatemalan Communist Party.

At the Caracas conference, John Foster Dulles sponsored a declaration stating: "The domination or control of the government of whatever American country by a Communist movement constitutes a threat to the peace and sovereignty of all the republics." Cosignatories of this statement on the "Guatemalan threat to freedom" included the following well-known freedom-loving liberal democrats, Batista of Cuba, Somoza of Nicaragua, Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela, Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, Stroessner of Paraguay, Odría of Peru, and finally that Gladstone of the Caribbean, Trujillo of the Dominican Republics.

The regime they condemned as unfree was doomed—agrarian

reform equalled communism in the C.I.A.'s view, especially in a land relatively close to the strategically important Panama Canal. Three months later a C.I.A.-trained rabble of irregulars led by Castillo Armas entered Guatemala from Honduras. Arbenz fell and a right-wing military dictatorship took over, recognized by the United States two days later. Castillo Armas himself was soon assassinated. "A great loss to his own nation and to the entire free world. President Armas was a personal friend of mine;" was President Eisenhower's panegyric.

The case of the Bolivian revolution showed, however, that the United States was capable of an infinitely more subtle and flexible response toward radical regimes than one would have concluded from the short shrift given to Arbenz.

The Bolivian revolution of 1952 caused an initial unfavorable State Department reaction when it was recalled that the revolutionary party, the M.N.R., was precisely the organization that the United States had moved against in 1943. Very soon, however, cooler and more astute assessments of the situation prevailed, and a large aid program was launched to help President Paz Estenssoro. This was something unparalleled in U.S.-Latin American history: for the first time the United States Government was prepared to give aid to a reforming Latin American government that even contained Marxists in its top ranks. The reasons for this policy about-face are complex, but some indications can be given.

In the first place neither of the M.N.R.'s two great economic measures, the land reform and the nationalization of the large tin mines, affected American commercial interests. No United States companies owned estates in Bolivia, as had been so in the Guatemalan case, and the Patiño, Aramayo, and Hochschild mines represented Bolivian, British, French, and Swiss capital. There was thus no vengeful lobby cutting the State Department's freedom of action by demanding instant redress.

Neither were the United States military as upset as in the Guatemala case. Bolivia is a poor landlocked country without particular strategic importance for America.

Thirdly, with the world price of tin, Bolivia's major export, falling, the country was in an extremely dependent position and it was recognized that granting aid would allow the United States to exercise considerable political and economic control. It is also suggested by Professor Alexander that a special knowledge and sym-

pathy existed at the United States embassy in La Paz toward President Paz's aims and objectives, and that the local American diplomats, all career officers, persuaded the United States Government to adopt a soft line, convincing policy makers "that more could be gained by going along with the Bolivian revolution then, and trying to convince it of the necessity of modifying policies considered extreme in Washington than by opposing it."

Mr. John Cabot, assistant secretary for Inter-American Affairs, echoed this view: "We have just made a unique grant of aid to Bolivia . . . we do not necessarily approve of all the present Bolivian government has done; on the contrary we have had to make strong representations to it regarding its attitudes toward American interests . . . . we believe it is sincere in desiring social progress and in opposing Communist imperialism."

Within only a few months this policy was succeeding well for the United States. Increasingly, economic control was passing to American administrators, and wedges were being driven into the M.N.R. to split off the "dangerous" Lechín left wing.

After three years, the United States was sufficiently in command of the situation to ensure the acceptance of the ultrafavorable Davenport petroleum-exploitation code under which Gulf entered Bolivia and a stabilization program that killed the trade unions' power; neutralized the UN advisory missions that were seen as too socialist; and in short, in the words of George Eder, head of the program, "meant repudiating at least tacitly virtually everything the revolutionary government had done over the previous four years."

In the internal political sphere, massive support was given to Presidents Paz and Siles against the Lechín wing of the M.N.R. Nothing Lechín could do, could improve his standing with the United States embassy and stop the pressure. On one occasion he even went to the length of carrying out an official visit to Nationalist China as a somewhat odd gesture of good faith, but to no avail.

The massive political influence that the aid program brought also, on occasions, extended to control of foreign policy. In 1964 the *New York Times* wrote that Bolivian-U.S. relations were "just short of open quarrel" over Bolivia's failure to break with Castro-Cuba. It went on to comment, "this has been a highly political aid program." Very soon afterward the Bolivian government broke with Castro and, not long after, M.N.R. divisions caused this government to fall, being replaced by the very pro-U.S. Barrientos regime.

The Cuban revolution however, in contrast to the Bolivian, was not handled with any subtlety or flexibility at all.

Since 1898, Cuba had become an economic dependency of the United States with, for example, so great an acreage devoted to sugar for the American market that basic staples had to be imported, and land laborers had work for only three or four months in the year. Together with this poverty-producing economic situation, Cuba suffered from the corrupt and brutal Batista dictatorship. Revolution could not have been long delayed. As things happened, Castro succeeded finally in being the catalyst of this revolutionary situation, and once the immediate end of removing Batista was accomplished, set about a reconstruction of the country. Castro's plans involved giving land to those without it, rooting out corruption, including those U.S. business houses which had bought off and collaborated with Batista, and providing nonagricultural workers with a share of industrial and mining enterprises. These policies at once alienated the business element and the United States, as many of the expropriated concerns were American ones. The confiscation of U.S. property became the key issue, although there were others such as anti-U.S. propaganda, and the question of freedom in Cuba.

Although the United States had an excellent precedent as regards what line to take (such as Roosevelt took in the Mexico oil case of 1938), it was tragically ignored. Instead, there followed protests and retaliations, which set off more takeovers and propaganda attacks, so that by the end of 1960 trade with the United States had virtually ended, and almost all Cuban resources were in state hands. Having arrived at the stage where 90 per cent of industry and 55 per cent of agricultural land was state-owned, the Castro government turned to socialism as the only philosophy that made sense of the new postrevolutionary situation. Yet Castro was slow to turn to a full-blown Communist solution, and the U.S.S.R. was extremely hesitant to recognize Cuba as Communist. Thus, far from there being a sinister conspiracy imposed by convinced Marxist Castroites, ideology in fact trailed way behind events, most of which were United States initiatives.

There is unfortunately no space for a detailed examination of the events leading up to the Cuban crisis of 1962. Suffice it to say that boycotts and the Bay of Pigs brought increased Cuban dependence on the Eastern bloc, and, with it, involvement in Cold War strategic questions. In the resulting conflict situation, over which

Cuba ceased to have control, the United States emerged as victor, but America continued to go on losing the campaign against Cuba which had caused it. Despite the boycotts and blockades and expulsion from the O.A.S., it has proved impossible to bring down the Castro regime, which continues as an inspiration for Latin American states which wish to make a socialist option in their economic development.

The example of Cuba gave the upper hand to those American policy makers who were determined that there should be no repetitions, and caused a swing back to active interventionism in the case of the Dominican Republic in 1965. The Bay of Pigs was not seen as a tragic blunder to be avoided but a technique to be improved. As Senator Dodd was to write:

> If American arms had intervened in the battle of the Cochinos beachhead on the same scale as Soviet arms intervened, the outcome of the battle, I am sure, would have been different and the Castro dictatorship would now have become an evil memory of the past. Had we intervened effectively, there would today be every reason for rejoicing. The trouble was that our intervention was deficient in planning and determination and scope. This was our error, this was the lesson to be learned.

A State Department brief noted: "When we confronted the Communists promptly and vigorously *in our own hemisphere*, as in the Dominican crisis, they were halted; when we failed to recognize them and confront them, as in Cuba, the tumor took root and grew."

A new doctrine was formulated, or rather a new variant on the old. This Johnson Doctrine stated that "the American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere." This was stating formally that the United States would in future automatically intervene in any American country where it seemed to the United States that Communists might take over.

It is evident from these quotations as well as from the events of the last few years that the concepts of the Monroe Doctrine and armed intervention still have strong support among American policy makers.

The article of the O.A.S. charter forbidding interventions appears to have now been pushed aside as obsolete. It read, "The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force

taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any ground whatever." It is now claimed that Latin American states are more threatened from within by guerilla movements than by external aggression. The United States amply proved its capacity to deal with guerilla threats indirectly during the campaign in Bolivia in 1967, which campaign was organized through the 1958 military assistance treaty.

The methods of applying the Monroe Doctrine have changed, but the concept itself remains unchanged and intact. Judging from President Nixon's Latin American policy speech of November 1969, it will stay untouched. The first of his major points in fact was "a firm commitment to the inter-American system." For those Latin American states anxious to break away from this system and choose their own roads to development and progress, the outlook is bleak indeed. Many, thinking of their position, must have pondered the dying words of President Porfirio Díaz, "Pobre México, tan lejos de Dios, y tan cerca de los Estados Unidos."

23

Political Pressure Groups

The prominent position of the Catholic Church in Latin America brings with it considerable political influence.* Traditionally the Church, or more exactly, the hierarchy, formed one of the three pillars of the establishment together with the military and the landed classes, and indeed the Church could often count itself among the most wealthy of the latter. There were, it is true, members of the lower clergy who identified themselves with the common people; men like Father Hidalgo, who took an active part in the Mexican revolution for independence. However, in general throughout the republican period the Church was usually allied with the forces of social conservatism. Following the condemnation of socialism in the nineteenth century, the rise of Marxism and protosocialist groups in Latin America in the first decades of the twentieth century tended to deepen the Church's conservatism.

Today this identification of the Church with conservative forces continues to hold good in some republics, perhaps in Colombia most of all, but the present picture is an exceedingly complex one. Since the time when the social encyclicals first became known in Latin America, with their emphasis on social justice and concern for the living conditions of the poor, the Church as a whole in many countries has been steadily moving toward a more progressive position. The rise of Christian Democratic parties has shown the possibility of combining Church allegiance and social conscience, and indeed in some Latin American countries priests are now in the forefront of those pressing for social reforms.

In Brazil the Catholic-oriented Accão Popular played a more radical part than the Communist Party in the movement for basic

*Editor's note: Some political scientists have claimed, on the contrary, that the Church has been by and large in a weak political position since the wars of independence and has been forced to maintain itself by formal and informal ties of the hierarchy with some elements of the power structure.

education. The individual actions of some priests who have joined guerilla movements, the best-known case being that of Camillo Torres, have also tended to persuade the common man of the Church's increasing radicalness, even though it was against the lack of radical attitudes in the Church that the guerilla priests were in part protesting. A perhaps more genuine sign of a changed Church attitude in many Latin American countries is that it has helped in the overthrow of tyrannical rulers who only a few decades ago would almost certainly have received its protection. By affirming human rights, preaching against tyranny, and very occasionlly by the use of such medieval weapons as excommunication, the Church has assisted in the downfall of dictators such as Perón, Batista, and Trujillo. Currently the Church forms one of the centers of opposition to the excesses of the right-wing Brazilian military regime, in Haiti a series of prelates have been deported because of President Duvalier's hostility toward their efforts to bring about a more humane society there, and in Paraguay all the bishops have taken an increasingly strong stand against the government.

UNIONS

Trade unions form another important political group in Latin America. As with the Church, there are wide differences between union strengths in the different republics: in general they are strongly based in the southern states of Latin America and weak or virtually nonexistent in the Central American republics. This difference is chiefly a function of degree of industrialization and in those Latin American countries which are overhwelmingly agricultural, unionism is correspondingly weak, for example Honduras. This is not just a Latin American trend. Agricultural unions are also extremely feeble in Europe and the United States.

Although it is difficult to generalize, there are a number of basic points about Latin American labor. Following the continental European tradition the trade unions there have always been politically active. Business unionism, as it is known in the English-speaking world, where the concern of the leaders is, in the words of Samuel Gompers, "to get more for labor" is not a feature of the South American industrial scene. Latin American unionists have always considered themselves as a political force; indeed in some countries a force of key importance. In Bolivia, for example, the tin miners constitute one of the country's most important political groups and

they have a largely Marxist-oriented union leadership which has stressed the union's political role to the exclusion of all else. Thus the strike, for example, in Latin America commonly has political ends, in contrast to its almost exclusively economic use in the United States or Britain. The last general strike in Britain was in 1926; in Argentina there were three attempts at one in 1969. In some countries labor militancy has escalated far beyond the strike. In Argentina and in Bolivia, unions have maintained armed militias to bolster their strength.

Since the 1930's, Communists have occupied key positions in unions in many Latin American countries, though their power has declined somewhat of late, owing to government repression and their own slavish following of Soviet policy lines, which often had little relevance to the country's situation and therefore discredited them in the eyes of fellow workers. Some Latin American governments have made attempts to offset Communist influence by encouraging democratically inspired internationals like O.R.I.T. and the Christian C.L.A.S.C., though with little result. The first is often fatally identified with the United States via its A.F.L.-C.I.O. connection, and the latter is so small that it is unknown to most trade unionists. Sometimes, when other methods have failed, Latin American governments have been forced to take direct action to secure obedience from the unions. When Perón, for example, was attempting to consolidate his control over the Argentine unions there were frequent interventions.

STUDENTS

Latin American university students play an active role in political life; indeed they are often of key importance. In all countries student politics are integrated with national politics and therefore elections of student leaders reflect national political hostilities. To achieve prominence in such a student political body is to become a national political figure in many republics, and it is therefore not surprising that many Latin American students take their political activities a good deal more seriously than their studies. It is thus quite usual for student bodies to call strikes and organize demonstrations which are intended as a direct challenge to the incumbent government. On a number of occasions these student demonstrations have been the immediate cause of the fall of a regime. In fact something of a trend can be discerned. It goes something like this. The

students demonstrate against an unpopular government and during the course of the demonstration, the police either fire spontaneously or are provoked into doing so. This not uncommonly produces martyrs on the students' side and alienates public opinion. Frequently in such a case the occasion of the dead student's funeral is used by all opposition groupings as a political weapon against the government and as the excuse for a far bigger demonstration. Violence at this demonstration has caused the downfall of governments.

The organization of Latin American universities has little in common with those of the English-speaking world. In Britain and North America the university administration normally lays down detailed regulations governing the running of the university and the lives of the students, and students have control only over the organization of such bodies as social and sports clubs. In Latin America, however, the students have a real say in running the universities. Most of this student power derives from the Córdoba reforms of 1918, which began in Argentina and spread to the other republics, carrying with it a general democratization. Thus today, depending on the country, students have between a fifth and a half of the seats in the policy-making university councils. They can often therefore pass political resolutions against the wishes of the faculty, for example to shelter political refugees. In many Latin American countries, university autonomy extends to the right to grant political asylum as though the university were a foreign embassy.

Because of the national importance of student political activity, one frequently finds many examples of the classic *ewige Student*, would-be politicians who spin out their studies until late into their thirties, even going to such extremes as either repeating exams already passed or else failing them so as to keep their student status and with it the ability to continue in university politics. The tone of university politics is usually more extreme than that of the national, except where the university contains a relatively large number of engineering, science, or medical students. These students tend to have the reputation of being conservative or at least apolitical. The probable reason is that any progress at all in these subjects calls for relatively long periods of practical work, dissection, laboratory experiments, and so forth, which consequently means less time for political activity. In some countries, so anxious have the governments been to remove nests of radicals, that old universities have been shifted *en bloc* to new sites at some distance from government buildings and other likely demonstration targets, usually with the specious

excuse that the old buildings were an insult to the students' dignity.

The class composition of the student body varies from country to country. Where the student is working-class and struggling to finance his way through college, resentment at his situation often feeds a radical political stance. Middle-class students at provincial universities, where the cost of living is not so high, are likely by the same token to be less extreme.

LANDOWNERS AND BUSINESSMEN

Although not as important as during the nineteenth century, the large landowner still remains a significant political figure in most Latin American countries. The chief aim of the landed class is to maintain the status quo in the countryside and with it their privileges. Thus these groups bitterly contest such government activities as attempts at rural unionization. Where agricultural unions do not exist, i.e., in the majority of places, the farm laborers have no political voice at all. It has recently been shown that even in Chile, following the attempt at a land reform, landowners still have excessive political control over their workers. Perhaps only in Bolivia, Cuba, and Mexico, where this landowner class has been eliminated and much reduced respectively, is landlord direction of voting absent, and in these countries other abuses have taken its place. Politically the large landowners are the backbone of the Latin American conservative parties and though their influence today is less than before World War II, it is still absolute in terms of local politics in the countryside of most Latin American countries.

In the more developed Latin American republics the industrialist has also achieved pressure group status, but over the area in general they do not approach the importance of the landowners. Businessmen engaged in banking, mining, import/export, and the like, also have a vested interest in favor of stability and therefore tend to share the pro status quo attitudes of the landowners. Industrialists involved in the manufacture of consumer durables may, however, show somewhat more progressive attitudes. They are likely to support governments of a more nationalist than conservative tendency in the hope that economic nationalist policies will cut imports and benefit their industries. They are also likely to give some support to measures of an egalitarian nature designed to raise average incomes, which will bring more consumers into the market.

24.

The Military in Latin America

During the short-lived regime of President Siles Salinas in 1969, a newspaperman asked a Bolivian politician which of his country's political parties he considered to be the strongest. "The armed forces," was the unhesitating reply, and the answer was only half meant as a joke.

Involvement by Latin American armies (and navies and air services where they exist) in the political life of their lands has been a persistent phenomenon throughout the 150-year-old history of these republics, and today shows no signs of waning. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1970's, just less than half the Latin American states, covering two-thirds of the total area, are ruled by military regimes of different types, and in most of the remainder the armed forces make up a major power grouping.

For Anglo-Saxons the military's possession of a key political role is an unfamiliar concept, as nowhere in the United States or the British Commonwealth does military political activity go much beyond lobbying legislators for better conditions, increased weapons budgets, and the like. It is because the political-military phenomenon is so strange to us that it is so little understood, and the purpose of this chapter is to examine the different types of Latin American military regimes and to look at the nature of army intervention. It is surely a good indication of our unfamiliarity with the actions of a political military that when considering army takeovers and uprisings, English ceases to provide an adequate vocabulary and we are obliged to fall back on French, German, and Spanish loan words such as *coup d'état, putsch*, and *golpe*.

Shortly before he died, the disillusioned and saddened Simón Bolívar, liberator of much of South America, wrote: "America is ungovernable. He who serves a revolution ploughs the sea." These words described most aptly the prevailing upset and chaos at the end

of the long-drawn-out revolutionary wars of 1810-25 which shattered Spanish colonial power in America. Instead of the relative stability of the moribund empire, a situation of economic, social, and political upheaval existed. This situation of war-shattered economies, concentration of land wealth and power in the hands of oligarchic *criollo* minorities, mass poverty, and ignorance, and the lack of a literate middle class all favored the continuation of the tradition of Spanish authoritarianism in the guise of military rule.

These historical factors, combining to favor army intervention in the early nineteenth century, coincided with other inherent advantages enjoyed by the Latin American military that remain today and are therefore relevant in helping to explain intervention.

Any Latin American army today possesses an organization which in terms of efficiency is far superior to that possessed by any competing civilian group such as a political party. These latter, in many Latin American states, show inferior organization when compared even with the supporters' clubs of the better-known soccer teams. The armies, however, and by the same token other armed services, are trained, disciplined, highly centralized bodies with the formalized hierarchical structure of command necessary to war-making machines. No civilian body approaches anywhere near this level of organization.

Besides vastly superior organization, Latin American armies also possess a certain mystique and prestige of the profession of arms, which stretches back to the medieval Iberian Peninsula and the *fuero militar*, when to be a soldier and assist in the expulsion of the Moslems became imbued with quasi-religious significance.

Thirdly, and by far the most important, almost everywhere in Latin America the military has, and insists upon keeping, a monopoly control of armed forces, and as Mao has remarked: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." This last factor of superiority has become more marked in the last decade, owing to advances in military technology and possession of such weapons as tanks, rocket launchers, and other materiel on an increasing scale, which has greatly increased the army's physical might in comparison with any rival civilian group. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries any civilian group, once provided with rifles, could become a rival "army," inferior in organization and training, but with a chance of holding its own, especially if numerically superior. Today's weapons, however, even if they could be obtained by a civilian body, are too

complicated and sophisticated to be operated efficiently by untrained men. In purely military terms it is now normally possible to oust a military regime only if the cooperation and active assistance of a disaffected section of the armed forces is forthcoming.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

While the above factors make seizure of power by the military a relatively easy matter, they do not assist the armed forces in the task of governing. Despite new courses of studies at military colleges with their much-vaunted "social content," no Latin American military is trained in the techniques of civilian government, and indeed the increasing professionalization, which makes the army unbeatable as a power contender, renders the forces less able to take up other roles once power has been achieved. It is worth remembering that the U.S., British, and French armies proved incapable of administering occupied Germany from 1945 onwards without the help of vast numbers of civilian specialists, and at the time the three armies probably represented the best assembly of military talent that could be found anywhere in the world. Armies in the Latin American states, when faced with the prospect of government, have an obviously simpler task in that they are dealing with relatively simple economies, though again their own intellectual resources are slighter. In general, the more highly developed and advanced an economy, the less capable of administering the country are the armed forces. Even in states with simple subsistence economies of agriculture and the export of tropical products, such as Ecuador, low educational standards and poor administrative competence have often forced the military to include civilian ministers in the cabinet, and to make heavy use of outside civilian advisors. Another case in point is the Ovando regime in Bolivia, which depends heavily on its civilian ministers to handle the more complex portfolios.

A further disadvantage faced by the military in governing revolves around the lack of legal and moral basis for its rule. The constitutions of Latin American states offer no help in that they legitimize civil rule only, and in the absence of this moral title some other basis must be sought for the regime. At times a right to rule may be claimed based upon armed might, and indeed exactly this argument was used recently by a civilian minister in defending the present Bolivian military government. The argument, however, is

clearly inadequate. If a government rules by force alone, lacking any other authority, deriving its legitimacy solely from its armed might, then any other movement able to amass equal physical power enjoys equal legitimacy, and revolt is licensed on the basis of *Kraft macht Recht*. Rarely, therefore, do Latin American juntas continue for long to rest their claims to rule on de facto appeals to force. Almost always, some attempt at least is made to give the government the appearance of legitimacy, whether by plebiscite and referenda, fixed or otherwise, or by the calling of elections for a distant date so that the junta can justify itself as a caretaker regime. This process of subsequent legitimization is a constant feature of Latin American military interventions, though the real motivation for such interventions may vary widely. However, whatever the actual compelling reason is, it is almost always alleged that the armed forces are taking over only because of the chronic and abject failure of the politicians. One may now look at some of the real reasons for stepping in.

MOTIVES FOR INTERVENTION

Practically all Latin American militaries regard themselves as having a special guardianship of the "national interest," though interpretations of what is meant by this vary from country to country. Some armed forces understand this as giving them a veto power to be exercised whenever it seems to them that the civilian government's actions are threatening the real and permanent interests of the state. They therefore conceive of themselves as playing the part of constant vigilance in defense of the country's long-term interests. A recent example of such an attitude was provided by the Peruvian coup of October 3, 1968, when the army moved against President Belaúnde. At the swearing-in ceremony of the new junta, General Velasco Alvarado made several references to saving the country, and the official communique issued next day spoke of economic chaos and of arrangements made by the Belaúnde government that were harmful to the legitimate interests of Peru (i.e., the Agreement and the Act of Talara).

Other Latin American armies have claimed a special custodianship and interpretation of the constitution, and have reserved the right to act to protect normal constitutional procedures and civil liberties such as freedom of the press. At times this guardianship of

the constitution has been invoked against a legally elected civilian government or president who had established dictatorial rule, examples being army movements against Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela and Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, and to some extent Perón in Argentina, though in this last case the motivations were more complex.

Often, claims to be restoring civil freedoms have led to worse or at least equally bad repression, so that, in biblical parlance, one dictatorship is cast out and another seven times worse replaces it. This has not always been the case, however, the classic exception being Marshal Henrique Texeira Lott's famous "preventive coup" in Brazil in 1955. The elections of that year gave a clear victory to Kubitschek and João Goulart as his vice-president, but some sections of the armed forces, principally a group led by Colonel Mamede, considered the pair as too extremist and set about organizing a coup to prevent their taking office. President Café Filho resigned, and the acting president, Carlos Luz, attempted to get rid of Lott so that the coup could be executed. Lott, however, seized Rio in a counter-coup and deposed Luz, thus allowing the installation of Kubitschek and Goulart. This case has become the classic example of a coup aimed at maintaining an electoral decision made in accord with the constitution.

Another type of intervention motivation functions when military takeovers occur in furtherance of sectional or class interests, or through one man's political ambition. Thus a regular cause of *golpes* in Latin America has been attempts made by reform-minded civilian presidents to cut the military budgets in order to free money for social needs. Traditionally, Latin American armies have swallowed up 20 to 25 per cent of the national budget of most states—in exceptional cases even taking as much as 42 per cent (Paraguay). They also often receive funds in theory allotted to other ministries, such as special housing subsidies. Hostility to cuts in the army budget takes two forms; resentment of loss of personal living standards owing, for example, to cuts in subsidized housing allowances; and resentment at loss of status vis-à-vis other Latin American armies by the refusal of a reforming government to buy modern, costly, and in most cases completely unnecessary armaments such as aircraft carriers. Rationally, purchase of such weapons cannot be justified, as Latin American armies play an essentially police role, there being no military threat from outside the continent, and but slight risk of heavy fighting between Latin American states. Apart from the Chaco War, the Peru/Ecuador conflict, and latterly the El Salvador/Honduras clashes,

there have been no major confrontations between Latin American states during this century. There is, therefore, little reason to keep arms budgets at levels relatively higher than those of European states which have fought two world wars in the same period and still in some cases face a real invasion threat. In most cases the war minister, even in reform-minded civilian regimes, is an armed forces representative, and has not usually hesitated in intimating to the government that any drastic reduction, or even moderate cutting back, would cause the army to turn out the regime.

In the case of Venezuela, regionalism seems to have played an important part in some coups based largely upon the Andean state of Táchira and the desire of officers from this state to advance themselves as a group. Between 1889 and 1950, all Venezuelan presidents and most officers had come from this region. This Andean separatism played a part in ousting the Acción Democrática government in 1948 and replacing it with Pérez Jiménez, who, it was believed, would maintain the area's control of the army. Since 1950, however, the hold of this area on the armed forces has weakened considerably and other regions now have reasonably good representation among the officer corps.

Threats to the army's existence have always been a prime cause of *golpes*, causing much swifter action than budget-trimming operations by a civilian government. Where an army has feared that it was about to be abolished, or its real power weakened by the creation of another paramilitary force, e.g., a workers' militia, reaction has usually been swift. Thus, for example, Perón's plans to arm the workers and Goulart's attempts to suborn the N.C.O.'s brought instant military intervention. Sometimes abolition or militia creation has proved successful in reducing or eliminating the political role of the army. In 1948 in Costa Rica, following a civil war, the army was completely disbanded by the victorious movement of José Figueras. Since that time security has been in the hands of the police force. The existence of a workers' militia in Mexico in 1923 also undoubtedly enabled the Obregón government to resist the army led by De la Huerta.

However, often the military have acted before the militias that were intended as a curbing counterweight were effective. This was the case in Guatemala, where Jacobo Arbenz (1950-54) sought to raise a militia to balance the regular army, whose loyalty to the government had become shaky owing to disagreement over various, principally land, reform laws.

Similarly in Bolivia, the M.N.R. party militias met with hostility from the regular army, and even more so did plans for a complete abolition *a la Costa Rica.* That "the armed militias, backed by the Communist Party, wanted to put an end to the army" was given by Ovando Candia as a justifying reason for the coup of November 1964 against President Paz. And today Juan Lechín, strongest supporter of the plan to scrap the Bolivian armed forces, is the *bête noire* of the generals. It was the army that forced his exile in October of 1969 within days of his entering Bolivia. In general, therefore, the principle may be stated that Latin American armed forces will become counterrevolutionary and *golpista* whenever a reforming regime, or any other for that matter, courts labor in an attempt to make itself more independent by setting up militias, or attempts to replace the army in any other way.

One man's political ambitions and search for wealth is also a cause of military political intervention, the usual arrangement being that in return for cooperation the armed forces are guaranteed increased wages, better conditions, and generally favored treatment. Thus military dictators such as General Juan Gómez of Venezuela and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic were able to steal millions of dollars. Sometimes a dictator of this type may come to power at the hands of the military, but subsequently outmaneuver them, emerging as a personal ruler, as in the case of Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua. However, when this occurs, some other support base personally loyal to the strongman must be sought, usually a palace Praetorian guard as in the case of President Duvalier of Haiti and the Tontons Macoute, upon whom riches and favored treatment must be lavished.

The last motivation for military intervention to be discussed is the case in which the army seizes power with the avowed aim of producing social reform, achieving deep structural changes, and so forth; in short, the phenomenon sometimes known as Nasserism. Of course, very often such intentions have been proclaimed by *golpistas* who, once installed in office, proved as conservative as the men they had ousted. Professor Lieuwen has written: "Many officers in the lower ranks who talked of social reform really wanted increased pay and more rapid promotion." However, while admitting that this has often been the case, certain differences can be pointed out, perhaps in the case of coups conducted by lower-rank officers from the middle sectors.

Throughout the nineteenth century, military officers traditionally came from the upper-class landed families, but the beginning of the twentieth century saw the officer corps, particularly in Argentina, being penetrated by cadets from urban middle-class groups. Many officers from such backgrounds did not automatically align themselves with their more aristocratic brethren (though many did, through marriage and because the power of any army as a socializing force compelling conformity is great). These middle-class new-type officers were against the old classic economic model of exportation of primary products, and stood for reforming the economy upon modern lines. This often included many economic nationalist policies, some idea of land reform to break the oligarchies' power, and the timid beginning of welfare-state policies to give greater security and better living and working conditions to the masses. In some cases the older upper-class senior officers attempted to prevent this philosophy from gaining ground. In other cases, for example in Bolivia following the Chaco War, the old officer class was completely discredited and Colonels Germán Busch and David Toro were able to seize the presidency, albeit briefly in each case.

The fact that Toro, a military man, was brought down by the army's withdrawing support raises an important point, that of the heterogeneity of Latin American armed forces. There always have been, and are, wide differences among the militaries of different countries, between the different services in one country, and within each service in any particular state. In the face of such a complex situation, only the very broadest of generalizations will hold good. Thus, often for reasons of generational conservatism, high-ranking officers have been less in favor of social reform than groups of captains and colonels. The same tends to be true of naval officers in countries where this service is important, as naval officers continue to be drawn from higher-class levels than army officers. The Argentine navy, for example, never really supported Perón, mistrusting what they saw as his antidemocratic demagoguery. Nor did the army support him completely, as it contained two opposed groupings known as reds and blues, or democrats and nationalists. The nationalists either supported Perón openly or at least quietly cooperated with him, whereas the democratic reds were relatively noninvolved and stayed clear of politics until mounting economic chaos and the threat of Perón's appeal to labor finally motivated them to act. It was this group that mounted the 1955 revolution, and it has since then stood

for the exclusion of the Peronistas from politics and for a maintenance of the social status quo and laissez faire liberal economy. Post-Perón civilian presidents only lasted as long as they did by exploiting these splits in the military (Frondizi), and deliberately clouding their policies (Illía) so as not to offend the different groups. However, following the 1965 elections, when the Peronistas got 40 per cent of the vote, Illía's days were numbered, and he was in fact removed by a *golpe* in the following year.

Air forces are relatively new creations in Latin America, most dating from about World War II. As a whole they have not achieved great political significance, possibly on account of their marked numerical weakness. This notwithstanding, some air force officers, for example General René Barrientos of Bolivia, have succeeded as military politicians.

MILITARY TAKEOVERS

Having examined the main motivations for army intervention, one can now consider briefly the mood, timing, and methods of military takeovers. The sense of unchallengeable power, increased these days by possession of modern weaponry, is one aspect of disposition to mount a coup. This sense of power, coupled with one of the previously considered motivations, and some topical excuse are usually sufficient to set *golpe* preparations in motion. In some cases this sense of power, ability, and superiority over civilians passes normal bounds and has been described by Professor Finer as, "morbidly high self-esteem." He cites the example of the Argentine secret military lodge, the Group of United Officers (incidentally these secret lodges are a feature of Latin American armies and sometimes have very considerable importance) to which Perón belonged, whose famous manifesto ran as follows: "Civilians will never understand the greatness of our ideal. We shall therefore have to eliminate them from the government, and give them the only mission that corresponds to them: work and obedience."

The military have a clear opportunity to intervene when the civilian ruler can be seen to have no solid support base or where an overall power vacuum exists without any political party strong enough to rule. This, for example, has been the Bolivian situation since the death of General Barrientos and also explains persistent coups in Central America, where no strong alternative political grouping existed and where there has traditionally been no strong

feeling of the invalidity of army rule or need for constitutional government. Traditionally also in such countries, organizations tending to produce a strong and vocal public opinion have been weak or lacking, e.g., trade unions, outspoken churchmen, and large business enterprises.

A factor of some significance in military takeovers is the contagion effect whereby the idea of mounting a coup spreads rapidly from one country to another following a successful example. In Venezuela Pérez Jiménez was probably influenced and encouraged in attempting his coup in November 1948 by the example of General Odría's success in Peru the month before. In the same way, General Ovando was probably influenced in preparing his coup of September 1969 by the example of General Velasco, who had seized the Peruvian government almost a year earlier. In this latter case, much of the Peruvian revolutionary rhetoric was borrowed by the Bolivians.

Once the military has decided to make its influence felt in the political life of a country, there are a number of ways in which this can be done. The lowest level is normally by way of hidden threats and blackmail designed to influence the civilian government's actions. Thus in May 1969, General Ovando warned President Siles that any departure from the Bolivian revolution would provoke armed-forces action; such departure to be defined by Ovando, of course. More threatening behavior, in fact tantamount to a coup, occurs when the military refuse to defend the regime. This was the case in Guatemala in 1954 when the army refused to act against the rag, tag, and bobtail C.I.A.—sponsored rabble of Castillo Armas, which invaded the country from neighboring Honduras.

The highest and most direct level of intervention is reached when the armed forces decide to do the work themselves and organize a coup. This usually takes the form of a *golpe de estado*, the arrest and exiling of the old head of state, sometimes accompanied by a *cuartelazo* (literally, "blow from the barracks"), when a display of armed force, sometimes of considerable magnitude, is laid on, and key points are seized to prevent any possible counteraction. Often the *golpe* proves sufficient without the need for the circle of tanks around the palace as, for example, was the case when President Ramírez of Argentina was removed from office. Members of the G.O.U. officers' lodge simply forced him at pistol point to write a letter of resignation. Another Argentine example provides the contrast, where a full-scale *cuartelazo* was necessary. This was the re-

moval of Perón in 1955, which demanded an extensive well-organized operation. When it was first discovered that Perón intended to set up an armed workers' militia, various provincial army commanders of the red, or democratic, section of the Argentine army began to plot his overthrow. In Spanish-American parlance, the sounding out of officers to assess their willingness to take part in such an operation is called the *trabajos*, which are then followed by the *compromisos* or hard agreements to take part. Therefore, in accordance with these plans, the commanding officers of several big provincial barracks led their troops in a march on Buenos Aires, while the navy, which as was seen earlier was traditionally anti-Peronista, blocked the mouth of the River Plate. Perón decided that the cause was lost and sought exile in a Paraguayan warship. In such *cuartelazos* only rarely does actual fighting take place. Usually forces for and against are analyzed in chessboard fashion and the weaker side gives in. Where the attack is successful and the president removed as planned, his right to go unharmed into exile is almost always recognized. A successful *golpe* and *cuartelazo* is usually followed by a *pronunciamiento*, or broadcast political manifesto justifying the overthrow of the old government, outlining the ideological position of the new one, and giving the names of the officers in the *junta militar*.

It is sometimes suggested by Latin American scholars that with increasing professionalization the political role of the Latin American military will progressively decrease and finally disappear. Today almost all Latin American states provide military college and postgraduate courses for officers, though the quality of these varies greatly. The United States also provides Spanish-language higher instruction for Latin American officers at bases in the Canal Zone and in the United States. There is little available evidence, however, that higher educational standards among the military have inhibited political activity. Rather, since many Latin American universities and educational establishments provide mediocre courses, the fact of having received training of a relatively good standard outside the country is likely to increase a "savior of the nation" mentality, and cause officers to believe even more firmly that their responsibility is owed to the nation and not to the civilian government and, however mistakenly, in their ability to rule well. In 1966, upon turning out President Illía, the Argentine army, one of the most highly profes-

sionalized in Latin America, claimed that its mission was to "regenerate the nation" and "restore Argentine greatness." On the whole there seems little reason to expect a decrease in the political activity of the military in South America.

How, then, do things stand at present? Briefly the position is that only in Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Mexico are the soldiers controlled by the civilian politicians and, following the recent "Tacna" revolt in Chile, perhaps that country's reputation for having an apolitical army needs revising. In Costa Rica, as noted earlier, the army is a mere police force, and in Mexico the military is well offset by other power groups such as organized labor. This is also the case in revolutionary Cuba, where the officer corps of the old Batista army was destroyed almost in its entirety and a new regular army built up in its place. This highly politicized new model army is, however, outnumbered ten to one by militia men. In Bolivia where, following the 1952 revolution, an attempt was made to do just this, the army made a very successful comeback and now holds the political ring. The same is true in almost every other country of Latin America. Military intervention in Latin American political life seems to be a fact that will remain for many decades to come.

PART 6:

The Church in Latin America

JORDAN BISHOP

25.

Pastoral Activity and Ecclesial Awareness

The first step in understanding current trends in pastoral activity in the Church in Latin America is to see the historical situation out of which both Church and society are emerging.

The aim of this first chapter will be to analyze the traditional ecclesial awareness of the Church on this continent as formed by her historical praxis so as to better understand the new vision of the Church which is emerging out of a new historical experience. That new vision will be the subject of a later chapter.

Our methodology will be interdisciplinary: historical, sociological, theological.

Two possible alternatives seem open to one interested in reflecting on the pastoral activity of the Church at a given historical moment. One might begin with an analysis of the doctrinal or ideological statements of the Church at that time and then make inferences about how they may or may not have affected the mission of the Church. Such a deductive method would, for example, seek to cull from the documents of Medellín 1967 how the Church's attitude on revolution, institutionalized violence, and overpopulation would affect her contemporary mission.

The other alternative would be to study the pastoral practice of the Church of a given epoch or the manner in which her actual mission practice unfolded in a given society, noting what Ivan Vallier refers to as "the structural or organizational mechanisms that are developed to realize religious control."[1] Such religious influence and control seems to be a description in sociological terms of what we mean theologically by Christian mission.

Such an inductive method of analysis has the distinct advantage of situating our consideration of mission or pastoral activity directly within and in relation to the society in which Christ meant it to serve.

Our first concern, therefore, will be to analyze the past and present pastoral activity of the Church in Latin America in the light of her unique historical and social contexts. These latter factors have helped to shape and mold both her own self-image and the consequent understanding of her mission in a given moment in the evolution of the society in which she lived and changed.

THE PROBLEMATIC

Christian mission seems to imply both historically and sociologically a process whereby the Church seeks to maintain at a maximum level her religious influence in a given society. When Christ commissioned the apostles to "go and teach all nations," the urgency of that mission became subject at once to those innumerable variables which would define it differently from one culture to another, from one historical moment to another: language, competitive religious systems, the popular world-view.

Each succeeding generation of missioners would continually have to incarnate that message and interpret it anew to each age in the face of new challenges and threats. Christian mission, then, emerges not only out of the internal dynamic of the Spirit but also out of the constant interplay between Church and society in a changing world in which the Lord of history also acts.

As a corollary to this, and as a result of her historical stance and interplay in a given society, is a self-understanding or vision of the Church which, while growing out of her historically conditioned experience, tends in turn to determine to a great extent her continuing mission or pastoral activity in that society. Such a specific vision or conception of the Church in a given place and time will be referred to later as the "ecclesiological ideology."

Some Hypotheses for Pastoral Activity

Having developed somewhat the methodology and the problematic, one might specify further the analysis of pastoral activity, past and present, in Latin America by offering five hypotheses relevant to Christian mission.

Hypothesis 1: Christian mission in a given historical moment will be in part the result of the interpenetration and the interdependence between Church life and a society's total system of social control, power structures, and integrative base.

Hypothesis 2: Accordingly, and as a result of the above-mentioned historical praxis, there will arise a specific conception of the Church or an "ecclesiological ideology," which will in turn tend to determine future pastoral activity within that society and culture.

Hypothesis 3: Since apostolic times the pastoral activity of the Church in any given historical moment has revolved around the three ministries commissioned by Christ to the Church: that of evangelizing (Word-*Kerygma)*; that of uniting the believers in a common sacrament (Communion-*Koinonia)*; that of participating in a common service (*Diakonia*).

Hypothesis 4: In a given instance of the Church's mission, one of the three ministries tends to dominate the other two and leave them in orbits of relative importance depending on the integrative force of the then-current ecclesiological ideology.

Hypothesis 5: Given the historical moment of change and revolution in which Latin American society finds itself, the Church would best define her mission primarily in terms of the ministry of service in her overall effort to preach the gospel and unite men in the fellowship of Christ.

CHURCH–STATE DYNAMICS

The pastoral activity of the early Church until the Edict of Constantine (313), as observed in the Epistles and especially in Acts, reflects a rather closed world in which there was little social mobility. In that world there existed a great variety of religious expressions whose sphere of influence was limited to a very restricted social and familial milieu. Such a social structure had its effects on the interpretation of Christian mission. Cult activity, for example, was

quite simple as compared with an elaborate Jewish Temple ritual and the pagan Roman liturgy. The ministry of service, while not directly challenging basic Roman institutions such as slavery or the inferior status of women, did preach a radical practice of brotherhood among men and the active service of those in need. The dominating and integrating ministry was that of evangelizing, the proclaiming of a new word of hope that called men to fraternal communion and service. Out of the totalitarian milieu of Roman society arose a concept of the Church or an ecclesiological ideology as that of an evangelical movement of loosely federated local churches sharing the same religious experience of the Spirit and hope in the future of the risen Lord.

The hallmark and sign of authenticity of membership in the "Way" was not primarily cultic initiation, as was the case in the mystery religions. Neither was it spiritual knowledge, as was the case among the Gnostics and the spiritualists, but confession of the Lord's name and service of the poor (Heb. 13:15-16).

The apostolic Church, then, appeared in the praxis of her mission in Roman society as an evangelical movement whose motivating ideology was one of the liberation of man and communion with a God whose common fatherhood made all men brothers.

MEDIEVAL RELATIONSHIPS

With the revolutionary changes in Roman society consequent on the rise to power of Constantine the Great came the legitimization of Christianity within the empire and the prestige and power consequent on being named the official religion of the state. From this new praxis we find a new ecclesiological ideology emerging: the Church as integrator of Christian society.

The Church found herself profoundly inserted into the human community because of her role as promoter and sustainer of Western civilization after the fall of the Roman Empire and the barbarian invasions. Attention became focused on her historical-temporal dimension and consequent misson as civilizer and guardian of the spiritual, political, and cultural values of Christendom.

This process of amalgamation of the "two societies" favored at once a certain confusion but also a real tension between ecclesiastical and secular powers, as Schmemann notes:

> Here lay the deepest of all the misunderstandings between the Church and the empire. The Roman state could accept the ecclesiastical doctrine of God and Christ comparatively easily as its official religious doctrine; it could render the Church great help in rooting out paganism and implanting Christianity; and finally, it could Christianize its own laws to a certain extent. But it could not really recognize that the Church was a community distinct from itself; it did not understand the Church's ontological independence of the world. The religious absolutism of the Roman state and the emperor's belief that he was the representative of God on earth prevented it. The trouble was that conversion to Christianity not only did not weaken but actually strengthened this belief and brought it to its logical conclusion.[2]

The above description offers some analogies, if not exact parallels, for the Spanish and later Spanish colonial situations and the resulting effects on the pastoral activity of the Church under the crown.

In the West the Papal States tended to some extent to absorb Church-state relationships into a model of relationships with a foreign power: a Church-state related to a state-church, but within the state, coterminous with the state-church. As such it was to some extent a question of relationships between powers rather than between institutions. The Church was a sociological institution but it was not, even as institution, adequately distinguished from civil society. Yet, the head of the universal Church, the pope, was also a sovereign: hence the logic of the *placet* on episcopal appointments within the territories of the Spanish Crown. The Church institution, as in the case of a minor whose proper father has passed away, was put under the tutelage of the Spanish Crown.

As well as a dominance of the ecclesiastical by the civil, there was a relegating of the profane to dependence on the religious, both on personal and institutional levels. Rather than a Christianizing of society from within, there was a certain sacralization from without.

> From the days of the Emperor Constantine until far into the nineteenth century the Christian Church, despite many reformations and despite many changes in society, had possessed a clearly defined character in public social life. The place and function of the Church were firmly established. Everyone knew what was to be expected of it. It was the rise of industrial society that first destroyed the old harmony between *ecclesia* and *societas*.[3]

It may be well to note in passing that only recently has Latin America begun to enter what could be called an industrial society. Her societal structures are still greatly feudal, as are those of the Church itself.

As a result of the sacralization of society from without due to the merger of the "two societies," the communal awareness of the Church is obscured. The clergy attend to roles of civil service within the society and tend to form a caste within the ranks of the Church, thereby relegating lay participation to one of passive acceptance of things religious.

Finally there occurs an increasing process of papal centralization of authority in an attempt to offset a latent nationalism in the state-churches faced with a leader who himself was a sovereign. Since Spain moved rather in the direction of a Byzantine-type establishment than in that of a Gallican (Catholic) or Protestant national church, the papal centralism was to some extent abdicated in the *Patronato*. Nevertheless, Jesuit allegiance to Rome in the face of the Spanish Crown did concretely maintain much of the disciplinary uniformity imposed on the universal Church by Rome in her attempt to maintain unity of practice and authority.

LATIN AMERICA

Such, then, in broad strokes were the main elements of the pastoral activity of the Church in Europe up until the time of the Spanish conquest, with some important differences in Spain itself. Reference was made before to the *Patronato Real*, an agreement between the Church and the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns whereby the state-church was placed as a minor under the tutelage of the state. This institution, which gave the crown almost complete control of the Church in the New World, perpetuated and even increased the confusion of ecclesiastical and political affairs. The crown was to occupy itself with the evangelization of the New World as well as with its conquest. Such a procedure carried with it the consequent pastoral implication (at times in practice if not in theory) that with the juridical organization of society, the founding of the Church was likewise secured. More concretely, this experience of the Church in

Latin America has fostered an attitude that conversion is assured more by an aggregation to the state-church than by personal choice. In a society in which everyone is Christian, it seemed logical that conversion meant pertaining to the Christian Church. In this instance those visible signs of aggregation and continuing affiliation with the Church would be given pastoral importance. The administration of the sacraments of baptism and marriage, in particular, had (and still have) profound *social* meaning as symbols of integration into a society which is at once civil and religious.

Finally, the Church's presence in the world was one of complete immersion in a society which was itself grounded in the Faith at least nominally. In that instance, institutionalized Christianity or the whole of Christian society was a vehicle for the maintenance of Christianity. The Christian states since Constantine had protected the Church, defended her doctrines against divisive heresies (which also caused civil unrest), and identified themselves with the *ecclesia*. The Iberian Crowns continued this policy in the New World until the liberal and nationalistic revolutions in Europe and the United States took root in the Latin countries and the Church began to find herself in a new and often hostile environment.

In the meantime, the *Patronato*, the *encomienda*, and the *placet* over episcopal appointments and missionary activity led the hierarchy to seek the favor of the powerful to ensure the Church's institutional survival, often in terms of a very conservative and even, at times, of a reactionary political affiliation.

In summary, then, one notes that in a society where there was no effective competition or threat to the Church's religious influence, the ecclesiastical institution tended to fuse with the major institutions of society. Her major thrust became identified with territorial expansion and consolidation while the cultic ministry came to dominate in the light of the Church's ritual monopoly. The priest's primary role became that of administrator of sacraments and civil servant, while the layman was relegated gradually to being a ritual client.

The evangelical ministry is almost entirely replaced by a sacramental catechesis as the Christian liturgy assumes the ritual trappings of the former pagan state religion. Finally, Christian service is to a great extent understood as the conquering of unbelievers and the consolidation of one Christian society.

THE MODERN PERIOD

The post-Tridentine and Vatican Council I epochs mark another change in the understanding of Christian mission and ecclesiological ideology likewise reminiscent of the corresponding changes in Western society. The rise of industrialization broke the Church's integrative force in Christendom, while the religious pluralism of the Reformers threatened for the first time in twelve hundred years her ritual and dogmatic monopoly. With the loss of her privileged position in medieval society, the Church attempts to maintain her accustomed place of influence by forming coalitions with traditional power groups. Her mission is often characterized by defense of privilege through a skillful use of her power to influence in her favor decision-making groups in society, especially the aristocracy.

In addition, one notes an emphasis on the institutional aspect of the Church as a necessary means of salvation as over against the Reformers, whose ideology and praxis was more the spiritual and personalistic one of "faith alone," the Word of God, and the one priesthood of all the faithful.

More recently in Latin America, under the liberalizing and secularistic influences of the republican era, Christian service is conceived mainly in terms of establishing its own institutions, especially educational, so as to defend the faithful against what, with the breakup of the unanimity of the former Christendom, the Church now considered a hostile world. In this new environment the Church began to define her mission in terms of social conditioning. To maintain the faith of the Christians and at the same time Christianize a now more pluralistic world, it was necessary to exert influence from without through her various institutions.[4]

In both cases, be it the Church understood as "integrator of Christian society" or as a "perfect society," the exercise of her social ministry depended on the maintenance of the status quo. Institutions that are conceived of in terms of the defense of the Faith are most careful not to annoy the powers that be, by whose tolerance they exist. Hence, historically, Catholic schools and other institutions are carefully apolitical and noncritical in everything except the defense of the institutions themselves. This is particularly the case where "political Catholicism" is the dominant pattern. No questioning,

then, of official syllabi, but a quiet acceptance of a secular role which favors the status quo. Cooperatives, social action, community development projects, and charities are often not only apolitical in the sense of a direct political commitment, but also in the sense of fomenting an apolitical ideology: this may be another form of not rocking the boat.

As adjuncts of a pastoral activity centered on the defense of the Church and her institutions and the defense of the faith of individuals (since the nineteenth century the approach is definitely individualistic), the institutions accept without question a secular role that tends to preserve the status quo. The cases of churchmen, for example, who preached resignation to the peasants oppressed by unjust landowners are frequent. Recently the Peruvian Agrarian Reform Office published an announcement in the Lima papers regarding the establishment of agrarian cooperatives among the coastal *campesinos*. Two photos were shown, one of a large sign over the manor house of the hacienda which read: "Trabajar, Callar, Rezar" ("Work, Keep Quiet, and Pray"). The other photo was of a sign at the entrance of the hacienda advising the public that it was now a cooperative organized to benefit the former *peones*, now owners of their farm.

A further political consequence of more recent pastoral activity was that Church leadership came to be concentrated to a great extent in the hands of foreigners.

The greatest shock to the pastoral effort in Latin America, especially as integrated in the role of sacramental administration, was the expulsion of 2,500 Jesuits in 1767. Since the Jesuits had been maintaining many of the seminaries, there followed a decrease in the number of national priests and a consequent curtailment of the sacramental ministry. All pastoral activity continued, however, to revolve around the Mass and the sacraments but with fewer and fewer priests to administer them. The bishops comment in the eighteenth century, "The priests arrive and have no time to evangelize."[5]

Yet, there has not been until the present a reorientation and a reintegration of pastoral activity either around the ministry of the Word or that of service. Rather, the policy of Rome has been to issue a call for foreign priests to fill the depleted ranks of the Latin American clergy. The effect until recently has been mainly to continue the process of sacramentalization and to subordinate the evangelistic and social ministries to the cultic, all still within an ecclesiological vision

adequate for Christendom. Furthermore, the large numbers of foreign clergy has retarded the growth of a more lay-based and authentically Latin American Church.

CONTEMPORARY RELATIONSHIPS

Vatican Council II and the Conference of Latin American Bishops at Medellín reflect in doctrinal and ideological terms the more basic sociological changes which have taken place in church-society dynamics at large and on this continent especially since World War II.

In the last thirty years a significant change took place in some sectors of the Church in Latin America, a change from the former attitude of the defense of privilege, in which the hierarchy had been forced to play a political role.[6] The impact of European theology and Catholic Action groups gave a new thrust to pastoral activity. Many churchmen moved to a tactic of penetration of secular institutions. Through Catholic Action organizations laymen and priests began to influence trade unionism, *campesino* organization, public education, and so forth. The Church offered to her laity a separated and controlled contact with society while they "participated" in the divine mandate or mission entrusted to the hierarchy. These were signs, important ones, that the Church recognized the need for a renewed pastoral activity to meet the challenges of a changing society. Yet, it had to be a new tactic, not based on political maneuvering but on the internal spiritual resources of committed laymen and priests.

More recently, two grass-roots movements have been threatening the Church's traditional position of religious control in Latin America, namely Marxism and Protestant sectarianism. Both offer to the dispossessed a new hope of salvation from present conditions, to the psychologically alienated a sense of affiliation with an international movement, and to the socially marginated a meaningful person-to-person participation in a community of persons. Christian mission, then, is bound to reflect these new forms of competition and threat. Also, one can hope for a new ecclesiological ideology to emerge from this present praxis. All in all, it is not surprising that in the face of a society in rapid change and even revolution, pastoral activity finds itself in flux and growth.

More noteworthy of the emerging dynamics are those of the decentralization and declericalization of pastoral structures. *Comunidades de base*, small self-governing, self-supporting, and self-

propagating ecclesial communities represent a common phase in some areas, especially in Brazil. A nonclerical Christian ministry is a reality in many parts, although there is some disagreement as how to define the roles of those new pastoral agents, be they called "deacons," *Pastor Católico*, or *Animador de la Comunidad.*

There is no doubt that, whereas the Church in the United States has in part defined her mission in terms of legitimizing the American way of life and of integrating migrant Catholics into that mainstream, the Church in Latin America is more and more finding herself to be a unique voice in providing a religious and ideological basis for urgent social change. Through social communications and closer identification with the Latin American peasant and urban poor, she is addressing herself more committedly to the solution of social questions as a collaborator in programs of integral development. A nascent lay leadership is growing as a result of her more grass-roots, participatory pastoral activity, evident in attempts at a *pastoral de conjunto* and *una pastoral de comunidades de base*. As regards these small ecclesial communities and the awakening lay participation, the question still remains as to which ministry will evolve as the integrator of the overall pastoral activity.

There is emerging a new vision of the Church, a reintegration of her traditional ministries, and a confronting of her prophetic role in Latin American society. These more recent developments will be considered within the larger historical context outlined above and in the light of those working hypotheses which we suggested for the pastoral analysis of that historical data.

NOTES

1. Ivan Vallier, *Catholicism, Social Control, and Modernization in Latin America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 17.
2. Alexander Schmemann, *The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), pp. 148-149 (also Chicago: Regnery, 1966).
3. Jurgen Moltmann, *Theology of Hope* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 306.
4. Cf. Segundo Galilea, *Para una Pastoral Latinoamericana* (Mexico City: Paulinas, 1968), p. 20.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
6. Vallier, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.

26.

Ecclesiological Analysis of Pastoral Activity

From the previous brief analysis of the past and present pastoral experience of the Church in Christian Europe and in Latin America, one is in a better position to ascertain the self-awareness of the Church ("ecclesial awareness") and the underlying ecclesiology out of which pastoral activity is currently emerging. The concern here will be to see how the Church has until recently symbolized her experience in doctrine and deed. Thus, one will be better able to appreciate the changes in pastoral activity which the Church is presently experiencing.

As a point of departure three aspects of the Church as she relates in a given moment of her history can be taken: (1) to the future Kingdom; (2) to herself in assembly; and (3) to the world in which she has found herself until recently here in Latin America.

The Church and the Kingdom. Before the discovery of the New World and even after, salvation was specially conceived. The dictum, "No salvation outside the Church" was formulated within a rather closed world-view. Since the known world was Europe, and the Church was one with Christian society, it was nonsense to think of anyone outside of the Church and therefore outside the sphere of salvation. Besides the tendency to define the limits of Christian salvation in terms of the limits of Christian society, one notes another tendency to identify the Church with the kingdom of salvation itself. If one immediately asks how the Moors and later the peoples of the Indies entered into this schema of salvation, one need only recall the ambivalent attitude even of a Saint Francis Xavier before the pagans and the infidels. Missionary methods were more often than not those of the "clean sweep" and the *tabula rasa* in an effort to implant Christianity and "civilize" the New World. So difficult was it to conceive of salvation outside the limits of Christian Europe that first contacts with the Indians in South America sparked much discussion

over whether or not they were human and therefore subjects of salvation. Even when this was established, the ideal of pastoral activity was simply to broaden the geographical boundaries of salvation and create the "Christendom of the Indians" (Saint Turibio).

Besides this spatial conception of salvation, the pastors of that era also suffered from a dualistic interpretation of the same salvation, which gave emphasis to the *anima,* the "spiritual principle of life," which passed through this life as a test for entrance into heaven.

The Church as Assembly. More recently, with the breakdown of Christendom, one notes a tendency to define the limits of the Church in accord with a conception of herself as a perfect society.

The emergence of national states offered the Church a new model by which to define and defend herself. There arose the conception of the Church as "sociological institution." Robert Bellarmine's definition of the Church, not wholly unlike a description of the Republic of Venice, indicates a shift in the Church's relationship with society different from the former one of socioreligious integration. This juridical understanding of the Church was consistent with the above dictum on the question of salvation. If there is no salvation outside the Church, one must in turn be able to define well the limits of the Church. "The Church," says Bellarmine, "is the society of men united by the profession of the true faith, the communion of the same sacraments, under the government of the same pastors, principally of the only Vicar of Christ on earth, the Roman Pontiff."[1]

This particular conception of the Church, with its emphasis on sacraments and hierarchy to the near exclusion of lay participation (the Church as the People of God) and with a benign understanding of the world as a place of grace (Paul VI's encyclical *Ecclesiam suam*), still determines to a great extent Catholic pastoral activity.

The Church in the World. The "world" as distinct from the Church, be it a church one with Christian society or later as a sociological institution in a hostile world, is the place of nonsalvation, of sin. Although of no worth in itself, it can be sanctified or consecrated by a religious, spiritual intention. The Convento of Santo Domingo in Cuzco is a graphic testimony to an understanding of the non-Christian world, past and present. The Convento was built on the ruins of the Temple of the Sun, ruins left by the siege of the capital of the Inca Empire. Today within the inner patio of the Convento one can find the partially restored temple, quite in con-

trast with the arches and paintings of the Cuzco School of Colonial Art which overlook it: architectural reminders of two worlds, Christian and non-Christian, which have yet to enter into serious dialogue.

ELEMENTS OF INTERRELATIONSHIP

The following figure attempts to interrelate the various elements which have so far appeared in our historical-theological analysis of the Church during the colonial and the republican eras with the aim of describing: (1) the popular ecclesial awareness or self-image of the Church in Latin America, (2) the ecclesiological "ideology" or historically determined conception of the Church which supports that awareness, and (3) four observations with reference to the hypotheses for pastoral activity already stated in Chapter 25. The value criteria will be added as that theme is developed.

Elements of a Given Ecclesial Awareness of the Church

Ecclesial Ministries	Value Criteria of Pastoral Activity	Objectives
Word *(Kerygma)*		Church-Kingdom (Salvation)
Sacrament *(Koinonia)*		Church-Assembly (Communion)
Social *(Diakonia)*		Church-World (Presence)

An Underlying Ecclesiological Ideology

The above figure, then, is a model to represent the interrelationships between the three ministries or ecclesial actions ordained by Christ on the one hand, the corresponding finality of each on the other, and the intervening value criterion of pastoral activity in each case: value criteria at once conditioned by and conditioning the underlying ecclesiological ideology.

Only an understanding of a given epoch's ecclesial awareness and the underlying ideology allows us to appreciate the quality of subsequent pastoral activity.

Definition of Terms. "Ministries": Amidst the historic evolution of the Church as institution and her theological development, we find three theological constants, three "givens" which may be said to

be the fundamental ecclesial actions commissioned by Christ himself. These are the three ministries of preaching, fellowship, and service. "Objectives": Each ministry is orientated to the building up of the Church in function of her mission. Hence, each ministry corresponds to a definite ecclesial objective, be it preaching the salvation to be found in the Kingdom of God, the fellowship lived in the Eucharistic assembly, or the witness offered to the world in the ecclesial gestures of presence and service. "Ecclesiological ideology:" The two points of reference, i.e., ministries and objectives, are in constant interplay in any given historical situation. They of themselves do not constitute the ecclesial awareness or vision of the Church in a given time and place, but rather are found and act within a more basic conception or image one might have of the Church. Because the mystery of the Church offers multiple aspects (one finds some twenty-four different images of the Church in the Epistles), the perception and living out of the Church's mystery will vary from age to age as it is perceived according to historical circumstances and against the backdrop of a changing society. In fact, doctrine and ecclesiastical activity can polarize the attention of the Christian community within very specific ecclesial perspectives even in an exclusive and unilateral sense. Casiano Floristan puts it this way:

> As an ecclesial task and human praxis, pastoral activity cannot help but put into play a determined concept of the Church; action is inseparable from the ideology of the man who realizes it: either he acts in conformity with the way he thinks or he winds up thinking in conformity with the way he acts. Pastoral action, inasmuch as it is a specifically human task, must also reflect in itself the ideology of the man who realizes it; by being an ecclesial task, it will necessarily reflect an ecclesiological ideology.[2]

Pastoral Observations. Based on the historical-theological analysis of the pastoral activity of the Church in Latin America and the model for the interpretation of that data, one can make four observations regarding the Church's self-image in Latin America and her subsequent mission and role in society.

With reference to Hypothesis 2 (p.253) we suggest that the underlying ecclesiological ideology of the Church in Latin America, since the conquest and until the recent present, has evolved from

that of the "integrator of Christian society" to one of a "sociological institution" or "perfect society." As these visions grew out of her experience of an interpenetration and interdependence with society, they in turn determined, to a great extent, consequent pastoral activity. That is to say, these two distinct, but complementary visions of the Church soon determined the criteria, priorities, and methods as regards the exercise of the three ecclesial ministries in the attainment of their corresponding objectives.

Since, in both instances, the first missionaries and later leaders imagined the Church to be coextensive with Christian society, the first pastoral criterion was that of global aggregation of the newly conquered peoples into the Catholic Church.

Since the Church in both instances defined the limits of salvation, primacy was given to those acts of visible incorporation into the Church, especially the sacrament of baptism. Evangelization and catechesis were oriented to the administration of the sacraments. While the urgency of faith for the valid reception of the sacraments was felt by the missionaries, unilateral interpretation of the axiom *ex opere operato* took the sting out of that urgency.

Since the world was the place of nonsalvation, the religious, sacralized world of the indigenous population could not be of Christian religious worth. Rather, it was idolatrous and only a "clean sweep" was possible so that there might be that unanimity of Christian society which would ensure salvation through Christian (Hispanic) law and culture.

To sum up, then, the three value criteria of pastoral activity of this period of history with respect to each ministry and its corresponding objective were as follows:

Elements of the Church's Ecclesial Awareness

Ecclesial Ministries	Value Criteria of Pastoral Activity	Objectives
Word	Aggregation	Church-Kingdom (Salvation)
Sacrament	Administration	Church-Assembly (Communion)
Social	Unanimity (Social Conditioning)	Church-World (Presence)

Ideology: Church as "Integrator of Society" "—Perfect Society"

With reference to Hypotheses 3 and 4 it was observed that in each age the Church tends to integrate herself structurally around the predominant influence of one of her three ministries: Word, sacrament, or service.

We have seen how important both culturally and religiously has been the visible sacramental incorporation into the Church. Since Latin America is often "Catholic" not only culturally, but also "by law," the evangelistic ministry has not until recently been interpreted in terms of a personal conversion and a free adult choice to accept Christ.

The social ministry of the Church in Latin America has also been relegated to a role supportive of the sacramental. Christian service was seen mainly in terms of maintaining the faith of the baptized and unanimity in society, be it through institutional competition or through political maneuvering to secure "Christian laws" and the Church's own institutional growth.

We have been speaking of ecclesial ministries, their corresponding objectives, and the intervening pastoral criteria set into motion by the underlying ecclesiological ideology. However, there seems to be one other element necessary to complete our experience of Christian mission, a more intuitive or emotional element.

The whole complex of attitudes and religious values engendered by a basic ecclesiological vision and the corresponding interplay of the three ecclesial ministries is what we may refer to as the "ecclesial awareness" or sense of the Church. This "ecclesial awareness," then, is basically a perception of values more intuitive and emotive than rational and cognitive.

For example, everyone today assents intellectually to the need and value of unity in the Church. The disagreement enters not on the intellectual level, but on the level of the *perception* of that value of unity be it in terms of a "contemporary" viewpoint or in terms of a "traditionalist" frame of reference. A contemporary perception of the value of unity would emphasize more the rationalistic, pluralistic, and dynamic dimensions of that value. Unity would be seen more in terms of interiority, of mind and heart. It could see unity in diversity, in the many forms of the one unity while always seeking new and changing expressions of that unity. Within a traditionalist frame of reference one might conceive of values in more ritualistic, organistic (absolutist), and static terms. He would tend to emphasize the visible signs of unity as indicative of that unity itself. Because of this, the signs of unity must be the same everywhere and are best dictated

from above so as to better ensure uniformity. He will also seek to maintain the existent signs of unity.

This example is meant to point out the fact that any change in ecclesial awareness of the Church, which is basically a question of value perception, will involve much more than intellectual assent to new theological categories or doctrinal formulation in the Church. It will involve fundamentally a change in the way one perceives even common values like unity.

INTEGRATION OF THE MINISTRIES

The impact of the past ritual monopoly of the Church on Christian mission has been lessening since the middle of the seventeenth century mostly because of the expulsion of the Jesuits and the consequent decline of sacramental practice for the lack of national priests. Catholic liturgy is being reformed and adapted and the ministry of the sacraments continues to be dominant in pastoral activity. Since, however, popular religiosity is based in extrasacramental, familiar devotions, one wonders if a renewed Christian liturgy will, of itself, be effective in interpreting God's action in history in Christ to contemporary Latin man. Even theologically, Christian liturgy depends on the informing dynamism of the Word and the authenticating action of Christian service.

Will the ministry of the Word be the dominant integrating ministry in our pastoral activity here? The rapid growth of Protestant evangelism and the recent appearance of Catholic pentecostalism would seem to indicate an affirmative response. However, the dynamism of the Word itself seems to depend to a great extent on the world-view of the Christians who meditate and act on it. A case in point is the alienating, otherworldly salvation offered by some Protestant sects which tends to put their members at odds with rather than at the service of the world.

What seems to be the test and the proof of the relevance and the authenticity of current mission in Latin America is the ministry of service for various reasons. There are first those political realities which are also for missioners those "signs of the times" through which God also can reveal himself. In the face of a painful struggle for social, political, and economic integration, the integral development of Latin America will be found to the extent that it can transcend the nationalistic and social barriers which currently maintain

her in a state of sociopolitical fragmentation. In this context, the Church is the only formal organization which spans the four and one-half centuries of Spanish-American history. She has had a profound effect on the present social order and as such could perform a vital role in the creation of a new one. In addition, her ecclesial presence has been unique in superseding national boundaries, and implanting a religio-cultural unity over the entire continent. Such a presence could in the future rally men to collaborate in endeavors geared to promoting the common good and continental unity.

Also, as an organization, she manifests a special capability for maintaining close contact between elites and masses, the rulers and the ruled. These lines of communication will be vital in creating that climate in which the necessary participation and mobilization of the masses can take place in a truly liberating way.

For these and other reasons Vallier, for one, maintains the thesis that any true social transformation of Latin American society is conditioned on the *religious* renewal of the Roman Catholic Church.[3] This religious renewal consists precisely in the creation of a religiously based value system free of interested political and economic ties. It would allow the Church to offer that mystique or word of hope necessary to draw men and nations together in a common quest for unity and peace. Yet, for Latin man, already cynical about "political promises" and *el declaracionalismo*, the Word without its concrete incarnation in the disinterested service of a new society would be less than promising. Only a communal sign (i.e., more than individual testimonies) of Christian service on the part of the Church could convince contemporary Latin Americans of the power of her Word and the healing of her sacrament.

There are early indications that the Church is moving to interpret her evangelistic and liturgical ministries in the light of that service. From this praxis is emerging a new but already old, ecclesiological ideology, that of the Church as an evangelical movement but now in a revolutionary society. In this revolutionary world she seeks to serve by offering that dynamic frame of religious reference which directs her members to a socioethical leadership in the secular sphere. Her own structures favor more "local church" growth and grass-roots mobilization and participation of the "baptized masses." With the layman's role more clearly defined in terms of Christian service in society, her specifically religious leaders are finding their role as pastors and spiritual leaders more needed and demanded by the Christian community.

Ecclesial Awareness Transformed—An Emerging Pastoral Perspective

With this overview one can now turn to the body of analysis. In the light of the forces of change affecting the institutional Church, the model below helps to identify a given ecclesial awareness. To describe the new religiously based value system, the new value criteria of pastoral activity will be identified as well as the underlying ecclesiology which in turn would inspire a new ecclesial awareness.

Elements of a New Ecclesial Awareness

Ministries	Value Criteria of Pastoral Activity	Objectives
Word	(Aggregation)	Church-Kingdom
	PROCLAMATION	(Salvation)
Sacrament	(Administration)	Church-Assembly
	CELEBRATION	(Communion)
Social	(Unanimity)	Church-World
	DIALOGUE	(Presence)

Ecclesiological Ideology: Church as Sign

On the basis of the above overview, one can now assess the most recent value criteria of pastoral activity in Latin America.

In contrast to former tendencies to aggregate men into the Church, there is now more of an awareness of the necessity of proclaiming Christ and his message while calling men to an adult, free choice to follow him. We might add that this call to conversion is now within the context of small person-centered *comunidades de base.*

Sacramental life in these small ecclesial communities is motivated less by routine administration of the sacraments to individuals and more by a communal celebration of hope in the coming Kingdom.

Since sacramental celebration in this sense is more oriented to a present and future reality, namely the Kingdom, there is less possibility for the old dualism between cult and life to appear. The sacrament celebrated in this spirit necessarily orients the Christian to his life in the world, to service in a pluralistic society, and to cooperation in the larger mission of God as he prepares man for the coming of his Kingdom.

NEW VALUE CRITERIA FOR PASTORAL ACTIVITY

The value criteria of proclamation, celebration, and dialogue seem to flow from the following understanding of the relationship between the Christian ministries and their objectives.

Word:Kingdom. In Pope Paul's encyclical *Populorum Progressio* salvation is presented as an integral process of going from "less human conditions to more human conditions" (PP 20-21). Paul does away with the old religious dualism between natural and supernatural. There is no "natural" preparation for salvation but rather a need to seek its completion in the "not yet."

Notice that Paul speaks of faith as a "more human condition." The analysis of the process of salvation definitely flows from a "theology of possibilities" quite in contrast to the former "theology of limitations." In this new awareness of the process of salvation there is less need to define the perimeter of the Church, i.e., to know who is in or out, but more concern to show the possibilities of membership in the Kingdom.

Sacrament: Church-Assembly. "The Church", say the Council Fathers, "is a kind of sacrament or sign of intimate union with God, and of the unity of all mankind" (*Lumen gentium* 1; cf. *Gaudium et spes* 42). The sacraments, then, are orientated toward the realization of this larger task of unity. As signs of unity they at once celebrate that unity achieved by the Spirit and so become the source of even greater union.

Social: Church-World. According to the value criterion of dialogue as explicated by Pope Paul in *Ecclesiam suam*, the world no longer appears as the place of nonsalvation. Christ came to serve the world, the place of God's creative action, and to accompany men in their journey toward the Kingdom. "Grace is everywhere," says Bernanos. Justice, peace, authentic development are signs and not just preparations of the coming Kingdom. "The Church" comments Liegé in many places, "is in the world, for the world, and in solidarity with the world." It is a "Church for others."

A NEW ECCLESIOLOGICAL IDEOLOGY

Concurrent with the changes in pastoral activity under the stresses both internal and external already described, one notices the

gradual unfolding of a new ecclesiological ideology, the Church as sign.

In an insightful article, Father William Frazier sums up the attributes of sign as applied to the Church in the document *Lumen gentium.*[4] An attempt will be made to relate his reflections to what has been seen so far as elements of an ecclesial awareness of the Church.

As sign the Church recognizes the workings of grace outside her limits. The world and not the Church defines the perimeter of salvation in which works "the living God, the savior of the whole human race" (1 Tim. 4:10). As sign raised up among men, the Church is motivated to cooperate with other forces and movements toward the realization of the common good. Such a motivation was less obvious or even desirable under the former ecclesiological ideology of the Church as perfect society in a hostile world.

Sign also alerts the Church to serve an objective larger and more important than herself. No longer identified and coextensive with Christian society, the Church is now freer to give herself over "for the life of the world" (John 6:33).

Sign, by giving emphasis to the quality of the Church's presence in the world, points up her enormous spiritual potential for the building up of a new world order. She is seen more clearly as a religious system and not simply as a sociopolitical institution demanding respect because of her massive, worldwide organization.

The ecclesiological ideology of sign admits to a much larger mission of God, in which she has an integral role to play and a divine service to render. Rather than identify the Church with the kingdom of salvation, Christians recognize that God does not limit himself to his gifts, in this case, the Church herself.

Furthermore, sign, while not minimizing the gifts and offices in the Body of Christ, does project mission as the activity of the whole People of God. Sign also implies a humble attitude regarding the presence of the Church in the world, one that favors dialogue with the Spirit as he is found working in each culture. In fact, sign even admits to the disunity in the midst of the Church herself. Sign can be relevant or false but, more often than not, it is ambiguous, a fact not readily admitted in the more triumphal ecclesiological ideology of the Church as a perfect society. The Church is a Church of sinners.

Finally, in an understanding of the Church as sign, one sees a shift from the sacramental to the social ministry as the integrator of

pastoral activity. As a perfect society, the Church often understood her pastoral activity almost exclusively in terms of providing her members with the sacraments as spiritual resources necessary to live in a hostile world. Frazier suggests that "if the Church is a sign, its energies will be centered not only on its own sacramental life, but on the Paschal Mystery at work in the events of secular life and time."[5] She attempts to read correctly the signs of the times to be better able to communicate to men her belief in the liberating presence of God in history.

Her concern for human needs, for justice, peace, and integral development are signs of the same concern of God for the liberation of man.

From the point of view of her evangelical ministry, Church as sign seeks to go to all nations, as Frazier observes, "not only to enrich, but to be enriched." "The world", he continues, "has a mission to the Church as well as the Church to the world. This means, of course, that missionary adaptation is much more than a question of expediency or technique. For only by clothing itself with the cultures of the world is the Church able to recognize the depths of its own catholicity."[6]

In this light, then, the real crisis of the Church in Latin America is not that we are "losing our grip on the Catholic masses" or that the popular religiosity is under attack. For the Church as sign, the real crisis is how she is seen, how she is understood, how as sign she is communicating the values of the gospel. Former ecclesiological ideologies often turned the Church and its mission in upon itself and away from the world and its problems. Even in the last Synod of Bishops in Rome the discussions over ecclesiastical reforms provoked the comment from an African Christian that such was "a luxury of the rich." To others the churches of the United States and Northern Europe appeared as the "daughters of opulence."

In summary, then, attention can be drawn once more as to how two different ecclesiological ideologies can carry quite distinct implications for Christian mission.

Fathers Leo Mahon and Robert McGlinn, first priests from the Archdiocese of Chicago to work in the parish of San Miguelito in Panama, at first differed on how to approach the evangelization of the people. In his study on that parish, Francisco Bravo notes:

> As we have said in another place, Father Robert [McGlinn] believed that all the people ought to be attended simultaneously, since the gospel is for all. Let us put ourselves on guard

> against this apostolic sophism. We believe and this is the firm conviction of the members of the team at San Miguelito—that precisely because the gospel is for all, it is necessary to raise up a sign so high and luminous that all can see it from any place.[7]

One can conclude by noting some continuing ambiguities in pastoral activity. All of us, for example, manifest traditional or contemporary value perceptions in different areas of our life and in our religious experience, in particular. This may explain in part how *la pastoral de la cristiandad* is still dominant in Church thinking and practice in Latin America. It does not correspond to historical reality nor to predictable future developments in a revolutionary society.

Present pastoral activity by and large is quite ambiguous. We educate the faith of an elite while maintaining the masses in religious ambiguity. Instead of preparing for an authentic evangelization of the masses and the formulation of a new and dynamic frame of religious interpretation, our mission is largely institutional (parochial) and clerical (sacramentalization). As suggested earlier, the only way out of this situation seems to be the decentralization of the parish-based sacramental pastoral orientation in favor of precultic or evangelical *communidades de base* and the declericalization of pastoral activity by the handing over of responsibility to what Dussel calls "native apologists."[8] These would be those authentic Christians who share the culture with which they must establish a critical dialogue, while being open to a world much larger than their own: the "native apologist" must be a transcultural individual, a "catholic" personality.

Any valid reform of the pastoral activity calls for the reintegration of the ecclesial ministries around another pole other than that of the sacramental. We have seen how the lack of priests makes it practically impossible to maintain an effective sacramental ministry under current Church legislation. The deeper reason, of course, is that by and large Latin America religiosity needs to be evangelized in the light of the gospel. The masses had only begun to accept Christianity when the Church entered the epoch of the great pastoral "siesta" in the seventeenth century.

The alternatives for a reintegration of the ecclesial ministries are two: that primacy be given to the Word and evangelization or to the social and service. We have already referred to this question in a summary way and will discuss it at length in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. Quoted in C. Floristan and M. Useros, *Teologia de la Acción Pastoral* (Madrid: B.A.C., 1968), p. 65 (author's translation).
2. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
3. Ivan Vallier, "Religious Elites," in *Elites in Latin America*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (New York: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1967), pp. 221-222.
4. William Frazier, "The Church as Sign," in *The Church as Sign*, ed. W. J. Richardson, M.M. (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Maryknoll Publications, 1968), pp. 1-15.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.
7. Francisco Bravo, *The Parish of San Miguelito in Panama: History and Pastoral-Theological Evaluation* (Cuernavaca: CIDOC Sondeos no. 4, 1966), p. 132.
8. Enrique Dussel, *Hipotesis para una Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina* (Barcelona: Estela-IEPAL, 1967), p. 35.

27.

Pastoral Activity in the Social Ministry

One of the working hypotheses and an underlying theme in the previous chapters has been that the ecclesial ministries should be reintegrated in the social ministry. That is to say that given the historical moment of change and revolution in which Latin American society finds itself, the Church would best define her mission primarily in terms of the ministry of service in her overall effort to preach the gospel and unite men in the fellowship of Christ.

This hypothesis itself grows out of reflection on recent pastoral developments in the Church as it defines itself vis-à-vis new socio-economic and political trends in contemporary society.

It is these more recent pastoral developments and understandings of "mission" which will be considered now.

Christian Mission: To Influence Society

Reference was made previously to various Catholic Action groups which originated in Belgium and France, especially. The Young Christian Workers (JOC), the Young Christian Farmers (JAC), and the Young Christian Students (JUC) are some of the more well-known groups. Other movements such as *los cursillos de cristiandad*, and the Catholic Family Movement also play an important role in moving the Church out of the directly political sphere while at the same time building up those religious resources capable of influencing society. Most characteristic of these movements has been their affiliation to the hierarchy. Some have been quite clerically dominated, even communicating to the layman a clerical point of view or "spirituality." They are action oriented, but often along lines of influence which identify Catholic Action almost exclusively with elite groups in society such as the militant or "anti-Communist"

university professors. The greatest weakness of these movements is the excessively clerical influence. The laymen are seen as auxiliaries to the hierarchy, who are often of an ecclesiological ideology which in the past has interpreted the role of the layman in terms of ritual client. "Action" is sometimes interpreted in terms of sacramental practice and/or "brotherly assistance" to the other members of the organization.

However, the description of these organizations does not complete our analysis or give us a real understanding of the role that these new leaders perform in pastoral renovation.

As a matter of fact, these Catholic Action organizations themselves are not as influential as before. Rather, lay participation in Christian mission is more recently conceived in terms of direct involvement in ethical leadership in secular institutions. The clergy, on the other hand, are finding themselves called not so much to "organize" the laity under their aegis, but rather to create that dynamic frame of religious reference which will motivate Christians to service in the world.

Christian Mission: To Serve Society

One notes that since *Populorum Progressio* and Medellín, Church authority has increasingly come forward to legitimize change, especially for traditional Catholics. The present government of Peru, for example, has defended its policies a number of times by indicating that such measures are well within the Medellín guidelines.

Since this function of the Church as legitimizer of change is quite different from our experience of the Church in North America, one might reflect for a moment on the function of religion in the United States and then in Latin America. Normally religion functions in a society in part by giving sanction or legitimation to its values and structures. As such, it is a function usually conceived of in terms of order, unity, and tradition. Will Herberg's oft-quoted dictum about the "religion of the American way of life" is a case in point. Peter Berger suggests that the irrelevance of institutionalized Christianity in the United States is bound up with its functionality in that society. It is valued and is a source of unity in the measure in which it is irrelevant.[1] A carefully nuanced parallel might be sought in Latin America. In both cases the Church's active social engagement in the

1960's is subversive, since a church which is actively concerned with social revolution, with racial problems, with Vietnam, and with justice for marginal social groups can no longer be a bond of unity in a society based on the preservation of the status quo.

Of course, in Latin America that applies equally well to the ideological statements at Medellín regarding social change.

In Latin America one point is quite clear: present social structures are inadequate to meet the needs of the common good. Rather, they tend to favor the dichotomy between rich and poor, elites and masses. If the Church in this instance tends to legitimize the existing social structures, she necessarily sides with the minority ruling class and could become another obstacle in the way of the marginated in their struggle for a just participation in economic, cultural, and political power. According to the political scientist, Thomas G. Saunders: "The Church's function [in Latin America] must incorporate strong emphasis on social change and transition . . . The Church when it is responsible validates change in the same way that in a more stable society it legitimizes order and unity."[2] Of course, to foreign missioners who are familiar with the social role of religion in our own society in preserving order and unity, this quite different role of the Church in Latin America comes as a shock. Add to this the value criterion of unanimity which we may unconsciously espouse along with our vision of the Church as integrator of Christian society and we begin to see the problem. Latin Americans often greet North American religious personnel as agents of a political imperialism.

In this regard Ivan Illich is reflecting what is a popular image:

> In 1966 missionaries—unwillingly, perhaps, and even unconsciously—were court chaplains to the AID personnel; and the more they were independent from AID personnel personally, the more believable was their unconscious support for AID policies. Quite independently from each other, the North American church and the North American politician tell us that we have to give more schooling to all kids. And in the concrete moment when I wrote this barbed pamphlet ["The Seamy Side of Charity"] to throw as a thought-provoking statement into a meeting of 3,000 Protestants and Catholics united to colonize South America with North American Christianity, I wanted simply to say that anybody who in 1967 goes on a mission to Latin America and is not fully aware that, willy-nilly, he cannot but be one more instrument for the support of the Alliance for Progress and for the transport of North American *societal modes* to Latin America is plain stupid[3] (author's italics).

As missionaries from "developed" countries, we must not impose our understanding of the function of the Church in our own "societal modes" on the Church in Latin America. Rather, the Church's role of legitimizer of social change is all important for motivating Christian laymen to participate in and serve Latin society in its quest for integral development.[4]

One can look now at how, as a matter of fact, the Church in Latin America is legitimizing change and for this reason is being accused at times of political subversion, as in the cases of Brazil and Paraguay.

She performs the function of legitimizing change through acceptance of change, as innovator of change, and as motivator of change.

The Church legitimizes change by the acceptance of reforms and developmental actions once they are established. Her witness in this instance can be quite clear when she herself willingly suffers from the reforms as has been the case in the Agrarian Reform Law in Peru.

More importantly, as innovator she provides new insights into the theory and practice of change not in the traditional sense of a "Catholic solution" but as change may be made a more human process. In a concrete situation she may be able to spell out just what are "the more human conditions" referred to by Pope Paul in *Populorum Progressio.*

As a matter of fact, when speaking of social change in Latin America, one finds a number of current theories, which fall roughly into the categories of "developmental theories" or "revolutionary theories" of social change. It is to a description of these theories that we now turn so as to understand the Church's particular insight into the process.

A "developmental theory of change" (in Spanish, *desarrollista*) would be characteristic of many professional technicians in development. Its adherents believe that underdevelopment is a temporal problem in which it is just a matter of time until the developing countries attain the standard of living of the already developed nations. In this sense, underdevelopment is the antechamber of development. Emphasis, therefore is given to questions of increased production within a neocapitalistic system. The answer is to "multiply bread." Within this perspective there is an elitist understanding of the process of development. Participation of the masses is restricted

to following out what the professionals plan in terms of their growth. This is necessary so that the discipline required of rational growth and modernization be maintained.

There are a number of variations on the "revolutionary theory of social change," but the main characterictics are as follows. Underdevelopment is more than a temporal problem; it is rather a structural problem demanding radical changes. Much more than "multiplying bread," it is necessary to "distribute bread," or wealth in this instance. Its adherents also believe that the development of some countries is the cause of the underdevelopment of many others. Within this framework one can appreciate better the unique characteristics of each school of thought.

First are those to whom one can refer to as the nationalists, those reformist governments which find themselves still within a neocapitalist system. Except for a certain anti-imperialistic nationalism, they usually do not have a well-formed ideology of social change within which they could unite the people in common developmental tasks.

Next would come the Moscow Marxists, who generally agree that Latin America finds herself in a prerevolutionary situation. Their tactic, then, is to form coalitions of "Popular Fronts" with other parties in an effort to prepare the society gradually for a revolutionary change.

The Peking Marxists seek on the other hand to "spark" a popular uprising by a small, well-disciplined guerilla activity.

The bishops at Medellín call for revolutionary changes in social structures by popular participation within developmental and political tasks. In the documents one notices a marked shift in the Church's traditional conception of change in terms of an orderly, progressive, rational movement of history. An analysis of the documents on *Justice* and *Peace* show the result of an enriching dialogue with Marxists on the dialectical process of history. The Church now more readily acknowledges that the movement of history may involve at certain junctures conflict, tensions, and struggles between those in power and those seeking a just participation in the power. "Colonialism," "institutionalized violence," "dependence," "struggle," terms taken from Marxist sociologists and economists, are acknowledged as adequate descriptions of Latin American reality.[5] One notes, nonetheless, the Church's reluctance to ideologize that process of history as necessarily involving violence. The option for

violence or nonviolence is less that of the marginated masses and more that of those few who are presently exercising power, often in a way which maintains the majority in a state of "institutionalized violence."[6]

The Church offers a three-step process aimed at involving the masses in their own development and liberation: first, a process of personal and social awakening or *conscientización*, which through human expression and dialogue promotes personal responsibility and group action aimed at drawing the masses into their own integral development.[7] On the other hand, the Church recognizes the technical aspects of development which demand a certain elite role in problems of planning and utilization of scarce resources.[8] Nonetheless, Medellín follows the direction of *Populorum Progressio* (PP 14) by viewing development as a political, social, and cultural process as well as economic. As such, popular participation is necessary if development is to achieve its sociocultural ends.

Following on this program of *concientización* is an equally important step of the organization of the people so that they may enter more effectively into development programs on the basis of just representation.[9]

Finally, Medellín envisions the ultimate goal of integral development to be the integration of the marginated masses into the spheres of social, economic, and political power.[10]

This three-stage program of "participatory revolution" as outlined at Medellín gives a needed balance to the current *desarrollista* tendencies in development programs. There is no denial of the "elite" function in development, but rather a call to those professionals to seek the participation of the people in such a way that they mature, outgrow their political and social infantilism, and become responsible for their own destiny and development.

This aspect of the Church's more recent prophetic role in Latin American society sets the stage for and gives direction to two other types of emerging Church leadership.

LOCAL CHURCH GROWTH IN A REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY

Other churchmen, cleric and lay, are dedicating themselves to the building up of strong evangelical and worship-centered congregations, referred to before as *comunidades de base*. These ecclesial

communities are found not only within traditional parochial structures as in San Miguelito in Panama but also in more functional settings according to professional and working groups. The orientation of this type of leadership is toward a grass-roots Catholicism. The growth of small evangelical communities with their own leadership is one of the most encouraging signs in the religious renewal of pastoral activity. The danger that this sort of group runs is to fall into a type of sectarianism, be it religious or social. The smaller communities will depend always on the religious affiliation to the regional and universal Church. The true role of the bishop and priest as the efficacious sign of unity among the various churches is coming more to the fore. As regards the relationship of these local churches to the world around them, a relationship that has been described in terms of sign, each community must be oriented beyond itself toward the larger world in which Christians are meant to serve.

CHRISTIAN PRESENCE IN A REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY

Out of the Church's involvement in the social order is emerging another religious activity with its own type of leadership. The work among labor leaders and cooperativized *campesinos* in Chimbote, Peru, as well as the voice of ONIS, *Movimiento Sacerdotal*, represents the concern and participation of priests and laymen of Peru in current social matters. The Bolivian Institute of Social Study and Action (IBEAS) offers another instance of the effort lay and religious people are making to understand and meet the reality in which the Church's pastoral activity must unfold. These Christian leaders tend to accept a de facto religious pluralism and so try to engage men of goodwill in common efforts of social justice on every front that provides the opportunity. As such, they emphasize grass-roots ethical action in the world. They also enter into the social revolution by forming coalitions with those involved in the service of the poor. They also tend to see the Church's social ministry as primary and as the integrator of the evangelical and sacramental ministries. They manifest a deep concern to back up the Church's moral declarations with Christian testimony. In this regard one notes a new development in that priests and sisters are working either in urban or rural situations and living off their earnings. Their motives are those of identification and presence, but their roles are still to be defined in terms of the society around them.

These Christians run certain risks in their elite activity in the Church. They could promote a Christian "utopianism" and attempt to offer "solutions" to some complicated social and political questions. The challenge seems to be the question of how to be radical without being utopian.

Others espouse an illusionary idealism which blinds them to the effective and balanced use of coercion and power to achieve what may always be a relative justice.[11] When faced with a seemingly reactionary society, these could be tempted to go "off to the guerrillas" or in the case of the Church "to cop out." If the temptation of the Church leaders is to foment a certain religious and social inbreeding, the danger of the social-minded Christian is that he may become impatient with change in Church structures and separate himself so as to enter directly into the "secular sphere."

It is difficult to predict if this emerging religious leadership in the Church in Latin America will be able to create rapidly a new ecclesial awareness and scale of values among Latin Catholics. Some are skeptical. Thomas Saunders metions this difficulty:

> So-called cultural Catholicism not only exists in lower-class, uneducated, rural peoples, but in the upper and middle classes as well; that is, the Catholicism of even educated people is predominantly a reflection of class and of cultural interests. Much of the concern for a "new Church " in Latin America reflects a confidence in the capacity of Catholicism to overcome that impact of society which, since Durkheim, we are inclined to regard as universal. More likely, it would seem, is the permanence of a sophisticated elite of laymen and priests alongside a more conventional Catholicism in Latin America.[12]

Others envision broad social change in Latin American society as a whole only if and when the Catholic religious factor and cultural power can be brought to bear on the whole process of integral development. Religious reform is a condition for true social reform. Says Vallier:

> Put in more direct terms, those who want to help get Latin America moving may be placing their bets on the wrong horse—at least if things are taken in long-term perspective. Instead of simply more capital or shiny tools, support is needed to help the new Catholic elites transform their system in order that the "Catholic" factor and its cultural power can be applied to the whole task of social development. In short, religious reform is required for social reform.[13]

Christian Mission in the Light of the Social Ministry

Recent societal trends in Latin America as well as the new religious roles as noted call attention to the fact that the Church finds herself more and more defined in terms of her social ministry. One can now turn to a theological analysis of the meaning the social ministry could have as integrator of the other ecclesial ministries.

The basic Judeo-Christian experience is that God is a God of history. He reveals himself in the concrete events of man's history, individual and social. So it is that the only recourse for Christians who wish to find the presence of God is to enter into action, into history, and then reflect on and evaluate their experience in the light of his Word. The Word gives one that faith-consciousness by which to understand the deeper meaning of history. So it is that the ministry of the Word is primary among the ministries. By it is announced and proclaimed the mystery of Christ in the world and in his Church.

In actual pastoral practice, active faith among Latin Catholics has been long presupposed. So it was that emphasis was given to educating that faith which was itself more sacramentally orientated. Yet, the experience of some Maryknollers in catechetical work in Puno since 1948 has led them to suspect that a catechesis unrelated to life easily falls into doctrinaire ritualism: the meaningless repetition of abstract propositions or prayer formulas. Today one finds much more emphasis given to that global acceptance of Christianity and adherence to Christ which is called conversion. Yet, this conversion itself must be related to action, so as to be lived in the concrete history of man, to be clothed in his culture. The Hebrews saw the intimate relationship between word and deed; in fact they used one word to signify both: *dabar*. The ministry of the Word lends light and direction to the Christian and saves him from activism. The ministry of the Word is meaningful when it interprets the event of God's self-revelation.

Because it symbolizes and expresses the unity between God and man and among men, the liturgy or sacrament is the most noble ministry. As such it is the source and the culmination of the Christian life. It does not seem to be the integrator of present pastoral activity, however. Rather, the liturgical renewal, more than a renovation of Christian life and pastoral activity, has occasioned a struggle

between those of contemporary and traditionalist value perceptions as to what unity means and how it is to be symbolized. Moreover, the sacrament depends on the Word and the faith-consciousness of the community that consecrates the sacrament of unity. The liturgical sense, then, needs to be continally evangelized and deepened in the understanding which comes from prayerful reflection on history.

The social ministry serves as the foundation and the proof of authenticity of both Word and sacrament. At the beginning, however, one should note that the social ministry has often been identified with social projects or socioeconomic development. As such, the socioeconomic is only one aspect of development and can be ambiguous, that is, it can equally make people materialistic and spiritually suffocate them as well as awaken and liberate them. So it is that here development and the social ministry are taken in a very restrictive sense as those "more human conditions" which free and make the human person grow.

The Scriptures give a twofold meaning to the ministry of service or the *Diakonia*. The Christian is committed to the service of God as he acts in history to free man, as he moves to create an ever new "Exodus" and to call men from the worship of the gods of the status quo to that worship of him which is "in spirit and truth." This is especially so in the case of service of the Lord of history among us as we move toward his Day.

The Christian is also committed to a life of service of his fellow man, to participate in the human situation not in the passive sense suggested by the question of the lawyer, "Who is my neighbor," but in the active sense suggested by the response of Christ, "Which of them proved himself neighbor to the other?".

One can conclude, then, that the social ministry implies the service of God in the liberation of man. This interpretation of the social ministry corresponds to the order of God's creative and liberating activity: God—World—Church. The Church is for the life of the world, as is the Eucharist, the symbol of her life (John 6:51). Only inserted into the history of God's liberation of man will the Church be able to offer that word of hope in such a way that it will be listened to and believed.

As such, then, the social ministry is orientated to whatever gesture of service will free man from those social and religious alienations which prevent him from entering into his history and creating

it. So freed, the writer believes, man will be more open to encounter in the Word the Lord of history, who speaks to men in events, in the idiom of his liberating action. Only in this context will the liberating Word of God and the ministry of the *Kerygma* have meaning. Only by experiencing true liberation will man be led to commit himself to the risen Lord, hopeful of participating in his future when the world will be transformed into his risen Body.

As believers committed to the liberation of man in Christ, Christians will gather around the table of the Lord to celebrate their hope, to recall that past event which is at once a futurable, a call to follow him who has gone ahead. The Eucharist, then, will be a sign of hope for the future, but also a sign of the peace and reconciliation of the present. The Day of the Lord with the Eucharist is a moment to rest (even from the revolution), to enjoy the present, to be deeply the world, to regain our sense of humor, to celebrate, to accept creation for one day instead of transforming it, and to recall that "Jesus Christ is faithful, yesterday, today, and forever."

The biblical witness reminds us that the social ministry puts us at the service of the Lord, but not at that of the world. We do not equate human progress with the Kingdom of God. We are not basing our understanding of the equality and dignity of man on past human experience. History relates that tragic tale of how each succeeding revolution only turned into a new status quo, the rule of the many by the few. On the other hand, Christian faith and love are subversive of every succeeding status quo; they cast down those idols which call themselves gods and rob man of his future, of his hope. Rather, in its deepest sense Christian love is politically subversive: it seeks the interests of the whole society and of the common good, but often in a situation where the status quo maintains the rule of the few at the expense of the many.

In such a world we can expect the same fate as our master: to be expelled from a world which continually seeks to flee the future so that a few might enjoy the present. This no longer frightens us, however, this possibility of persecution and death. He who lives and liberates man offers us an absolute to satisfy man's unlimited hope. The justice, progress, and peace of this world will be at best relative, but Christ promises an absolute future, an absolute justice and love.

In the meantime, he has freed us from the fear of death that sin brings so as to be able to serve others by offering them the same

freedom, the same service of disinterested love. The author of Hebrews sums up well the attitude of faith that underlies the social ministry, the efficacious sign of God's disinterested love.

> Let us go to Jesus, then, outside the camp, and share his degradation. For there is no eternal city for us in this life but we look for one in the life to come. Through him, let us offer God an unending sacrifice of praise, a verbal sacrifice that is offered every time we acknowledge his name. Keep doing good works and sharing your resources, for these are sacrifices that please God (Heb. 13:13-16).

NOTES

1. Cf. Peter Berger, *The Noise of Solemn Assemblies* (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 103.
2. Thomas G. Saunders, "Religion and Modernization," The Institute of Current World Affairs, unpublished letter.
3. Wayne Cowan, "In Interview with Ivan Illich," *Christianity and Crisis* (August 4, 1969), p. 218.
4. Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano, "Justicia," as found in *La Iglesia en la actual transformación de América Latina a la luz del Concilio,* Vol. II: *Conclusiones* (Bogotá:CELAM, 1969), pp. 52-53. English edition, Washington: Latin American Bureau.
5. "Justicia," pp. 55-56.
6. Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano, "Paz," as found in *La Iglesia en la actual transformación de América Latina a la luz del Concilio,* Vol. II: *Conclusiones* (Bogotá: CELAM, 1969), pp. 71, 72.
7. "Justicia," p. 59.
8. "Justicia," p. 60.
9. "Justicia," pp. 57-58.
10. "Paz," p. 69; "Justicia," p. 60.
11. Saunders, unpublished letter.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Ivan Vallier, "Religious Elites," in *Elites in Latin America*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 225-226.

28

Revolution in Latin America

It is generally recognized that there have been three serious attempts at radical social change in the history of Latin America: the Mexican revolution, the Bolivian revolution of 1952, and the Cuban revolution beginning about 1960, a year or so after Fidel Castro succeeded in coming to power. Of these the first appears to have lost its fire and is gradually subsiding into a neocapitalist society. The second succeeded in destroying the old power centers but found the constructive phase of the revolution difficult, and finally succumbed to counterrevolutionary forces in 1964. The third appears to be moving ahead slowly after a number of setbacks, due partially to the United States' blockade and partly to local bureaucracy. It should be noted that while responsible for extreme hardship, the blockade may have helped the Cuban revolution more than it hindered it; the presence of a powerful and determined enemy has unified large sectors of the population behind Fidel Castro. The flight of large numbers of middle-class and professional elites was only to be expected. It takes place on a lesser scale in all Latin American countries, and is to be expected under any government that attempts to impose austerity measures on any but the lower classes.

POSSIBILITY OF REVOLUTION

Many conservatives reject the possibility of revolution, and this for a variety of reasons. The fundamentalist Protestant or the Catholic feels that there is no basis for revolution in the Bible or in the history of the Church: God made the world the way he wanted it and it is a sin to try to change it. Here it should be noted that for many centuries the human imagination was so limited by technological and cultural factors that any real social change was assumed

to be impossible. Voltaire, for example "is the social reformer *par excellence,* careless about consistency and system-making, eager to achieve immediate practical results . . . a man of property, to whom the preservation of order was nature's first law.."[1] The same Voltaire wrote that "it is impossible in our unhappy world for men living in society not to be divided into the two classes of rich and poor." Without the poor there could be no civilization; it is because men have to work that society can survive.[2] Change in this situation is neither possible nor desirable. The fact is, of course, that the New Testament is hardly a revolutionary handbook. Paul could hardly imagine a world without slavery, and in the face of his eschatology the present age could be supported. A twentieth-century evangelist has written recently: "It should be observed that Pentecostals do not expect all the world to become Christian through the efforts of evangelism. Rather, they see that the remedy of many of earth's ills must await the Second Advent of the King of Kings, for which they earnestly pray and wait. His coming will solve the problems of the social order."[3] For this type of mentality real social change is either impossible or uninteresting.

In the face of all this, the advent of industrial capitalism appears as a revolutionary force; it has effectively demonstrated the possibility of change. It is also quite possible that this industrial civilization in its most advanced form, that of the present-day United States, may be caught in the web of its own contradictions. In spite of a revolutionary origin and a dynamic history, present United States policy is definitely weighted on the side of the status quo in Latin America, even as the benefits of the consumers' society are loudly proclaimed via the mass media—benefits that are largely inaccessible to the growing Latin America proletariat. The widely proclaimed Alliance for Progress never really got off the ground and is now officially dead,[4] and whatever happens to United States AID programs in Latin America, it is doubtful whether military aid will decrease unless the military, for nationalistic reasons, turn against their benefactors from the North.

JUST WAR AND REVOLUTION

The remarks of Paul VI in *Populòrum Progressio* were interpreted in some areas as a green light for revolutionaries. Actually the position taken was hardly novel, representing more or less the doc-

trine of Thomas Aquinas.[5] Traditional just-war theory, as spelled out in a 1962 *Mensaje* article,[6] practically eliminates the possibility of violent revolution. As Denis Goulet mentioned in a paper given at the 1968 CICOP meeting, the trying of all peaceful means of effecting change is simply a shortcut to jail, exile, or an untimely grave. For most revolutionaries, any rational justification of revolution is irrelevant; the revolution is simply an existential necessity. The present situation is declared impossible, and revolution, violent revolution, is the only alternative. Under such circumstances, of course, frustration mounts as people continue to live under the regime that they have already condemned, and it is in anger and frustration that many young people are prepared to take to the hills in search of another society. In his talks in Colombia, Paul VI was perhaps aware of this, and it may be this awareness that was behind his rejection of violence, even though it was interpreted as the usual clerical alliance with the status quo. Dom Helder Camara, archbishop of Recife, has also opted for nonviolent resistance, and in his case there is no suspicion of alliance with the forces of reaction.

GUERRILLAS AND REVOLUTION

Nevertheless there is some question as to the viability of peaceful revolutions. In Chile, the "Revolution in Freedom" of President Eduardo Frei is a good example. The United States has taken care to arm the generally conservative military groups and to train them in counterinsurgency. Even in Chile, a country with a solid civilist tradition and democratic institutions, the armed forces received $9 million in United States military aid in the fiscal year of 1966. Richard Gott, writing in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* from Santiago, felt that the time was definitely past when U.S. power in Latin America would support social reform:

> Dungan's [Ambassador Ralph Dungan] departure from Chile, therefore, symbolizes not just the end of an era for Chile but for the whole of Latin America. The democratic alternative has failed. This does not mean that the guerrillas will descend triumphantly from the hills. Far from it. The Left, in reality, is weak and splintered as never before. It does mean, however, a strengthening of the Right, which was driven from several entrenched positions during the Kennedy epoch. The new situa-

> tion will demand a new slogan, less glamorous than the old one of "revolution in liberty." Latin America's future leaders, under United States tutelage, are likely to rally under their former banner of "little democracy and less reform."[7]

"Law'n order" has been a powerful slogan recently in United States politics, and it should not be forgotten that there are also some very nice lawns in Latin American suburbs to be protected from the unwashed and underprivileged. This is the key justification for military expenditure in Latin America, the cornerstone of the militarist ideology: "Someone has to maintain order in these countries." The inevitable result has been an increasing number of military takeovers. Even the mild leftism of the Goulart government in Brazil—Goulart himself was a large landholder—resulted in a military "revolution," and offprints of a propaganda article on "the country that saved itself from communism" flooded the continent. More recently, the chickens have come home to roost, and United States officials appear slightly embarrassed at the Fascist tactics of their protégés in Brazil.[8] This will not bring about a change in policy, although conceivably the Peruvian military government's nationalization of a Toronto-based oil company, which has caused a strong reaction not in Ottawa but in Washington, might induce some doubts as to the wisdom of backing military regimes as a matter of long-term policy.

All this, of course, is of vital significance in estimating the possibilities of success of guerrilla-type revolutionary movements. It is now clear that Latin American governments, and military governments in particular, can count on unlimited United States aid for counterinsurgency purposes. Ernesto Guevara apparently thought in terms of creating a number of Vietnams in Latin America; this is not something to be done lightly even if it were possible, which does not appear to be the case at the present time in Latin America. In Bolivia, at least, a popular basis was lacking for a revolutionary movement. In Peru, small groups, brutally repressed before they could get off the ground, also failed. In Venezuela and Guatemala the situation is uncertain.

In any event, the popular base for a guerrilla-type revolutionary movement is crucial. The fact that the Bolivian army, with the assurance of as much United States aid as might be needed and with a numerical superiority of something like 300 to one, was able to defeat Ernesto Guevara and his group really proves nothing with respect to the possible efficacy of an authentic guerrilla situation.

The fact is that such a situation did not exist in Bolivia: it is essential to the classical guerrilla situation that the *guerrillero* be indistinguishable from the peasantry and that he have the support of the peasnatry. This implies, in effect, a population hostile to the regular army forces. In the case of Bolivia in 1967, the population was in great measure indifferent both to the army and to *guerrilleros*, spectators in a drama in which they did not really take part.

In planning the operation, the Cubans were led by the Bolivian Communist Party (Moscow-oriented) to believe that the people were hostile and ready to rebel. This was true to some extent of the miners, but not of the peasantry, who had already benefited from a land reform and had little confidence in politicians of any kind. The mines have been occupied since 1965 and the destruction of the miners' unions, the constant fear of being sacked, and the ever-present pressure of troops in the mines have for the moment reduced the miners to passive resentment. The middle classes, with the exception of university students, have no reason to rebel against the present government. Whether the Communist Party leaders who gave such glowing reports of revolutionary possibilities in Bolivia were aware of this or not is hard to say; it is possible that they were playing at being revolutionaries without suspecting that they might one day have to do something about it. In the end they did nothing.

REVOLUTION AS EDUCATION

Ernesto Guevara and Regís Debray also saw in the guerrilla *foco*, or nucleus, an educational situation. The middle-class revolutionaries, sharing the lives of peasants and workers in the bush, would be educated to a different kind of life, a classless society in miniature with the austerity required for building a revolutionary society. In the case of Bolivia this was not to be; with few exceptions the middle-class leaders of the Communist Party preferred the city to the bush. The Cuban situation was unique in that the guerrillas in the bush had at least the passive sympathy of the people in the towns, and the United States was not aware that they were thinking in terms of a real revolution. This is understandable, since most Latin American coups merely involve the status quo under new management. In fact, it was only after Fidel Castro came to power that the real revolution began. As Regís Debray points out, the "folklore" of

Fidel's beards, revolvers, and bush-jackets is more than decorative: it is educational and symbolic. It implies an acceptance of the austerity required to build a different kind of society, an austerity required for the development of a revolutionary society. In most of Latin America there is no question of this: many fine speeches are made about austerity, but in practice it is limited to the lower classes.

THE ALLIANCE FOR THE PROGRESS OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES

As a program for social change, the Alliance for Progress died with John Kennedy, and was not guaranteed success even while John Kennedy still lived. The intellectuals of the Kennedy regime were naturally hesitant to impose land and tax reform in a paternalistic manner, and so for all practical purposes a veto power on such measures was given to the Latin American oligarchies.

Victor Alba, in a book published in Mexico in 1964,[9] blames the Latin American oligarchs for the failure of the Alliance for Progress. Richard Gott has written recently that under Nixon:

> The evangelism of President Kennedy, who tried to persuade the Latin American oligarchs to commit suicide by promoting schemes for tax and land reform, will be forgotten. It was counterproductive at the best of times, and an interesting example of just how dangerous intellectuals can be when they move into politics.[10]

It was the middle-class minorities that prospered and continue to prosper, although as this group grows many have to emigrate in order to live as they are accustomed. Those who have fled Cuba are generally classified as political refugees; the rest constitute the Latin American "brain-drain." Traditional Latin American educational structures tend to increase the middle-class population faster than Latin American societies can absorb it.

PREREVOLUTIONARY SOCIETIES?

Many people speak of Latin American societies today, with the possible exception of Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, as prerevolutionary. North American pressures for social reform have all but ceased to exist, and the gap between the middle and upper-class minorities and the marginal elements in society tends to increase. Development ideologies tend to presuppose that development in Latin American countries will follow patterns set in the nineteenth

century in Europe and North America. This does not seem to be true, and one crucial difference in the development pattern may lead inevitably to ever-increasing unemployment:

> The growth of investment and increase in production in Peru, as in all Latin American countries, is taking place at a time when, as a result of the importation of technological innovations from the highly developed capitalistic countries, an ever *smaller* but much *more skilled* labor force is required.[11]

The hope that development may introduce larger numbers of the population into the consumers' society is reduced becuase of this situation. As advertising preaches the values of the consumers' society through the mass media, the frustration of the unemployed and underemployed increases. The problem is compounded by the fact that an automated industry with high capital and low labor imputs tends to put artisans out of business[12] and thus to increase the number of unemployed or marginally employed. The adjustment to other types of employment has already begun, and as for the *campo*, the pattern already formed of migration to the cities will surely continue.

Nevertheless, however the revolutionary theoretician may see this, it is not proven that this situation really has a revolutionary potential. In some ways the myths of a consumer society are more powerful agents of pacification than the reality. Social mobility, principally implemented through the school system, enforces conformity with the status quo more effectively than an efficient police force; only those who conform remain in school and reach the desired mecca of middle-class status. The system serves to funnel out and integrate into the middle classes the most dynamic elements of the lower classes. Ivan Illich has remarked in this context that the school has a greater counterrevolutionary potential than napalm, and it still remains to be seen whether the frustration engendered by the large percentage of dropouts has the revolutionary potential that Illich attributes to it.[13] As Illich himself points out, the system has its own ideological justification built in; in theory any Latin American can climb into the middle class, just as in theory any black man in the inner city can get a good job and a house in some suburb.

The fomenting of military elites by the United States Government can be a double-edged weapon, as recent events in Peru have shown. Industrial structures and a changing pattern of foreign invest-

ment (tending to higher capital and lower labor imputs) have increased the dependence of Latin American nations on the United States.[14] Not only the left but numerous elements on the right resent this dependence. American investment and business activity is welcomed by governments, but North American-type competition is not always welcomed by conservative Latin American businessmen of a traditional type. Confiscation of American properties following real or alleged abuse is by no means a monopoly of or even a sign of "leftist" ideologies. At the same time, nationalist sentiments exist on the left as well as on the right, and there is much resentment of what is termed the hypocrisy of the United States. AID personnel and the planners associated with the Kennedy regime favored measures such as tax and land reforms, yet in the case of Cuba—admittedly under the Eisenhower regime—United States demands were such as to impose a veto on any effective land reform.[15] Recent events in Peru lead one to believe that the same criteria will be followed in any disputes over nationalization, tax problems, and so forth.

This still does not imply that a prerevolutionary situation exists anywhere in Latin America. Rightist and nationalist elements welcome United States support, military aid, and especially U.S. pressure to maintain the status quo in Latin America. Yet it should not be forgotten that:

> These armies are not without social aims, but their enthusiasm far outstrips their competence. Although raised in the United States image, they are not irreversibly pro-American. They know that they have a nationalistic, xenophobic, public opinion to deal with. They also know that the United States has nowhere else to turn. The Americans now have no significant "friends" in the southern continent. Most of the Left is hostile—although the orthodox Communists are busy fighting on so many fronts that they often forget to attack the United States—and the Right has been disillusioned by what they regard as Kennedy's betrayal. It will take a lot of wooing to win them back, though Nixon is probably a better man than anyone else to attempt this task.[16]

More recently still, a member of the Bolivian parliament, affiliated with a traditionally right-wing party, made a public plea for support of the Peruvian junta in their quarrel with the United States over the nationalization of the International Petroleum Company,[17] suggesting that, in the case of reprisal in the form of cutting the Peruvian

sugar quota, other Latin American sugar producers should refuse to take up the gap left by the suppression of the Peruvian quota.

With respect to nationalist sentiment, both on the right and on the left, one factor becomes very clear: the principal "enemy" is the United States, and much of the talk of "revolution" is directed against U.S. imperialism.

NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

Dom Helder Camara, archbishop of Recife, Brazil, is perhaps the leading proponent of nonviolent tactics for the overthrow of present social and economic structures. For Dom Helder, a revolution is clearly necessary, a multifaceted revolution that will change political, social, economic, and religious structures in Latin America and in the underdeveloped countries.[18] The option of nonviolence is necessary, in the view of Dom Helder, since any violent outbreak would bring immediate reprisal, ending in another Vietnam:

> Do you want realism? I say this: if in any corner of the world, but especially in Latin America, there occurs an explosion of violence, you may be sure that the Big Ones will arrive. Even without a declaration of war, the Super-powers will be on the spot and we would have a new Vietnam . . . You still want realism? Precisely because it is necessary to arrive at a structural revolution, it is indispensible to promote first, but in a new sense, a "cultural revolution." If mentalities are not profoundly changed, structural reforms, basic reforms, will remain on paper, useless.[19]

Dom Helder is possibly right in this, but what little experience we have would indicate that *any* real attempt at revolutionary change, be it violent or nonviolent, will attract an immediate reprisal. Neither the groups that Dom Helder calls "internal colonialists" nor the United States are disposed to allow any real change in the present situation. If a nonviolent movement shows any signs of success, it will be smashed ruthlessly with whatever means are necessary to maintain "order." And "order" means the status quo, if indeed it does not mean the negation of rights which had appeared to be won.[20] As Dom Helder points out, the present state is a state of violence.

Military dictatorships exist—and others may come into being whenever "order" is threatened—with the full and active support of

the United States. The guardians of the present situation have potentially unlimited resources at their disposal, the backing of the greatest military establishment that history has known. Those who commit themselves seriously to any kind of nonviolent "cultural revolution" can expect to be imprisoned, exiled, tortured, and killed. The danger is less for those who form part of the clergy—priests and religious—since to attack the Church directly tarnishes the image somewhat. This is beginning to change, particularly since ecclesiastics, both Catholic and Protestant, have in many instances overcome the "anti-Communist hangup." A few years ago it was sufficient to paint a movement red in order to enlist the pressure of the Church against it. Today many Christians would simply reply, "If this be communism, let us make the best of it."

A REALISTIC STRATEGY

Nevertheless, nonviolent resistance and serious work at *conscientización* appear to be the most realistic approaches to social change in Latin America today. The left is atomized, and no group that attempts a violent revolutionary movement can count on the support of other leftist groups. In fact, organized hostility is more probable. From all signs, the Soviet Union is actively opposed to any real revolutionary movements in Latin America. The fact that most governments *talk* of things like agrarian reform can provide a basis for the beginnings of a cultural revolution, simply by insisting that people take the promises of their governments seriously. While such tactics are obviously subversive, they can put the guardians of the status quo in an embarrassing position. This talk serves to deepen already existing contradictions.

Some thinkers even oppose efforts at *conscientización,* since to make people aware of their situation can lead to violence, a fear that is not entirely groundless. On the other hand, it is generally recognized that the present situation involves violence, is imposed by violence, and that considerable pressure will be needed if anything is to change. That is one reason why it is more accurate to speak of "nonviolent resistance" than of "nonviolence."

The best hope for revolutionary changes lies in the cumulative pressures of a conscious population. A great deal of imagination is required if this is to be successful, since what is involved is a move toward redefining the possible in the popular consensus, so that the

situation that today is regarded as normal or inevitable comes to be regarded as impossible and resisted by the people. To some extent this has already happened: among a good proportion of the Latin American intelligentsia, *capitalism* is valued at about the same level as is the once "normal" institution of human slavery.

The difficulty is that this opposition is felt rather vaguely and at the level of slogans, rather than at the level of a concerted revolutionary strategy. The end result is that capitalism, or capitalist imperialism, is in little or no danger at the present time, in spite of the vague ideological consensus against it. The stock response is, of course, that this consensus is directed against a caricature, a nineteenth-century type of capitalism that no longer exists in fact. To this the Latin American intellectual will reply that if this is the case, why does the exploitation of Latin America continue? And especially, what other hypothesis explains the position taken by the United States in the Kennedy Round?

Obviously, the issues involved carry with them a number of emotional overtones, so that it is difficult to obtain an objective picture of the situation. But on the whole it would be safe to say that United States hegemony in Latin America is the principal target of would-be revolutionaries and that resentment is deep, bitter, and growing constantly. To date there are no signs in the United States of the kind of policy change that would significantly affect these trends. Most Latin American intellectuals would accept without question the interpretation presented by Carl Oglesby in *Containment and Change*.[21] In some measure this is a question of scapegoatism, and a certain envy of United States material achievements. It should be added that these attitudes can in their own way act as a brake on revolutionary movements. Except for embassies, cultural centers, and some U.S.-owned industry, the United States is out of reach and concentration of local hatred of it works as a smoke screen to prevent serious action against "internal colonialism."

In short, discontent is widespread; there is a growing consensus among intellectuals that the principal enemy is United States imperialism, but the left is divided and largely ineffectual; and U.S.–backed military forces are firmly in control or ready to back up existing conservative governments. Revolution appears to be a long way off, but the best chance of achieving radical change lies in a profound change in the popular consensus, so that government under present models becomes an impossibllity.

NOTES

1. Harold J. Laski, *The Rise of European Liberalism*: *An Essay in Interpretation* (London: 1936; New York: Humanities, 1962), p. 137.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Melvin L. Hodges, "A Pentecostal's View of Mission Strategy," *International Review of Missions* 57 (July 1968) 310.
4. AP wire report in *Presencia* (La Paz), February 19, 1969, p. 1.
5. *Summa Theologica* II-II, q. 42, a.2 ad 3.
6. Cf. Gerardo Claps Gallo, S.J., "El cristiano frente a la revolución violenta," *Mensaje* 115 (December 1962) 719-732.
7. Richard Gott, "The End of a U.S. Experiment in Chile," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, August 17, 1967, p. 5. CIDOC-DOC 67/31.
8. Cf. Joseph A. Page, "Closing Down the Showcase," *Commonweal* 89 (January 10, 1969) 461-462.
9. Victor Alba, *Parasitos, mitos y sordomutos* (Mexico 1964); English translation: *Alliance without Allies* (New York: Praeger, 1965).
10. Richard Gott, "Where Hot Air Can Cure Headaches," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, January 16, 1969, p. 7.
11. Anibal Quijano Obregon, "Peruvian Development and Class Structure," in *Latin America, Reform or Revolution*, ed. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1968), p. 298.
12. "The traditional role of agriculture was not just food production; it included domestic manufacture of clothes, tools, etc. The importation of manufactured goods from the cities tends to narrow the role of agriculture to food production alone," *ibid.* p. 303.
13. Cf. article in *Siempre* (Mexico, D.F.), August 7, 1968.
14. Cf. Quijano Obregon, *art. cit., passim.*
15. In the beginnings of the Cuban land reform, United States policy demanded immediate payment in dollars for U.S.—owned land subject to the land reform. This was equivalent to a veto on land reform: "Given this financial state of affairs, there was no possibility of any other form of payment if the agrarian reform were to develop at that pace that the revolutionary government deemed necessary. This had been the stated goal of the revolutionaries from the inception of their struggle"; Maurice Zeitlin and Robert Sheer, *Cuba*: *An American Tragedy* (London: Penguin, 1964), p. 137.
16. Gott, "Where Hot Air Can Cure Headaches," *op. cit.*
17. *Los Tiempos* (Cochabamba, Bolivia), February 23, 1969, p. 5.
18. Dom Helder Camara, "La violence: option unique? " Conference in Paris, April 25, 1968, *Informations Catholiques Internationales*, May 15, 1968. In Portuguese in CIDOC-DOC 68/107.
19. *Ibid.*
20. E.g., the systematic destruction of unions under the Bolivian military regime.
21. Carl Oglesby and Richard Shaull, *Containment and Change: Two Dissenting Views of American Society and Foreign Policy in the New Revolutionary Age* (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

APPENDIX

SELECTED BIBILIOGRAPHY

(Books are listed within the various categories in the order of probable utility.)

ESSENTIAL BEGINNING

A person coming to live and work in Latin America can make a good beginning by reading, at least: (1) an introduction to intercultural understanding; (2) a factual overview of the country or region in which he is going to live; (3) a community study, either urban or rural; and (4) a study of the political organization and of the political parties of the particular country.

1. Introduction to Intercultural Understanding

Brown, Ina. *Understanding Other Cultures*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

Hall, Edward T. *The Silent Language*. New York: Fawcett Premier, 1965.

Luzbetak, Louis. *The Churches and Culture: An Applied Anthropology for the Religious Worker*. Techny, Ill.: Divine Word Publications, 1963.

Honigmann, John J. *Understanding Culture*. New York: Harper, 1963.

Bunker, Robert and Adair, John. *First Look at Strangers*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1959.

2. Factual Overviews

Three sources furnish helpful books of this kind for many of the countries of Latin America. They are:

New York and London: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Studies). These are generally excellent and are revised periodically. They are usually about 200 pages in length. Titles in this series include: *Argentina:* George Pendle; *Bolivia:* Harold Osborne; *Chile:* Gilbert Butland; *Colombia:* W.O. Galbraith; *Ecuador:* Lilo Lanke; *Uruguay:* George Pendle, and *Venezuela:* Edwin Lieuwen.

Washington: Government Printing Office. The Foreign Areas Studies Division publishes a U.S. Army Handbook for some countries in Latin America. These studies may run 400 pages in length and cover many areas of interest within a country.

Belgium: Bruxelles 3; Pro Mundi Vita Institute (6, rue de la Limite). The Institute publishes booklets in English and other languages about many of the Latin American countries. Information included is religious as well as socioeconomic. Treatment is brief, so the booklets may serve more as supplementary sources. Available through major religious superiors and socioreligious research centers.

In addition there are many other descriptive and factual studies of particular countries or regions. Some have been issued by various governments or through standard sources of statistical information, such as the UN or the O.A.S. Other studies of interest are listed below:

Argentina: Whitaker, Arthur P. *Argentina*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

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Colombia: Holt, Pat M. *Colombia Today and Tomorrow*. New York: Praeger, 1964.

Ecuador: Meggers, Betty J. *Ecuador*. New York: Praeger, 1966.

Paraguay: Raine, Philip. *Paraguay*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1965.

Peru: Robinson, David A. *Peru in Four Dimensions*. Detroit: Blaine Etheridge, 1964.

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Pike, F. B. *The Modern History of Peru*. New York: Praeger, 1967.

Uruguay: Fitzgibbon, Russel. *Uruguay: Portrait of a Democracy*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1956.

Ferguson, J. Halco. *River Plate Republics*. New York: Time-Life, 1965.

Maggi, Carlos. *El Uruguay y su gente*. Montevideo, 1963.

Venezuela: Moron, Guillermo. *A History of Venezuela*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1964.

Bernstein, Harry. *Venezuela and Colombia*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

Mexico: Branderburg, Frank R. *The Making of Modern Mexico*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

Coe, Michael D. *Mexico*. New York: Praeger, 1962.

Simpson, Lesley Byrd. *Many Mexicos*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1959.

Central America: Parker, Franklin D. *The Central American Republics*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964.

Adams, Richard. *Cultural Surveys of Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras*. Washington: Pan American Sanitary Bureau, 1957.

Panama: Biesanz, John and Mavis. *The People of Panama*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1955.

Dominican Republic: Rodman, Selden. *Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic*. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1964.

Puerto Rico: Lewis, Gordon K. *Puerto Rico*. New York: Monthly Review, 1963.

Bourne, Dorothy and James. *Thirty Years of Change in Puerto Rico*. New York: Praeger, 1966.

3. Community Studies—Urban and Rural

A good community study should give the reader a vivid insight into the social organization and the life-styles of the people involved. Most of the Latin American countries have had good community studies of one kind or another. Some of these are listed below. Furthermore, several studies are outstanding for their vivid or insightful qualities. Such are: most of the works of Oscar Lewis, Carolina Maria's *Child of the Dark*, Fals Borda's *Peasant Society in the Colombian Andes* and Wagley's *Amazon Town*.

URBAN STUDIES:

Lewis, Oscar. *Five Families*. New York: Wiley, 1962.

_____. *La Vida*. New York: Random House, 1966.

Carolina Maria de Jesus. *Child of the Dark* (life in a *favela* in Rio.). New York: Dutton-Signet, 1963.

Rogler, Lloyd H. and Hollingshead, A. B. *Trapped: Families and Schizophrenia*. New York: Wiley, 1965.

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Mexico: Wolf, Eric. *Sons of the Shaking Earth.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962.

Redfield, R. and Villa Rojas, A., *Chan Kom: A Maya Village.* Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1962.

Lewis, Oscar. *Life in a Mexican Village.* Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1963.

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Guatemala: see Eric Wolf, under Mexico.

Adams, Richard. *Formal Analysis of Behavorial Segments of a Guatemalan Community.* Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1963.

Costa Rica: Loomis, Charles et al. *Turrialba.* New York: Free Press, 1953.

"THE CULTURE OF POVERTY"

This is an interesting theme developed by Oscar Lewis and, in a larger sense, by Michael Harrington in *The Other America*. Lewis's treatment can be found in John T. TePaske (ed.) *Explosive Forces in Latin America*. (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1964.) and in the introduction to *La Vida* (New York: Random House, 1966). Perhaps controversial, but worth considering.

4. Political Organization and Parties

The following titles are given as leads to be followed up by personal judgment as to their worth. Many books in the political field are ideological, but what should be sought for here is a descriptive and hopefully analytical study of the political organization of a country or region. If the particular country one is interested in does not have a special study, recourse can be made to general surveys of Central or South America or the Caribbean.

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AN ORIENTATION TO LATIN AMERICA

The early experiences of a person coming to Latin America can cause the success or failure of both the person and his work, whether it be that of the Peace Corps volunteer, the missioner, a business man or foreign service personnel.

Many Americans who have come to Latin America do not stay very long only because they had not been trained to make a viable—and valuable—adaptation to an alien land and its people. As a result, they experience "culture shock," and either withdraw from the life around them or over-adapt to it. In either case they lose the respect of the people to whom they have come.

This book is written for anyone preparing to enter what is for him the "new" culture of Latin America—an exciting, challenging but often baffling and potentially disastrous experience. *Shaping a New World* is basically a handbook for survival on the one hand, and on the other a reliable guide to how one can make his presence of enduring value both to himself and his host country.

On a practical rather than scholarly level, this book introduces the reader to the political, cultural, social and religious dimensions of the fastest growing continent in the world—a continent whose future will affect that of North America more immediately and decisively than will either the Middle East or Southeast Asia, unless the Third World War erupts in either of those places and makes any future questionable.

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They have lived in and studied Latin America for years. By drawing on sociology, anthropology, economics, political and religious history they have produced a book eminently helpful in the life as well as the work of anyone whose success in Latin America will depend on how well he understands both the land and the people he must somehow make his own.

Cover Design by Al Schreiner